


**AN ANTHOLOGY
OF
RECENT PHILOSOPHY**

AN ANTHOLOGY OF RECENT PHILOSOPHY

Selections for Beginners from the
Writings of the Greatest 20th
Century Philosophers

*With Biographical Sketches, Analyses and Questions
for Discussion*



COMPILED BY
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THOMAS Y. CROWELL COMPANY
PUBLISHERS - - - NEW YORK

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PRINTED IN THE U. S. A. BY
QUINN & BODEN COMPANY, INC.
RAHWAY, N. J.

PREFACE

The widespread interest in philosophy and classroom needs have tempted me to prepare an anthology which would give a cross-section of the most readable of recent philosophical literature. While the book is primarily designed for use in college courses in philosophy, I have also had especially in mind those persons who wish to know something of what philosophers are saying, but who are too busy to read widely in the literature. At the same time I trust that such readers may here make the acquaintance of thinkers whose books they will desire to read, lists of which are given in the appendix.

The excellent sourcebooks in philosophy now on the market are all mostly made up of selections from the classical philosophers. The restriction of the excerpts here assembled to the literature of the last two decades makes this the only available anthology of philosophy built out of the writings of the greatest of recently deceased and living philosophers. However, the arrangement of the book according to the chief types and problems of philosophy has made it necessary to omit many philosophers who are fully as worthy of being included as those whose names appear herein. While this is regrettable, it was really unavoidable.

The analysis which precedes each excerpt, the suggestions and questions which follow, and the glossarial index are innovations which, I hope, will aid the student in understanding the material.

At least three readings of each selection will be required for its complete mastery. First, let the student read the analysis and the excerpt simply for interest, without pondering over the details. Then let him study the selection with the idea of correlating each statement in the analysis with that part of the selection which it aims to summarize. In connection with this careful study the student will find it helpful to write out an analysis of his own, using the one given in the book as a sample but trying to improve upon it by bringing out other ideas he finds in the selection which are not adequately expressed in the analysis. After this careful study of the selection, under the guidance of the analysis, let the student go over it a third time

to find answers to the questions at the end and to form his own opinions of what the author says. This should be a *critical* reading, just as the first is primarily for *interest* and the second for *understanding*.

I wish to express my very great appreciation of the courtesy which authors, editors and publishers have shown in granting permission to use copyright material. Specific acknowledgment to the publisher will be found in the reference at the end of each excerpt. I am especially indebted to Professors W. E. Hocking, J. A. Leighton and Seba Eldridge for valuable suggestions, and to my colleague, Dr. G. B. Phillips, for assisting me in assembling the material.

D. S. R.

Oxford, Ohio.

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PART ONE: ORIENTATION

A CONSPECTUS OF CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY

This conspectus is made with special reference to the selections in this book, and the reader will find it an interesting and profitable exercise to place each author in one of the classes.

- | | | |
|------------------------|---|--|
| I. <i>Idealism</i> | { | <div style="display: inline-block; vertical-align: middle;"> A. Absolute Idealism </div> <div style="display: inline-block; vertical-align: middle; font-size: 4em;">{</div> <div style="display: inline-block; vertical-align: middle;"> 1. The Absolute as Spirit.
(Pantheistic Idealism.)
 2. The Absolute as Intelligence.
(Speculative Idealism.)
 3. The Absolute as Self or Will.
(Personalistic or Voluntaristic Idealism.) </div> |
| | | <div style="display: inline-block; vertical-align: middle;">B. Spiritual Monism or Creative Evolutionism.</div> <div style="display: inline-block; vertical-align: middle; font-size: 4em;">{</div> <div style="display: inline-block; vertical-align: middle;">C. Spiritual Pluralism or Theistic Personalism.</div> |
| II. <i>Realism</i> | { | <div style="display: inline-block; vertical-align: middle;"> A. Monistic Realism </div> <div style="display: inline-block; vertical-align: middle; font-size: 4em;">{</div> <div style="display: inline-block; vertical-align: middle;"> 1. Emergent Evolutionism or Evolutionary Naturalism.
 2. Logical Monism or Naturalism. </div> |
| | | <div style="display: inline-block; vertical-align: middle;">B. Pluralistic Realism</div> <div style="display: inline-block; vertical-align: middle; font-size: 4em;">{</div> <div style="display: inline-block; vertical-align: middle;"> 1. Logical Atomism.
 2. Critical Realism (Dualistic). </div> |
| III. <i>Pragmatism</i> | { | A. Experimental Pragmatism.
B. Instrumentalism.
C. Humanism.
D. Fictionalism. |
| IV. <i>Other Types</i> | { | A. Mechanism (Behaviorism).
B. Vitalism.
C. Superman Philosophy.
D. Agnosticism (Positivism).
E. Cultural Pluralism. |

CHAPTER I

THE NATURE AND VALUE OF PHILOSOPHY

I. PHILOSOPHY AND TEMPERAMENT, by *William James*

Analysis

The meaning of a philosophy of life is explained by interpreting a passage from Chesterton. This is followed by a definition of philosophy and a statement of its value, interest and appeal. James then shows how temperament influences a man's philosophy and distinguishes the two chief and opposite types of temperament in philosophy—the empiricist and the rationalist or the "tough-minded" and the "tender-minded." Stating a possible objection to such an interpretation and admitting its partial truth, he defends himself by insisting that other people inevitably judge the writings and teachings of a philosopher by the impression they make on them. Hence the truest philosophy will, in the long run, be that which is "most completely *impressive* to the normal run of minds." Herbert Spencer is selected as an illustration of this point.

In the preface to that admirable collection of essays of his called *Heretics*, Mr. Chesterton writes these words: "There are some people—and I am one of them—who think that the most practical and important thing about a man is still his view of the universe. We think that for a landlady considering a lodger it is important to know his income, but still more important to know his philosophy. We think that for a general about to fight an enemy it is important to know the enemy's numbers, but still more important to know the enemy's philosophy. We think the question is not whether the theory of the cosmos affects matters, but whether in the long run anything else affects them."

I think with Mr. Chesterton in this matter. I know that you, ladies and gentlemen, have a philosophy, each and all of you, and that the most interesting and important thing about you is the way in which it determines the perspective in your several worlds. You know the same of me. And yet I confess to a certain tremor at the audacity of the enterprise which I am about to begin. For the philosophy which is so important in each of us is not a technical matter; it is our more or less dumb sense

of what life honestly and deeply means. It is only partly got from books; it is our individual way of just seeing and feeling the total push and pressure of the cosmos. I have no right to assume that many of you are students of the cosmos in the classroom sense, yet here I stand desirous of interesting you in a philosophy which to no small extent has to be technically treated. I wish to fill you with sympathy with a contemporaneous tendency in which I profoundly believe, and yet I have to talk like a professor to you who are not students. Whatever universe a professor believes in must at any rate be a universe that lends itself to lengthy discourse. A universe definable in two sentences is something for which the professorial intellect has no use. No faith in anything of that cheap kind! I have heard friends and colleagues try to popularize philosophy in this very hall, but they soon grew dry, and then technical, and the results were only partially encouraging. So my enterprise is a bold one. The founder of pragmatism himself recently gave a course of lectures at the Lowell Institute with that very word in its title,—flashes of brilliant light relieved against Cimmerian darkness! None of us, I fancy, understood *all* that he said—yet here I stand, making a very similar venture.

I risk it because the very lectures I speak of *drew*—they brought good audiences. There is, it must be confessed, a curious fascination in hearing deep things talked about, even though neither we nor the disputants understand them. We get the problematic thrill, we feel the presence of the vastness. Let a controversy begin in a smoking-room anywhere, about free-will or God's omniscience, or good and evil, and see how every one in the place pricks up his ears. Philosophy's results concern us most vitally, and philosophy's queerest arguments tickle agreeably our sense of subtlety and ingenuity.

Believing in philosophy myself devoutly, and believing also that a kind of new dawn is breaking upon us philosophers, I feel impelled, *per fas aut nefas*, to try to impart to you some news of the situation.

Philosophy is at once the most sublime and the most trivial of human pursuits. It works in the minutest crannies and it opens out the widest vistas. It "bakes no bread," as has been said, but it can inspire our souls with courage; and repugnant as its manners, its doubting and challenging, its quibbling and dialectics, often are to common people, no one of us can get along without the far-flashing beams of light it sends over the

world's perspectives. These illuminations at least, and the contrast-effects of darkness and mystery that accompany them, give to what it says an interest that is much more than professional.

The history of philosophy is to a great extent that of a certain clash of human temperaments. Undignified as such a treatment may seem to some of my colleagues, I shall have to take account of this clash and explain a good many of the divergencies of philosophers by it. Of whatever temperament a professional philosopher is, he tries, when philosophizing, to sink the fact of his temperament. Temperament is no conventionally recognized reason, so he urges impersonal reasons only for his conclusions. Yet his temperament really gives him a stronger bias than any of his more strictly objective premises. It loads the evidence for him one way or the other, making for a more sentimental or a more hard-hearted view of the universe, just as this fact or that principle would. He *trusts* his temperament. Wanting a universe that suits it, he believes in any representation of the universe that does suit it. He feels men of opposite temper to be out of key with the world's character, and in his heart considers them incompetent and "not in it," in the philosophic business, even though they may far excel him in dialectical ability.

Yet in the forum he can make no claim, on the bare ground of his temperament, to superior discernment or authority. There arises thus a certain insincerity in our philosophic discussions: the potentest of all our premises is never mentioned. I am sure it would contribute to clearness if in these lectures we should break this rule and mention it, and I accordingly feel free to do so.

Of course I am talking here of very positively marked men, men of radical idiosyncrasy, who have set their stamp and likeness on philosophy and figure in its history. Plato, Locke, Hegel, Spencer, are such temperamental thinkers. Most of us have, of course, no very definite intellectual temperament, we are a mixture of opposite ingredients, each one present very moderately. We hardly know our own preferences in abstract matters; some of us are easily talked out of them, and end by following the fashion or taking up with the beliefs of the most impressive philosopher in our neighborhood, whoever he may be. But the one thing that has *counted* so far in philosophy is that a man should *see* things, see them straight in his own

peculiar way, and be dissatisfied with any opposite way of seeing them. There is no reason to suppose that this strong temperamental vision is from now onward to count no longer in the history of man's beliefs.

Now the particular difference of temperament that I have in mind in making these remarks is one that has counted in literature, art, government, and manners as well as in philosophy. In manners we find formalists and free-and-easy persons. In government, authoritarians and anarchists. In literature, purists or academicals, and realists. In art, classics and romantics. You recognize these contrasts as familiar; well, in philosophy we have a very similar contrast expressed in the pair of terms "rationalist" and "empiricist," "empiricist" meaning your lover of facts in all their crude variety, "rationalist" meaning your devotee to abstract and eternal principles. No one can live an hour without both facts and principles, so it is a difference rather of emphasis; yet it breeds antipathies of the most pungent character between those who lay the emphasis differently; and we shall find it extraordinarily convenient to express a certain contrast in men's ways of taking their universe, by talking of the "empiricist" and of the "rationalist" temper. These terms make the contrast simple and massive.

More simple and massive than are usually the men of whom the terms are predicated. For every sort of permutation and combination is possible in human nature; and if I now proceed to define more fully what I have in mind when I speak of rationalists and empiricists, by adding to each of those titles some secondary qualifying characteristics, I beg you to regard my conduct as to a certain extent arbitrary. I select types of combination that nature offers very frequently, but by no means uniformly, and I select them solely for their convenience in helping me to my ulterior purpose of characterizing pragmatism. Historically we find the terms "intellectualism" and "sensationalism" used as synonyms of "rationalism" and "empiricism." Well, nature seems to combine most frequently with intellectualism an idealistic and optimistic tendency. Empiricists on the other hand are not uncommonly materialistic, and their optimism is apt to be decidedly conditional and tremulous. Rationalism is always monistic. It starts from wholes and universals, and makes much of the unity of things. Empiricism starts from the parts, and makes of the whole a collection—is not averse therefore to calling itself pluralistic. Rationalism

usually considers itself more religious than empiricism, but there is much to say about this claim, so I merely mention it. It is a true claim when the individual rationalist is what is called a man of feeling, and when the individual empiricist prides himself on being hard-headed. In that case the rationalist will usually also be in favor of what is called free-will, and the empiricist will be a fatalist—I use the terms most popularly current. The rationalist finally will be of dogmatic temper in his affirmations, while the empiricist may be more sceptical and open to discussion.

I will write these traits down in two columns. I think you will practically recognize the two types of mental make-up that I mean if I head the columns by the titles “tender-minded” and “tough-minded” respectively.

THE TENDER-MINDED

Rationalistic (going by
“principles”),
Intellectualistic,
Idealistic,
Optimistic,
Religious,
Free-willist,
Monistic,
Dogmatical.

THE TOUGH-MINDED

Empiricist (going by
“facts”),
Sensationalistic,
Materialistic,
Pessimistic,
Irreligious,
Fatalistic,
Pluralistic,
Sceptical.

Pray postpone for a moment the question whether the two contrasted mixtures which I have written down are each inwardly coherent and self-consistent or not—I shall very soon have a good deal to say on that point. It suffices for our immediate purpose that tender-minded and tough-minded people, characterized as I have written them down, do both exist. Each of you probably knows some well-marked example of each type, and you know what each example thinks of the example on the other side of the line. They have a low opinion of each other. Their antagonism, whenever as individuals their temperaments have been intense, has formed in all ages a part of the philosophic atmosphere of the time. It forms a part of the philosophic atmosphere to-day. The tough think of the tender as sentimentalists and softheads. The tender feel the tough to be unrefined, callous, or brutal. Their mutual reaction is very much like that that takes place when Bostonian tourists mingle with a population like that of Cripple Creek. Each type believes the other to be inferior to itself; but disdain in the one

case is mingled with amusement, in the other it has a dash of fear. . . .

If any of you here are professional philosophers, and some of you I know to be such, you will doubtless have felt my discourse so far to have been crude in an unpardonable, nay, in an almost incredible degree. Tender-minded and tough-minded, what a barbaric disjunction! And, in general, when philosophy is all compacted of delicate intellectualities and subtleties and scrupulosities, and when every possible sort of combination and transition obtains within its bounds, what a brutal caricature and reduction of highest things to the lowest possible expression is it to represent its field of conflict as a sort of rough-and-tumble fight between two hostile temperaments! What a childishly external view! And again, how stupid it is to treat the abstractness of rationalist systems as a crime, and to damn them because they offer themselves as sanctuaries and places of escape, rather than as prolongations of the world of facts. Are not all our theories just remedies and places of escape? And, if philosophy is to be religious, how can she be anything else than a place of escape from the crassness of reality's surface? What better thing can she do than raise us out of our animal senses and show us another and a nobler home for our minds in that great framework of ideal principles subtending all reality, which the intellect divines? How can principles and general views ever be anything but abstract outlines? Was Cologne cathedral built without an architect's plan on paper? Is refinement in itself an abomination? Is concrete rudeness the only thing that's true?

Believe me, I feel the full force of the indictment. The picture I have given is indeed monstrously over-simplified and rude. But like all abstractions, it will prove to have its use. If philosophers can treat the life of the universe abstractly, they must not complain of an abstract treatment of the life of philosophy itself. In point of fact the picture I have given is, however coarse and sketchy, literally true. Temperaments with their cravings and refusals do determine men in their philosophies, and always will. The details of systems may be reasoned out piecemeal, and when the student is working at a system, he may often forget the forest for the single tree. But when the labor is accomplished, the mind always performs its big summarizing act, and the system forthwith stands over against one like a living thing, with that strange simple note of individuality

which haunts our memory, like the wraith of the man, when a friend or enemy of ours is dead.

Not only Walt Whitman could write "who touches this book touches a man." The books of all the great philosophers are like so many men. Our sense of an essential personal flavor in each one of them, typical but indescribable, is the finest fruit of our own accomplished philosophic education. What the system pretends to be is a picture of the great universe of God. What it is,—and oh so flagrantly!—is the revelation of how intensely odd the personal flavor of some fellow creature is. Once reduced to these terms (and all our philosophies get reduced to them in minds made critical by learning) our commerce with the systems reverts to the informal, to the instinctive human reaction of satisfaction or dislike. We grow as peremptory in our rejection or admission, as when a person presents himself as a candidate for our favor; our verdicts are couched in as simple adjectives of praise or dispraise. We measure the total character of the universe as we feel it, against the flavor of the philosophy proffered us, and one word is enough.

"Statt der lebendigen Natur," we say, "da Gott die Menschen schuf hinein,"—that nebulous concoction, that wooden, that straight-laced thing, that crabbed artificiality, that musty schoolroom product, that sick man's dream! Away with it. Away with all of them! Impossible! Impossible!

Our work over the details of his system is indeed what gives us our resultant impression of the philosopher, but it is on the resultant impression itself that we react. Expertness in philosophy is measured by the definiteness of our summarizing reactions, by the immediate perceptive epithet with which the expert hits such complex objects off. But great expertness is not necessary for the epithet to come. Few people have definitely articulated philosophies of their own. But almost every one has his own peculiar sense of a certain total character in the universe, and of the inadequacy fully to match it of the peculiar systems that he knows. They don't just cover *his* world. One will be too dapper, another too pedantic, a third too much of a job-lot of opinions, a fourth too morbid, and a fifth too artificial, or what not. At any rate he and we know off-hand that such philosophies are out of plumb and out of key and out of "whack," and have no business to speak up in the universe's name. Plato, Locke, Spinoza, Mill, Caird, Hegel —I prudently avoid names nearer home!—I am sure that to

many of you, my hearers, these names are little more than reminders of as many curious personal ways of falling short. It would be an obvious absurdity if such ways of taking the universe were actually true.

We philosophers have to reckon with such feelings on your part. In the last resort, I repeat, it will be by them that all our philosophies shall ultimately be judged. The finally victorious way of looking at things will be the most completely *impressive* way to the normal run of minds.

One word more—namely about philosophies necessarily being abstract outlines. There are outlines and outlines, outlines of buildings that are *fat*, conceived in the cube by their planner, and outlines of buildings invented flat on paper, with the aid of ruler and compass. These remain skinny and emaciated even when set up in stone and mortar, and the outline already suggests that result. An outline in itself is meagre, truly, but it does not necessarily suggest a meagre thing. It is the essential meagreness of *what is suggested* by the usual rationalistic philosophies that moves empiricists to their gesture of rejection. The case of Herbert Spencer's system is much to the point here. Rationalists feel his fearful array of insufficiencies. His dry schoolmaster temperament, the hurdy-gurdy monotony of him, his preference for cheap makeshifts in argument, his lack of education even in mechanical principles, and in general the vagueness of all his fundamental ideas, his whole system wooden, as if knocked together out of cracked hemlock boards—and yet the half of England wants to bury him in Westminster Abbey.

Why? Why does Spencer call out so much reverence in spite of his weakness in rationalistic eyes? Why should so many educated men who feel that weakness, you and I perhaps, wish to see him in the Abbey notwithstanding?

Simply because we feel his heart to be *in the right place* philosophically. His principles may be all skin and bone, but at any rate his books try to mould themselves upon the particular shape of this particular world's carcase. The noise of facts resounds through all his chapters, the citations of fact never cease, he emphasizes facts, turns his face towards their quarter; and that is enough. It means the right *kind* of thing for the empiricist mind.

WILLIAM JAMES, *Pragmatism*: pp. 1-13 and 33-40. Reprinted with the permission of Longmans, Green & Co.

SUGGESTIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Write out a brief and concise statement of your own philosophy of life.
2. Why do you think professional philosophers suppress the influence of temperament on their philosophizing? To what extent do you think they are justified?
3. Study the two lists of characteristics on page 7 with a view to rearranging each list according to some definite logical principle or of reducing each list to a smaller number by combining those most alike. Can you think of any other characteristics which might be added to either list?
4. Discuss James's statement that "the finally victorious way of looking at things will be the most completely *impressive* way to the normal run of minds." Do you think that the principle of evaluating philosophies which is implied in this statement is sound? Give a reason for your answer.

II. IS PHILOSOPHY DOOMED? by *Will Durant*

Analysis

Quoting a famous quatrain against philosophy Durant insists that it is false. The study of philosophy gives new ideas and provokes thought. The differences between philosophers are partly verbal. Science really changes much more rapidly than philosophy, and hence the mere fact of differences between systems of philosophy is really no condemnation of philosophy. Illustrations of far-reaching changes in scientific doctrines are given, some taken from the physical and others from the social sciences. Answering the charge that philosophy is obscure, Durant points out that everything interesting is obscure. He admits that some philosophy is dishonest and that some is false. Although it has no practical utility philosophy nonetheless has values all its own. It gives unity of mind and a total perspective on the universe. Durant defines philosophy as "*unified knowledge unifying life.*" Philosophy is self-discipline. It also makes us better because of the company we keep, since the study of philosophy is "an ennobling intimacy with great men."

A hasty glance at the history of speculation tempts the lazy soul to conclude that every philosopher contradicts every other, with a final result of zero.

Myself when young did eagerly frequent
Doctor and saint, and heard great argument

About it and about; but evermore
Came out by the same door wherein I went.

Now this famous quatrain, like most things beautiful, is false; we do not come out by the same door wherein we enter, unless we have left our brains outside. A man cannot make even a

half-adequate study of the great philosophers without changing his mind on a hundred vital points. Such a man will change his mind even about the contradictions of the philosophers; for he will discover that on nearly all of the fundamental problems nearly all of the philosophers agree; their differences being due rather to the terminology of their time than to the hostility of their thoughts. If such a man is also a student of the history of science he will discover that it is in science, much more than in philosophy, that theories and unchangeable dogmas kaleidoscopically change. Fifty years ago our cosmic history began with the Nebular Hypothesis of Laplace; now it begins with the planetesimals of Mr. Chamberlain (or has that fashion altered too?). Fifty years ago the *Origin of Species* was the Bible of biology; now none so poor to do it reverence. Evolution by continuous variations was displaced by the improved and accelerated method of mutations; mutations were found to be the illegitimate offspring of hybrids; and now we are groping back with Mr. Kammerer towards le Chevalier de Lamarck and the neck of the giraffe. Newton established certain laws of motion, and Einstein has dethroned them. Mayer and Joule and Rumford and Davy and a hundred others proved the indestructibility of matter and the conservation of energy; and Messrs. Soddy and Rutherford and L. Poincare begin to cast slurs upon these ultimate dogmas of modern science. Another Poincare tells us in French, and Mr. Pearson tells us in English, and Herr Mach tells us in German, that the "exact" knowledge of science is merely a shorthand description of approximate probabilities, and the eternal and immutable laws of nature are only the statistical averages of the observed habits of matter. (What shall we do with a science that has become as uncertain as philosophy, and with a nature whose laws are as reliable as statistics?) Mathematics was once a system of rigidly exact and infallible truths; suddenly the dimensions began to breed, the infinites began to include one another, the part became as great as the whole, and Einstein demonstrated that a straight line is the longest distance between two points. Francis Galton and Karl Pearson complained that we had "put our money" on Environment, when Heredity wins in a canter; Mr. Wiggam announced this brilliantly to the world; and now Dr. John B. Watson informs us, after hatching two hundred babies, that the environment of the embryo and the child is the chief factor in determining character and history, and that heredity is a minor item, with a negligible influence. Every good historian proves

that history is "a Mississippi of falsehoods"; every good Egyptologist has a new ladder of dynasties and dates, differing from the others only by a few thousand years; and every good anthropologist laughs at Tylor. The scientific experimental laboratory psychology of Messrs. Wundt, Kulpe, Ebbinghaus, Cattell, and Stanley Hall is cast into the cemetery of dead infallibilities; and we must learn the same things all over again in brand-new terms of conditional reflexes and vocal cords. Dr. Watson does his best to be polite to these antediluvians; but he cannot write a page of the latest and only scientific psychology without scattering the entrails of his predecessors to all the constellations of the zodiac. It is a merry circus for a philosopher.

Having pointed out this beam in the enemy's eye, we can afford now to admit a mote or two in our own. Yes, philosophy is obscure; but so is Shelley, so is science, so is woman; so is anything interesting. Worse, philosophy is sometimes dishonest; we dress up the beloved prejudices of our hearts, or the theology of our aunts, in the garb of a sternly objective Reason. "Metaphysics," says Bradley, "is the finding of bad reasons for what we believe upon instinct; but to find those reasons is no less an instinct." Sometimes it is the finding of bad reasons for what we should like our neighbors to believe. It is hard to tell whether some philosophers have been simpletons or diplomats. The mechanist seldom behaves as if he thinks he is a machine; as Bergson showed, he laughs when he catches himself behaving like one; and only by a certain self-deception can he cling to this theory. The idealist seldom behaves as if he thinks that his room ceases to exist when he leaves it, or that he himself ceases to exist when he lies asleep, unperceived by any mind. Undoubtedly some of the obscurity of philosophy is due to the lies it has told. Truth is clearer than fiction. . . .

But after all, what is the use of philosophy? A shameful question to ask; you do not ask it of poetry, which is also an imaginative construction of a world incompletely known. In a strictly American sense, philosophy is useless; it will not swell your income, or help you to trade horses, or guide you in your selections at Saratoga or on the Exchange. It may even make you a little careless and unambitious about these things. But what if, after winning at Saratoga, or in Wall Street, or in Washington, you find yourself ignorantly naïve, coarsely unfurnished in the head, brutal in behavior, chaotic in desire, unstable in character, and blindly miserable?

Well, philosophy should give you, first, unity of mind. We

are all so slovenly and self-contradictory in our thinking; we need a little coherence and consistency; let us pull ourselves together and rise to that *total perspective* which is philosophy,—and then through unity of mind should come unified desire, and through this that unity of character which is personality, and through this that unity of life which is the secret of such modest happiness as humanity can maintain. *Philosophy might be defined as unified knowledge unifying life*; it is not philosophy if it is knowledge alone, scholastically insulated from affairs. A philosopher is a man who remakes himself towards his great desire; he achieves that self-discipline without which we are inevitably the slaves of other men.

But finally, philosophy is not merely a study of systems, it is an ennobling intimacy with great men. It is one of those winding and hilly roads which lead to that Eden in which geniuses never die and wisdom makes with beauty the “highest music.” That Country of the Mind where Socrates and Plato and Epicurus, Raphael and Leonardo and Angelo, Bach and Beethoven and Wagner, Goethe and Shelley and Keats, await us with a grateful welcome, glad to speak to us as long as we will listen, and careful to give us only of their best. In this City of God inexhaustible treasures lie open to our hands; we need only seek and we shall find. We cannot live long in that air without becoming, despite ourselves, a little finer through the company we keep. Perhaps if we lift ourselves to those clear heights we too shall some day be keen enough of eye to see new truth and beauty in the world and skilled enough in speech to reveal it to men. Let us climb. Perhaps we shall find Dr. Watson then among the philosophers.

WILL DURANT, *Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy*, edited by E. S. Brightman, pp. 157-160. Published by Longmans, Green and Co. Reprinted by permission.

SUGGESTIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Draw up a list of the values Durant claims for philosophy.
2. Is Durant a friend or an enemy of science? Give reasons for your answer based on what he says in this selection.
3. Is there any evidence in the selection that Durant shares James's view that a man's philosophy is determined by his temperament? Which of the two types of temperament discussed by James seems to you to characterize Durant and why? Or do you think that Durant represents an in-between type?

III. THE VISION OF THALES, by *John Laird*

Analysis

The author represents Thales, first of the Greek philosophers, as having fallen into a well while star-gazing (philosophizing). His maid-servant laughs at him. He makes her admit that his wisdom has been fruitful to him and to his country, yet she insists that he is stupid for over-indulging in star-gazing. After she leaves him to bake bread for his dinner, Thales drops asleep and dreams a dream. He is taken in a chariot by a stranger who reveals to him the secrets and beauties of the earth. He asks to be shown still more and he is taken to a sage who tells him all about mankind and shows him the masses of men in a great but dirty city. But this does not satisfy Thales, who now asks for knowledge about the gods. He is taken to three different sages and he is astonished that they differ so much in their opinions about the gods. Thales worries over the fact that men know so much about physical nature and about themselves but so very little about the gods. Awaking from his dream, weary and heavyladen, he bids the maidservant bring him wine. She laughs knowingly at him again.

Long ago, as Thales stood gazing at the stars, he fell into a well; and his handmaiden laughed, saying he was so rapt in the things of heaven that he could not see the earth at his feet. Then Thales called her, for she was witty and comely, and he bade her bring a salve for his hurt, and wine and some bread.

So she tended his hurt, and Thales spoke with her, and said: "Pretty one, dost thou jest at this star-gazing like the rest of the Thracians?" Then the maiden laughed again, and answered, saying: "O subtle Ionian! Canst thou find this salve in the moon, or draw wine from the stars; and how couldst thou live if thine handmaid did not serve thee?"

And Thales said: "Pretty one, how did I find this salve? Hast thou not heard how I foresaw that the harvest of olives would be great beyond all expecting, and how I hired all the olive presses in Miletus and Chios, paying the earnest-money for them, so that, when the harvest came, I could ask for what I would, and take my toll of all the oil that was pressed?" And the maiden answered: "Verily thou art a cunning man, yet I would thou didst not cheat the poor. For all men must have oil."

Then Thales said: "The poor need not lack till they die, and we who are not born to riches must seek for riches as we find the means. Yet I would fain have thee see that my star-gazing is not a thing of no account. For because of my learning in the stars I knew that the day would turn into night, and so it befell while the Lydians fought with the Medes. Then the slaughter

was stopped, and peace was made, and fathers had not to bury their sons any more. Tell me, was not this a great thing, and did I not find great honour in it?"

And the maiden answered lightly: "Verily thou art wiser than any in Ionia, and thou hast gone into far countries, and hast learned to tell how far away the ships be from thy steep tower, and by thy learning thou didst turn the Halys from its course so that the army of Croesus passed it in safety. For these things I honour thee, although I am but a Thracian and thine handmaid. Yet thou art foolish and fallest into wells, so that I must tend thee as a mother tends a child. And this thing passes my wit, and thy wit too, O sapient infant! And now I must leave thee, for thy star-gazing does not bake bread, and thou wilt chide me an I bring thee not thy bread at sunrise, even if thy stupid stars pay no heed. And, prithee, keep away from the well."

So the maiden left him, and Thales mused awhile and fell asleep. And as he slept he saw one coming to him with glass over his eyes and clad in leather. Then the stranger said: "Arise, and come with me." So Thales arose and went with the stranger, and they entered into a strange chariot with great sails fastened to it. And lo! they rose in the air, and sped over the land, and the noise of their going was as the droning of countless swarms of bees.

And the stranger showed Thales the source of the Nile, whereon Thales had often pondered, and huge armies, and many other marvels. Then Thales rejoiced because he saw what men had done when they looked beyond their feet, and sought out cunning devices, even as he had done.

And he spoke to the stranger, thanking him, and said: "I would fain know more of this knowledge, so that the oracles can learn of me and kings do my bidding." And the stranger said: "I shall take thee to a far country beyond the Middle Sea, and the sages of that country will tell thee these things. But, first, I must consult my own oracle."

Then the stranger put a band over his ears, and Thales heard the sound of tapping. And after a little while the stranger told him that the sages in the far country were ready to receive him. And Thales marvelled greatly at this oracle, but he kept silence.

So they journeyed many hundreds of leagues through the air, and the stranger told Thales how he kept the course. And

Thales understood him and was glad. And when they came to the far country they lighted on a hill above a river. And there was a palace on the hill and trees around it. Then the stranger left Thales at the gates of the palace, and Thales went to the door and asked if he might see the king. But the chamberlain told him that the house was no palace, only the abode of a sage, and that the sage would rejoice to welcome him. So Thales entered, and the sage told him how he read the stars, and showed him glossy pictures of the stars, and many charts, and great tubes to see them withal.

Then Thales marvelled and enquired concerning the stars, and how men could foretell their courses. And the sage showed him many figures and diagrams, and explained the proofs of them. And Thales said: "Often did I dream of these things, and now thou hast shown them to me. And this knowledge I count higher than any invention. For it is godlike. So now, I pray thee, tell me of the gods, and show me how men fare. For the knowledge of the gods is the most excellent of all knowledge; and yet I am a man, and I would learn how men are made happier by this wonderful knowledge and these many inventions."

And the sage said: "I can show thee mankind, but thou must seek other sages to learn of the gods." So he showed Thales a great city, and the men in it. And the men seemed to Thales to be weary, and dingy, and busy without zest, and clad in ugly raiment. And Thales said: "These be slaves, and I would fain see the rulers of the city." But the sage told him that these were no bondmen, but free, and that there were rulers among them. Then the heart of Thales was heavy within him, and he held his peace.

So the sage took Thales to see those other sages who might tell him of philosophy and of the gods. They journeyed in a chariot without horses, and the sages received Thales gladly.

Now the first sage was bearded and courtly, and the second sage was ruddy and hard of countenance and quick in his movements, and the third sage was lean and tired and wistful. And all the sages were clad like the men in the city. And they burned strange incense.

Then Thales enquired of them concerning the gods. And the first sage said that all things were one, and that this was the sum of our knowing. And the second said that knowing was doing, and the truth what men had made. And the third

sage said that nothing could be known concerning the gods, and that all knowledge was but a learned fable whereat a wise man should be merry.

Then Thales was sad because these sages had learned so little concerning the gods. For the first, he thought did not reason closely, though the sound of his words was good; and the third was too weary to think; and the second was little better than the Thracian handmaid. So Thales bowed to the sages and withdrew himself from them.

And after he left them, he mused very sadly, thinking that cunning inventions had increased, and much knowledge concerning numbers and the stars, and yet that he had seen men to be no happier than they were in Miletus, and that he had found they knew very little of the gods. But Thales knew that this knowledge was the most precious of all excellent things. And he knew that if men walked warily in their knowing there was nothing they might not find out.

Then the vision faded; and when Thales awoke the stars were pale in the sky, and all was still save for the note of a grasshopper near at hand. So Thales called his handmaid and bade her bring him much wine. For he was weary, he said, and had seen strange matters in a vision. And the girl laughed again.

JOHN LAIRD, *A Study in Realism*: pp. 218-221. Reprinted with the permission of the University Press, Cambridge, England. Title mine.

SUGGESTIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Write an interpretation of Thales' dream, giving your own idea of what each thing and event in the dream symbolizes.
2. Does the author sympathize with Thales' maid-servant?
3. Does he mean to imply that philosophers can never reach an adequate religious knowledge and that they should confine their attention to natural and social science?

CHAPTER II

WHAT PHILOSOPHY IS AND SAYS

I. WHAT PHILOSOPHY IS, by *Ralph Barton Perry*

Analysis

Quoting a verse of Milton, Perry shows how the critics have shifted their ground from calling philosophy harsh and crabbed to calling it impractical. He admits that it is not practical in the usual sense of that word, but he insists that it has a special contribution to make to human culture. What this contribution is becomes clearer when philosophy is contrasted with common sense. Only a philosopher would ask what common sense is, for one characteristic of common sense is that it never questions itself. Yet once the question is asked we find that different interpretations of common-sense have existed at different times and still exist in different places. Hence common-sense is ambiguous. Moreover it is habitual and imitative. Yet common-sense claims to be practical in the sense of being "relevant to the matter in hand" whereas philosophy is concerned with the more remote issues and with the way of life as a whole. And common-sense is always concerned with specific facts or situations whereas philosophers hold that all knowledge requires generalization and insist that no real thinker dare stop formulating general ideas about things. Thirdly, common-sense demands that tangibility or sensuous contact shall be the criterion of what is real whereas philosophy has no bias in favor of the physical realities, but stresses these along with the mental and moral. The chief value of philosophy is that it emancipates the mind from common-sense and all of its narrow-minded prejudices. In youth philosophy is entertained unawares when one asks all kinds of questions about the origin of the world, the nature of the soul, etc. It also underlies the activities of mature life and without it as a foundation they would soon topple over. This is especially true of religion. Doubts arise and one must philosophize to resolve them. The necessity of philosophy arises from the genuineness of the problems of religion. Philosophy is also similarly closely related to art. The imagination of the artist is akin to the impulse which generates philosophy. Likewise philosophy investigates the presuppositions of science and brings the different sciences into relation. Consequently philosophy is an indispensable aspect of a culture.

How charming is divine philosophy!
Not harsh and crabbed, as dull fools suppose,
But musical as is Apollo's lute,
And a perpetual feast of nectar'd sweets,
Where no crude surfeit reigns.

Since Milton wrote thus gallantly in its behalf, philosophy has fairly succeeded in living down its reputation for being "harsh and crabbed." No one who has made the acquaintance of Scholastic Philosophy, the philosophy of the Middle Ages, and still the established philosophy in Milton's day, can escape a secret sympathy with the view of these "dull fools." But in the course of the last three centuries, philosophy, especially English and French philosophy, has become more free in form, more imaginative, and more self-expressive. So that the critics and belittlers of philosophy to-day, too numerous, alas! to make it safe to call names, have taken up new ground. Philosophy is condemned, not for being unmusical, but for being unpractical. The music of Apollo's lute is itself under suspicion, being too unsubstantial and too remote to suit the temper of an age of efficiency and common sense.

PHILOSOPHY AND EFFICIENCY

I sincerely wish that I could recommend philosophy on grounds of efficiency and common sense. I should be listened to, understood, and believed. I should at once insinuate myself into the confidence of my reader. If I could but say: "Now look here! Philosophy is just a matter of plain, hard-headed common sense"; or, "If you want to succeed, try philosophy. It will help you to make and to sell, to outstrip competitors, and to be efficient in whatever you undertake"; if I could make such an appeal to you, your instincts and prejudices would secure me your ready sympathy. But I should have deceived you. What I should thus have recommended to you would not be philosophy. For philosophy is neither plain nor hard-headed; nor is it a means of success, as success is ordinarily construed. This is the case, not accidentally, but in principle. The very point of philosophy lies in the fallibility of common sense, and in the arbitrariness of vulgar standards of success. Philosophy is one of those things that must be met on its own ground. You must seek it where it is at home; if you insist upon its meeting you halfway it will turn out not to be philosophy at all, but some poor compromise—the name or husk of philosophy with the soul gone out of it. No one can understand what philosophy means unless he lets it speak for itself and in its own language. If philosophy is good, it is because it contributes to life something *different*, something peculiarly its own, and which cannot be

measured by any standards save those which philosophy itself supplies.

PHILOSOPHY AND COMMON SENSE

If we cannot justify philosophy by common sense, we can at least contrast it with common sense, and so approach it from that more familiar ground. Since we must admit that philosophy is at odds with common sense, let us make the most of it. What, then, *is* common sense? First of all it is evident that this is not a common-sense question. One of the things peculiar to common sense is that it must not be questioned, but taken for granted. It is made up of a mass of convictions that by common consent are to be allowed to stand; one does not ask questions about them, but appeals to them to determine what questions shall be asked. They are the conservative opinion, the solidified and uniform belief, on which men act, and which is the unconscious premise of most human reasoning. As a man of common sense, I *use* common sense to live by or to think by; it is a practical and theoretical bias which I share with my fellows, but which I do not think about at all.

Now suppose that in some whimsical and senseless mood I *do* think about common sense. Something very startling happens. This once unchallenged authority is proved to be highly fallible. Its spell is gone. It at once appears, for example, that common sense has had a history, and that it has varied with times and places. The absurdities of yesterday are the common sense of to-day; the common sense of yesterday is now obsolete and quaint. The crank of the sixteenth century was the man who said that the earth moved; the crank of the twentieth century is the man who says that it does not. Moreover, once common sense is thus reflected upon, it is seen to be in part, at least, the result of wholly irrational forces, such as habit and imitation. What has been long believed, or repeatedly asserted, acquires a hardness and fixity from that fact; in the future it is always easier to believe, more difficult to disbelieve, than anything recent or novel. And what others about us believe, we tend unconsciously to reflect in our own belief, just as our speech catches the accent and idioms of our social circle. Furthermore, a belief once widely diffused takes on the authority of established usage. It is supported by public opinion, as anything normal or regular is supported; unbelievers are viewed with hostile suspicion as unreliable and incalculable. "You can never tell what they will

do next." Or they are forcibly persecuted as a menace to the public peace. I have called habit and imitation "irrational" forces. By that I mean that they have no special regard for truth. They operate in the same way to confirm and propagate a bad way of thinking as a good way of thinking. It does not follow that common sense is necessarily mistaken; indeed reasons can be adduced to show that common sense is a very good guide indeed. But if so, then common sense is justified on other grounds; it is not itself the last court of appeal. Common sense, despite its stability and vogue, perhaps on account of its stability and vogue, is open to criticism. We cannot be sure that it is true; and it may positively stand in the way of truth through giving an unwarranted authority to the old and familiar, and through shutting our minds so that no new light can get in.

The philosopher, then, is one who at the risk of being thought queer, challenges common sense; he sets himself against the majority in order that the majority may be brought to reflect upon what they have through inertia or blindness taken for granted. He is the reckless critic, the insuppressible asker of questions, who doesn't know where to stop. He has a way of pinching the human intelligence, when he thinks it has gone to sleep. Every time there is a fresh revival of philosophical interest, and a new philosophical movement, as there is periodically, this is what happens. Some eccentric or highly reflective individual like Socrates, or Bacon, or Descartes, or Locke, or Kant, strays from the beaten track of thought, and then discovers that although it was easier to move in the old track, one is more likely to reach the goal if one beats out a new one. Such a thinker demands a re-examination of old premises, a revision of old methods; he stations himself at a new center, and adopts new axes of reference.

Philosophy is opposed to common sense, then, in so far as common sense is habitual and imitative. But there are other characteristics of common sense with which the true genius of philosophy is out of accord. We can discover these best by considering the terms of praise or blame which are employed in behalf of common sense. When ideas are condemned as contrary to common sense, what is ordinarily said of them? I find three favorite forms of condemnation: ideas are pronounced "unpractical," "too general," or "intangible." Any man of common sense feels these to be terms of reproach. It is implied, of course, that to be agreeable to common sense, ideas

must be "practical," "particular," and "tangible." And it is the office of philosophy, as corrective of common sense, to show that such judgments, actual and implied, cannot be accepted as final.

PHILOSOPHY AND THE PRACTICAL

What is meant by "practical," in the vulgar sense? Let me take an example. Suppose a man to be trapped on the roof of a burning building. His friends gather round to make suggestions. One friend suggests that a ladder be brought from next door; another friend suggests that the man climb to an adjoining roof and descend by the rain pipe. These are practical suggestions. A third friend, on the other hand, wants to know what caused the fire, or why the man is trying to escape. He is promptly silenced on the ground that his inquiries are beside the point. Or approach a man in the heat of business and offer him advice. You will soon find out whether your advice is practical or not. If you have invented something, a physical or industrial mechanism, that will facilitate the matter in hand, you show that you are a practical man, and there is a chance that you will be listened to. But if you ask the business man why he is trying so hard to make money, and express some doubt as to its being worth while—well, let the veil be drawn. He may see you "out of hours," but you will scarcely recover his confidence. "Practical," therefore, would seem to mean *relevant to the matter in hand*. It is usual with adults to have something "in hand," to be busy about something, to be pursuing some end. The practical is anything that will serve the end already being pursued; the unpractical is anything else, and especially reflection on the end itself. Now the philosopher's advice is usually of the latter type. It is felt to be gratuitous. It does not help you to do what you are already doing; on the contrary, it is calculated to arrest your action. It is out of place in the office, or in business hours. What, then, is to be said for it? The answer, of course, is this: It is important not only to be moving, but to be moving in the right direction; not only to be doing something well, but to be doing something worth while. This is evidently true, but it is easily forgotten. Hence it becomes the duty of philosophy to remind men of it; to persuade men occasionally to reflect on their ends, and reconsider their whole way of life. To have a philosophy of life is to have

reasons not only for the means you have selected, but for what you propose to accomplish by them.

PHILOSOPHY AND GENERALIZATION

Common sense also condemns what is "too general." In life it is said to be a "situation" and not a theory that confronts us. The man who is trusted is the man of experience, and experience is ordinarily taken to mean acquaintance with some group of individual *facts*. In political life what one needs is not general ideas, but familiarity with concrete circumstances; one must know men and measures, not man and principles. Historians are suspicious of vague ideas of civilization and progress; the important thing is to know just what happened. In the industrial world, what is needed is not a theory of economic value, but a knowledge of present costs, wages, and prices. As a preparation for life it is more important to train the eye and the hand, which can distinguish and manipulate, than the reason and imagination, which through their love of breadth and sweep are likely to blur details, or in their groping after the ultimate are led to neglect the immediate thing which really counts. Common sense would not, of course, condemn generalization altogether. It has too much respect for knowledge, and understands that there is no knowing without generalizing. There must be rules and classifications, even laws and theories. But the generalizing propensity of mind must be held in restraint; after a certain point it becomes absurd, fantastic, out of touch with fact, "up in the clouds." The man of common sense, planted firmly on the solid ground, views such speculations with contempt, amusement, or with blank amazement.

Philosophy offends against common sense, then, not because it generalizes, for, after all, no one can think at all without generalizing; but because it does not know when to stop. And the philosopher is bound to offend, because if he is true to his calling, *he must not stop*. It is his particular business to generalize as far as he can. He may have various motives for doing this. He may be prompted by mere "idle curiosity" to see how far he can go. Or he may believe that the search for the universal and the contemplation of it constitute the most exalted human activity. Or he may be prompted by the notion that his soul's salvation depends on his getting into right relations with the first cause or the ultimate ground of things. In any case he

is allotted the task of formulating the most general ideas that the nature of things will permit. He can submit to no limitations imposed by considerations of expediency. He loses his identity altogether, unless he can think more roundly, more comprehensively, or more deeply, than other men. He represents no limited constituency of facts or interests; he is the thinker at large.

PHILOSOPHY AND THE TANGIBLE

It is significant that facts are reputed to be "solid," general ideas to be of a more vaporous or ghostly substance. Thus facts possess merit judged by the third standard of common sense, that of "tangibility." If we go back to the original meaning, the tangible, of course, is that which can be touched. Doubting Thomas was a man of common sense. Now we have here to do with something very original and elemental in human nature. Touch is the most primitive of the senses. And if we consider the whole history of living organisms, it is the experience or the anticipation of *contact* that has played the largest and the most indispensable part in their consciousness. That which can have contact with an organism is a body; hence bodies or physical things are the oldest and most familiar examples of known things. The status of other alleged things is doubtful; the mind does not feel thoroughly at home and secure in dealing with them. Physical science enjoys the confidence of common sense because, though it may wander far from bodies and imagine intangible ethers and energies, it always starts with bodies, and eventually returns to them. Furthermore, even ethers and energies excite the tactual imagination; one can almost feel them. The human imagination cannot abstain from doing the same thing even when it is perfectly well understood that it is illegitimate. God and the soul are spirits, to be sure; for that there is the best authority. But when they have passed through the average mind they have a distinctly corporeal aspect, as though the mind were otherwise helpless to deal with them.

Philosophy is not governed by an animus against the physical. Indeed philosophy is bound to recognize the possibility that it may turn out to be the case that all real substances are physical. But philosophy *is* bound to point out that there is a human bias in favor of the physical; and is bound so far as possible to coun-

teract or discount that bias. Philosophy must nurture and protect those theories that aim especially to do justice to the non-physical aspects of experience, and protest against their being read out of court as "inconceivable" or inherently improbable. A generation ago philosophy was usually referred to as "mental and moral" philosophy. There is a certain propriety in this, not because philosophy is to confine itself to the mental and moral, but because philosophers alone can be depended upon to recognize these in their own right, and correct the exaggerated emphasis which common sense, and science as developed on the basis of common sense, will inevitably place on the physical.

OUR UNCONSCIOUS PHILOSOPHIZING

Philosophy, then, can afford to accept the unfavorable opinion of common sense, and may even boast of it. Philosophy is unpractical, too general, and intangible. If the condemnation implied in these terms were decisive and final, then philosophy would be compelled to give up. But philosophy is not merely contrary to common sense, for it *emancipates* the mind from common sense and establishes the more authoritative standards by which it is itself justified.

Though I should have persuaded you that philosophy is a strange thing which you must visit abroad in its own home, nevertheless I now hope to persuade you that you once entertained it unawares. Though if philosophy is now to enter, you must expel from your mind the ideas that make themselves at home there, this same philosophy was once a favorite inmate. Only you were too young, and your elders had too much common sense, to know that it was philosophy. Unless you were an extraordinary child you were very curious about what you called *the world*; curious as to who or what made it, why it was made, how it was made, why it was made as it is, and what it is like in those remote and dim regions beyond the range of your senses. Then you grew up, and having grown up, you acquired common sense, or rather common sense acquired you. It descended like a curtain, shutting out the twilight, and enabling you to see more clearly, but just as certainly making your view more circumscribed.¹

Since then you have come to feel that the questions of your

¹ Cf. Wordsworth's "Ode on Intimations of Immortality from Recollections of Early Childhood," in *Harvard Classics*, xli, 609.

childhood were foolish questions, or extravagant questions that no busy man can afford to indulge in. Philosophy, then, is more naïve than common sense; it is a more spontaneous expression of the mind. And when one recovers this first untrammelled curiosity about things, common sense appears not as the illumination of mature years, but rather as a hardening of the mind, the worldliness and complacency of a life immersed in affairs. It would not be unfair to say that the philosophical interest is the more liberal, common sense having about it something of the quality of professionalism.

But there is another and a more important sense in which philosophy is entertained unawares. It underlies various mature activities and interests whose standing is regarded as unquestionable. When these activities or interests are reflected upon, as sooner or later they are sure to be, it appears that they require the support of philosophy. This is most evident in the case of religion. We all of us participate in a certain religious tradition, and with most of us the principal elements of that tradition are taken for granted. We assume that there is a certain kind of life, a life of unselfishness, honesty, fortitude, and love, let us say, that is highest and best. We assume that the worth of such a life is superior to worldly success; that it betokens a state of spiritual well-being to which every man should aspire, and for which he should be willing to sacrifice everything else. We assume, furthermore, that this type of life is the most important thing in the world at large. Thus we may suppose that the world was created, and that its affairs are controlled, by a being in whom this type of life is perfectly exemplified. God would then mean to us the cosmic supremacy of unselfishness, love, and the like. Or we may suppose that God is one who guarantees that those who are unselfish and scrupulous shall inherit the earth, and experience eternal happiness.

DOUBT

Now observe what happens when one is overtaken with doubt. One may come to question the worthiness of the ideal. Is it not perhaps a more worthy thing to *assert* one's self, than to sacrifice one's self? Or is not the great man after all one who is superior to scruples, who sets might above right? Who is to decide such a question? Surely not public opinion, nor the authority of any institution, for these are dogmatic. Once hav-

ing doubted, dogma will no longer suffice. What is needed is a thoughtful comparison of ideals, a critical examination of the whole question of values and of the meaning of life. One who undertakes such a study, every one who has made even a beginning of such a study in the hope of solving his own personal problem, is *ipso facto* a moral philosopher. He is following in the steps of Plato and of Kant, of Mill and of Nietzsche, and he will do well to walk for at least a part of the way with them.

Or suppose that our doubter questions, not the correctness of the traditional ideal, but the certainty of its triumph. Suppose that, like Job, he is impressed by the misfortunes of the righteous, and set to wondering whether the natural course of events is not utterly indifferent to the cause of righteousness. Is not the world after all a prodigious accident, a cruel and clumsy play of blind forces? Do ideals *count* for anything, or are they idle dreams, illusions, a mere play of fancy? Can spirit move matter, or is it a helpless witness of events wholly beyond its control? Ask these questions and you have set philosophical problems; answer them, and you have made philosophy.

It is possible, of course, to treat doubt by the use of anæsthetics. But such treatment does not cure doubt. With many, indeed, anæsthetics will not work at all. They will require an intellectual solution of intellectual questions; their thought once aroused will not rest until it has gone to the bottom of things. And problems forgotten in one generation will reappear to haunt the next. But even if it were possible that the critical and doubting faculty should be numbed or atrophied altogether, it would be the worst calamity that could befall mankind. For the virtue of religion must lie in its being true, and if it is to be true it must be open to correction as enlightenment advances. Salvation cannot be won by a timid clinging to comfortable illusions.

What should be done for the saving of our soul depends not upon an imaginary state of things, in which the wish is father to the thought, but upon the real state of things. Salvation must be founded on fact and not on fiction. In short, the necessity of philosophy follows from *the genuineness of the problems that underlie religion*. In religion, as in other activities and interests, it will not do forever to assume that things are so; but it becomes important from time to time to inquire into them closely and with an open mind. So to inquire into the ideals of life and the basis of hope, is philosophy.

PHILOSOPHY AND ART

Let us turn to another familiar human interest, that of the fine arts. There exists a vague idea, sometimes defended by the connoisseur, but more often ignored or repudiated by him, that the greatest works of art must express the general or the universal. Thus we feel that Greek sculpture is great because it portrays man, whereas most contemporary sculpture portrays persons; and that Italian painting of the Renaissance, expressing, as it does, the Christian interpretation of life, is superior to the impressionistic landscape which seizes on some momentary play of light and color. Now I do not for a moment wish to contend that such considerations as these are decisive in determining the merit of art. It may even be that they should not affect our purely æsthetic judgments at all. But it is clear that they signify an important fact about the mind of the artist, and also about the mind of the observer. The Greek sculptor and the Italian painter evidently have ideas of a certain sort. They may, it is true, have come by them quite unconsciously. But somehow the Greek sculptor must have had an idea not of his model merely, but of human nature and of the sort of perfection that befits it. And the Italian, over and above his sense of beauty, must have shared with his times an idea of the comparative values of things, perhaps of the superiority of the inner to the bodily life, or of heaven to this mundane sphere. And the observer as well must have a capacity for such ideas, or he will have lost something which the artist has to communicate. The case of poetry is perhaps clearer. Historical or narrative poems, love poems to a mistress's eyes or lips, evidently dwell on some concrete situation or on some rare and evanescent quality that for a moment narrows the mind and shuts out the world. On the other hand, there are poems like Tennyson's "Higher Pantheism," and "Maud," Browning's "Rabbi Ben Ezra," Wordsworth's "Tintern Abbey," or Matthew Arnold's "Dover Beach,"² in which the poet is striving to express through his peculiar medium some generalization of life. He has had some wider vision, revealing man in his true place in the whole scheme of things. Such a vision is rarely clear, perhaps never entirely articulate; but it betokens a mind struggling for light, dissatisfied with any ready-made plan and striving to emancipate itself

² See *Harvard Classics*, Vol. XLII, 1038, 1052, 1148, 1183; Vol. XLI, 650. Also below, pp. 44 ff.

from vulgar standards. And one who reads such poetry must respond to its mood, and stretch the mind to its dimensions.

It is not necessary for our purpose to argue that the merit of poetry is proportional to the breadth of its ideas; but only to see that breadth of ideas is an actual feature of most poetry that is with general consent called great. The great poets have been men whose imagination has dared to leave the ground and ascend high enough to enable them to take the world-wide view of things. Now such imagination is philosophical; it arises from the same impulse as that which generates philosophy, requires the same break with common sense, and fundamentally it makes the same contribution to life. There is this difference, that while the poetic imagination either boldly anticipates the results of future arguments, or unconsciously employs the results of arguments already made, philosophy *is* an argument. Poetry because it is a fine art, must present a finished thing in sensuous form; philosophy, because it is theory, must present definitions of what it is talking about, and reasons for what it says. And there is need of both poets and philosophers since for every argument there is a vision and for every vision an argument.

PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE

The term "science" is now commonly employed to designate a band of special knowledges, headed by physics, pushing rapidly into the as yet unknown, and converting it first into knowledge, then into invention, and finally into civilization. Science is patronized and subsidized by common sense; and it is a profitable investment. But science, although often like Peter it repudiates philosophy and disclaims ever having known it, is of philosophical extraction and has philosophical connections that it cannot successfully conceal. Precisely as you and I were philosophers before the exigencies of life put a constraint upon the natural movements of the mind, so human knowledge was philosophical before it was "scientific," and became divided into highly specialized branches, each with a technique and plan of its own. There are many ways in which the philosophical roots and ligaments of the sciences are betrayed. The different sciences, for example, all have to do with the same world, and their results must be made consistent. Thus physics, chemistry, physiology, and psychology all meet in human nature, and have to be reconciled. Man is somehow mechanism,

life, and consciousness all in one. How is this possible? The question is evidently one that none of these sciences alone can answer. It is not a scientific problem, but a philosophical problem; and yet it is inseparably connected with the work of science and the estimate that is to be put on its results.

Again, science employs many conceptions with no thorough examination of their meaning. This is the case with most, if not all, of the *fundamental* conceptions of science. Thus mechanics does not inform us concerning the exact nature of space and time; physics does not give us more than a perfunctory and formal account of the nature of matter; the greater part of biology and physiology proceeds without attempting carefully to distinguish and define the meaning of life; while psychology studies cases of consciousness without telling us exactly what, in essence, consciousness is. All of the sciences employ the notions of law and of causality; but they give us no theory of these things. In short, the special sciences have certain rough working ideas which suffice for the purposes of experimentation and description, but which do not suffice for the purposes of critical reflection. All of the conceptions which I have mentioned furnish food for thought, when once thought is directed to them. They bristle with difficulties, and no one can say that science, in the limited sense in which the specialist and expert use the term, accomplishes anything to remove these difficulties. Science is able to get along, to make astonishing progress, and to furnish the instruments of a triumphant material civilization, without raising these difficulties. But suppose a man to ask, "Where do I stand, after all is said and done? What sort of a world do I live in? What am I myself? What must I fear, and what may I hope?" and there is no answering him except by facing these difficulties. There is no one who will even attempt to answer such questions except the philosopher. . . .

RALPH BARTON PERRY in *Lectures on Dr. Eliot's Five-foot Shelf of Books: Section, Philosophy, General Introduction*. Reprinted by permission of P. F. Collier & Son Company. Title mine.

SUGGESTIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. What is the "something different" which Perry thinks philosophy contributes to life?
2. Write out a brief statement of what common sense is, using the topic *The Philosophy of the Unphilosophical*. Use Perry's ex-

- position of common sense as a basis but feel free to express all of your own ideas as to what people who have never studied philosophy think about the world.
3. Discuss Perry's definition of the practical as that which is "relevant to the matter in hand." Suggest some other definition.
 4. Why does the philosopher never stop generalizing? What three motives actuate the philosopher here?
 5. Why do men have a natural bias in favor of physical realities? Is this bias justifiable? Why or why not?
 6. Try to interpret some of your own experiences earlier in life in terms of Perry's discussion of our "unconscious philosophizing." For example, write out any experiences you can remember in which such questions as Perry mentions came home to you with peculiar force. Do you still have such experiences?
 7. Why does religion need support from philosophy?
 8. To what extent is the artist like the philosopher? How do they differ?
 9. State two ways in which philosophy supplements science.

II. WHAT PHILOSOPHY SAYS, by William Ernest Hocking

Analysis

Hocking holds that anyone who becomes a philosopher must accept certain basic presuppositions. But while philosophers recognize that it is their business to investigate the presuppositions of other human activities, few philosophers have ever interested themselves in the presuppositions on which their own work is necessarily based. He quotes Peirce and Sheldon in support of his thesis. Defining philosophy as *the general interpretation of experience*, he argues that any such interpretation is based upon three presuppositions: (i) Things have a meaning. (ii) Human beings can grasp that meaning or some of it. (iii) It is worth while to do so and ought to be attempted. Taking up the first more in detail Hocking refers to the current interest of philosophers in facts, but he insists that philosophy will wither at the roots unless the interest in facts is supplemented by an interest in the meanings of these facts. Then, too, the philosopher must assume that the world as a whole has meaning as well as the particular facts of experience. Those who, like Holt, deny that the world as a whole has meaning, advocate the doctrine of *neutralism*. This doctrine is partly true, as is shown by the fact of the evanescence of meaning in everyday life. But Hocking insists that Tolstoi was right in holding that the assumption that the whole has meaning is essential to the belief that separate facts have meaning. In support of this he makes use of the idea of a double boundary of concepts, or those which can apply equally well to a whole or to parts. The concept of the self and some other concepts are given as illustrations. Such concepts show us how what seems meaningless can be caught up into a larger whole which is meaningful. The second presupposition is then developed in greater detail. He criticizes those who rob values or meanings of their objective reality and reduce them to states of the mind or make them creations of man. This view robs meanings of their

durability. Hocking insists that the meanings we know are not human creations but genuine realities which we discover. Our judgments in the realm of values are true or false as determined by that non-human order of values. Taking up the third presupposition Hocking argues that the real meanings of things cry out to be known. He enumerates three respects in which the theory that values are man-made additions to a world of neutrals robs the world of meaning and the philosophic enterprise of significance. In conclusion Hocking uses the myth of Merlin to explain his meaning, pointing out that it is better than the myth of the sphinx.

. . . There are certain views about the universe which are assumed or postulated in the nature of the philosophic enterprise itself, so that every philosopher by his activity, if not by his doctrines, acknowledges them.

It is a large part of the business of philosophy to bring to light the presuppositions of other activities. Philosophy might therefore be expected to be especially keen in the scent for its own presuppositions. But partly because it has been haunted by the ideal of a presuppositionless beginning, and partly because it has been busied with determining the presuppositions of the sciences, its enquiries into its own presuppositions have been (so far as my limited knowledge goes) desultory and incomplete.

And in one respect, at least, we are peculiarly ready at the present moment for renewing the enquiry. For there is a widespread disposition to question whether a presuppositionless beginning of philosophy is possible. Hegel and the pragmatic movement are in complete accord in denying such possibility. Let me recall the words of Charles Peirce:

"We cannot begin with complete doubt. We must begin with all the prejudices we actually have when we enter upon the study of philosophy. . . . Let us not pretend to doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts." And Professor Sheldon, in a notable paper recently published in the *Journal of Philosophy*, puts the case with even greater vigor:

"Let no one think that the philosopher is, or ever can be, purely empirical or unbiassed. He is, on the contrary, deep down in his mind, a dogmatist. He must always look for something which he believes at the bottom of his heart he will eventually find. . . . If he did not have a persisting faith in this matter he would lack sufficient motive for continuing his arduous task."

The words "prejudice" and "dogma" are here employed, of course, for their challenging effect. Neither writer intends to

urge us to build our philosophic structure on an uncriticized foundation. Each would agree that prejudices and dogmas taken as we find them are individual, variable, obstructive,—the richest field of wild game for the philosophic hunter.

I trust, then, that I am not too far from the intention of these writers if I propose that a part of what they were aiming at is a set of necessary presuppositions, such as all criticism would tend to reinstate. To find such presuppositions would be to clarify our dogmas and prejudices, to recognize the element of necessity in them, and so to win common consent. More than this, it would do justice to the inescapable ideal of a presuppositionless beginning. For to know what our presuppositions are is to know *how far we are* from the presuppositionless beginning, and thus to have such beginning in mind, and really to depart from it.

Let us agree, for the sake of the argument, upon a tentative statement of what the philosophic enterprise is. Philosophy, as I understand it, is first of all the examination of beliefs,—beliefs being the opinions we live by, as distinct from the opinions we merely entertain. This pluralistic effort to criticize our several major beliefs drives us to some comprehensive belief about the world we live in, so that philosophy becomes the *general interpretation of experience*. The *description* of experience is a part of our business, and to the end of true description, a precise logical scrutiny of the categories; but description is not enough unless description also explains. For after all, it is the necessity of understanding which drives us to philosophy; and whatever interprets the world to men will be to them “philosophy,” whether we acknowledge it as such or not.

With this understanding, I submit that every one of us as philosopher requires at least these three presuppositions:

First, that things have a meaning;

Second, that we human beings are competent to grasp that meaning, or some of it;

Third, that it is worth while to do so, and ought to be attempted. . . .

Our first assumption is that *things have a meaning*: that is to say, there is nothing meaningless in the world (taking things one by one) and (taking them collectively) the world as a whole is not meaningless.

The most obvious difficulty in the way of this postulate is that we are bound in all good conscience to be empirical toward

our world; and to be empirical is to accept things as they are, with a "natural piety" which does not insist on explanation. We have come to believe that there are certain ultimate matters of fact which every philosophy must simply accept as *there*, such as space, or the actual configuration of events, or the amounts and numbers of things, or the existence of anything at all. If some of them should yield up a meaning to us, it would be just another matter of fact that they did so. We have domesticated the word "datum," and are growing fond of it. In this respect, our own philosophic age has more natural piety than any preceding age in history.

Still, it seems clear that from the radically empirical standpoint, the postulate that everything has a meaning has the same type of justification as the postulate that everything has a cause. We have the same illusion (if it is an illusion) in both cases,—that of having now and then a direct experience of meaning as of causation. And in each case, if we allow Hume to analyze our experience for us, the supposed object mysteriously eludes us. I seem to see the axe split the wood: but no, I only see the axe fall and the wood then spring apart. Likewise, I seem to see the intention of the wood-cutter: he is preparing his wood-pile for winter. But no, I only perceive the events, and their meaning is a subjective act of interpretation. Personally, I do not accept Hume's analysis; but even at that, if experience does not *give* causes nor meanings, neither can it *reject* them.

Our inability to see a meaning in any case would not afford justification for supposing that no meaning is there. This we could do only if we are prepared to *prove* some aspect of the world to be necessarily meaningless. But in that case, though there is no overt self-contradiction, we should have brought the inexplicable or irrational fact within the world of our meanings, so that it has ceased to be a mere and meaningless matter of fact. If we conceive that an ideal park plan will include some places of natural wildness, they do not cease to be wild; but they are brought within the scope of the rational artifice.

Our present obdurately empirical bent is a sign of good health. It is a normal mental appetite for stuff to be interpreted together, no doubt, with much justified impatience with former interpretation. It may well be that our accumulation of the raw material of experience will always outrun our interpretative powers, and keep us duly humble and naturally pious. But the empirical attitude in the sense of pure acceptance must be

regarded as preliminary, not eventual, unless the impulse of philosophy is to be withered at its root.

So far, we have been speaking of the meanings of things taken piece-meal. But after all, that is not our main concern. Our interpretations have the ambition to deal with the whole situation; and the meaning of the whole filters through to confer significance upon the parts. The most formidable difficulty we have to face is the doubt whether the whole of things can have any meaning.

This difficulty is of a logical order. Meaning is a relative term: it can apply only to what is partial. The whole, then, as a sort of Absolute, must be without meaning. Whatever is true of the whole must bear alike on all the parts, and can make no difference to any of them: it must bear alike on high and low, matter and mind, good and evil. Conversely, we cannot describe the whole in terms of one side of any antithesis, when both sides are found in experience. The whole cannot be good, for experience contains both good and evil. It cannot be mental, for experience contains both mental and non-mental. It cannot have specific meaning, because all meanings come in contrasting pairs.

This type of consideration is familiar under a hundred forms. It applies to the ultimate logical analysis of experience as well as to its totality. It gives the realist like Mr. Holt his neutral entities, just as it gives the logical mystic his indescribable unity or substance. It unites the pragmatist and the pluralist in the corollary that since the whole, if there is a whole, can make no difference, it can make no difference to treat it as if it does not exist, and give our interest and loyalty to meanings which, because of what they are opposed to, as good against evil, have definable work to do in a real time order. We are dealing, in fact, with a sort of metaphysical frontier, in the sense that many explorative thinkers are halted at this line. *Neutralism*, if I may coin the title, is the prevalent belief regarding ultimate reality. All the gods worth worshipping are finite.

Experience lends a certain support to this logic. For even in such small editions of wholeness as we find in a single human career, there is as we pass from the part to the whole an *evanescence of meaning*. The sense of a day's work can be told. But who can tell the entire tendency or significance of his life? The definable meanings are partial; and when we enquire what on the whole they lead to, they vanish, like dream-bridges with-

out abutments, into unspecified termini. . . . The whole of life is less convincingly meaningful than the parts, and the same is true, only more strikingly, of more inclusive wholes, state, humanity, world.

My belief is that this is a point in which our intuitions must give instruction to our logic. We know, as Tolstoi knew, that unless the whole of a life has meaning, the meanings of the parts are illusory; and the same is true of every totality. We know, then, that *this logical frontier of neutralism must be passed*. And my belief is that we have in hand the means to pass it. . . .

If I may sketch my own mode of expressing the case, it is that, besides the concepts which have a single boundary, there are also concepts which have, or may have, *a double or multiple boundary*.

Take the concept of "the mutual." The mutual is opposed to the non-mutual or exclusive. Thus common property is among the mutual things, private property among the non-mutuals. But since, when A has nothing in common with B, B also has nothing in common with A, all pure exclusions are mutual. Thus the private properties of A and B are *mutually non-mutual*. I need not dwell on the immense social importance of this situation. It means that Plato was radically mistaken, not in desiring that friends should have as much as possible in common, but in failing to see that they may have more in common by having less in common, as when the exclusions of private properties and families allow sharable personal developments not otherwise possible. Thus the concept of the mutual gains a new and wider boundary and it does so without abandoning the old one, because the original contrast between the mutual and the non-mutual must be kept intact.

This kind of concept is thoroughly familiar; but it is relegated by most reputable logicians to a sort of logical *demi-monde*. I wish to defend its respectability. There is nothing smeary or irresponsible about its behavior. It cannot be accused of "turning into its own opposite" or of having overflowed its banks; there is no twilight zone about it, and no irrational flux. It is a matter of clear saltation.

Now the existence of such concepts as these enables us to see how the whole of things can be significant. For granted that all terms which express meaning come in contrasting pairs, so that each applies primarily to only a part of the world, it yet remains to be asked whether one of the pair may have a double

boundary, and *apply also to the whole*. From my own point of view, the concept of *self* has seemed the most perfect example of this class of concepts: for while the self has always a not-self over against it, it is always *taking that not-self in*,—its life may be said to consist in a process of consuming its limits. It has seemed to me to offer the best instance of a concept which could apply at once to the whole and to a part. But perhaps it is not private selfhood which best describes the whole: perhaps it is the mutual, in the form of the social or the “we”; while private selfhood, as the most completely non-mutual aspect of existence, is included within it. . . .

Although the world is well-stocked with the apparently waste,—the uncounted sand grains, the bad lands, the deserts, the empty spaces, the unused interiors and other-sides of things, the unnoticed and innumerable heavenly bodies, the many-too-many insects and perhaps also to our dull eyes the many-too-many of mankind,—our judgment is never tenacious in holding to the verdict, “meaningless.” For we have seen too many things, in the course of history, swing out of that category into relation with our tangible concerns, too many deserts have become gardens and waste rocks precious ores.

Then, too, in a world in which everything is momentarily affecting everything else, nothing is functionless. The myriads of organisms in the early stages of evolution are not left behind by the highest, but are organized into its life-cycle. Humanity cannot be itself without animal, vegetable, micro-organism: thus the highest, by itself, is not so high as a union of the highest with the not-highest. The “highest” in biology turns out to be a concept with a double boundary. It begins to appear to our slow political vision that the “highest races” so far from rendering the less high superfluous, are not so high as a possible just union of the “highest” with the “backward.” The failure of aristocracy is in supposing that there is a class of “the best,” a class with a single boundary which clearly excludes the not-best. And perhaps if there is a Highest Being, its boundary also will extend to include lower ranges of the scale. This is the clear sense of Augustine’s remark:

“With a sounder judgment I apprehended that the things above were better than the things below, but all together better than the things above by themselves.”

When the relatively meaningless is thus in many ways caught

up into the circuits of meaning, we recognize that if logic allows our postulate, life will not deny it.

Our second proposition, as philosophers, is that the *meaning of things can be known by us*; or, to put it in the negative form, that a true understanding of things as they are is not beyond our grasp.

Modern philosophy has gone through a curious reversal on this point. It began with a vehement rebuke to our native presumption in thinking to read God's intention or nature's intention in the arrangements of the world. If it is dangerous to impute motives to our neighbors, how much more so to impute motives to nature, and how much deeper folly to treat such fancies as knowledge. It required a philosophic revolution to cure this folly; but the campaign against the appeal to "final causes" was one of the most successful of philosophic movements. An humble and Job-like agnosticism about values was well-established long before the corresponding agnosticism in ontology.

Now, in various quarters, we find a complete resumption of confidence; but on the ground that there are no objective and non-evident meanings in things to be sought for. Value is simply the projection of our human interests upon the frame of events. It is the external counterpart of wish, instinct, desire or imagination; and were these to vanish, this aspect of meaning would vanish also. A value, according to Professor Perry, is "any object of any interest." The world of values, according to Mr. Bertrand Russell, is our contribution to the world: it is the realm of our freedom, for here we rule as kings. Our philosophies, according to Mr. Santayana, are works of art; they belong to the domain of that "rhetorical and emotional rendering of existence, which when deepened and purified becomes poetry and music." If meanings are thus determined by our own natures, or products of our own devising, the question of our competence to know them cannot arise.

I am convinced that we must decisively reject this easy route to self-confidence, which is, in substance, the route of subjective idealism. As a revolt from the impossible and long-lasting repression of our value-judgments, these doctrines are refreshing. Their validity is in their unqualified assertion that if we are to philosophize at all, *we must judge and must believe in our power of judgment*. But their way to security and free-

dom is not less destructive of the life of philosophy than the way of repression. They purchase confidence at the cost of robbing meaning of its metaphysical roots, and making it a painted aspect of the surface of experience.

When we postulate that things have meanings, we are putting the meanings on the same plane of objectivity with the things. The logical issue can be placed on this point. If our interpretations of the world are really emotional renderings, the question of their truth or falsity becomes impertinent. They may be clever, interesting, elevating, or beautiful, but not true or false. But we intend them to be subject to the test of truth. If some one tells us that our philosophy is classic or romantic or profoundly imaginative, we may think these worthy graces; but if that is all, we know we have failed. Ruskin, who might excusably have been concerned with the æsthetic quality of his thought, felt himself outraged by the persistence of this type of appreciation. I have lost his words; they are something as follows: "We tell men their social order is wrong, their souls are in danger, and they reply,—'It is very beautiful.' " We should have the same reason for indignation. We intend our philosophies to convince and move men to action because they are reliable reports of the nature of the world. It is their business to be beautiful; and would that they could all be as beautiful as the works of Plato or Dante or Santayana. But their primary virtue is their truth, their primary vice, their falsity; and no one can withdraw his philosophy from this test without convicting himself of essential triviality.

There is some analogy between philosophy and biography in this respect. A good biography must be something better than faithful to fact: it must be a work of art and imagination. It must be so, in part, because without imagination it cannot be true. It is dealing with a living and therefore meaningful theme: it must present the facts of that life in the light of that person's own vision of the world. If it falls into bare chronicle, or if it substitutes the writer's vision for that of the subject, it is so far false biography. Philosophy must also be imaginative in order to be true; and philosophical imagination may also be false, because it has something objective to be true to. And if an interpretation may be false, it follows that the meaning alleged is neither on the surface of things, nor at the sole control of the interpreter. It is the objective world which is passing judgment upon it.

In some sense, then, the structure of the world is in itself significant: there is, in some sense, *an objective reason* in the make-up of things. . . .

The meanings, then, which we try to find in our philosophies are the meanings which are *there*. And with this understanding, all of the reasons which led our predecessors to doubt our capacity to judge the meaning of the world resume their force.

But the same conviction, pressed farther, carries with it the cure of that doubt. For *we also* are things in the world: and like other things there, we and our doings have a meaning. Now we are a special variety of thing, namely, philosophers, enquirers after meanings. But to suppose that the world has produced meaning-seekers incompetent to assess meanings is to suppose a typically meaningless situation, such as our first postulate forbids us to assume. Hence we cannot believe that our valuations are irrelevant to, or essentially divergent from, the objective meanings of things; our estimations of the world must be potentially competent estimations. . . .

Our second postulate, then, warrants us in taking courage anew from that great word of Aristotle, "Let us live, therefore, as if the immortal quality were our share,"—the immortal quality of valid judgment.

Our third postulate expresses one of these objective meanings of the world, and supplies a first principle of action. It is that it is *worth while to know* the meanings of things; or perhaps we might say that they *ought* to be known by us, in the sense that it is a sort of cosmic pity if they are not known!

In a world of pure fact, there is nothing objectively wrong. In a world of meanings, there are situations which we can say are wrong in themselves; among them this situation, that a meaning and its possible appreciator do not come together. It is the destiny of meaning to be understood; and if its being is not fulfilled in this way, there is just so much tragedy and loss. The fact that the meaning is there, in the object, thus creates a certain imperative, "Know the meaning of things." This, I think, is the original of all imperatives: "*Be objective*: open your mind to the objective reason of the world." Philosophy is the first response of the moral will to the world's summons, that we commit to it our ultimate fortunes, and therein realize a part of the elusive meaning of our own lives.

If interpreting were a subjective enterprise of adorning with meaning a neutral world, it would still be important, but it

would lack the imperative quality. And there are various concrete ways in which both we and the world would be the losers.

First, we should limit the possible values of the world to the measure of our desires. We suppose that desire is first and value afterward; whereas desire expands to the measure of the values it finds. Were music not presented to us, we should never know from the state of our untutored desires that *that* glory was one of the possibilities of the world. We have no reason to assume that there is any limit to the objective value of the world. On the surface, we find it moderately good and moderately bad: but moderation has no metaphysical standing. The mystic—the metaphysical mystic—reports that he has perceived a worth in being which outpasses our prudent imaginations; and if among the many mystics there is one true observer, we dare not attempt to measure the meaning of things from the psychological end, condemning ourselves forever to a universe of compromised and middling worth.

Then again we should limit our own fertility and freedom. Creative imagination has its conditions: it grows by what it feeds upon; it springs out of contemplation, and varies with hope. The capacity to invent begins in the capacity to observe,—a law which the biography of genius strikingly confirms. There is no mental parthenogenesis. Subjectivism ascribes to our minds a fertility which is not unconditionally our own; for if at any time we are gravid with meaning, it is the universe which has made us so.

And finally, we limit our own effective realism. For if the world is objectively meaningful, then it is in the most apparently meaningless and forbidding places that the greatest opportunities for the disclosure of new meanings exist: here most of all the world asks to be understood. If the values are our own, these places are in prudence to be avoided. But the philosopher knows by instinct that he is bound to open his mind unreservedly, and even by preference, to experience in its bleakest, cruelest and most refractory characters. The meaning of the meaningless is often that it be overcome or abolished; but in any case it is to be faced and understood. The philosopher must be realistic as only one who believes in objective meaning can be. For it is in the realism of the critically hopeful, not in the critical realism of the hopeless, that the world's hope lies. . . .

My fear is that I have burdened you with too much argument

rather than too little. And if so, I beg to atone for it by resorting to a form of philosophy sanctioned by the highest of names, the form of myth.

Nature was once thought to be a Sphinx, guarding a deep-wrought riddle; and we men were hypothesis-makers, hazarding guesses at the peril of our lives.

It is commonly held to-day that the Sphinx has nothing to guard. Her pretentious mystery (to adopt the language of Mr. Santayana) is but "a thin deception practised upon me by nature. The great Sphinx in posing her riddle, and looking so threatening and mysterious is secretly hoping that I may laugh. She is not a riddle but a fact. . . . Why take her residual silence for a challenge or a menace? She does not know how to speak more plainly. Her secret is as great a secret to herself as to me."¹ Then we philosophers who try to fathom her meaning are victimized like those who try to dive deep in shallow waters. The figure is untrue, and we must change the myth: for the only answer to an imperfect myth is a truer one.

According to the old Welsh legend, Merlin, the magician and prophet after spending some years as counsellor at the court of King Arthur, suddenly and mysteriously disappeared. It was supposed that he fell prey to the sorceress Nimu, who having coaxed his secret from him, used it to throw him into a trance and imprisoned him alive in a great rock.

Many years later, a wanderer lost in the mountains fell exhausted to the ground, and was startled to hear a voice coming as it seemed from the depths of the earth, and speaking in an ancient and uncouth form. He understood that the voice purported to be the voice of Merlin, and that a spell was being told which, if spoken from above, would break the prison and set Merlin free.

But he could distinguish only a few of the syllables. And though they stamped themselves upon his memory; and he set them into a ballad, which he sang up and down the mountain roads; and he fancied sometimes that while he sang there was a trembling and cracking within the hills and a great, distant shout which only he could hear; there was no deliverance. Now every seventh year a traveler is lured to that spot and another fragment of the spell is recovered and another song is made. But Merlin cannot be released until the travelers meet and join their fragments into the complete saying.

¹ George Santayana, *The Realm of Essence*, p. xix.

We philosophers, the travelers of the myth, are taking part in an age-long labor of release. The meanings we find are actual possibilities buried in the heart of the world. Our different reports are, in part, our own creations, wrought by imagination and added to the wealth of racial poetry. But they are, first of all, our debt to the infinite imprisoned meaning of the world. Our differences cannot be regarded as mere personal accidents; for it is because of these differences that the whole spell may be recovered. If we learn how our thoughts belong together, Merlin may yet walk the earth again.

W. E. HOCKING: *Philosophical Review*, Vol. XXXVII, pp. 140-155. Reprinted by permission. (With important omissions.)

SUGGESTIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. How would Hocking's three presuppositions square with James's theory that a man's philosophy is determined by his temperament? Are the presuppositions beyond the influence of temperament, and such that every philosopher would have to accept them, or are they simply expressions of the tender-minded temperament as described by James?
2. Is the fact that sense experience never gives meanings a good reason for denying that facts have meaning?
3. What is neutralism? What is the truth in it? How does Hocking try to go beyond neutralism?
4. Give an example of your own of a concept which has a double boundary in Hocking's sense.
5. Why does Hocking insist that values or meanings are more than human and that they are rooted in the nature of things? Do you think he proves this or is it just an assumption?
6. State the three defects in a subjective or man-made theory of value or meaning.
7. Compare the myth of Merlin with the vision of Thales above. Do you think that they contain the same teaching or do they represent different conceptions of the business of philosophy? Justify your answer.
8. The following autobiographical poem by Alfred Tennyson should be read in connection with Professor Hocking's interpretation of the myth of Merlin and with the section in the selection from Professor Perry on Philosophy and Art, especially the paragraph dealing with the relation of philosophy to poetry.

Merlin and the Gleam

O Young Mariner,
You from the haven
Under the sea-cliff,
You that are watching
The gray Magician

With eyes of wonder,
I am Merlin,
And *I* am dying
I am Merlin
Who follow the Gleam.

Mighty the wizard
Who found me at sunrise
Sleeping and woke me
And learn'd me Magic!
Great the Master,
And sweet the Magic,
When over the valley,
In early summers,
Over the mountain,
On human faces,
And all around me,
Moving to melody,
Floated the Gleam.

Once at the croak of a Raven
who crossed it,
A barbarous people,
Blind to the magic
And deaf to the melody,
Snarl'd at and cursed me.
A demon vexed me,
The light retreated,
The landskip darken'd,
The Master whisper'd,
"Follow the Gleam."

Then to the melody,
Over a wilderness
Gliding, and glancing at
Elf of the woodland,
Gnome of the cavern,
Griffin and Giant,
And dancing of Fairies
In desolate hollows,
And wraiths of the mountain,
And rolling of dragons
By warble of water,
Or cataract music
Of falling torrents,
Flitted the Gleam.

Down from the mountain
And over the level,
And streaming and shining on
Silent river,
Silvery willow,
Pasture and plowland,
Innocent maidens,
Garrulous children,
Homestead and harvest,
Reaper and gleaner,
And rough-ruddy faces

Of lowly labor,
Slided the Gleam.

Then, with a melody
Stronger and statelier,
Led me at length
To the city and palace
Of Arthur the King;
Touch'd at the golden
Cross of the churches,
Flash'd on the tournament,
Flicker'd and bicker'd
From helmet to helmet,
And last on the forehead
Of Arthur the blameless
Rested the Gleam.

Clouds and darkness
Closed upon Camelot;
Arthur had vanish'd
I knew not whither,
The king who loved me,
And cannot die;
For out of the darkness
Silent and slowly
The Gleam that had waned
to a wintry glimmer
On icy fallow
And faded forest,
Drew to the valley
Named of the shadow,
And slowly brightening
Out of the glimmer,
And slowly moving again
to a melody
Yearningly tender,
Fell on the shadow,
No longer a shadow,
But clothed with the Gleam.

And broader and brighter
The Gleam flying onward,
Wed to the melody,
Sang thro' the world;
And slower and fainter,
Old and weary,
But eager to follow,
I saw, whenever
In passing it glanced upon
Hamlet or city,
That under the Crosses
The dead man's garden,

The mortal hillock,
Would break into blossom;
And so to the land's
Last limit I came—
And can no longer,
But die rejoicing,
For thro' the Magic
Of Him the Mighty,
Who taught me in childhood,
There on the border
Of boundless ocean,
And all but in Heaven
Hovers the Gleam.

Not of the sunlight,
Not of the moonlight,
Not of the starlight!
O young Mariner,
Down to the haven,
Call your companions,
Launch your vessel
And crowd your canvas,
And, ere it vanishes
Over the margin,
After it, follow it,
Follow the Gleam.

CHAPTER III

THE RÔLE OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE HISTORY OF CIVILIZATION

I. ADDRESS AT THE SIXTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF PHI- LOSOPHY (1926), by *John Dewey*

Analysis

Dewey points out the ambiguities in the terms philosophy, history and civilization and states his own view that they are all aspects of the same evolving process. He contrasts this view with that which makes philosophy the study of eternal, unchanging truths, indicating the implicit contradiction in that view when it is embodied in a history of philosophy. For to write a history of philosophy is to admit that philosophy is a developing aspect of culture. The common element in the two opposed views Dewey considers to be the interest both types of philosophers have in *meaning* rather than in *truth*. He develops this contrast between meaning and truth. This leads him to make external nature, as dealt with in physics and astronomy, for example, subordinate to "conscious experience," the latter being "the only measure there is of the former." Philosophy is then identified with the growing edge of a culture, where new ideas in science and politics are continually being grafted into the mind of the race as constituted by the traditional body of beliefs. The philosophers "ideas" are not facts, but *guiding policies* which definitely aim to control the future developments of a culture. The author denies that this would mean only one dominant philosophy for each age on the ground that growth is only possible where philosophical ideas are in conflict. Hence any advance in civilization demands that there always be rival philosophies. While science exercises the negative influence on philosophy of eliminating such philosophical ideas as are incompatible with the body of scientific knowledge, nevertheless imagination plays a much greater rôle in philosophy than in science. Dewey then suggests that the time is ripe for the development of an indigenous American philosophy which will express the aspirations of our own culture, instead of being primarily based upon the thought of European philosophers. He would even welcome a materialistic American philosophy, if it were really expressive of our own culture.

Volumes have been written about each term of our theme. What is civilization? history? philosophy? Yet time passes, and as ambiguities and complexities cannot be eliminated by definition, we can only circumvent them by begging questions. But as to one of the terms at least, namely, philosophy, we shall

frankly make what is begged explicit. A statement of the relations of philosophy to the history of civilization will, after all, only expound, in some indirect manner, the view of philosophy to which one is already committed. Unless this fact is faced, we shall not only beg the issue, but we shall deceive ourselves into thinking that we are setting forth the conclusions of an original inquiry, undertaken and executed independently of our own philosophical conceptions.

As for myself, then, the discussion is approached with the antecedent idea that philosophy, like politics, literature, and the plastic arts, is itself a phenomenon of human culture. Its connection with social history, with civilization, is intrinsic. There is current among those who philosophize the conviction that, while past thinkers have reflected in their systems the conditions and perplexities of their own day, present-day philosophy in general and one's own philosophy in particular, is emancipated from the influence of that complex of institutions which forms culture. Bacon, Descartes, Kant, each thought with fervor that he was founding philosophy anew because he was placing it securely upon an exclusive intellectual basis, exclusive, that is, of everything but intellect. The movement of time has revealed the illusion; it exhibits as the work of philosophy the old and ever new undertaking of adjusting that body of traditions which constitute the actual mind of man to scientific tendencies and political aspirations which are novel and incompatible with received authorities. Philosophers are parts of history, caught in its movement; creators perhaps in some measure of its future, but also assuredly creatures of its past.

Those who assert in the abstract definition of philosophy that it deals with eternal truth or reality, untouched by local time and place, are forced to admit that philosophy as a concrete existence is historical, having temporal passage and a diversity of local habitations. Open your histories of philosophies, and find written throughout them the same periods of time and the same geographical distributions which provide the intellectual scheme of histories of politics, industry, or the fine arts. I cannot imagine a history of philosophy which did not partition its material between the Occident and the Orient; which did not find the former falling into ancient, mediæval, and modern epochs; which in setting forth Greek thought did not specify Asiatic and Italian colonies and Athens. . . .

The two views of the history of thought are usually proffered

as unreconcilable opposites. According to one, it is the record of the most profound dealings of the reason with ultimate being; according to the other, it is a scene of pretentious claims and ridiculous failures. Nevertheless, there is a point of view from which there is something common to the two notions, and this common denominator is more significant than the oppositions. Meaning is wider in scope as well as more precious in value than is truth, and philosophy is occupied with meaning rather than with truth. Making such a statement is dangerous; it is easily misconceived to signify that truth is of no great importance under any circumstances; while the fact is that truth is so infinitely important when it is important at all, namely, in records of events and descriptions of existences, that we extend its claims to regions where it has no jurisdiction. But even as respects truths, meaning is the wider category; truths are but one class of meanings, namely, those in which a claim to verifiability by their consequences is an intrinsic part of their meaning. Beyond this island of meanings which in their own nature are true or false lies the ocean of meanings to which truth and falsity are irrelevant. We do not inquire whether Greek civilization was true or false, but we are immensely concerned to penetrate its meaning. We may indeed ask for the truth of Shakespeare's "Hamlet" or Shelley's "Skylark," but by truth we now signify something quite different from that of scientific statement and historical record.

In philosophy we are dealing with something comparable to the meaning of Athenian civilization or of a drama or a lyric. Significant history is lived in the imagination of man, and philosophy is a further excursion of the imagination into its own prior achievements. All that is distinctive of man, marking him off from the clay he walks upon or the potatoes he eats, occurs in his thought and emotions, in what we have agreed to call consciousness. To know the structure of sticks and stones, an enterprise in which, of course, truth is essential, apart from whatever added control it may yield, marks in the end but an enrichment of consciousness, of the area of meanings. Were significance identical with existence, were values the same as events, idealism would be the only possible philosophy. Thus scientific thought itself is finally but a function of the imagination in enriching life with the significance of things; it is of its peculiar essence that it must also submit to certain tests of application and control.

It is commonplace that physically and existentially man can but make a superficial and transient scratch upon the outermost rind of the world. It has become a cheap intellectual pastime to contrast the infinitesimal pettiness of man with the vastness of the stellar universe. Yet all such comparisons are illicit. We cannot compare existence and meaning; they are disparate. The characteristic life of man is itself the meaning of vast stretches of existence, and without it the latter have no value or significance. There is no measure of physical existence and conscious experience because the latter is the only measure there is for the former. The significance of being, though not its existence, is the emotion it stirs, the thought it sustains.

It follows that there is no specifiable difference between philosophy and its rôle in the history of civilization. Discover and define some characteristic, some unique function in civilization, and you have defined philosophy itself. To try to define philosophy in any other way is to search for a will-o'-the-wisp; the conceptions which result are of purely private interpretation for they only exemplify the particular philosophies of their authorship and interpretation. Take the history of philosophy from whatever angle and in whatever cross-section you please, Indian, Chinese, Athenian, the Europe of the twelfth or the twentieth century, and you find a load of traditions proceeding from an immemorial past. You find certain preoccupying interests that appear hypnotic in their rigid hold upon imagination and you also find certain resistances, certain dawning rebellions, in struggle to escape and to express some fresh value of life. The preoccupations may be political and artistic as in Athens; they may be economic and scientific as to-day. But in any case, there is a certain intellectual work to be done, the dominant interest working throughout the minds of masses of men has to be clarified, a result which can be accomplished only by selection, elimination, reduction, and formulation; it has to be intellectually forced, exaggerated, in order to be focussed, to be, that is, intellectually, in consciousness, since all clear consciousness by its very nature marks a wrenching of something from its subordinate place to confer upon it a centrality which is existentially absurd. Where there is sufficient depth and range of meanings for consciousness to arise at all, there is a function of adjustment, of logical reconciliation of the ruling interest of the period with preoccupations which had a different origin and an irrelevant meaning. Consider, for example, the uneasy restless effort

of Plato to adapt his new mathematical insights and his political aspirations to the traditional habits of Athens; the almost humorously complacent union of Christian supernaturalism in the Middle Ages with the naturalism of pagan Greece; the still fermenting effort of the recent age to unite the new science of nature with inherited classic and mediæval institutions. The life of all thought is to effect a junction at some point of the new and the old, of deep-sunk customs and unconscious dispositions, brought to the light of attention by some conflict with newly emerging directions of activity. Philosophies which emerge at distinctive periods define the larger patterns of continuity which are woven in effecting the longer enduring junctions of a stubborn past and an insistent future.

Philosophy thus sustains the closest connection with the history of culture, with the succession of changes in civilization. It is fed by the streams of tradition, traced at critical moments to their sources in order that the current may receive a new direction; it is fertilized by the ferment of new inventions in industry, new exploration of the globe, new discoveries in science. But philosophy is not just a passive reflex of civilization that persists through changes, and that changes while persisting. It is itself a change; the patterns formed in this junction of the new and the old are prophecies rather than records; they are policies, attempts to forestall subsequent developments. The intellectual registrations which constitute a philosophy are generative just because they are selecting and eliminating exaggerations. While purporting to say that such and such is and always has been the purport of the record of nature, in effect they proclaim that such and such *should* be the significant value to which mankind should loyally attach itself. . . .

Thus philosophy marks a change of culture. In forming patterns to be conformed to in future thought and action, it is additive and transforming in its rôle in the history of civilization. Man states anything at his peril; once stated, it occupies a place in a new perspective; it attains a permanence which does not belong to its existence; it enters provokingly into wont and use; it points in a troubling way to need of new endeavors. I do not mean that the creative element in the rôle of philosophy is necessarily the dominant one; obviously its formulations have been often chiefly conservative, justificatory of selected elements of traditions and received institutions. But even these preservative systems have had transforming if not exactly a

creative effect; they have lent the factors which were selected a power over later human imagination and sentiment which they would otherwise have lacked. And there are other periods, such as those of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in Europe, when philosophy is overtly revolutionary in attitude. To themselves, the turn was just from complete error to complete truth; to later generations looking back, the alteration in strictly factual content does not compare with that in desire and tendency of effort.

Of the many objections which may be brought against the conception that philosophy not only *has* a rôle, but that it *is* a specifiable rôle in the development of human culture, there are two misconceptions which I wish to touch upon. What has been said, taken without qualifying additions, might suggest a picture of a dominant system of philosophy at each historic period. In fact there are diverse currents and aspirations in almost every historic epoch; the divergence of philosophic systems instead of being a reproach (as of course it is from the standpoint of philosophy as a revelation of truth) is evidence of sincerity and vitality. If the ruling and the oppressed elements in a population, those who wished to maintain the *status quo* and those concerned to make changes, had, when they became articulate, the same philosophy, one might well be skeptical of its intellectual integrity. The other point is much more important. In making a distinction between meaning and truth and asserting that the latter is but one type of meaning, important under definite conditions, I have expressed the idea as if there might be in the processes of human life meanings which are wholly cut off from the actual course of events. Such is not the intent; meanings are generated and in some degree sustained by existence. Hence they cannot be wholly irrelevant to the world of existence; they all have revelatory office which should be apprehended as correctly as possible. This is true of politics, religion, and art as well as of philosophy. They all tell something of the realm of existence. But in all of them there is an exuberance and fertility of meanings and values in comparison with which correctness of telling is a secondary affair, while in the function termed science the accuracy of telling is the chief matter.

In the historic rôle of philosophy, the scientific factor, the element of correctness, of verifiable applicability, has a place, but it is a negative one. The meanings delivered by confirmed

observation, experimentation, and calculation, scientific facts and principles, in other words, serve as tests of the values which tradition transmits and for those which emotion suggests. Whatever is not compatible with them must be eliminated in any sincere philosophizing. This fact confers upon scientific knowledge an incalculably important office in philosophy. But the criterion is negative; the exclusion of the inconsistent is far from being identical with a positive test which demands that only what has been scientifically verifiable supply the entire content of philosophy. It is the difference between imagination that acknowledges responsibility to logical compatibility with demands of ascertained facts, and a complete abdication of all imagination in behalf of a prosy literalism.

Finally, it results from what has been said that the presence and absence of native-born philosophies is a severe test of the depth of unconscious tradition and rooted institution among any people, and of the productive force of their culture. For sake of brevity, I may be allowed to take our own case, the case of civilization in the United States. Philosophy, we have been saying, is a conversion of such culture as exists into consciousness, into imagination which is logically coherent and is not incompatible with what is factually known. But this conversion is itself a further movement of civilization itself; it is not something performed upon the body of habits and tendencies from without, that is, miraculously. If American civilization does not eventuate in an imaginative formulation of itself, if it merely re-arranges the figures already named and placed, in playing an inherited European game, that fact is itself the measure of the culture which we have achieved. A deliberate striving for an American Philosophy as such would be only another evidence of the same emptiness and impotency. There is energy and activity among us, enough and to spare. Not an inconsiderable part of the vigor that once went into industrial accomplishment now finds its way into science; our scientific "plant" is coming in its way to rival our industrial plants. Especially in psychology and the social sciences an amount of effort is putting forth which is hardly equalled in the rest of the world. He would be a shameless braggart who claimed that the result is as yet adequate to the activity. What is the matter? It lies, I think, with our lack of imagination in generating leading ideas. Because we are afraid of speculative ideas, we do, and do over and over again, an immense amount of dead,

specialized work in the region of "facts." We forget that facts are only data; that is, are only fragmentary, uncompleted meanings, and unless they are rounded out into complete ideas—a work which can only be done by hypotheses, by a free imagination of intellectual possibilities—they are as helpless as are maimed things and as repellent as are needlessly thwarted events.

Please do not imagine that this is a plea in disguise for any particular type of philosophizing. On the contrary, any philosophy which is a sincere outgrowth and expression of our own civilization is better than none, provided it utters the authentic idiom of an enduring and dominating corporate experience. If we are really, for instance, a materialistic people, we are at least materialistic in a new fashion and on a new scale. I should welcome then a consistent materialistic philosophy, if only it were sufficiently bold, and, in spite of any attendant æsthetic repulsiveness, in the degree in which it marked the coming to consciousness of a group of ideas, which formulated a coming to self-consciousness of our civilization and thereby furnished ideas, supplied an intellectual polity, to direct further observations and experiments and to organize their results on a grand scale. As long as we worship science and are afraid of philosophy we shall have no great science, except a lagging and halting continuation of what is thought and said elsewhere. As far as any plea is implicit in what has been said, it is, then, a plea for the casting off of that intellectual timidity which hampers the wings of imagination, a plea for speculative audacity, for more faith in ideas, sloughing off a cowardly reliance upon those partial ideas to which we are wont to give the name of facts.

JOHN DEWEY: *Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy*. Edited by E. S. Brightman, pp. 536-542. Published by Longmans, Green and Company. Reprinted by permission.

SUGGESTIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. What do you think of Dewey's distinction between truth and meaning? Try to formulate an illustration that will make this distinction clearer.
2. How would Dewey's idea of philosophy square with the notion that philosophy is rather a life of contemplation than an active effort to bring about changes in social evolution? Do you think

that the contemplative idea of philosophy is tied up with the view he rejects in the third paragraph?

3. Would Dewey's view that conflicting philosophical ideas are essential to progress in a culture have any bearing on the ideal of abolishing or outlawing war? If so, what?
4. To what extent does Dewey think a materialistic philosophy would be justified in the United States?

II. ADDRESS AT THE SIXTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF PHILOSOPHY (1926), by *S. Radhakrishnan*

Analysis

Admitting that every civilization has its peculiar philosophy and that this is inevitably an expression of the temperament of the people who created it and of the environmental conditions at the time it was created, Radhakrishnan nevertheless insists that there is an unchanging reality which philosophers contemplate and by which they are controlled. The philosopher is rooted in the history of his own culture and reflects that history in his philosophy. Philosophy is creative because it transforms the life of the people. Yet the great philosopher is contemplative and through contemplation he discovers an ideal the slow realization of which in the life of a people is the work of centuries. The author then points out the numerous changes in modern life in all of its aspects which have been brought about by the new developments in the special sciences. All old ideals are in a weak and vanishing stage in their evolution. New ideals are everywhere in process of formation. This is philosophy's golden opportunity. Even scientists, in trying to heal the wounds which they have made, are abandoning irreligious philosophies and are more and more demanding a spiritual interpretation of reality. Radhakrishnan states such a spiritual philosophy very briefly and applies it to the problems of religion and of social relations. He pleads for the acceptance of a new philosophy of life "fair to science and faithful to true religion."

"A civilized nation which has no metaphysics is like a temple decked with every kind of ornament, but possessing no holy of holies" (Hegel). Hegel does not mean by "metaphysics" here epistemology or logic, but a definite theory of the universe, a world-view, what Plato would call a synoptic vision of reality, which takes into account not only the movements of matter, but the teleological attitudes of men, and which does justice to every side of human experience. Every civilization implies such a metaphysics, even as it has its art and literature, social and religious life. The philosophy of a particular nation will reflect the general temperament of its people, and will bear special reference to the problems of the age when it was formulated.

Each system of thought has its own formulas, its own characteristic applications and phrases, its own way of encountering the new problems which always come up in life and thought. It does not, however, mean that there are no universal interests or any objectivity in truth. Simply because the way in which the problems are proposed and the forms in which the solutions are presented vary, we cannot conclude that truth changes its nature with its temporal course or local setting. Philosophy, as a *study* of reality, is subject to evolution. Our knowledge of reality grows, but it does not necessarily follow that the real itself, as distinct from the actual, is evolving. As we are finding it increasingly difficult to account for cosmic evolution on the principle of mechanical adaption to environment, we will find it equally difficult to explain completely the history of philosophic development on the basis of the temperament of the thinkers and the nature of their immediate surroundings. There is, all through, the pressure of an absolute ideal, the control exercised by the nature of reality.

I agree with Professor Dewey in thinking that philosophy, or our knowledge or reality, is psychologically mediated. The individual thinker is not merely reason, naked and undefiled. His rational character is an element in a complex setting. Any human being is not an abstract entity, a mere mind or mechanism, but a product of history, with his roots in a long racial, social, and ancestral past. History makes him what he is, and determines his way of approach. The point at which the world presses on him varies with his geographical position and his historical environment. The problems which face a philosopher in China at the present moment are different from those which engage the thinkers in this country. The conditioning forces of geography and history enable us to understand the whole course of thought, Eastern and Western, their accents and emphasis, their variations and developments.

Philosophy is not simply a theoretical counterpart of the social and spiritual life of a people, but it has a normative function. From the time of the Upanishads in the East and Plato in the West, it has been the task of philosophers to guide the development of the people by formulating ideals and pointing out which of the experiences are to be regarded as central for human life. Philosophy is not a mere reproduction of the facts of life, but is essentially creative in the sense of transforming life. The philosopher meditates on the deeper

problems, and the people at large absorb the results of his inquiry. A civilization is a philosophy concretized.

There are thinkers of the present day who ask us to purge philosophy of all interest in morals and society. It is, however, impossible for a true philosopher to eliminate himself entirely from his surroundings. But he should adopt an attitude of detachment and dispassion. It requires a spacious and sensitive mind to understand the different attitudes of men, their ideals and aspirations, and to guide them to their purpose. If we are to get a comprehensive and synoptic vision, we must step aside for a while, and watch the procession. To be able to transform life, we must transcend life, not merely for the sake of transcending it, but also for the sake of transforming it. Philosophy is first to be contemplated before it is worked out. The recognition of the ideal is the first step, while its slow realization is the work of centuries.

It is not necessary for me to give you any illustrations from history to show how a philosophy has a true organic relation to its environment. . . . I may perhaps indicate how a system of philosophy at the present day, if it is to be adequate and alive, should be relevant to our present problems which are in a sense unique. Our main interest as a Congress of Philosophy is not so much academic and antiquarian, as contemporary and creative. I believe that there has been no age in the history of the world so full of interest and anxiety to the thoughtful as is the present one. The determining factor in the present situation of the world is the rôle of science. Modern science is breaking down barriers and is creating common interests. The philosophy of the future is likely to be less provincial in character. The world over we seem to be faced by the same problems. The new mathematics, the new physics, the new psychology are revolutionizing accepted notions of space and time, matter and mind. A rethinking of the problems of the borderland has become urgent.

The advances of science have not only disturbed the peace of the philosophers but have also upset social order and spiritual bases. The world is becoming outwardly uniform, though not yet inwardly united. The shrinkage of space is raising its own problems. The East and the West have become next-door neighbors, but not yet understanding friends. We are anxious for world-unity, but are not prepared for getting rid of the habit of mind which makes for world-discord.

When we turn from international to national concerns, our problems are not less acute. Democracy is passing through a testing time. Fascism in Italy and Bolshevism in Russia are only two examples. The class-conflicts in the economic world point to an unstable social equilibrium. The theory that society is a piece of mechanism which will adjust itself automatically through the operation of economic forces of freedom of contract and competition, is steadily losing ground. The workmen claim higher wages and more leisure, with facilities for education and enlightenment, recreation and relaxation. But they do not know how to make constructive use of their leisure, and are devising expensive ways of killing it.

In domestic relations, the upsetting of conventional standards is causing disturbance. There is a lack of understanding between the older and the younger generations. In the traditional codes men have claimed freedom for themselves and have demanded discipline for women. Often men set at rest all bickerings by referring to the natural superiority of women. But women are coming into their own, and are refusing to be our superiors. They are insisting with great force and, I regret to say, much success on becoming our equals. We seem to be more anxious for equality than for quality. It is not very modern for a man or a woman who is sick of his or her partner to take another, but what is modern is a philosophy in justification of it. We have had wickedness with us from the beginning of human history, but we are giving the old habit a new name, self-expression, or wider life. We are regularizing irregularities.

When we come to personal religion, we see an extraordinary amount of restlessness. The sciences of psychology, sociology, and anthropology are undermining the foundations of orthodox theology in every religion. The varied accounts of religious experience seem to support the view that God is but a shadow of the human mind, a dream of the human heart. The application of the empirical method to religious experience has had unsettling results. Mystics, we were told this morning, are highly suggestible folk, given to externalizing their private fancies. An attitude of atheistic naturalism, of humanistic idealism is becoming more popular. The textbooks of the past do not seem to be of much help in solving the problems of the present. No prophet of old, it is asserted, could have anticipated our difficulties, or understood them. Any attempt to reinterpret ancient faith to suit modern needs may show reverence for

the past, but not intellectual honesty. Our modern educated young men have no use for religion as trust in God, or communion with the Unseen. We have built up our technique of society, and are trying to live clean lives; and religion has some pragmatic value as an attitude of life making for social peace and betterment. In every religious community we have a large number of people who are avoiding the discomfort of thinking, and growing indifferent to the problems of the higher life. Others there are, who shut their eyes to the facts of science and modern knowledge; and like horses in blinkers, they go by the beaten track. The cultured stand by a vague social idealism but no amount of ethical exhortation can take the place of religion. Many openly avow doctrines of selfishness in morals and anarchism in social life.

On every side of life, personal, social, national, and international, the old ideals have ceased to carry conviction. The old science, the old theology, the old sex code, the old economics, the old political theory, and the old international standards are doomed. We cannot revert to them. The fundamentalist's attitude in all these departments has no future.

The new ideals have not come into being. Here is the chance for philosophy. Are we to drift, waiting for something to turn up? Or shall we undertake the spiritual direction of the community? If philosophy is not to abdicate its function, it has to face the challenge of the present situation, and quickly, too. We are not so much in need of a keen analysis of particular problems, as those of essence and existence, sense and perspectives, or a pragmatic insistence on methodology and on the futility of metaphysics, interesting as they all are, but philosophy in the larger sense of the term, a spiritual view of the universe, broad-based on the results of the sciences and the aspirations of humanity. It is no use reasserting conventional views; for that would be to ignore the inwardness of the present unrest. We have to steer a middle course between orthodox theology and godless naturalism.

It is a welcome sign of the times that science, which has inflicted the wounds, is also trying to heal them up. Some of the greatest philosophers of the present day are scientific metaphysicians. They are not satisfied with the facile solutions of a crude naturalism. It is becoming increasingly evident that a scientific view of the world does not make God superfluous. The passing flux of the world is not like the heaving and hurrying,

yet ultimately unprogressive movement of an agitated sea. The course of life is not a series of accidents, but is an ordered ascent from the fresh beginnings of life up to man, and from the primitive uncivilized man to the more spiritual type. The world is tending towards deification, to use the phrase of Alexander. The subjection of the cosmic process to law, and its tendency to produce higher values suggest a Creative Principle operating throughout the course of nature, bringing about ever new and higher forms of life on the stage prepared for it by the lower. This creative urge, this immanent drive in things, this *nisus* towards increasing diversity and perfection, whatever we may call it, indicates the reality of an ultimate Spirit which in religious terms is called God. Such a view is also in harmony with the religious history of the world. From the primitive savage, kneeling before some supposedly sacred tree or holy stone, thrilled with the thought that somewhere at the back of created matter lies and vibrates a Force, a Power beyond his knowing, into contact with which he must somehow come, down to the great faiths of to-day, men have understood that God is the reality behind and beyond and within the shifting panorama of nature and history.

The interpretation of this cosmic evolution, whether in terms of emergent or creative evolution, requires us to admit that God's creative activity is not confined to the significant stages in the evolutionary process, but inspires the whole onward march. God does not intervene to create mind or life or spiritual insight, but is working continuously. Creation is not an instantaneous act, but is an eternal process. The immanence of God which follows from this hypothesis is the pledge that evil and error, ugliness and imperfection are not ultimate. Evil has reference to the distance which good has to traverse. Error is the stage on the pathway to truth. Ugly is only half-way to a thing, in Meredith's phrase.

The human being has much in common with plant life and animal world, but in addition has power to understand his place in the world's scheme and to share in the work of God. He can control his growth, as plants and animals cannot. Pre-human progress *happened*. Human progress can be *willed*. Each of us has a place in the great adventure. We can use the material with which we are supplied to promote our spiritual ideals. We have enough freedom to deal with the given material. Human development is not a mere passive unfolding of which each step

is rigorously determined by the preceding, but is a process of active reconstruction, conditioned by the materials furnished by experience. Until the different individuals realize the purposes with which they are charged, the world-process is unfinished.

Some such view, it seems to me, will help to clear up our present confusion. Religion will not be a mere sanction for the rules of conduct. It is a vision of reality, superior to the historical process. In religious life we endeavor to gain a foothold in the world of eternal values from which to dominate and transmute the life of time. Religion is not merely social service and vague humanitarianism, but confidence in the supremacy of a spiritual reality which gives us strength, and faith in the hour of need that, though the waves on the shore may be broken, the ocean conquers nevertheless. It is not only a life transforming, but a life transcending. The world is suffering, not for lack of light, but for lack of power. We have a high moral tone, but not much moral fervor. We speak of brotherhood, but with little real brotherly love. We love humanity in the abstract, but pass it by in the concrete. We love the beggars on the stage, but not at the theater-door nor even at the temple-door. The dynamic energy to make us live up to our ideals comes, not from the mind, but from the depths of the soul. Self-discipline is a necessary quality of moral life. If we do not cast out the devil from our nature, we cannot exorcise it from the society which it torments. We cannot be satisfied with social idealism, however divine it may be. We may be doing God's work all the time, but let us keep some free moments for self-examination and communion with the Eternal. Prayers to Deity now and then are not enough, but we should also hold our soul in patience, and wait in silence for the answers to our prayers. Such an attitude is likely to develop a serenity of mind and poise which will not be disturbed by the shocks of circumstance. Endurance and reform and not indignation and destruction should be our ideal. There is no use in being condemnatory towards a sinner. We must stretch out to him the hand of sympathy and fellowship as a pilgrim who has been led astray. Every sinner has a future, even as every saint has had a past. The worst criminal has within him an indestructible potency of regeneration. He can turn over a new leaf, and gain a new start.

If this spiritual attitude controls our life from its apex to its foundation, then it will help to sanctify society itself. The

secular and the religious aspects of life are not two independent departments, governed by independent laws, but relative distinctions within a larger whole. We should welcome the world of human appetites as the scaffolding from amid which the life of the spirit must rise. The purpose of the institution of marriage is not mutual satisfaction, but enhancement of personality. There is a great saying in the Upanishads, "Not for the sake of the husband is the husband dear, but the husband is dear for the sake of the spirit. Not for the sake of the wife is the wife dear, but the wife is dear for the sake of the spirit." We are not simply individuals, but members of society, and pursuers of spiritual ideals. Life is not merely a list of opportunities for self-satisfaction, but a set of obligations for realizing spiritual good. If life is to be lived merely from moment to moment, then there will be nothing to live for. Self-realization consists, not in the raw exercise of elemental passions, but in their sublimation. Except in the pages of fiction we do not have two people agreeing with each other in tastes and temper, in ideals and aspirations. No two persons are alike. The differences are the material which have to be worked into a harmonious whole. If the existence of incompatibility be a justification for separation, most of us would be divorced. No! It is a challenge to a strenuous life. Marriage is the beginning of the problem, and has for its end the transformation of one's chance mate into a lifelong comrade. Those who enter married life should be prepared for the exercise of patience and restraint. Women insist on equality; they are welcome to do so. But only let them impose their higher standards of discipline on men, rather than accept the lower standards of freedom which they rightly deprecate, or used to deprecate, in men.

In the economic world coöperation should take the place of competition. We must give up the individualistic view, and look upon society as a system of mutual, though varying, obligations held together by a common ideal. Every kind of function is valuable, so long as it serves the social good. Democracy does not mean equality of endowment or function, but equality of value as human beings. Each man as man has a value which is unique, and a dignity which is inalienable. The workers are certainly entitled to the essential conditions of well-being, but should not forget that what is necessary for well-being is not simply easier circumstances, or more comforts of life and larger

opportunities for pleasure, but inner harmony and spiritual poise. The great religious teachers speak to us of a peace which the world can neither give nor take away. Without serenity and poise, restraint and self-control, we are not truly civilized, however great may be our outward accomplishments. A monkey trained to ride a bicycle and smoke a pipe is still a monkey.

In the world of international relations we are to realize that national, racial, religious imperialism does not make for peace. Unless we grow internationally minded, peace will not break out on earth. We cannot get rid of wars and rumors of wars simply by talking of peace and actually preparing for war. When a nation in the height of its power and the plenitude of wealth helps its weak neighbor, even at the sacrifice of its interests, that act will bring peace nearer than all conferences and congresses on peace. We cannot accomplish spiritual ends by mechanical measures.

Our attitude towards races whom we are pleased to call primitive and savage must be one of sympathy. The "primitive" and the "savage" but for the grace of God are ourselves under much less favorable conditions. We should see in the differences of races and nations the means by which humanity should progress through mutual service and enrichment to its complete, full-orbed development.

In the sphere of religion we cannot adopt the dualistic attitude that the plants in my garden are of God, while those in my neighbor's garden are planted by the devil which we should destroy at any cost. It is unfair to God and man to assume that He has entrusted His exclusive revelation to some one prophet, Buddha, Jesus, or Mohammed, expecting all others to borrow from him, or else suffer spiritual destitution.

The present needs make upon philosophy a demand to put forth a constructive theory of life, fair to science and faithful to true religion, a philosophy which would insist on the supremacy of a spiritual reality and the practice of self-discipline and self-sacrificing service. This seems to me to be the rôle of philosophy in the present stage of the history of civilization.

S. RADHAKRISHNAN: *Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy*. Edited by E. S. Brightman, pp. 543-550. Published by Longmans, Green & Co. Reprinted by permission.

SUGGESTIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. State the chief difference between Dewey and Radhakrishnan. If you see any points on which they are in agreement, state them.
2. Does Radhakrishnan prove that his spiritual philosophy would solve the complicated problems of modern life or does he merely assume it?
3. How does his idea of the relation of philosophy to civilization differ from that of Dewey?
4. Which of these two thinkers seems to you to be the more progressive and why?
5. Which seems to you to be nearer to the American ideal of life and why?
6. Do you think that Radhakrishnan's emphasis on God is compatible with Dewey's view? Why or why not?

CHAPTER IV

THE CHIEF DIVISIONS AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY

I. DEFINITIONS OF THE MAIN BRANCHES OF PHILOSOPHY, by *W. P. Montague*

Analysis

The author first defines the three great philosophical subjects—Methodology, Metaphysics and Theory of Value—and their important subdivisions. He makes it clear that there is considerable overlapping of these divisions. In connection with a definition of epistemology he states briefly the three chief theories in this branch of methodology, and in connection with a definition of logic he distinguishes the problem of validating beliefs from that of finding their origin. He points out that the five possible origins of belief have given rise to five types of logical theory. None of these is true to the exclusion of the others, since each theory is especially applicable to a particular type of belief. Moreover, there is still a sixth type of logical theory based upon the fact that some beliefs are incapable either of being proved or disproved.

The grand divisions of Philosophy are: I, Methodology; II, Metaphysics, and III, Theory of Value.

The Theory of Value is concerned with the nature of ideals and with the ways in which they may be made actual. It may be subdivided into: (1) the study of the good and of the means of realizing it in conduct, which is Ethics; and (2) the study of the beautiful and of the means of realizing it in art, which is *Æsthetics*.

Metaphysics is concerned with all questions of a general and fundamental character as to the nature of the real. It may be subdivided into: (1) Analytical Metaphysics or Ontology, which is the study of the basic categories of the sciences; and (2) Synthetic Metaphysics or Cosmology, which is the study of the generic conclusions of the sciences, and which, by the inter-relating of these, produces a unified picture of the world as a whole.

Methodology may be subdivided into: (1) Logic, and (2)

Epistemology, which deal respectively with the ways of attaining and with the ways of interpreting knowledge.

It is clear that these three main divisions of philosophy are partly, though only partly, independent of one another. What ought to be in the way of goodness and beauty is not necessarily determined by what actually exists. To that extent the ideals of ethics and æsthetics are independent of the conclusions of metaphysics. But the manner in which our ideals can be realized is obviously controlled by the kind of world we live in; hence, from the standpoint of the practical moralist and artist the philosophy of values is to some extent bound up with the theories of metaphysics. The same mixture of dependence and independence is to be found in the relation between metaphysics and methodology. What criteria we shall use to attain truth will depend largely upon the nature of the reality we are investigating; and yet the same criteria may often be used to test the most diverse judgments. And as with logic so also with epistemology. The ways of interpreting truth as such, or the knowledge relation itself, will certainly depend in part upon what psychology and physics reveal as to the nature of the knowing subject and the known object. Yet here again the epistemological problem of whether realism or idealism is correct in its interpretation of the knowledge relation is a problem which at least in some of its aspects is independent of the particular nature of the terms of that relation. And finally, it would be easy to show that the relation between theories of method and theories of value contains a similar blend of dependence and independence.

In the philosophy of the last two centuries, however, the problems of method have been interwoven with those of metaphysics to such an extent that the issues distinctive of each have been lost sight of. For this reason it has seemed worth while to attempt a segregation of the two branches of methodology, which we have called logic and epistemology, from each other and from the other problems of philosophy.

As preparatory to this effort to isolate the methodological inquiry into the Ways of Knowing from the metaphysical inquiry into the Ways of Being, we must consider more specifically the two branches of methodology which we have referred to as logic and epistemology.

Epistemology, or the theory of knowledge, includes many problems and is consequently susceptible of many definitions.

We prefer to treat under this title that phase of the knowledge relation which throughout the history of philosophy has generated the sharpest and most significant controversy. *To what extent, if any, are the things and qualities of the world dependent upon their being related as objects to a knower or subject?*

On this question there are three classic theories which have contended with one another for acceptance. First, there is the theory of "objectivism" or epistemological *realism* which holds that objects exist exactly as they are apprehended, that things are in themselves and apart from us just what they seem to be when we experience them, and that consciousness reveals directly the nature of external reality. Secondly, there is the theory of "subjectivism" or epistemological *idealism* which holds that the nature and existence of an object is constituted by its relation to a mind or subject, and that consequently all reality in so far as it can be conceived at all must be conceived as conscious experience. Thirdly, there is the "representative" or "copy" theory of knowledge which we have called epistemological *dualism*. According to this theory objects are of two kinds, internal objects or "ideas," depending upon consciousness and directly revealed by it; and external or physical objects which are independent of consciousness and never directly experienced by it, but which can and must be inferred as the hypothetical causes of experience. . . .

. . . In traditional philosophy formal logic has been defined as the art and science of correct thinking. And correctness of thinking has been regarded as meaning only correctness of inference from premises to conclusion. It is obvious, however, that if, as logicians, we are seeking for principles of correct thinking, we cannot remain satisfied with the discovery of rules which do no more than make our conclusions accord with our premises. We must extend our search until we discover principles by which our premises can themselves be made valid. This search for criteria of absolute validity and material truth as distinguished from relative validity and formal truth has sometimes been regarded as a branch of epistemology. We prefer, however, to regard it as the logical goal of logic itself. By logic, then, we shall mean *the search for the ultimate criteria by the use of which our beliefs can be validated and true knowledge be attained.*

As will be seen, the problem of validating beliefs is intimately associated with the problem of ascertaining the source of beliefs. Hence in connection with the logical problem of validity we

shall treat to some extent the psychological problems of genesis.

Our ideas and beliefs can be traced to one or more of the following origins: (1) Testimony of others; (2) Intuition, which is at least partly grounded in instincts, feelings, and desires; (3) Abstract reasoning from universal principles; (4) Sensory experience; (5) Practical activity having successful consequences. Each of these sources may be, and actually has been accepted as indicating a primary criterion for determining philosophic truth; and thus to the five sources of belief there correspond the following five types of logical theory: (1) Authoritarianism; (2) Mysticism; (3) Rationalism; (4) Empiricism; (5) Pragmatism.

For each of these types of logical theory there exists a type of belief for the validation of which it appears to be especially suited. To illustrate: any one of us, if asked whence we derived our belief in the existence of Napoleon Bonaparte and on what grounds we held it, would reply that the belief was derived from the testimony of historians and held on the ground of authority. Again, all of us hold certain beliefs which seem to have no basis of support other than that of intuition. The feeling that dark places and dead bodies are dangerous; that these persons are to be trusted and those distrusted; that certain ultimate evaluations of life and the universe must be accepted. All these are examples of the class of attitudes and beliefs of the second or mystical kind. The third or rationalistic criterion applies most naturally to mathematical propositions such as $7 + 5 = 12$, the truth of which is derived from and tested by deductive reasoning from certain universally accepted principles. Beliefs about particular things such as that grass will be green and that snow will be cold are derived from and tested by perceptual experience, and hence exemplify the use of the fourth criterion, that of empiricism. Beliefs that refer to the future and that are assumed primarily as bases for action illustrate the fifth or pragmatic criterion, which is not always easy to distinguish from empiricism. Such judgments as that an enterprise in which we are about to engage will be successful, that the future will resemble the past, are founded neither on direct perception nor on deduction from self-evident principles. They appear to be postulates which have been derived from the exigencies of practical conduct, and we are content to test them by their practical results. If they work badly, we reject them as false and seek others. Sixthly and finally, there are many proposi-

tions which we should all agree can be neither proved nor disproved by any of the above criteria, and which consequently furnish the grounds for a sixth and negative type of logical theory, that of Scepticism.

Thus we see that testimony, intuition, reason, perception and practice are all to some extent grounds of actual beliefs, and that as such they afford support for five diverse theories as to the method of attaining truth. . . .

W. P. MONTAGUE, *The Ways of Knowing*: pp. 31-35.
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Title mine.

SUGGESTIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Make a classificatory scheme which will exhibit graphically the main divisions and subdivisions of philosophy.
2. Read the definitions of each of the branches and subdivisions mentioned in Montague's article in some comprehensive dictionary, for example, the Century or Murray dictionaries, and select from the definitions there given the one most like Montague's definition of each term.
3. What explanation does Montague offer for the overlapping of the various divisions and subdivisions of philosophy?
4. To what extent does he regard psychology as a branch of philosophy? Would he treat it as a subdivision under logic, or as a natural science which has finally freed itself from philosophy? Give a reason for your answer.

II. CRITICAL AND SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY, by *C. D. Broad*

Analysis

Distinguishing between *Critical* and *Speculative* Philosophy, the author points out that the latter is dependent upon the former. One of the chief problems of critical philosophy is to clear up the meaning of ambiguous general concepts, examples of which are given. No other science deals with the clarification of such concepts, yet all the sciences use them. Since the time of the *Enlightenment* critical philosophy has made considerable headway in clarifying the meaning of some of these concepts, notably matter. A second task of critical philosophy is to criticize all underlying and assumed principles of reasoning, by the two-fold process of breaking them up into their terms and of using the light obtained by this analysis to reinterpret the propositions analyzed. A classification of propositions is given, each type being then carefully defined and exemplified. Five characteristic marks of a postulate are enumerated. Two useful general methods used in critical philosophy are then carefully explained and each is made

clearer by being applied to a simple problem. The relations of critical philosophy to other philosophical and non-philosophical sciences are then stated. Broad then defines speculative philosophy, and states two corollaries of the definition. Admitting that there may be another way of knowing than discursive reasoning, he holds that this is only a possibility and does not prove one type of speculative philosophy to be true to the exclusion of another. But if we can not establish a particular form of speculative philosophy by intuitive reasoning, neither can one be established by purely deductive reasoning. Dr. McTaggart's recently published *Nature of Existence* is cited as a proof of this fact. The value of speculative philosophy is not in its conclusions but in the power it has to emancipate the mind from the rut of any special science, be it physical or social. Speculative philosophy must also take into serious consideration the religious and mystical experiences of mankind, and these experiences must be carefully distinguished from their various interpretations. All of this is the task of speculative philosophy.

It seems to me that under the name of "Philosophy" two very different subjects are included. They are pursued by different methods, and can expect to reach quite different degrees of certainty. I am wont to call them *Critical* and *Speculative* Philosophy. I do not assert that either can be wholly separated from the other. The second quite certainly presupposes the first, and it is probable that in the first we tacitly assume some things that belong to the second. But they certainly can be separated to a considerable extent, and it will be best to begin by explaining and illustrating what I mean by each in turn.

CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY

In ordinary life and in the special sciences we constantly make use of certain very general concepts, such as number, thing, quality, change, cause, etc. Now, although we constantly *use* them and apply them with fair consistency, it cannot be said that we have any very clear ideas as to their proper analysis or their precise relations. And it is not the business of any of the special sciences to clear up these obscurities. Chemistry, e.g., tells us a great deal about particular substances, such as gold and *aqua regia*, and about their qualities and relations; but we should not go to a chemistry book for a discussion on substance, quality, and relation. Chemistry simply assumes these general concepts as fully understood and concerns itself with particular instances of them.

Now it is certain that our ideas about such general concepts are highly confused, and this shows itself as soon as we try to apply them to cases which are a little out of the ordinary. We think we know what we mean by "place" and "person," for instance; and we do no doubt agree in the main in applying and withholding these terms. But suppose we are asked: "In what place is the mirror image of a pin? And is it in this place in the same sense in which the pin itself is in *its* place?" Or suppose we are asked: "Was Sally Beauchamp a person?" We find ourselves puzzled by such questions, and this puzzlement is certainly due in part to the fact that we are not clear as to what we mean by "being in a place" or "being a person." Similar difficulties could be raised about all the fundamental concepts which we constantly use. Thus there is both need and room for a science which shall try to analyze and define the concepts which are used in daily life and in the special sciences. There is need for it, because these concepts really are obscure, and because their obscurity really does lead to difficulties. And there is room for it, because, whilst all the special sciences *use* these concepts, none of them is *about* these concepts as such. I regard Critical Philosophy as the science which has this for its most fundamental task.


It seems to me that such a science is perfectly possible, and that it actually exists, and has made a good deal of progress. I will illustrate this with some examples. Since the time of Berkeley and Descartes philosophers have devoted much attention to the problem of the "Reality of the External World." I do not pretend that there is any agreed answer to the question among them, but their inquiries have been most valuable in clearing up the meanings of such terms as "matter," "sensible appearance," "sensation," "perception," "independence," etc. Any competent philosopher nowadays, whether he asserts or denies the independent existence of matter, is asserting or denying something far more subtle and far better analysed than anything which Berkeley or Descartes would have understood by the same form of words. Again, we are not agreed on the right analysis of "cause"; but any view we may reach should be far subtler and clearer than that which could have been held before Hume wrote his classical criticism of this category. In making such statements I am, of course, referring to present-day philosophers who are really capable of appreciating and

continuing the work of their predecessors. In any age there is plenty of philosophical writing which is far below the level of the best work of past ages. Moreover, there are fashions in philosophy, and even the best men of a certain period may ignore important results reached by the best men of a certain earlier period which happens for the time to be unpopular. Thus the philosophers of the *Aufklärung* neglected many important distinctions which the Scholastics had clearly recognized, and I think it probable that some of the *summi philosophi* of our time tend to neglect much fine gold which was mined by Kant and Hegel. Still, with these qualifications, it is pretty obvious that Critical Philosophy, as partly defined above, does make real and fairly steady progress.

Now Critical Philosophy has another and closely connected task. We do not merely use unanalysed concepts in daily life and in science. We also assume uncritically a number of very fundamental propositions. In all our arguments we assume the truth of certain principles of reasoning. Again, we always assume that every change has a cause. And in induction we certainly assume something—it is hard to say what—about the fundamental “make-up” of the existent world. Now the second task of Critical Philosophy is to take these propositions which we uncritically assume in science and daily life and to subject them to criticism. In order to do this we must first clear up the concepts which the propositions are about. It is impossible to know what weight to attach to the proposition that “every change has a cause” until you have assigned definite meanings to the words “change” and “cause.” It is often found that a man’s certainty about such propositions is directly proportional to the vagueness of the terms concerned in them. So the second part of Critical Philosophy is dependent on the first. No doubt it is also true that the first is dependent on the second. We clear up the meanings of terms by reflecting on the propositions in which they occur, just as we clear up the meanings of propositions by finding out the right analysis of their terms. I fancy that the two processes go on by alternate steps, very much as the development of thought and of language must have done in pre-historic times.

When we have got a clear idea of the meanings of propositions which are commonly assumed, our next business as Critical Philosophers is to expose them to every objection that we can think of ourselves or find in the writings of others. As a result

of such reflection and criticism it seems to me that we can divide propositions roughly according to the following scheme:



By an *à priori premise* I mean some proposition such as “Colour cannot exist without extension.” This expresses a connexion between two universals which is seen to be necessary by reflexion upon instances and which does not need to be deduced from anything else. By *à priori principles* I mean the principles according to which we pass from asserting one proposition to asserting others. This group therefore includes the principle of the syllogism, the fundamental axioms of probability, and so on. By *inferred à priori propositions* I mean those which can be deduced from *à priori* premises by means of *à priori* principles. The proposition that π is not a rational number is an example.

By an *inspective empirical proposition* I mean one which asserts of some particular existent with which the mind is acquainted at the time, some property which the mind can notice by inspection to belong to it. Examples would be: “My headache is of a throbbing character,” “A certain one of the presentations of which I am now aware is red,” and so on. *Perceptual propositions* are based on those particular existents about which we can make inspective judgments, but they make assertions which go beyond these existents and their properties. They are not *reached* by inference from inspective propositions; but, if we were called upon to *defend* them, we should do so by a mixture of inductive and deductive inference from such propositions. Examples would be: “That is a red pillar-box,” “A man is talking to me,” and so on. An *inferred empirical proposition* is one that is derived from a number of perceptual propositions either directly by pure inductive generalization, or indirectly by deduction from one or more inductive generalizations of the first kind. Examples of the two would be: “All

living grass is green" and "The benzene molecule consists of six CH groups arranged at the corners of a regular hexagon."

I have included a third great division, viz. *Postulates*. The contents of this group are extremely puzzling to me. There are certain important general propositions, such as "Every change has a cause," "All sensa are appearances of physical objects," etc., which I tentatively put into this group. They seem to me to have the following characteristics: (i) I do not find them self-evident. (ii) I do not know of any self-evident premises from which they could be deduced by any known logical principles. Hence I cannot group them as *à priori* propositions. (iii) If they are to be grouped as empirical propositions they would have to come under the head of inferred empirical propositions. And this seems impossible for most of them. All inductions make some assumption about the structure of nature, which may be called the "Uniformity of Nature," for want of a better name. It would evidently be circular to try to prove such a proposition inductively. Again, any particular perceptual judgment may be defended by argument if we grant the *general* principle that all sensa are appearances of physical objects. But I can see no possibility of inferring this principle either inductively or deductively from the existence and correlations of sensa. (iv) On the other hand, it is equally impossible to refute these propositions by argument. And (v) in practice every one assumes them, and it is difficult to see that we could possibly unify our experience or that we should have any motive for carrying our researches further if we did not assume them to be true. I take these five characteristics as the marks of a postulate. . . .

It seems to me that we can lay down two useful general methods in Critical Philosophy. I will call them the *Principle of Exceptional Cases* and the *Principle of Pickwickian Senses*. I will now illustrate them with some examples. (i) If we want to clear up the meaning of some commonly used concept it is enormously important to see how it applies to exceptional and abnormal cases. E.g., let us take the concept of "being in a place." This is commonly applied to things like pins and chairs, and it seems to be a simple two-term relation between a thing and a place. But now suppose that we ask: "Where is the mirror-image of a pin; and is it in its place in the same sense in which the pin itself is in *its* place?" It seems plausible to answer that the place where the image is is as far behind the

mirror as the place where the pin is is in front of the mirror. At once two difficulties arise. (a) If you go to the place where the pin is said to be you can touch something correlated with the visual appearances which have guided you to this place. But, if you go to the place behind the mirror where the image is said to be, you may touch nothing or you may touch a brick wall. You will certainly not feel anything like a pin. (b) If you approach the place where the pin is said to be from *any* direction there will be a series of visual appearances which continues till you reach the place. But, if you approach the place where the image is said to be, you will find (α) that it is only from *certain* directions that any visual appearance resembling the pin is there, and (β) that from *all* directions of approach the series of visual appearances stops before you reach this place. Now in theory you could either take the sense in which the pin is in its place as fundamental, and try to explain the sense in which the image is in *its* place by making a number of supplementary hypotheses; or you could take the sense in which the image is in its place as fundamental, and regard the facts which are true of the pin and not of the image as due to the fulfilment of certain special conditions which *need* not be realized but which in fact generally are. The latter seems to be the only hopeful course to take. It leads us to two conclusions. (a) A perceptual object consists of several correlated components: one visual, one tactual, and so on. Generally the visual, tactual, and other components are all in the same place in important and definable (though different) senses. But they *may* be in different places when certain special simplifying conditions (homogeneity of the medium, etc.) are not fulfilled. (b) "Being in a place" is not a simple two-term relation between a visual appearance and a place. It is really at least a three-term relation, viz., "being in place *x* from place *y*." Under special conditions, which happen to be often very nearly realized, there are similar visual appearances in a place from *all* places within certain range. This is true of the pin. With a plain mirror we get a more general and less simple case. We have (α) similar visual appearances in a place from many, but not from all, *directions*. (β) There are no such appearances in this place from any place behind the mirror. (γ) There is no correlated tactual object at the place. The commoner, but more special, case is explained by the existence of a special set of simplifying conditions, which we refer to as the "homogeneity of the medium." This way of

looking at the facts might be compared to regarding a circle as a specially simplified instance of the general conic section. Once you know the properties of the general conic you can deduce all the properties of the circle; but, if you insist on starting with properties of the circle you will find a great deal to puzzle you in the properties of the general conic. Another example would be given by the study of multiple personality, telepathy, and other abnormal psychical phenomena. If we start with the view, which purely normal cases suggest, that every human body has one and only one self connected with it, and that this self is a completely unified continuous existent, we shall find the abnormal phenomena most difficult to deal with. But if we start from the other end, and regard the normal cases as due to special simplifying conditions which happen to be generally fulfilled, we may be more successful.

(ii) *The Principle of Pickwickian Senses* was first developed by pure mathematicians in their attempts to define such things as irrational numbers. They saw that any entity which has the same formal properties as $\sqrt{2}$ and $\sqrt{3}$ are supposed to have can be taken to be $\sqrt{2}$ or $\sqrt{3}$, even though its internal structure be very different from that which people had commonly assigned to irrationals. Thus they define $\sqrt{2}$ and $\sqrt{3}$ as certain series of rationals, and show that such series have to each other relations of the kind which irrationals are supposed by every one to have to each other. The advantage of this definition is that it is quite certain that something exists which answers to it, whereas with other definitions of the same entities this cannot be shown to be so. Now of course most people do not think of irrationals, like $\sqrt{2}$ and $\sqrt{3}$, as *series* of ordinary numbers, but as a special *kind* of number. Hence, when we call certain series of rationals by the name of "irrational numbers," we may be said to be using the phrase in a "Pickwickian sense." (The name is due to Dr. Moore.) This principle has always been familiar in Theology. When theologians say that the Second Person of the Trinity is the son of the First Person, they are using the word "son" in a highly Pickwickian sense. Any one who will read, e.g., St. Thomas's brilliant discussion of this subject in the *Summa contra Gentiles* will see how careful St. Thomas is to point out in his own language that phrases like "sonship" and "begetting" cannot be interpreted literally here, and will further see what an elaborate and metaphorical interpretation St. Thomas puts upon such phrases. Now Whitehead and Russell have ex-

PLICITLY carried this principle over into philosophy, where I am quite sure that it is destined to play a most important part. Whitehead has used it to define points, moments, etc., and has succeeded in giving Pickwickian senses to these terms, in which it is certain (α) that they exist; (β) that they have to each other the sort of relations which we expect points and moments to have; and (γ) that there is an intelligible and useful, though Pickwickian, sense in which we can say that volumes are "composed of" points, and durations of moments. This seems to me to be one of the most important steps in the philosophy of applied mathematics.

Russell has used much the same method in dealing with the still harder problem of the nature of matter, and the relation of a bit of matter to its various sensible appearances. I am not prepared to accept Russell's theory as it stands, because I think it still fails to do justice to the extreme complexity of the problem. But I think we can safely say that *any* tenable theory of matter can only admit its existence if it be defined in a highly Pickwickian sense. Even on the ordinary scientific view the statement that pillar-boxes are red must be interpreted in an extremely Pickwickian way before it can be accepted; and more critical reflexion show that still more radical modifications are needed in the common-sense view of the nature of matter. Thus the problem of matter and our perception of it seems to come to this:—"To define a Pickwickian sense of 'matter' in which (a) pieces of 'matter' shall have to each other the kind of relations which physics requires them to have; (b) the variability and privacy of its sensible appearances shall be compatible with its relative constancy and its neutrality as between all observers; (c) justice shall be done to the apparent dependence of its appearances on the physiological condition of the observer and the variations of the medium; and (d) the minimum amount of purely hypothetical entities shall be postulated."

It is most important to understand that questions like: "Does matter exist?" or "Is the self real?" cannot be answered with a simple Yes or No. Unquestionably there are facts in the world to which the names "matter" and "self" apply; and in that sense they are names of something real. But it is vitally important to distinguish between *facts* and the proper *analysis* or *description* of facts. The words "matter" and "self," as commonly used, do suggest certain theories about the facts to which they are applied. These theories are never clearly recognized or

explicitly stated by common-sense; and on critical analysis, they are often found to consist of a number of propositions of very different degrees of importance and certainty. E.g., I think there is very little doubt that the word "self," as commonly used, implies something like the Pure Ego theory of the structure of those unities which we call "selves." Hence any one who rejects the Pure Ego theory is, in one sense, "denying the reality of the self." But, if he offers an alternative analysis, which does equal justice to the peculiar unity which we find in the things called "selves," he is, in another sense, "accepting the reality of the self." Whenever one particular way of analysing a certain concept has been almost universally, though tacitly, assumed, a man who rejects *this analysis* will seem to others (and often to himself) to be rejecting the *concept* itself. Thus James raises the question: "Does Consciousness Exist?" and suggests a negative answer. But really neither James nor any one else in his senses doubts the existence of certain facts to which we apply the name "consciousness." The whole question is: "What is the right analysis of these facts?" "Do they involve an unique kind of *stuff*, which does not occur in non-conscious facts; or is their peculiarity only one of *structure*?" To deny the first alternative is not really to deny the *existence* of consciousness; it is merely to deny an almost universally held *theory about* consciousness. Philosophy seems to me to be full of unprofitable discussions which depend on a failure to recognize this kind of ambiguity; and the Principle of Pickwickian Senses has the advantage that it forces the distinction on our notice.

It remains to say something about the relations of other sciences to Critical Philosophy. It is clear that logic and ethics are simply branches of Critical Philosophy. Logic is its most general and fundamental part, being the science which classifies and analyses propositional forms and discusses their formal relations to each other. Now all sciences *consist* of propositions which are of various forms and stand in such relations that some are supposed to "follow from" others. But no other science is *about* propositional forms or their formal relations. Thus logic deals with the most fundamental of all concepts, and with those *à priori* principles which form the connective tissue of all knowledge. Ethics is that part of Critical Philosophy which tries to analyse the concepts and appraise the assumptions which are involved in our judgments of moral value.

The distinction between mathematics, physics, or chemistry, and what is called "the philosophy of" these sciences is, I think, pretty clear. But, as we pass to the more concrete and less advanced sciences, the distinction becomes in practice less definite. Discussions about mechanism and vitalism, e.g., are in part at least questions of Critical Philosophy, and yet they appear in books on biology. I think that psychology is wrongly counted as a part of philosophy; it is strictly a natural science based on observation and induction. But any standard work on psychology is full of discussions which really belong to Critical Philosophy. Attempts to analyse and define sensation, perception, selfhood, etc., belong to Critical Philosophy; but it is quite impossible for the psychologist to avoid them, for these concepts are not, like those of physics, clear enough to be used for ordinary scientific purposes without risk of error. It is generally a bad thing when a science and the philosophy of that science are mixed up with each other, because two very different kinds of problems must then be dealt with by the same man, and hardly any one combines the special aptitude and knowledge needed for both. We are all familiar with the nonsense which eminent philosophers have talked about scientific questions; it is only equalled by the nonsense which eminent scientists continually talk about philosophical questions.

SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY

It is quite evident that what I have been describing under the name of *Critical Philosophy* does not include all that is understood by philosophy. It is certainly held to be the function of a philosopher to discuss the nature of Reality as a whole, and to consider the position and prospects of men in it. In a sense Critical Philosophy presupposes a certain view on this question. It assumes that our minds are so far in accord with the rest of Reality that by using them carefully and critically we approach nearer to the truth. But it is still clearer that Speculative Philosophy presupposes a considerable amount of Critical Philosophy. Its business is to take over all aspects of human experience, to reflect upon them, and to try to think out a view of Reality as a whole which shall do justice to all of them. Now it is perfectly useless to take over the scientific, social, ethical, æsthetic, and religious experiences of mankind in their crude, unanalysed form. We do not know what they mean or what

weight to attach to various parts of the whole mass till we have submitted them to a critical analytic investigation. Two results follow at once from this consideration. (i) We cannot admit the claim of any system of Speculative Philosophy to be the final truth. The best of them will be guesses at truth, and will be subject to modification as more facts are known, and as known facts become more and more fully analyzed and criticized. (ii) We must always admit the possibility that Critical Philosophy has not yet been carried far enough to make any attempt at Speculative Philosophy profitable.

There is another general point which it seems important to notice. I think that, in different forms, it plays a vital part in such different philosophies as those of Mr. Bradley and M. Bergson, and in the thought of most great theologians, whether Christian or non-Christian. This is the question how far the discursive form of cognition by means of general concepts can ever be completely adequate to the concrete Reality which it seeks to describe. Thought must always be "about" its objects; to speak metaphorically, it is a transcription of the whole of Reality into a medium which is itself one aspect of Reality. We are bound to think of Reality as a complex of terms having various qualities and standing in various relations; because, if we do not think of it on these lines, we cannot think of it at all. With Mr. Bradley's attempt to show that this scheme involves *internal* contradictions I do not agree. But I do see clearly that we have only to compare a tune, as heard, or an emotion, as felt, with any conceptual description which we can give of them, to recognize how inadequate every conceptual description of Reality must be to Reality itself. When we can *both* be acquainted with something as a whole *and* can analyze and describe it conceptually, this difficulty is at its minimum. But we cannot be acquainted with Reality as a whole, as we can with a tune or an emotion, and therefore the difficulty is at a maximum in Speculative Philosophy. This limitation of the whole conceptual scheme is one which we must simply recognize once and for all and then ignore. We cannot avoid it in detail, and we cannot understand in outline any other kind of cognition. Since it is perfectly general, it applies equally to *every* system of Speculative Philosophy, and therefore gives us no ground for preferring one to another.

It has been held by many philosophers, e.g., Spinoza and Hegel in the past and Dr. McTaggart at present, that important

results about the structure of Reality as a whole can be reached by deductive arguments from self-evident premises. The best general account of such a view will be found in Dr. McTaggart's *Nature of Existence*. I do not think that this view can be refuted; it is theoretically possible, so far as I can see. But I am completely sceptical about its practicability. I feel pretty certain that all known attempts to elaborate a system of Speculative Philosophy on these lines either contain logical fallacies, or introduce premises which are ambiguous and only become self-evident when so interpreted as to be trivial. And I have not the slightest expectation that future essays in this direction will be any more successful.

It seems to me that the main value of Speculative Philosophy lies, not in its conclusions, but in the collateral effects which it has or ought to have, on the persons who pursue it. The speculative philosopher is forced to look at the world synoptically, and any one who does not do this at some time in his life is bound to hold a very narrow and inadequate idea of Reality. This is a danger to which the natural scientist is peculiarly liable. The extraordinary success of physics and chemistry within their own sphere tempts men to think that the world is simply a physico-chemical system. These sciences, quite rightly for their own purposes, ignore the existence of minds; and scientists are liable to forget that somehow minds have grown up in a world of matter, and that it is by means of their activities that matter and its laws have become known. If a man referred to his brother or his cat as "an ingenious mechanism" we should know that he was either a fool or a physiologist. No one in practice treats himself or his fellowmen or his pet animals as machines, but scientists who have never made a study of Speculative Philosophy seem often to think it their duty to hold in theory what no one outside a lunatic asylum would accept in practice. If we remember that physics and chemistry are simply constructed to unify the correlations which we find among a selection of the *sensa* of three or four senses, the idea that these sciences give a complete account of the structure of all Reality becomes ludicrous. Thus our inability to explain the facts of life and mind in purely physico-chemical terms is not a paradox to be explained away, but is what might reasonably have been expected from the outset.

On the other hand, the man who starts from the side of mind is equally liable to fail to do justice to the facts. The properties

with which physics and chemistry deal *are* very pervasive, and we *do* know them more accurately and thoroughly than we know anything else. And minds *are* very closely bound up with certain bits of matter, viz., our brains and nervous systems, and they *do* seem to have gradually developed in a world which once contained nothing but matter. The characteristic fault of Idealism is to be unable to see the trees for the wood, and the characteristic fault of Realism is to be unable to see the wood for the trees. The great merit of Idealism is that it really has tried to do justice to the social, ethical, æsthetic, and religious facts of the world. The great merit of Realism is that it really has tried to face in a patient and detailed way the problem of matter and of our perception of it. But neither of these activities is a substitute for the other; and a genuine Speculative Philosophy must combine the detailed study of the lower categories with the due recognition of the higher categories, and must try to reconcile the pervasiveness of the former with the apparently growing importance of the latter.

There is one thing which Speculative Philosophy must take into most serious consideration, and that is the religious and mystical experiences of mankind. These form a vast mass of facts which obviously deserve at least as careful attention as the sensations of mankind. They are of course less uniform than our sensations; many people, of whom I am one, are practically without these experiences. But probably most people have them to some extent, and there is a considerable amount of agreement between those people of all nations and ages, who have them to a marked degree. Of course the theoretical interpretations which have been put upon them are very varied, and it is obvious that they depend largely on the traditions of the time, place, and society in which the experient lives. I have compared the experiences themselves with sensations; we might compare the common features in the interpretations which have been put upon them with our ordinary common-sense beliefs about matter; and elaborate systems of theology might be compared with big scientific theories, like the wave theory of light. Obviously there remains a further step to be taken, comparable with philosophic criticism and interpretation of scientific theories about matter. It seems reasonable to suppose at the outset that the whole mass of mystical and religious experience brings us into contact with an aspect of Reality which is not revealed in ordinary sense-perception, and that any system of Specula-

tive Philosophy which ignores it will be extremely one-sided. In fact it cannot safely be ignored. If we count all such experiences as purely delusive, we must explain how such a widespread and comparatively coherent mass of illusion arose. And, if we find it impossible to take this view, we must try to understand and criticize these experiences; to sift away those factors in them which are of merely local and temporary interest; and to see what the residuum has to tell us about the probable nature of Reality. The great practical difficulty here is that those who have the experiences most vividly are seldom well fitted for the task of philosophical criticism and construction; whilst those who are fitted for the latter task are not often mystics or persons of religious genius. It is alleged, and it may well be true, that the capacity for such experiences can be cultivated by a suitable mode of life and a suitable system of training and meditation. In so far as this can be done without detriment to the critical faculties it deserves the serious attention of philosophers; for theories which are built on experiences known only by description are always unsatisfactory.

C. D. BROAD in *Contemporary British Philosophy*, First Series. Edited by J. H. Muirhead. Reprinted by permission of George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., London. (New York: The Macmillan Company.)

SUGGESTIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Give other examples of ambiguous general ideas similar to those mentioned by Broad.
2. Give at least one other example of each of the types of propositions Broad mentions.
3. Work out an application of the *Principle of Exceptional Cases* to some problem of your own choosing. What is the chief value of this principle?
4. Apply the *Principle of Pickwickian Senses* to some current social problem. What is the chief value of this principle?
5. What is Broad's general attitude on the values and limitations of speculative philosophy? Does he imply that all of the beliefs of this type of philosophy are of the type on which Montague's sixth type of logical theory is based? See above, page 69.
6. Compare Broad's classification of the branches of philosophy with Montague's classification. Where would Broad put each of Montague's three grand divisions? Where would Montague put each of Broad's two main divisions?

III. DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES IN THE CHIEF TYPES OF PHILOSOPHY, by J. H. Muirhead

Analysis

Writing with special reference to contemporary British philosophy, Muirhead implies that every philosopher likes to think that the present trend of philosophy is in the direction of his own views. He then distinguishes idealism from realism and indicates some of the differences between the types of idealism and those between the types of realism. After stating these basic differences, he proceeds to enumerate four essential points of agreement between all present day philosophers. (i) It is generally recognized that the old controversy between Realism and Subjective Idealism has ended in a recognition of the duality of experience, within which both the *subjective* and the *objective*, the *experiens* and the *expertum* must be given equal weight. (ii) The old controversy between spiritualism and materialism has now, thanks to the influence of the biological sciences, ended in a general acceptance of a *levels theory of reality*. Matter and spirit are now both admitted to be real, but only as two among other levels. (iii) Most philosophers also agree that there is in the universe an underlying urge toward ever higher levels of being, beyond any that has yet been realized in our human experience. (iv) Philosophers are widening their outlook to include moral, æsthetic and religious values in their theories of reality. This new interest in theory of value has naturally been accompanied by a revival of Platonism. Philosophers are more and more recognizing that religion represents "a level of human experience (perhaps the highest) at which new aspects of the world of reality reveal themselves to the soul."

... Of the general trend of philosophy in our own time each writer would probably give a different account and most would experience a certain satisfaction in discovering that it was in the direction of the establishment of his own particular opinions. There are not many who, with the candour of the late James Fitzjames Stephen, would say that they would be sorry to think that the mass of mankind were doomed to hold the views at which they themselves had arrived. For this reason I feel now, as I felt in writing the former Preface, that I have no right to prejudice the reader by my own particular interpretation of the trend of contemporary philosophy, or to presume here to pass what might appear to be judgment on the contributions of individual philosophers. Nevertheless, I believe that I am expressing the mind of the great majority of the writers in these volumes in rejecting the view that there are no common tendencies traceable in the thought of our time and country.¹

¹ For an explanation of these references, note the source of this selection (below, p. 92).

Of the existence of deeply marked divisions founded on difference of approach and on the results arrived at there is, of course, no question. There is the difference denoted by the terms Idealism and Realism, however unsatisfactory these may be to denote it. On the one hand we have thinkers who approach philosophy from the side of the great comprehensive faiths of mankind as embodied in its art and poetry, its heroisms and its religions, and who have sought (and think they have succeeded in finding), if not the letter in which these faiths have been encased, yet sufficient assurance of their validity to be able to maintain them in face of the apparent brutality and uncompromisingness of fact. On the other hand there are those who approach philosophical problems from the side of the facts, pledged only to the simplicity of the truth as it is revealed in them. William James has characterized the distinction as that between the tender- and the tough-minded, the white-robed and the dark. In reality it is the difference between those who start from the concrete experience of the ordinary man with its comprehensive interests and seek by a process of criticism the grounds and the extent of its validity and those who, imbued with the analytic spirit of modern science and of the economies that are enjoined by it, seek to plough their way through the jungle of fact to what of light—or of darkness—may be found at the other side.

There are further divisions in these two main streams. In Idealism there is the distinction between those who take their start from the world that is experienced as containing something of which the process of experiencing is a revelation—something-in-itself, if no longer conceived of Kant-wise as an impenetrable *Jenseits*, yet as something which, while revealing itself through appearances, carries us beyond them. And there are those who would find in the temporal processes of the mind's own thinking, willing, and feeling the clue to what men mean when they speak of truth and reality in the sphere of knowledge, beauty and good in that of feeling and action. The first are drawn to lay emphasis on the element of permanence or non-temporal unity, the second on the plurality with which a world whose essence is change is necessarily infected.

There is a similar and even more confusing diversity among professed Realists. There are those who take their start from the theory of knowledge, and are chiefly concerned in maintaining the existence of things independent of knowledge whether

sentient or conceptual as against all forms of subjectivism. And there are those who, starting from the world as it presents itself to science, occupy themselves rather with analysis and description of its contents. Of the former Professor Laird and Professor Dawes Hicks may be taken as examples, though they would deny that knowledge theory is the sole or even the most important department of philosophy. Of the second, Mr. Bertrand Russell and Professor Lloyd Morgan are representative in the first, Professor J. Arthur Thomson in the present series. But the first of these last mentioned writers differs *toto cælo* from the others in his conception of the kind of world that is revealed to analysis. In his Logical Atomism the whole emphasis is upon its plurality: "the original manifold of events." Matter and mind are defined in terms of the "compresence" of "events." In the Philosophy of Evolution of the others the emphasis is upon integration and system reaching ever higher levels as we pass from matter to life and from life to mind, and only explicable as the manifestation of what the former of them calls "one immanent Causality."

All these separate lines of thought are clearly traceable in the essays in these volumes. Yet it would be strange if, in the ferment of thought which they represent, there were no lines of approximation, no tendency for extremes to meet, no precipitate that could be said to bear the character of an assured result or be a sure mark of progress. As examples of what seems to me to be actually taking place, I shall venture to mention some definite points on which, if there is no general agreement of interpretation, there is among thinkers a far more sympathetic understanding than ever before of the problems to be solved and a far deeper conviction of the necessity of reaching the "synopsis" in which, according to Plato, true philosophy consists.

(i) No controversy has gone deeper during the last century and a half than that between Realism and Subjective Idealism: the doctrine that we have immediate knowledge of a non-mental world and the theory that we know nothing immediately but our own subjective states. Yet the controversy as so stated may be said to be a thing of the past. To quote the writer of the first article in the present series (James Ward): "The duality of experience as involving both a subject and an object, an *experiens* and an *expertum*, is no longer questioned by any competent thinker."²

² James Ward: *Hibbert Journal*, October, 1924, p. 176.

How we are to interpret the ultimate nature of the reality which is known or with what right we take the physical objects of sense-perception as the type of the real world—the question of the relation between what has been called perceptual and logical objectivity—may still be a subject of keen controversy. But that knowledge is in some sense an immediate revelation of a reality other than that of the knowing activity itself, and that this activity is not the creator of its own world may be said to be the starting-point of all recent British philosophy. The ground on which such realism walks may still be somewhat boggy owing to the survival of subjectivist terminology, as in the ambiguous use of such terms as “sensation”; theories of perception may be a perfect tangle of perplexity; what is clear is the general admission of the essential polarity of experience. Even pragmatists, who are most closely identified with the “creationism” that finds favour elsewhere,³ acknowledge in some sense the mind’s allegiance to what James calls the “matrix of experiential circumstances,” and are prompt to disown subjectivism in the older sense.

(ii) Equally out of date may be said to be the old controversy between materialism and spiritualism. Philosophers are far from agreed as to the status of spirit in the Universe. On the other hand there has grown up in the present generation, owing chiefly to the great developments in biological and psychological science and the recognition of the unique parts that life and consciousness play in evolution, a profound distrust of any attempt to explain phenomena in terms of “matter” and mechanical action alone. What might be called the hierarchical or nodal view of the world as at once continuous and at certain points in the order of complexity self-transcendent, in the sense of permitting the emergence of entirely new qualities not resolvable into anything that went before, may be said to be the common property of Realism and Idealism in all their forms. Whatever may be true of water in the physical world, the water of life seems to be capable of rising above its own level. There are still doubtless those who hope to be able to produce life from the lifeless, or, again, who would seek to explain the phenomena of consciousness in terms of subconscious physical movements. But among British philosophers, at any rate, so far as they concern themselves with this problem, it is generally recognized that chemico-mechanics furnish a method of ap-

³ E. G. in *Creative Intelligence*, New York, 1917.

proaching vital phenomena rather than the basis of a satisfactory theory as to their nature. Even though life could be produced from the apparently lifeless, the conscious from the unconscious, it would still remain true that at the higher level we have something entirely new. What would be proved, if anything, would be that matter and life were more than we took them to be. If Shakespeare's brain wrote *Hamlet*, it was more than a brain. There has thus resulted a growing recognition that the world is a house of many mansions, each with its own key, and that the attempt to find in physics a skeleton-key that will open all locks is bound to fail. There is indeed nothing more characteristic of contemporary British philosophy than the common sense that leads it to refuse a place to extreme behaviouristic theories founded ultimately on the denial of the variety in unity that pervades Nature.

(iii) Going along with this conception of a hierarchical order of different levels of being in the world is the growing recognition of the necessity to assume the operation of an underlying *nisus* or urge in Nature not only to maintain itself at any particular level which it may have reached ("to persevere in its own essence"), but to advance to ever higher levels. We have learned to associate this doctrine with the philosophy of Bergson, but it finds independent support in recent biological research. Vitalism in the older sense of belief in a soul infused from without as an entity or entelechy independent of the body is generally rejected, but the facts of organic life, as expounded by such writers as J. S. Haldane, J. Arthur Thomson, Julian Huxley, have forced into evidence the presence of an integrating, self-transcending principle not resolvable into any mere chemically acting aggregation of biophores. The "Rubicon" between mechanism and life thus crossed, there is less reason to hesitate over the line which separates life from spirit. As on the basis prepared for it by chemico-physical action there "emerges" in *life* something not resolvable into it, yet triumphing in and through it, so out of the natural instincts, owing to the presence of *mind*, there arise interests and relationships transcending their origin both in content and in their power to subordinate it to other ends.

It is only a generalization from all this to see in evolution in general as thinkers belonging to all schools now do, the operation of a creative principle precipitating ever new and higher forms of life on the stage prepared for it by the lower. Whether

philosophers as yet sufficiently realize what is involved in the conception of a *nisus* in Nature towards forms of reality, which include while they go beyond what has gone before, is another question. I have tried elsewhere⁴ to show that a more general recognition of the change in our conception of reality, which results from assigning to the universe an immanent purpose, in other words an *εἶδος* or ideal form, to which it is in some sense pledged (for it is this that the doctrine of the *nisus* must mean if it means anything), would go far to reconcile the differences between Realism and Idealism as represented by leading writers of to-day.

(iv) Arising out of this there is a further feature of contemporary British philosophy, on which, if there cannot be said to be general agreement, there is a remarkable approximation among thinkers otherwise at the opposite poles of the philosophical firmament. Corresponding to the levelling view for which the mechanical philosophy stood, there was until recently a general tendency to express the object to which Nature strove, if not, with Lucretius, any longer in terms of pleasure, yet in terms of social survival. To be valuable meant to be of aid in securing the permanence of social types. Here also by a general widening of outlook philosophers have come to recognize that as there may be trans-individual so there may be trans-social values. Whatever the origin of the sense of duty, devotion to truth, love of beauty, these objects, once apprehended, mean not only the opening up of new sources of enjoyment but a quickening of insight into the nature of the world, of which they are an *effluence*, and thus acquire a status and value of their own, by which our conceptions of reality are extended and enriched. Philosophers are indeed far from agreement in their interpretation of the meaning and criteria of beauty, truth, and goodness. But before problems can be solved it is necessary to have them stated in all their depth and range, and it is this widening of men's ideas as to the content of experience and the difference that is made in it by the advent of mind and spirit that is one of the most hopeful signs of British philosophy as reflected in these volumes.

Under these circumstances it is not at all surprising that this widening has taken the form of a revival of Platonism, the great meeting-point of Realist and Idealist. No philosopher was ever

⁴ *Philosophical Essays* presented to John Watson (Queen's University, Kingston, Canada), "Emergent Realism," pp. 336 ff.

more insistent than Plato on the reality of a world independent of the processes by which we come to know it, or more convinced that knowledge was essentially a revelation. Yet none more clearly recognized the distinction between the temporal and spatial appearance or show of things, and the permanent non-spatial reality that is revealed through it. To Plato the type of the reality, which was independent of mind, was not the sense-datum of ordinary perceptual experience, nor yet the Pythagorean numbers and shapes of which he held the matter of the world of sense to be built up, but the unsensed world of essences of which beauty and goodness were the highest expression. It was these in the end that claimed the soul's allegiance as at once beyond it, soliciting it as from another world, and yet its own surest possession here and now.

As a form of Mysticism nothing would seem more alien to the common sense I have already claimed as a feature of modern British philosophy than Platonism so interpreted. In other countries, notably in America, the newer schools both of Realism and Idealism have little in common with it.⁵ In this country, where the Platonic tradition has never been wholly lost, there is a recognizable difference. Common sense itself has never been more sensible than in the recognition of the greatness and ineffableness of the deeper phases of human experience. The poetry of last century, with Coleridge, Shelley, and Wordsworth at its fountain head, has been Platonic to the core. What inspiration the idealist movement in the sixties and seventies did not draw from these and from the mysticism of Carlyle it drew from the revived study in Oxford of the Platonic Dialogues. The new forms of Realism and Empiricism of the eighties and nineties were indeed largely reactions against the literary bias of this movement in the direction of scientific analysis. But these too had another side. The enemy against which the pluralism that was common to both was directed was not literary taint, but the leaning to an abstract monism which seemed to threaten the whole fabric of scientific truth. In their best representatives, both here and in America, Henry Sidgwick, William James, and later Mr. Bertrand Russell, ample room was left for the reality of the supersensible. As it has developed in its younger representatives, Realism in particular, while starting from the "atomism" of the last-mentioned writer, has found

⁵ G. P. Adams's *Idealism and the Modern Age* is an energetic reassertion as against them of the "Platonic Thesis."

itself constrained to extend its idea of reality from the simple substances to which analysis leads so as to include the substance that is revealed through but not by sense, and, like the Platonic εἶδη, constitutes the stable element in space-time events.

There is, indeed, no better illustration of the widening of outlook, of which I am speaking, in contemporary British Philosophy than the current application of the term "experience" to other fields than those covered by sense-perception—carrying with it as it does the implication of the existence of a real object essentially *sui generis*. This holds not only of moral and æsthetic but also of "religious experience." In the latter part of the nineteenth century it would not be too much to say that, with the exception of a few idealist writers, philosophy was divided between the attempt to buttress orthodox theism, mainly in the interest of practice, against the attacks of materialism and the denial of the reality of anything corresponding to popular conceptions of God. The God-consciousness was either something brought in from without, as in the *soi-disant* "revealed" religions, or something without real significance for human life, as in so-called "natural" religion. Writing of the whole attitude of philosophy to this subject in 1893, Bradley could say, "We have but little notion in England of freedom . . . we fail through timidity and through a want of simpleness and sincerity. That a man should treat of God and religion in order merely to understand them and apart from the influence of some other consideration and inducement is to many of us in part unintelligible and in part also shocking. And hence English thought on these subjects, where it has not studied in a foreign school, is theoretically worthless."⁶

Bradley may have underestimated the difficulty of the "disinterested" study of theology, but it is undeniable that since these words were written there has sprung up a wholly new appreciation of the independent and permanent significance of religious experience in human life. It is not merely that the "psychology of religion" is being explored as never before. Psychological and historical interest in religion as a phenomenon in the individual and the race is quite compatible with philosophical neglect of it as representing a level of human experience (perhaps the highest) at which new aspects of the world of reality reveal themselves to the soul. Idealist writers like Bradley and Bosanquet, realists like Professor Alexander

⁶ F. H. Bradley: *Appearance and Reality*, p. 450.

and Professor Lloyd Morgan, Pragmatists like Dr. Schiller, are all at one upon this. If what they have in view is to be called "natural religion," it is only natural in the sense in which Wordsworth speaks of "natural piety"—the sense of community between man and the greatness and beauty of Nature, including the justice and loving-kindness that man finds in himself. If philosophers are still far from any theoretic agreement as to the terms in which the object "*natura sive deus*," of religious experience is to be interpreted, or as to whether there is any single object at all, still further from any agreed policy as to religious education, yet their attitude to these problems has undergone in recent years an entire revolution which contains the promise of new and hopeful developments in what Aristotle called "the First Philosophy."

J. H. MUIRHEAD in the Preface to the Second Series of *Contemporary British Philosophy* of which he was editor, pp. 12-21. Reprinted by permission of George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., London. (New York: The Macmillan Company.) Title mine.

SUGGESTIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. List the chief differences between idealism and realism mentioned by Muirhead and compare it with the list given by James above (page 7).
2. What are the chief differences within the idealist school?
3. What are the chief differences within realism?
4. On the basis of the readings above place each author where you think he belongs (James, Laird, Dewey, Radhakrishnan, Montague, Broad and Muirhead), that is, tell whether you think he is an idealist or a realist and which type of each you think he exhibits.
5. Compare Broad's treatment of religious experience with Muirhead's discussion of the same subject. Are they equally friendly to religion or does one give it greater recognition than the other? Explain why you think as you do.

PART TWO: IDEALISM

CHAPTER I

A SKETCH OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF IDEALISM

I. IDEA, IDEAL AND IDEALISM, by R. F. A. Hoernlé

Analysis

After explaining the etymology of the words *idealism*, *ideal*, and *idea*, Hoernlé develops the three meanings of *ideal* which have determined the popular understanding of idealism as opposed to realism. The roots of the philosophical meaning of idealism are to be found in the history of the word *idea*. The popular meaning of *idea* as a name for any kind of intellectual process (thinking, believing, imagining, intending, etc.) is contrasted with the technical meaning of psychologists who restrict ideation to the reproduction of objects not actually present to the sense organ, thereby differentiating ideas from sensations and perceptions. The philosophical meaning of *idea* has passed through three stages from the early Greek philosophers to John Locke, Descartes and other early modern thinkers. Plato used the word to refer to the real or essential nature of anything and identified an idea with a universal essence or general principle. This notion is explained by relating it to the modern idea of a law of nature, and "cancer-research" is used as an illustration. The danger of calling the Platonic ideas concepts is pointed out and the incorporation in Plato's theory of ideas, of the meaning of ideals as perfections, or patterns after which particular things are modeled, is emphasized. This explains why the idea of good plays such an important rôle in Plato's theory. The mediæval schoolmen, following Plotinus and St. Augustine, used the word *idea* to mean the patterns in God's mind by which he created the various objects of the world. Although this is the development of a conception in Plato's *Timæus*, it really amounts to a reversal of Plato. For he made God subordinate to the eternal ideas, whereas this view makes the ideas the thoughts of the divine mind and therefore dependent upon God's thinking. John Locke and other early modern philosophers completed the process of degrading the idea by making it a copy in man's mind which represents an external object.

This gave rise to the *representative* theory of perception. This theory is really the outcome of the *causal theory of perception* and of the *copy theory of truth*. The causal theory of perception took the idea to be the effect of an impression made on the sense organ by an external object. Descartes and Locke regarded the idea as a mental effect caused by the sensory process in the nervous system. Both of these interpretations of the causal theory of perception are riddled by the contradiction that this theory is itself an idea and so are all of the assumed causes of ideas. Competent philosophers no longer hold

this theory, even though it is still held by naïve people. The copy theory of truth makes the ideas represent external objects, but it is also false, for it has no way of bridging the gap between ideas in the mind and objects outside of the mind. The ambiguity of the expressions "in the mind" and "outside of the mind" is pointed out.

Due to this ambiguity and to the misleading associations in the term *idea*, modern idealists would like to abandon the term altogether. There are, in fact, three basic tendencies in modern idealism and none of them are in any way dependent on the use of the term *idea*. One is the *levels theory of reality*, according to which *mind* or *experience* is the highest level of reality in the sense that it is the context which includes all other levels. (Compare Muirhead above, page 87.) Another distinctive note in modern idealism is the emphasis on the life or activity of mind as something which constrains the individual thinker, so that to say "I think" is equivalent to saying "the world thinks in me" or "reveals itself in my thinking." The third note in modern idealism is the emphasis on mind as creative of higher levels of reality than nature, especially in Art, Morals, Economics, Politics and Religion. Here again these creations are but ways in which an objective ideal order—the Absolute—appears and manifests itself in humanity. On the basis of these distinctive tendencies in modern idealism, *Spiritual Pluralism* is distinguished from *Absolute Idealism* as the two main types of modern idealism.

1. IDEAL V. IDEA

Idealism is a word which has two sources. One source is the term "idea." The other source is the term "ideal." "Idea" is the original term, which has come to us by direct descent from the philosophy of Plato, who himself took over the term from some of the scientific and philosophical writers of the fifth century B.C. "Ideal" is a modern substantive formed from the adjective *ideal*, which is itself a late Latin word formed long after the Romans had taken over the term "idea" from the Greeks into their own philosophical vocabulary. The original root of "idea," and, therefore, of "ideal," is *id*—(Latin *vid-ere*), which has yielded verbs and substantives to express the act of seeing and the objects of sight.

In current modern speech, as distinct from the technical language of philosophy, the meaning of "idealism" is determined by that of "ideal." Now, "ideal" is a word which itself has several shades of meaning. It has recently been defined as "a conception of what, if attained, would fully satisfy; of what is perfect of its kind, and, in consequence, is the pattern to be copied, and the standard by which actual achievement is to be judged."¹ An ideal is always a pattern, or standard, of ex-

¹ See *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, Vol. VII, p. 86 ff.

cellence, perfection, or supreme value. But this common, or central, meaning of the term assumes different shades according to the different views that may be taken of the relation of ideals to what is "real," to "actual fact." Ideals may be regarded either (a) as realized, or, at least, realizable, in fact; or (b) as unrealizable in their fulness, but as defining the direction in which we must seek for realization; or (c) as unrealizable because purely fanciful and imaginary. These three possible ways of regarding the relation of ideals to facts depend, of course, on the kind of ideal with which we are dealing. When we meet, as we occasionally do, with an object which is perfect of its kind—an object which is "as good as it can be," or "which cannot be bettered"—we say that the ideal of that kind of thing is here embodied or realized. Thus, e.g., the ideal of human beauty may, now and again, be found temporarily realized in this or that human body. On the other hand, in morality, and, again, in religion, we tend to think of supreme excellence as something which it is indeed our duty to strive after, but which we can never hope to realize completely. By comparison with God, who is worshipped as the embodiment of perfection, the saintliest of men is still a sinner. The more conscientious we are in our striving after moral goodness, or virtue, the less likely are we to be satisfied that our performance measures up to our aspiration. But, thirdly, it may, of course, happen that our ideals are mistaken, that we misconceive the nature of perfection. We may imagine false ideals which lead us astray in judgment and action.

All these shades of meaning reappear in the current, non-philosophical, use of the term "idealism." An "idealist," especially as contrasted with a "realist," may be a man who is blind to facts as they are and invests them in his imagination with a perfection which is not theirs. Or, again, he may be a man whose life is ruled by ideals, who puts duty above inclination, public above private good. Or, lastly, he may be a man who prefers to think the best of his fellows and of the world around him, and who, where others see only imperfection, sees perfection, if not realized, at least in process of being realized. Such a one sees the "soul of goodness in things evil."

To turn from these popular meanings of "idealism" to the philosophical meaning is to turn from "ideal" to "idea." Literally, "idealism," as the name for a philosophical doctrine, means a theory of Reality in terms of "ideas."

This statement, as it stands, does not, of course, help us much. It is a riddle rather than an answer. If we would find out what it means, we must explore the meanings of "idea."

Now, unfortunately, in the course of centuries of philosophical discussion, "idea" has acquired even more meanings than "ideal." Indeed, it has become a term so ambiguous and tricky that some modern writers avoid the use of it altogether. Nay, some idealists, like the late Bernard Bosanquet, have come to discard even the term "idealism" itself because of its misleading associations, and describe their own philosophical enterprise as "speculative philosophy." It is, thus, possible to be an idealist without "ideas." Or, in other words, it is possible, as we shall see, to state the theories which traditionally go by the name of "idealism," without using the term "idea" at all. Great as the part played by that term has been, its use has been something of an historical accident. At any rate, it is a term which can now be discarded as inconvenient and misleading, without sacrificing anything that is essential to the statement of the several distinct types of theory which are commonly classified together under the label "idealism."

However, before we can safely discard the term "idea," we must try to understand the chief senses in which it has been used by philosophers. For, although the term has become inconvenient precisely because of the many different senses in which it has been used, yet it is part of our task to make ourselves familiar with these different senses and to learn to distinguish them.

The term "idea" occurs in the vocabulary (a) of popular speech, (b) of certain psychologists, (c) of most philosophers.

2. (a) MEANING OF "IDEA" IN POPULAR SPEECH

In popular speech the phrase, "to have an idea of" an object, is nothing but a circumlocution for thinking, believing, imagining, intending, etc., something. Thus, "I have an *idea* that it will rain to-day" is equivalent to "I *believe* (expect) that it will rain to-day." "My idea is to build a house of my own, rather than buy or rent one," means that I *intend* (prefer) to build rather than buy or rent. When I cannot answer a question, I may reply that "I have no *idea*," meaning that I *know* nothing of the subject. This popular use of "idea" has, as we shall see below (c), filtered down into current speech from the

technical language of modern philosophy. But the term, in this process, has lost all precision. "Having an idea" is now nothing more than a loose way of expressing any kind of thought or imagination—a recollection of past experience, a plan for future action, a day-dream, the framing of a scientific hypothesis. In all these cases we could express our meaning just as well, without any mention of "ideas," by using one of the verbs for mental activity (judging, conceiving, remembering, etc.), and naming the object with which the activity is concerned. Or, rather, most commonly the object, i.e., *what* we are thinking, is not a *thing* which can be named, but a *judgment* which requires to be expressed in a sentence—either in an assertory sentence or else in a dependent clause beginning with "that" e.g., above, "that it will rain."

Again, when "ideas" are currently labelled good, clever, brilliant, foolish, silly, these adjectives apply to *what* we are thinking of. We mean that what we are thinking of is relevant or irrelevant, adequate or inadequate, to the situation. I have, e.g., to solve a difficult problem. I try vainly this way and that. At last a "brilliant idea" occurs to me, i.e., I happen to think of a course of action which will produce the desired result. A man who is said to be "full of ideas" is a man whose memory, imagination, thought range over many objects, and who, consequently, is resourceful and well-informed. In short, all occasions on which we talk of "having ideas" can be dealt with according to the maxim: "There are no ideas, there is only thinking." It is good discipline to make clear to oneself that "to have an idea of—" or "to have an idea that—" are simply metaphorical expressions for "thinking of—" or "thinking that—"

3. (b) MEANING OF "IDEA" IN PSYCHOLOGY

Certain psychologists have tried to rescue the term "idea" from this loose, popular use, and to reinvest it with a precise technical meaning. They distinguish three levels, or stages, in the development of our knowledge, viz., sensation, perception, ideation (or conception). They take the third stage to be characterized, as its name indicates, by the emergence of "ideas." It is in this sense that we find psychologists discussing whether animals are capable of "forming ideas," or are limited to sensing and perceiving. It is easiest to make the point clear to oneself by reflecting on the obvious difference between, e.g.,

seeing a colour or hearing a sound, and remembering or thinking of that colour or sound when they are no longer seen or heard. We commonly say that an object is "present" when we perceive it, "absent" when we imagine it or think of it. Now, it is to the technical description of this difference that many psychologists restrict the term "idea." They define an "idea" as "the reproduction, with a more or less adequate image, of an object not actually present to the senses."² As this is not a book on psychology, it is not our business here to examine or criticize this definition. We will notice only that, if the definition is taken strictly, we can have no "idea" of any object which, like the relation of identity, or virtue, or God, cannot from its very nature be "present to the senses." Yet we can obviously *think* of these things, and know various propositions about them; and we can also think without images. Hence, it would seem that, even for psychology, any account of thinking or knowing which restricts these activities to the use of "ideas," as here defined, must be inadequate.

4. (c) MEANING OF "IDEA" IN PHILOSOPHY—(1) *Plato*

And so we pass, thirdly, to the philosophical meaning of "idea." Or, rather, we ought to say "meanings," for the fact is that in the course of more than 2,000 years of philosophical discussion the meaning of "idea" has undergone changes so profound that, whilst each stage is, no doubt, recognizably connected with the preceding one, yet they also differ so widely from each other as to compel us to treat them as distinct. Up to the philosophy of Kant and the post-Kantian idealism of the nineteenth century, we can distinguish three chief stages in this history, (1) For Plato, "ideas" are "real natures" or "essences." (2) For St. Augustine and the mediæval thinker, "ideas" are the patterns in God's mind of all created things. (3) For Descartes, Locke, and their followers, "ideas" are all objects of whatever sort which human minds in any way apprehend. The subsequent history of the term "idea," in Kant, Hegel, and the idealists of the nineteenth century down to Bradley, Bosanquet, and others in our own day, is not for our purposes of the same importance. For, of these later thinkers it is true that their idealisms can be stated without using the term

² Quoted from Baldwin's *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*, q. v. "Idea."

"idea." In this introductory chapter, therefore, we shall confine ourselves to the three meanings enumerated above. Their history is, briefly, as follows:

(1) The original, non-technical, sense of "idea" among the ancient Greeks was, probably, "look," "appearance," "form." So far as sight is concerned, it is obviously by their characteristic look, appearance, form that we identify, or recognize, things for what they are. Now, *what a thing is* has been technically called its "nature" or its "essence."³ There is no reason why the essential nature of a thing should be restricted to what can be apprehended of it by sight. On the contrary, the essential natures of things might be such as to be incapable of being apprehended by any sense-organ whatever: they might be discernible only by intellect or reason. This is, in fact, the development which the meaning of "idea" has undergone in becoming a technical term in Plato's philosophy. The details of this development do not concern us here. It may well be, as Professor A. E. Taylor has argued with great learning, that the term first acquired a technical meaning in the School of Pythagoras, passing from "look" or "appearance," *via* "shape," "figure," "structure" of a body, to the geometrical structure or figures which the Pythagoreans regarded as constituting the real natures of different sorts of bodies, and as underlying their various sensible appearances. Other scholars have disputed this view, but whatever the truth in this matter may be, there is general agreement that the term "idea" came to be cut loose from all restrictions to visible appearance or geometrical figure, and to be used quite generally for the real or essential nature of anything. Socrates, who was Plato's master, insisted that every moral virtue or value—the Just, the Good, the Beautiful, and so on—has an "idea" or "real nature." There is, as we should say, a *principle* of justice, goodness, beauty, etc., which is more or less adequately embodied in, or exemplified by, the acts or objects which we call, severally, just, good, beautiful, etc. Socrates, too, urged the importance of gaining of these moral "ideas," or principles, the kind of knowledge which enables us to define them and thus to distinguish, e.g., acts which are really just from those which merely appear to be so. Thus, "ideas"

³ These terms, too, are translations from the Greek. "Nature" translates "physis," which appears to have meant originally what a thing is made of, its stuff, or substance (cf. J. Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*). "Essence," *via* Latin *essentia*, translates Aristotle's term "ousia," the "being," or the "what-it-is," of a thing.

enable us to escape from the vagaries of "opinion" into the security of stable "knowledge." It is clear, too, that such principles or *universals* (to use a technical term which philosophy owes to Aristotle), are not sensible, corporeal, geometrical, but "invisible" and "immaterial," objects to be apprehended by reason, not by the bodily eye. Precisely how far Socrates himself carried the development of this theory of "ideas" is a question much debated by scholars at the present day. But, at any rate, in the writings of Plato we find the theory generalized to cover the whole field of universals.

This statement requires some further explanation, in order that we may appreciate clearly the difference between the "idealism" of Plato and the idealisms of later thinkers.

The theory of ideas, as we find it in Plato, is a theory of the objects of scientific knowledge. It tries to tell us what sort of objects scientific knowledge is really concerned with—what exactly it is that the scientist is seeking to apprehend in the particular examples of stones, plants, animals, etc., which he is examining. It is obvious that the scientist is not interested in particulars *as such*. He is not interested in *this* particular example of a plant as against all others of the same kind. He is interested in it for the sake of what it can teach him about all others of the same kind. In other words, as we say nowadays, he studies particulars in order to discover the principles or laws of which the particulars are "instances" or "cases." A law, once discovered and formulated, will apply to, and "explain," *all* particulars of the same sort or kind. In other words, every law is a "universal" exemplified in a range of "particular cases." Let us illustrate. There is much talk just now of "cancer-research." A concerted effort is to be made by medical men to discover the cause and cure of cancer. "Cancer," here, is a "universal." The research aims at the discovery of the "idea," the "real nature," of cancer. No doubt the researchers can succeed only by examining particular instances of cancer, as various as possible, in a large number of patients suffering from the disease. But what they study in each "case" is the *nature*, or principle, of cancer *as such*, and so far as they grasp that nature in any case they will, *ipso facto*, have a knowledge of cancer in all other cases as well. Let it be noted that we have carefully said, "So far as they grasp. . . ." We do not affirm that we can learn all about cancer from any single case. On the contrary, the symptoms and manifestations of cancer will vary

somewhat with varying circumstances, and it will require the study of a large number of different cases if we are to acquire knowledge of the whole nature of cancer. Still, it remains true that the object of scientific curiosity in each particular case is the universal. We study cancer *as such*—the Platonic “idea”—in any and every particular cancerous growth. Statements about cancer in medical treatises are all “universal predications.” For, their subject is cancer *as such*, the universal; and this is why they are true of every particular case of cancer. The point which we have here illustrated from cancer-research holds good for every investigation in every branch of science. The objects of science are always universals, or what Plato called “ideas.” Only, we must take “science,” here, in a wider sense than the Natural, or Physical, Sciences from one of which our illustration was taken: we must include the Mental and Moral Sciences as well. In fact, “science” here covers every inquiry or research, in which the object we seek to know more about, is a universal, a principle, a law, exhibited in one or more particular cases. The Platonic theory of “ideas,” then, is a theory of the “real natures” of particular things, i.e., of the universal kinds, principles, or laws, of which particular things are instances or cases.

Now, there is one all-important point about this theory of ideas as objects of scientific knowledge which must be clearly understood.

Particulars, Plato tells us, are perceived by the senses: ideas (or universals) can be apprehended only by thought. In modern language, they can be only conceived, not perceived. Now, an object conceived is commonly called a *concept*, and hence Plato’s ideas, like modern universals, are often, and correctly enough, called “concepts.” But “concept” is a dangerous word to use. For it has acquired associations for us which are quite alien to Plato’s “ideas.” We tend to think of a concept as peculiarly a creature, or product, of mental activity. We are commonly told that we “form” concepts by a comparison of particulars; that particular instances are given “facts,” existing independently of us, but that the corresponding concept is something of our own making which “exists only in our own minds.” Particular cases of cancer—to recur to our example—exist in the real world; the concept of cancer is a creature of scientific theory and exists only in the minds of medical men. At any rate, this is a widely current modern view. Now, it is

true enough that without thinking or reasoning, i.e., without the mental activity of observing, comparing, analysing instances, rejecting what is irrelevant, connecting what is relevant, we should never discover any universal or law at all. Consider, e.g., the amount of intellectual labour which has gone into the discovery of Newton's law (i.e., concept) of gravitation, or Einstein's law of relativity. But, does it follow that these laws or concepts are therefore "mental" in a sense in which the facts from which they were elicited are not "mental"? Does it follow that these objects, because they are "concepts," exist only in the minds of those who think them? This conclusion has often been drawn, and those who have drawn it have then accused Plato of the philosophical crime of "hypostatizing concepts," i.e., of treating as independent realities what are really products, not to say fictions, of the human mind. But this is a misinterpretation of Plato's meaning. His "ideas" are not products of any mind, not even of the mind of God. They are *objects* apprehended by mind, not *states* of the apprehending mind. They are not *formed*, but *discovered*, by thinking. And in discovering them, just as in discovering a scientific law or principle, we attain to scientific knowledge of the essential nature of the particular things and events which we perceive by our senses. Thus, if we call Plato an "idealist," we must mean by "idealism," not the modern theory connected with Berkeley's name, which is most often so called, but strictly the theory that concepts (universals, laws, principles) are the essential natures of particular things, and the real objects of scientific knowledge.

There is one characteristic, however, of Plato's "ideas" which may, at first sight, seem to be lacking in the "universals" and "laws" of modern science. Ideas are, for Plato, not merely principles of explanation: they are also standards of perfection. They are not only the "essential natures" of particular things, but they are also "ideals." This comes out especially in Plato's treatment of moral and mathematical "ideas." What visible straight line is perfectly straight? What wheel, or other round object, is perfectly circular? What just action is perfectly just? Particulars are all more or less imperfect embodiments of "ideas." They have an "essential nature," but they exhibit that nature more or less incompletely. Quite generally, for Plato, no actual object of the senses quite realizes the ideal pattern, as it were, of the kind of thing it is. This treatment of universals as ideals is apt to strike us moderns as strange. Yet,

we are not really unfamiliar with it. Whenever we distinguish particulars of the same kind as *good* and *bad of their kind*, we are really applying Plato's principle. In every kind of thing, specimens (cases, examples) will range from those which are fine and fully-developed to those which are poor and stunted. Our judging of cattle or vegetables at agricultural shows depends wholly on this principle. Every teacher, too, knows the difference between a good example which exhibits the essential nature (universal) of a certain kind of thing, e.g., a disease, clearly and completely, and a bad example in which nature is hard to discern. In morals, the character of universals as ideas is especially striking. When we consider men in respect of their work or their duties, e.g., as husbands, fathers, citizens, soldiers, etc., we can obviously distinguish between work well done and work ill done. Of two husbands, one may be good, the other bad, i.e., one man's conduct may be all that a husband's ought to be, whereas the other's may fall far short. Yet, in order that we may thus compare them in respect of the degree in which each conforms to the "idea" of husband, which is also the "ideal" of husband, they must both *be* husbands. There would be no point in judging that a certain man is a good or a bad husband, when that man is not married at all. Thus, paradoxically, what we are, that we can be more or less perfectly, and the moral demand for each of us, in his profession and social relations, is to be what he is as well as he possibly can. This is why it is not absurd to appeal to a man with the exhortation, "Be a man!" He is a man, yes; but *being a man* is nonetheless a task in which a man may fail or succeed in varying degrees. Thus, one's "essential nature" (what one really is) is always also an "ideal" to be realized. In this point our modern thinking coincides with Plato's.⁴

The fact that Plato conceived his "ideas" also as "ideals" lends special interest to the position which he assigned to the "idea of good" in his theory of Reality. We could wish that

⁴ Here are two examples, picked at random, which illustrate how the nature (idea) of a thing may be used as a standard of perfection (ideal) by which to judge particular cases. In a newspaper description of a lion at the Zoo, I read: "Though lithe and well-built, he is not a perfect specimen of a lion. The qualities he lacks, however, are apparent only to those well versed in the subject of perfection in lions." And here is a passage from the Preface of Ruskin's *Unto this Last*: "There should, at these Government manufactories and workshops, be authoritatively good and exemplary work done, and pure and true substance sold; so that a man could be sure, if he chose to pay the Government price, that he got for his money bread that was bread, ale that was ale, and work that was work."

he had devoted at least a whole dialogue to argument expounding his theory of the "idea of good," instead of dealing with it only in a few paragraphs in the dialogue called *The Republic*. There it is described in somewhat metaphorical language by being likened to the sun in its relation to natural objects. Just as the sun makes all things visible, so the "idea of good" makes all things intelligible. It is "that which imparts truth to the known and the power of knowing to the knower."⁵ And, again, just as the sun is the condition of the growth and nourishment of living things, so the "idea of good" is the cause of all things being what they are. In short, Plato seems to be here adumbrating the view that there is a principle of goodness or perfection in the universe which manifests itself in all there is, and in the light of which we must try to understand all things, if we would know the full truth concerning them. Obviously this is a tremendous theory—extremely startling and difficult when held up against our everyday "common-sense" beliefs about the world. But, if for "idea of good" we were to say "God," the theory would sound more familiar, even if it remains just as difficult to the understanding. Still, all who take seriously the belief that the world is the creation and manifestation of a perfect God, are bound to say concerning God exactly what Plato says concerning the "idea of good." And, no doubt, it was this feature of Plato's theory of ideas which profoundly influenced the development of Christian theology, and facilitated the transition to the second meaning which the term "idea" assumed in the history of European philosophy.

5. (c) MEANING OF "IDEA" IN PHILOSOPHY—(2) MEDIAEVAL PHILOSOPHY

(2) The second chief meaning of "idea" has its roots in the philosophies of Philo, surnamed "The Jew," and Plotinus, the founder of the so-called "Neo-Platonist" school. But it has become important for us mainly through its adaption by St. Augustine, and its consequent influence upon the philosophy of the Christian thinkers of the Middle Ages. The difference between the Platonic and the Augustinian theory of ideas is best understood by considering the relation of ideas to God. In Plato's philosophy God may fairly be said to occupy a relatively subordinate position. In the imaginative account of creation,

⁵ *Republic*, Book VI, 508D; Jowett's translation.

in the *Timæus*, God is represented as making the world to the pattern of the "ideas," but the ideas are certainly not represented as being themselves created by God. For Plato the ideas, not God, are the supreme realities. On the other hand, when the Theism of Jewish and Christian thought came into contact with Greek philosophy, in the resulting give-and-take the balance was shifted in favour of God. If God is the supreme, and, indeed, the all-inclusive, reality, the "ideas" must somehow be conceived as constituting His being or "essence." This was facilitated by their character as "ideal patterns" which only thought can apprehend. Thus God came to be regarded as creating the world in accordance with these ideal patterns, which constitute his very nature, or essence, as Divine Intelligence. They are perfect, because He is perfect. The perfection of His nature is expressed in the perfection of what He thinks, just as the artist's nature is expressed in the æsthetic quality of the thoughts which he strives to embody in his works. Thus, the "ideas" become the creative thoughts of God, the eternal and immutable patterns in which He displays His essential nature as all-wise, all-good, all-powerful, and in accordance with which He creates the sensible world.

In this theory the status of the "ideas" is subtly changed, and the change proves to be of far-reaching importance. They are still, in a sense, "objects"—they are what God thinks. But they are also the very essence of God as thinker. The ideas now are what they are because God is what He is: in other words, they are His way of manifesting Himself. They are wholly one with Him: through them He reveals His infinite perfection.

To put the contrast as sharply as possible: for Plato the ideas, though they may be apprehended by mind, are in existence and nature independent of mind; for the mediæval thinkers, they are constitutive of God's mind, for God's mind expresses itself in what He thinks, and apart from the activity of His mind they are nothing.

6. (c) MEANING OF "IDEA" IN PHILOSOPHY—(3) LOCKE AND OTHER MODERNS

(3) The mediæval theory thus identifies the "ideas" with the essence of God's mind, without, however, changing their character as universals and ideals. The third theory, which meets us

at the threshold of modern philosophy, on the one hand makes "ideas" depend on human minds, and, on the other hand, drops the restriction of the term to universals and ideals, so that it now covers any and every object of which any human mind is at any time aware. Indeed, among "ideas" in this modern sense there bulk most largely precisely those particular objects of sense perception which Plato had so sharply distinguished from "ideas" in his sense. It is thus forcibly brought home to us how, in spite of a recognizable connection from step to step, the meaning of the term "idea," nonetheless undergoes profound alterations. The stages, briefly, are: universal—ideal pattern constituting God's creative thought—object of human perception and thought.

The classical definition of "idea," according to the third theory of it, is John Locke's "Whatever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks."⁶ "Thinking" is here used by Locke, exactly like Descartes' *cogitare* or *penser*, as a general term for all mental activities by which an object may be said to be "presented to," or "apprehended by," the mind. This is clearly shown by Locke's further description of ideas as "the immediate objects of the understanding in the widest sense." This "widest sense" covers perceiving, remembering, imagining, conceiving—in short, to use the terminology of present-day psychologists, all *cognitive* activities, all modes of being conscious of objects.⁷

The sting of this theory, however, lies in the word "immediate." This implies a distinction between the "immediate objects" of consciousness and another kind of objects of which our apprehension is only "mediate." The former objects are apprehended "directly," the latter only "indirectly," viz., in so far as they are "represented" by the former. In short, "ideas" are "representatives," sometimes even described as "copies," in the mind of objects *outside*. The external world is known to us by being, as it were, mirrored in our ideas. This is the so-called theory of representative perception—a theory according to

⁶ *Essay on the Human Understanding*, Book I, ch. vi, par. 8.

⁷ The use of "idea" for the "immediate object" of thought is common to all the writers of this period. Thus Descartes defines "idea" as "anything of which the mind is directly aware," and Malebranche, similarly, calls it "*l'objet immédiat de nostre esprit*." Descartes, in controversy with Hobbes, expressly defends his use of "idea" by reference to its mediæval use for the "perceptions of the Divine Mind"—a clear illustration of the linkage of theories.

which we perceive the external world by means of its mental representation in "ideas."

7. THE THEORY OF REPRESENTATIVE PERCEPTION

Let us analyze, briefly, an example, so as to see what exactly this theory means. Suppose a person to look at a rose. Then, according to the theory, there are involved three distinct factors. (a) There is the person's mind which perceives. (b) There is what the person "immediately" perceives, viz., a colour patch of characteristic shape. (c) There is the rose itself, the physical thing. It is of the essence of the theory to maintain that (b) "represents" (c) to the percipient mind, and that strictly, i.e., immediately, or directly, (c) is not perceived at all. What is perceived is only (b), and (b) makes the mind think of (c), and only in this indirect sense can the mind be said to "perceive" (c) by the mediation of (b). In other words, instead of saying, as we innocently do in ordinary life, that we "see a rose," we ought, according to the theory of representative perception, to say that we see a coloured patch which is our "idea" of the rose. It represents the rose which, itself, we cannot see.

This theory is the result of two distinct lines of thought. (1) One of these is scientific, and deals with the *causes* of perception. (2) The other is philosophical, and deals with the *truth* of what we perceive.

(1) Attempts at a causal theory of perception, i.e., at a theory explaining how perception comes about, go back, like so much else in philosophy, to the Greeks. Their common scheme is that the object somehow through the sense-organs affects, or stimulates, the mind and produces in the mind an effect by means of which the mind perceives the object. Through the Middle Ages back to the Stoics, and, beyond them, to Democritus, we can trace a tradition that perception takes place through the formation, under the stimulus of the external object, of *imagines in mente*, or *objecta interna*, which as "internal" effects are referred back to the "external" objects as their causes. This theory received a considerable impetus at the threshold of the modern era through the development, on the one hand, of the transmission theories of light and sound, and, on the other hand, of the physiology of the senses. Physics and physiology thus combined to explain perception as caused by a stimulus (e.g., a ray of light) proceeding from an object to a sense-organ, and

thence conveyed by the nerves to the brain. At this point, the theory divided into two branches. Strict materialists, like Hobbes, tried to stop with the effect in the brain, and thus treated every "idea" as a *phantasma*, i.e., as "an appearance which remains in the brain from the impression of external bodies upon the organs of sense." But most thinkers, accepting the existence of minds as well as of bodies, went on, like Descartes and Locke, to a theory of the interaction of body and mind, according to which the effect produced by the external stimulus in the brain produces, in turn, in the mind a "sensation" or "idea of sense." Thus, when we perceive an object, e.g., a rose, what we are immediately aware of are various sensations of colour, smell, touch, etc., in our minds, which we interpret as the effects caused in our minds by the external object, i.e., by the rose as a physical thing. Thus the ideas in the mind "represent" the object of which they are the effects. *Directly* we perceive only the ideas which the object causes to appear in our minds. The object itself is not perceived at all, but is known only *indirectly* by inference from effect to cause.

Plausible as this theory is at first sight, especially because of the apparent scientific warrant for it, yet it has been riddled by criticism and shown to be utterly incoherent and self-contradictory. For, if the theory is true, we are confined to our "ideas," and of the external objects which are supposed to be their causes we can know neither that they exist nor what they are like. Consequently, we cannot know whether our ideas "represent" anything at all. The very theory that our ideas "represent" objects which are not ideas will be but another, more complex, "idea" or "object of thought," and thus there is no escape from the circle of ideas. On the rock of this fatal flaw the theory suffers shipwreck, and in anything like its original form it no longer finds support among competent philosophers.

(2) The other line of thought which has led to the theory of representative ideas does not, like the previous one, attempt to account for the *origin* and *cause* of ideas, but seeks rather to explain what is meant by the *truth* of an idea. A "true" idea, we are apt to say, is one to which there "corresponds" an object in the "real" world; a "false" idea is a mere figment of our minds, to which, as to a dream or a fancy, nothing corresponds in the real world at all. Thus, a true idea has a representative function: a false idea represents nothing. It has, as some mod-

erns put it, no "objective reference." For example, the scenes and events which we witness in dreams are "objects" presented to our minds as surely as are similar scenes and events witnessed in waking life. In both cases we have "ideas"—object of which we are immediately aware. Yet in the one case we treat these objects as mere figments, in the other we treat them as representing "real" events in the physical world. Clearly, according to this line of thought, the theory of representation is a device for bridging the gap between the realm of mental ideas and the realm of physical realities. Immediately, we have nothing but "ideas," and so far one idea is as good as another. A dream-idea, an imagination-idea, are indistinguishable from ideas of real things, unless we introduce the theory of representation, and say that the latter ideas represent something, whereas the former represent nothing. But, unfortunately, in this form the theory suffers from the same defects as the causal theory, viz., it confines us to the circle of our ideas and shuts us off from physical things in such a way that the relation of representation between idea and thing, supposing it to exist, can never come directly to our knowledge. We can never compare idea and object, so as to verify their correspondence.

At this point we may conveniently note the ambiguity of the metaphor by which ideas are said to be "in" the mind. The supposed contrast between ideas "in" the mind and the objects "outside" the mind which cause ideas or correspond to them, has led to more loose thinking than any other phrase in the vocabulary of philosophers. "In" and "out" are, literally, metaphors taken from space, and, therefore, inapplicable to a mind. For a mind is not like a box in which, or outside of which, ideas can be supposed to be. "Being in a mind," then, can be only a metaphor for "being an object to a mind" or "being thought of"; and if the phrase is taken in this sense, we cannot infer from it, as has often been done, that ideas are "mental," i.e., that they are, not merely objects apprehended by the mind, but actually mental states or processes—bits of mind, as it were. Correspondingly, an object "outside" the mind ought to mean simply an object which is not being apprehended, as in the phrase "out of sight, out of mind." But, instead, being "outside" has often been identified with being "physical," with the result that physical objects have been regarded as incapable of being directly apprehended by mind at all. Their being physical has been held to place them by

definition "outside" mind, i.e., beyond the reach of direct apprehension, which is limited to the effects "in" the mind produced by the "external" thing. Thus, for the legitimate distinction between objects apprehended and objects not apprehended by a mind, there has been substituted the illegitimate distinction between ideas "in" the mind and the "external" world which the ideas "represent." But, when we brush aside the cobwebs of this theory, we can see that, though we may express the fact of a physical thing, e.g., a tree, being perceived by saying that it is "in" the mind which perceives it, yet the tree does not thereby cease to be physical. Nor is there any good reason for treating the perceived tree as a mental idea representing another tree itself unperceived.

8. TRANSITION TO MODERN IDEALISM

If then we reject these confusions, and with them the whole theory of "ideas" as mental representatives of physical things, does anything of value remain in the "new way of ideas" to which Locke attached so much importance?

The answer is "Yes." But, if we are to appreciate this value, we must abandon, once and for all, the false lead of the notion of representation, with all its presuppositions and consequences. Once we have resolutely done this, we shall discover important truths by following up the clues implicit in Locke's "way of ideas." But we shall find, also, that these truths can be stated without retaining the term "idea" with its burden of misleading associations.

(1) In the first place, then, the way of ideas once it has shed the theory of representation, introduces a definitely *new* point of view into philosophy. To consider objects as "ideas" is to consider them in an entirely *fresh context*, viz., the context of "objects of mind." Objects are of many kinds, and ordinarily we group them in several contexts according to their several kind. There are, e.g., objects real and unreal, actual and imaginary, true and false. And, correspondingly, there are different contexts, or "worlds," of objects. A "real" object is a member of the context called the "real world," in which neither giants nor fairies, neither Hamlet nor Pickwick, have a place. But when we watch a performance, or read the play, of *Hamlet*, or are absorbed in the *Pickwick Papers*, we live, for the time being, in a context, or "world," of imaginary persons and imaginary

events. The orderly and consistent distinction of these two worlds is one which, as children, we gradually learn to make, and which even grown-up people do not always wholly achieve. There are objects whose status is in doubt. Ghosts, for example, are by some people accepted as real, while others treat them as figments. Dreams, again, introduce us to yet another context, or world, of objects. Thus, there are many kinds of objects to apprehend and many ways of apprehending them. An educated mind is able to sort these various kinds of objects, more or less tidily and consistently, into their several contexts or worlds, and it passes, with ready adjustment, from world to world. In business, or politics, or science, our work lies in the "real" world, but when, in leisure hours, we take up a novel or go to a play, we pass into the world of imagination, whilst during sleep we may visit the world of dreams. In ordinary life we take these, and similar, distinctions for granted, and our practical, even more than our theoretical, interests lead us to occupy ourselves chiefly with the "real" world and to rank it as superior in status and importance to the others. But all these worlds are equally open to, and enter into, our experience. What we perceive, think, imagine, feel, may belong to any one of these worlds.

Now, to make us attend to, and reflect on, this fact is, we may fairly say, the first great service rendered to us by Locke's "way of ideas." For, there is one context which includes all the above contexts, viz., the context of "objects of mind," or, more simply, the context, or world, of "mind" or "experience." In this context all the others meet. In this context they can be compared and distinguished. Here they reveal their several natures and relations to each other. Considered as an "idea," i.e., as something apprehended by a mind, a physical object finds itself one of a crowd of other objects, some of which are, like itself, physical, whereas others belong to all sorts of other worlds. For, a mind is not limited to the "real," still less to the "physical," world. It may soar into the realms of Art on the wings of imagination, or in day-dreams amuse itself with unsubstantial fancies. And even in its "real" world it will acknowledge objects which are not merely "physical," e.g., other minds, human and animal, and in religion a spirit, or spirits, divine. Thus the context of "objects of mind," or, as it has sometimes been called, the "standpoint of experience," has, as against all other contexts, or worlds, the outstanding merit of *inclusiveness*. It eman-

cipates us from the preoccupation, which practical life imposes on most of us, with the real, especially in the narrow sense of the physical. It projects, as it were, all objects and their "worlds" on a single plane. For, whatever the differences between objects, and however diverse the worlds to which they belong, as objects of the same mind, as items in the same field of experience, they meet on common ground. And, if we take our stand on this common ground, we shall develop a philosophical programme which excludes no kind of object and no kind of experience, but holds that every kind of experience has some contribution to make to our knowledge of the Universe. Every kind of object reveals something of that whole which, as a whole, we call the Universe, or "Reality," in the technical sense of philosophy.

This, then, is the first of the distinctive notes which idealism strikes in modern philosophy.

(2) But, secondly, from the *world* of mind our philosophical interest may shift to the *life* of mind. Instead of thinking of mind merely as a focus, or meeting-point, of objects of all sorts and kinds, we may throw the emphasis rather on the *activity* of mind. But it matters greatly how we do this. For, if we misconceive the mind's activity in relation to its objects, we shall lose whatever gain our first step, above, has brought us. Perhaps our everyday way of speaking of mind and mental activity may here furnish us with a helpful clue. We certainly speak of mind as active: it feels, perceives, thinks, reasons, wills—in short, it exists and lives by *doing*, by being active. But we also express the very same fact by saying that mind "has" feelings, thoughts, desires, etc. And we even speak of these as "filling" the mind, as being its "contents." There are modern thinkers who insist on a sharp distinction between (mental) act and (non-mental) object. In every perception they distinguish the act of perceiving from what is being perceived; in every thought, the thinking from the object of thought; in general, in every experience, the experiencing from what is experienced. Now, whatever may be the value of this distinction . . . the point which we must bear in mind here is that there is another way of looking at these facts. When we perceive, no doubt we are active—we attend, select, engage our interest. But what we perceive comes to us; it is not mainly, and originally never, of our choosing, still less of our making. Some object stimulates us and we "respond." It attracts and holds our attention. We become absorbed and lose ourselves in it. So,

again, in thinking we are active, but what we think, once more, comes to us: the object of thought reveals itself to us, it determines our thinking. Whenever our thinking is good thinking, it is under the control of the object. When we are logically compelled to think so and not otherwise, then what we think is true. When we reflect upon these familiar facts, the "activity" of mind begins to wear a different face. It threatens almost to pass into passivity. Obviously we cannot separate the character and mainsprings of mental activity from the character of the "contents" or "objects" upon which that activity is exercised. It would certainly be false to conceive that activity as exercised upon a passive and indifferent material. We cannot perceive, think, will just what and when we please. In most ways it would be truer to say that "our" activity (the activity of "our" minds) is the activity of *what*, as object or content, fills our minds. If "I think" is one side of the truth, certainly "the world thinks in me," or "reveals itself in my thinking," is the other side. Our minds are microcosms, drawing all that is included in their range of awareness from the macrocosm of the Universe. And their activity and life is the activity and life of the Universe in them.

This is a second note struck by modern idealists—not by all, but certainly by many. But, whether struck by few or many, this second note is undeniably consonant with the first note, above.

(3) So far we have considered the activity of mind, and the various worlds of objects which enter into our experience, as if the contemplation of objects, be it in perception or thought, be it by way of knowledge, imagination, or dream, were the main business of mind. We must now remark, thirdly, that there are worlds in which mind is creative—worlds which are made and sustained by mind. Whether Nature, or the Physical World, can exist without a mind to apprehend it is a question to which we shall have to return. But there can be no doubt whatever that there are Spiritual Worlds through participation in, or membership of, which our minds attain their fullest realization. Art, Morals, Economics, Politics, Religion are facts which exist only in the medium of mind. If there were no minds in the world, there would be no works of art, no moral conduct, no economic activities and organizations, no states, no churches. All these are realities in, and through, which minds express themselves. A full knowledge of what

mind is and does is impossible apart from a full knowledge of these worlds which mind creates and through which it realizes its nature to the fullest. They are the very substance of its life.

It is the peculiar merit of idealism to have led the way in the philosophical study and appreciation of these worlds which mind not only contemplates, but creates and sustains as organs for its own self-realization. The "Philosophy of the Human Mind," which, in the hands of David Hume and the English Empiricists, had remained within the limits of introspective psychology, went out (so to speak) into the world under the leadership of Kant and Hegel and their followers in Germany and England, and drew within its compass the whole achievement of mind in Society and Civilization. Abandoning the "subjective" point of view of psychology, it acknowledged, not only the reality of Nature, but also the reality of the Spiritual Worlds which mind has erected on the basis of, and through mastery over, Nature. The "Philosophy of Mind" thus became the "Phenomenology of Spirit"⁸—the theory of all the ways in which Absolute Spirit appears and manifests itself in Nature and in Man, in short, the theory of Absolute Idealism.

This, then, is the third feature in the distinctive philosophical achievement of idealism. Many would hold that it represents the high-water mark of idealism; that idealists never aimed higher or succeeded more nobly than when they conquered for philosophy these realms of spiritual facts which are also spiritual values—realms which exist through mind and in which mind achieves the fulness of its own nature.

9. TYPES OF IDEALISM

It seems not unreasonable to acclaim *Absolute Idealism* as, in principle, the highest form which idealism has assumed. For, it has learnt the lesson of Locke's "way of ideas" in that it explores every avenue of human experience for the contribution it can make to a fuller knowledge of Reality. It regards mental activity as the process through which Reality discloses or reveals itself as an object of knowledge. And it treats the worlds which our minds create and sustain as the highest manifestations of the Absolute Spirit.

⁸ This is the title of the treatise which first established the reputation of Hegel.

But the various *motifs* (to borrow a term from music), which go to make up the many-hued texture of idealism, can be combined in other patterns than that of Absolute Idealism. . . . Of these, *Spiritual Pluralism* is, next to Absolute Idealism, philosophically the most important, and probably it is more popular. It is the theory that, in the last analysis, the universe is a Society of Spirits of all kinds and degrees. We know from ourselves what it is to be a mind or spirit, and with this clue to guide us we must interpret the rest of the universe. There will, obviously, be no difficulty in accepting, or postulating, the existence of God and other superhuman spirits, and in the animal world we are presented with sub-human spirits in varying degrees of remoteness from the human pattern. By analogy, we must suppose that plants, too, and even seemingly inorganic, or physical, objects, are really minds of a low order—an order so low that we can no longer in practice apprehend them as minds. What we call the physical, or material, world is merely the way in which these lower kinds of minds appear to our senses. Thus, the universe is a vast society of spirits, forming an ordered hierarchy from the lowest up to God. . . .

R. F. A. HOERNLÉ: *Idealism as a Philosophy*, pp. 45-75.
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SUGGESTIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Make a list of sentence definitions of idea, ideal, and idealism based upon this chapter. Compare the list with definitions of these terms in a comprehensive dictionary (Century or Murray).
2. Which meaning of ideal does the person who uses the term idealist as a term of reproach probably have in mind?
3. Does Hoernlé prove that the modern idea of a law of nature is identical with Plato's conception of an idea or universal essence? Offer any further proof or any disproof of this statement, or point out one similarity and one difference between the two views.
4. How is the technical meaning of idea in psychology related to the term concept? Why does Hoernlé object to Plato's ideas being called concepts?
5. Compare Montague's brief discussion of epistemological dualism (p. 67) with Hoernlé's discussion of the theory of representative perception. Is the latter a form of epistemological dualism in the sense of Montague?
6. State as concisely and clearly as you can the central difficulty in the theory of representative perception.
7. Compare Muirhead's discussion of the levels theory of reality with that of Hoernlé, including the latter's context theory of mind

or experience. Do these two thinkers seem to you to hold the same view?

8. Compare Dewey's view of philosophy as creative (pp. 48 ff.) with the third aspect of modern idealism stressed by Hoernlé. Indicate one fundamental difference and one basic similarity between the two views.

CHAPTER II

SPIRITUAL PLURALISM

I. APOLOGIA PRO FIDE, by *Hartley B. Alexander*

Analysis

Alexander enumerates the various dualisms of Christianity, and insists that they express a profound truth about nature and human nature. For, in the first place, it is a moral fact that man is at war with himself. But there is also an intellectual aspect of this dualism which is equally fundamental in human nature, and that is the contrast between rational or discursive and intuitive reasoning. Scientific rationalism, which characterizes the spirit of modernity, has misunderstood this dual nature of reasoning and as a result it has made a kind of god out of science. But, in truth, science is only an image of the real world. As Plato, Origen, Dante, Pascal, and the great thinkers of the race from age to age have always recognized, intuitive reasoning is our only human way of getting at the nature of reality. Christianity has been right in pointing out the perils of an exclusive use of discursive reasoning such as characterizes modern science. Not only are these twin dualisms the essence of Christianity and of human nature, the world itself is a dual reality. The perpetually shifting and dying temporal processes stand in opposition to the eternal logos or divine will. This fact is illustrated with a dream men commonly have. Scientific and historical knowledge does not reach the real meaning of the world. This is found only through the faith of religion and the intuitions of morality and art. The World War was the end of an episode in human history which began four hundred years ago and was dominated by the discursive reason. A new day is dawning. Suffering has brought modern man back to the quest for the eternal logos.

. . . At the core of the Christian religion there is a dogma—voiced in no creed, so far as I am aware—which cuts deep to the truth of human nature. It is the dogma of the antithesis and the struggle of the flesh and the spirit, of the World and the Word, the dogma of the suffering and striving man, which is nowhere so vividly expressed as in the terrible image of St. Paul, “the world is crucified unto me and I unto the world.” Out of this dogma have come the sharp-limbed dualisms of Christian conception: corruption and incorruption, body and soul, salvation and damnation, Paradise and Hell, God and the Devil, two Ways, a narrow and a broad, and there where they part an in-

exorable Judgment; and out of it, in exhortation and practice, have come the disciplines, asceticisms, martyrdoms of the body, castigations of the soul, which have made of Christianity pre-eminently a religion of the will. Rebirth and Resurrection, and *death* of the carnal that a man may be reborn into the spiritual, and *death* of the physical in order that a man may find resurrection into Life—these express the grimness and relentlessness of a faith which demands utter destruction of the objects of its hostility, even though a man rend the flesh of his body and cast away its living members. Greek morals demanded of a man temperance, self-mastery, self-restraint; but Christian salvation demands of him self-conquest and in part self-annihilation. It is a religion without compromise, a religion of war, and this is why its terrene church is a Church Militant and its supernal church a Church Triumphant.

This, I say, cuts deep to the truth of human nature, and deep to the truth of the world. First, and most profoundly, it is a moral fact; there is no toying with the forms of desire; there is no equivocacy in the qualities of the virtues; there are no indulgences, and absolution follows only on relinquishment; good is shining and intense, and evil is black and redemptionless. There is, I know, a monistic turn to theology which would exorcise evil with delicate phrases and save the face of the Devil in seeking to justify God; but such theology runs, I firmly believe, counter to the whole grain of the faith; the Christian religion is not monistic, it is dualistic, and its dualism is that of a relentless and eternal war. It is just such a war as every man knows in his own soul; life is unrelaxing choice, and choice is of good and evil: complexion this fact as you may, its features are fixed; and it is for this reason that I should say, with Pascal, that Christianity is true to human nature, and therefore worthy of respect.

There is a theological difficulty connected with this moral aspect of Christian dualism which the orthodox theologians have never satisfactorily solved; but it is not, first of all, with this aspect that I am concerned, but with another, an intellectual phase of the dualism which is in a way of more importance, since it touches more nearly the main current of modern scepticism and the moving dubieties of the modern man. For there is no doubt that the whole Renaissance culture of Europe, within which our lives are cast, has produced an intellectual conceit (the thing which the Eighteenth Century called Reason) that of

itself makes the recognition of Christian truth difficult. We are educated in modes of thinking and in a paraphernalia of science which are far more conducive to doubt than to faith,—or, as I should prefer to put it, which absorb us in the encrustations rather than lead us into the motives of life. I do not mean to say that our culture is irreligious or non-Christian; the Renaissance is not a Restoration of paganism; the intervention of Christianity made that once for all impossible. But none can deny that the spirit of modernity has clouded the eye of faith; not that, in particular, the edifices of our sciences—temples of learning and altars of knowledge, as we figure them—have commanded from many minds all that they have to give of reverence and devotion. As I see it, the whole consequence harks back to a partial and specialized understanding made into the staff and the support of our lives; for in reason itself there is a dualism, related to the moral dualism upon which Christianity rests, whose understanding is the true key to faith—at least, where want of faith is of the intellect.

For what, after all, is the nature of scientific, rationalistic scepticism, save it be a distortion, and hypertrophy of the periphery of life? Religions are man-made, it is said; and the words are uttered as a reproach. But is science any the less man-made? Its numbers are the ten digits of our hands; its measures are our palms and paces. By a vast process of dilation and fission, division and multiplication of its own forms—like the monstrous multiplication of infusorial life—it spawns and spreads about the whole circumference of human interests, and generates a sort of comb, a coralline structure, with its own dead casts for a supporting frame and life only at its ever-perishing surface. Within this colony of bones there are tunnels and cells, paths of no issue, and tortuous courses to the living waters; and our art of life becomes an art of threading the labyrinth and our craft a craft of motion. For though I speak in a figure, it is close indeed to the truth of what science is and of what it pretends to be—a guide to the ordering of our physical migrations to and fro upon the repeating surface of a circumscribed sphere. Our ideas are like frail antennæ with which we explore spaces beyond spaces, yet when we move it is with feet which cling to the soil; and we know that into that soil our most airy mansions will shrink with our decaying bones.

I present in an image what analysis will verify. Our mansion of rationalism is built up in a mathematical mode: its bricks

are numbers and its apices are formulæ; and the joy we have in it is the childish joy of endlessly assembling and endlessly toppling over our structural fantasies. It has practical values; that is, it guides our wanderings over the surface of this Earth; and indeed, it is more like a map, both in its manner of making and in its uses, than like aught else; for it may show a course, but it cannot reveal the motive of the journey nor the nature of the destination. To understand the latter there must be another form of knowledge and another type of reason, another truth, which, even in the scale of human experience, speaks in other modes. The mathematical, and, as we say, scientific manner of thought, was long ago named the operation of the dividing intellect and its reasonings platted as discursive; but there was also, long ago, name given to the type of reason which embraces both the presuppositions and the after-completion of science, and because it operates through insight and revelation it was called the intuitive reason. And with this, I come again to that central dualism which, as I have said, has an intellectual as well as a moral foundation.

Intuitive reason is in no sense remote from our daily life. It is altogether simple and human. In form it might be described as the reason of metaphor, for it is present in every metaphorical expression; the "gift of tongues" is a Scriptural phrase which I think denotes it; and that it is a gift, in some sense an inspiration, is indicated by the fact that it is our poets, masters of metaphor, whom men prize as their wisest. Plato is no doubt the father of the distinction between the two types of reason, as he is master in the use of both,—beyond dialectic is insight. It is present also in the great conceptions of Origen, who saw in history not merely a chain of events, to be told link by link; but throughout it a meaning, a Logos, the perception of which is wisdom; and again this distinction is the prime subtlety of Dante, who strives to combine both modes of expression in the great poem which he describes as having a double sense, *per litteram* and also *per significata per litteram*, the first a literal, the second an allegorical and mystical, meaning. So, once more, Pascal: "the heart has its reasons which the reason knoweth not"; there is a light of nature and there is an illumination of faith,—though only the former is human; the latter is the Grace of God.

Both Plato and Pascal were eminent in mathematics, masters of the science of their day and competent judges of the sig-

nificance of science in human thought, not only in their day but in ours also; and it is in words which seem to echo Plato that Pascal lays bare the root of scientific scepticisms: "Our soul is thrown into the body, where it finds number, time, dimensions; it reasons thereon and calls this *Nature, Necessity*, and can believe in nothing else." Number, time, dimensions,—these are the tools of the dividing intellect; these are the measures of our sciences, the projections of our map-makers. But the nature which they figure is strangely empty, and it is utterly distorted if it have not a Logos behind the image, a mystical beneath the literal intention. Plato, Origen, Dante, Pascal,—the great thinkers of our race, century by century, have perceived this fact; and they have placed over against the reason of number a reason of metaphor, over against the physical a spiritual reading, an act of faith, without which not number itself can form and combine. These men were judges of the scepticisms of their own day, of which they had taken the measure, and their utterances are judgments upon the scepticisms of our day as well: for in science there is nothing new excepting detail, the measures of it were long since set by our digits and our paces; and in scepticisms there is nothing new. There were sceptics in Corinth who doubted with the same doubts wherewith men doubt now, "In whom the god of this world hath blinded the minds of them which believe not, lest the light of the glorious gospel of Christ, who is the image of God, should shine unto them." It is, of course, no answer to a doubt to say that it is old; but at least this fact should take from it the noise of modernity, and perhaps it should persuade those who are moved by it to examine again the foundations of their convictions, to inquire whether truth may not indeed speak in a double tongue, and whether, in the great dualism of our nature, there may not be intellectual as well as moral insights which must fortify us in the faith.

Now the twin dualisms, the one of which, that of good and evil, salvation and damnation, is moral, while the other, that of discursive and intuitive reason, or, as often put, of reason and faith, is rational, are, as a matter of fact, inseparable. Both are of foundational importance in the Christian religion, and to a single end: for the moral dualism of good and evil is the whole motive of the drama of Redemption: Adam's fall, the passion of Christ, the Last Judgment,—the whole image

of Sin and Atonement is the visible working out of the war of God and the Devil; while, in a manner which for the theologians was no less conscious, the conflicts of reason and faith have been the sharpest stripes of Christian discipline. *Credo quia absurdum*, expressing the defiance which faith gives to reason, *Credo ut intelligam*, uttering the humility of reason in the presence of faith, and the wistful ontological surmise, *Dubito . . . ergo Deus est!*—these and their like, ranging from a glad recognition of the miracle of faith to an exalted sense of its power, are the theological expression of men's perception of the twofoldness of their own powers, and of this twofoldness. There is, and the theologians have known it, an obsessing danger, not to the mind alone but to the whole immortal soul, in an undisciplined devotion to things of the intellect; and in faith, which is the disciplinary insight which keeps reason from monstrosity, they have discovered a redemption of mind and soul. It is in this that lies Christian humility (never the servile thing Nietzsche imagined it to be), and it is through this that men escape the blindness of mind inflicted by the god of this world, which is the blindness of their own petty conceits.

Now there is a kind of pact, if I may so put it, between the Devil and the discursive reason—or, to speak with phrase less light, to live only with the discursive reason is to abide in a tomb and to live a living death. Science has three dimensions: an historical dimension, whose plausibilities and illusions are those of the cinematograph; a structural dimension which we call the organization of knowledge; and a practical dimension, represented by the absorptions of sense and appetite. In any one of these a mind may become so engrossed that it will wind itself cocoon-like in cerements of its own weaving, shutting off its vision of the heavens, and perishing as a husk. These are the perils of this world, and the distortions of nature, and the paths that lead to the final obliteration of the earth-bound—for all alike, they perish, and as surely as the sun sets, the time will come when the vanities of our cities and our books, of our numbers and our tales, shall be swept into the night. And that will in truth be a judgment day.

Herein, I am aware, I touch upon matters that affect not only many who doubt, but many who profess the Christian religion,—nay, herein I come to what I conceive to be the very heart of the true Christian theology, where the orthodox many

will not, I know, readily follow me. For to the many the truth of Christianity turns upon the historical verities of the Scriptures, and if a tradition lie or a miracle fail their faith is shattered; whereas to my mode of thinking there is not an episode of the two Testaments which might not be altered or replaced without impugning Christian truth; for to my mode of thinking each of these episodes, and the whole of the two Testaments, and the whole of human history of this world, and all that is therein of art and science and learning and of material grandeur and of material ruin, in all there is not an episode nor a form that is other than an image with a meaning, a letter in a book. Not the image but the meaning, not the letters but the Logos, are the world's truth, its inner fact and its sole enduring fact.

For consider—what is, what can be the height and depth and length and breadth of this our world if it be not from hour to hour the consummation and generation, death and birth, of its forms? The past *is* not, even so soon as it is named. The past *is* not; it is non-existent; it is nothing; not only irrecoverable, but annihilate. The reality of the world—and I proclaim all science for my voucher—the reality of the world *is* just the sum of its possibilities at any instant: in the dead past there are no possibilities; the book is closed and the fates are departed. There is a dream which sometimes comes to us which is a true image of the world's reality. In that dream we are ascending a stair, leading on, on, up into the gloom; behind and below us, as each foot lifts to a new tread, the stair dissolves into nothingness, and behind us is only void and the abyss; before us, there are a few steps faintly illumined and many vaguely surmised, and no landing that we may guess; but we must climb, onward with all our strength, for the stair, which is the world, is dissolving moment by moment beneath our feet and only in mounting is there life. That dream, I say, is an image of reality, and the little light is the illumination of our science, and the stair surmised is the great act of faith which is the impulse of life and which gives all the meaning it can possess to the little that we know and see.

The world, given us by sense and science, is an allegory, an image, a riddle to be read. Human experience is the act of reading, and the human body is but an instrument of precision, a lens, whose ever-shifting focus is throwing the signs into relief. Plato knew this—most Christian of pagans—and

he made it his philosophy. Origen knew it, and he set it forth in his great conception of nature and history as the phantasm of the Logos, which, in turn, is the eternal Son of the eternal Will of God. It is as though the Divine Will were the white light of creation, and the Divine Son the prism whereby this light were broken into the colored and banded manifestation which is the world. For us knowledge is of two sorts, to measure the range and intensities of the colored expanses, and this is the labor of science and of history,—and to recompose this outspread illumination into the single pure ray of white light which is its source and essence, and this is the insight of faith and the truth of the revelation.

That the light of this revelation is lifted up, like the brazen serpent in the Wilderness, like the Cross of the Atonement, to be a sign of salvation to suffering and tormented souls, groping in darkness, seemed to Origen the great lesson of Scriptural history; but assuredly it is no less the teaching of all history, natural and human. For every historian and every naturalist, consciously or not, casts his story sooner or later into the form of a drama of redemption—the progress of a civilization, the evolution of a race, the crystallization of a nebula into a solar system, the unfolding of a rose. Strife and disaster accompany these processes; they end in dramatic defeats: but like a drama, they are not played for the last act, their meaning is not the last act, nor any act; their meaning is in another dimension and in another than their scenic realm; it is a moral world, where good and evil are the protagonists, and in a spiritual world whose presence penetrates all nature as the beauty of the sunset penetrates the vapors of the evening skies.

I speak in images, but this world is an image, and there is no other speech. The plain, nay, the shouting fact of human experience is that men believe in and desire goodness and beauty, and feel the dearth of it and grope after it, and hope for light, and pray for redemption. This *is* human nature, and it is also the nature of that world from which human nature is born and within which we men have being. The plain fact *is* an act of faith in things unseen, things hoped for; and this act we call life. It is life; and it is also belief in God and yearning for salvation; and therefore I say that Christianity, which has figured forth these truths more profoundly than any other religion, is a true religion and *the* true

religion, and a revelation of life unceasing. Wherefore it is that to me the scepticisms born of rationalistic science and rationalized history sound thin and piping, remote and of little consequence.

From time to time in the course of the events of the life of man there come periods which mark the close of the natural chapters of human history. Usually such periods, such chapters, are better seen with their remoteness; the perspective of ages is required to bring into relief the full rounding out of historic episodes. But on occasion the chapter is closed with such finality, the changes which mark its period are so vastly volcanic, that not even to the contemporary mind is its meaning lost, and to men in their own day is brought a realization of the fact that once again a mode of living, a Dispensation, has been tried out by mankind, and that once again the eternal truth of human nature has been told in its temporal parable.

In such an hour of finality, in such a period of history, our days are cast. But yesterday, through all our cities, down all our gauded highways, we rode in fatuous pomp, confident, complacent, exalted in our own material and intellectual works; and but yesterday up from Tartarus there thrust a tongue of consuming flame, and the pride of our works became ashes,—nay, but to-day! for the fumes have not yet cleared, and we still grope blindly amid the burning dust of our own destruction. Four hundred years ago, in such another period as is ours, Europe passed from the Middle Ages into the Renaissance. The change began with the religious wars and the breaking down of old ecclesiastical conceptions; and it moved forward, through broken bars, to the myriad fantastic specializations of life which make up our civilization: to the new political conception of the sovereign irresponsible among sovereigns, to the new vagaries of the arts and compartmentalizing of the sciences, to the new divisions and multiplications of our economic and social institutions and of our ideal interests,—everywhere to politics for politics' sake, art for art's sake, knowledge for the sake of knowledge, magnitude and wealth and power for the sake of magnitude and wealth and power. In the domain of religious form, during this period, the development has been parallel: the dissolution of the international church, the problem of the separation of ecclesiastical

from political institutions, the multiplication of sects and of theologies, and finally the secularization of life with a sort of Sabbatical conformity as its religious lien; in short, an effort to separate out from the substance of life the religious element, and to make of it a thing apart. And as with religion, so with philosophy. We speak of an emancipation of mind, when what we mean is rather a withdrawal from life. The mission of philosophy, as wisdom of the highest things, yea, as the hand-maiden of theology, has been disowned, even with the quiet Cartesian gesture of conformity, and we have passed on to quibbles about knowledge, to creeds of experience based upon the shallows of experience, to critiques that touch the pulse of no spiritual need, and to antinomies of disembodied reason which die away into the vanities of logistic. O René Descartes, clear-eyed and clean-souled, true in devotion to truth, wouldst thou have had courage so to disown the past hadst thou seen unto what mouthings and mummings and shadow-plays thou wert parting the way? For philosophy is become as an histrion's art, whereto the curtains rise amid indifference and fall unto darkness.

I speak in no forgetfulness of the much that is subtle, that is true, that is noble in modern philosophy, and I speak in no condemnation, for it is ours to understand, not to reject history. But I speak also with a consciousness which to-day many a man shares with me of the pitifulness of the intellectual failure which has closed the era of the Renaissance. For the Great War, like a biting irony, has torn away the foundations of our conceits and stripped us of our sufficiencies. Under the test of a naked human passion the Renaissance philosophies have been against a wind of disaster. The realisms that knew no reality save number and power, the idealism that glozed with soft speech our unhealed sores and deep corruptions, the foolish adorations of the natural man, the sounding cant about evolution and progress, all are become but as gibbering and grimace, meaningless. In an hour when men had their utmost need of a full intelligence, an age which had boasted itself intellectual above all ages fell hapless into the Abyss.

With the Great War the period of the Renaissance is come and another episode of human history is turning to the past. Yet it does not pass without its lesson, its enlightenment, even though we shall be slow in reading the symbol. For it has shown us that reason alone is not sufficient for the guidance

of life; it has shown us that patriotism is not enough, that the needy soul calls also for the solace of a last viaticum; and it has shown us once again that the road to wisdom is through suffering. It has thrown into relief also, and anew, the image of Faith. In the course of the war we have seen men capable of cruelties and wickednesses which we had dreamed to be forevermore impossible; but we have also seen them rising to nobilities of vicarious sacrifice in which we had begun to disbelieve: in its depths and in its heights human nature has opened unforeseen ranges, below reason and above reason, and we must set new measures for men. We must take into account the whole reach of human possibilities, arrogances and humilities, negations and aspirations, and we must assess against the world not alone what men have done, but what they have been baffled in attempting, finding in futile impulse and in the dim prayers of unillumined souls perhaps our securest clue to the understanding of that Cosmic Nature which has so strangely created us strangers in her midst. The pattern of bones upon a fossil slab is but the hieroglyph of the shining creature that breathed and cried in the uncounted past; the dead themselves are but the proclamation of life, whose riddle is read not in the material token or the dissolvent fact but in the very glammers of living endeavor. In the end, it is even in the magnitude of our failures that we read the magnitude of our faiths.

Before us, through the gray of depression that is settled upon the nations, lies the road to the discovery and recovery of the meaning of history, the white light of the symbol. We have had a new lesson, a new revelation; it is ours to resolve it, not treading again the ways of the departed, but seeking in our own fashion the light in which, despite all illusions, our life itself is an act of trust. To religion and philosophy, conjoined in their mutual quest of the highest truth, is appointed the natural guidance. In the period just past they have moved in separation, not wholly, but essentially; and neither has thereby gained in its hold upon men's minds and hearts. In the future, they must recover their community, if not of form, at least of understanding, until once more in portraying the transfigured Man they shall have searched out the Logos of the World.

I am reverting to Christian imagery, but how else than revert if in this alone I find the vehicle of my thought? For if

the world be a symbol and its meaning such truth as I find implied in human nature and in human life, then Christianity is everlastingly true. And because the world *is* a symbol and life an expression of faith in the fact of a meaning, I find in the study of nature and of history but the one interest of the discovery of a true reading, and in the recorded history of Europe and of Christendom but the one possible reading. Whereof the token, like a stamp ineffaceable, inescapable, waxes in greatness and intensity with each repetition of its eternal truth: for its form is forever the same, cast as in relief upon the chaotic gloom, a stupendous Crucifixion, haloed with supernatural light as out of a cleft in the heavens, and lifted up amid the night of an outer Darkness.

H. B. ALEXANDER: *Philosophical Review*, Vol. XXIX, pp. 118-134. Reprinted in *Nature and Human Nature*, pp. 501-513 and 518-523. Reprinted here by permission of the Open Court Publishing Co.

SUGGESTIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Compare Alexander's view with that of Radhakrishnan above (pp. 55 ff.). Do these two thinkers seem to you to hold essentially the same view? If so, how do you account for the fact that one expresses the Hindu and the other the Christian philosophy of life? Is this a case of East and West meeting?
2. What danger does an author risk who states his view as the essence of a traditional religion? Does Alexander avoid this danger? Did Radhakrishnan avoid it above? Could the idealistic view which these two men hold be stated without any reference to a particular culture?
3. Is Alexander fair to science in calling it an image?

II. GOD IN RELATION TO MAN AND NATURE, by *James Ward*

Analysis

Distinguishing between the spatio-temporal and the spiritual worlds, Ward argues that faith in the values of the latter must supplement our knowledge of the events which make up the former. He holds that all philosophizing depends upon starting from the self as one among other selves. Although we can conceive of a being who unites all of these selves in one common divine life, we cannot imagine how the world would look to such a being, and, from our human standpoint, we are compelled to conceive of God as being like ourselves, a personal being. We do not know just what God's relation to the world is, but we do know that he is distinct from the world and yet that it limits him. He is immanent in it but he is also transcendent to it. But

it is a living world, constituted by spirits or free agents in whom God dwells. Three characteristics of this world of free spirits, this living natural world, are given—contingency in part, stability in part and progress in part. Brute life is only capable of progress in the sense of escaping evils, but man is capable of being drawn forward by ideal good as well as being capable of being pushed forward by the ills of life. Worldly wisdom is progress in inventions and the affairs of earthly life, but real progress comes only with the appreciation of an eternal order of values. Ward raises the question whether calling the world of evolution good is not really atheism in that it substitutes nature for God. The answer is no, since the good in nature is really derived from a transcendent God and is only an aspect of his divine being. Yet this is learned by faith and not by knowledge, as is shown by the way in which sense knowledge itself develops. Faith is prior to knowledge. Only through faith in a divine purpose has earthly progress been attained. Yet this earthly progress toward a more comfortable existence can never really satisfy the human mind. The values of science, art and religion point to a higher order of reality above the spatio-temporal world. Faith was justified by its results on the lower level of human life, and this must be the test of whether faith is worth while at the higher level of appreciation of the spiritual world of non-temporal values.

It is characteristic of man that he stands at the parting of the ways; and under the influence of both physical ills and spiritual ideals, is led eventually to conclude that he has no abiding city here and to seek a city yet to come. Meanwhile the dimensions that circumscribe this spatial and temporal world afford us no sure clue to the wider dimensions of that more spiritual world beyond; nor do they enable us to conjecture how the two are connected or how the transition is to be made. But none the less our hold on those higher spiritual ideals leads us to believe in God and forces us to think we were not made to die. But anyhow, it is urged, all that we are sure of are the ills and the vanities of the present; and if we must infer from the known to the unknown, is it not more likely that death will end them than that it will mend them? That present evil should set us hoping for future good is natural, but to argue from evil now to good hereafter is surely not rational. No, it is replied, vanity and vexation of spirit are not all that we find. Thoughtful men have been driven to call life an enigma but few have been willing to curse it as a folly or a fraud; it has too much meaning, shows too much purpose for that, though its secret and its goal be not yet clear. Mists may envelop us, mountains seem to bar our way; but often we have heard when we could not see, and found a way

by pressing forward, though, while we halted, there seemed no way at all. These are the two voices—faith and knowledge—how come they to put such different interpretations on the very same facts? Because knowledge is of things we see, and seeks to interpret the world as if they were the whole; while faith is aware that now we see but in part, and convinced that only provided the unseen satisfies our spiritual yearnings is the part we see intelligible—that which ought to be being the key to that which is.

And now to state succinctly the positive results we seem to have attained. They may be gathered up under four heads relating to Method or standpoint, to God or the One, to the World or the Many, and to Faith in the Unseen.

I. As to method—we have started from what we are, cognitive and conative subjects; and from where we are—so to say *in mediis rebus*—in a world consisting to an indefinite extent of other like subjects. No speculation, no dialectic, no ontological deduction, is needed to reach this position; and without it all these alike are impossible. But beginning thus, we are led both on theoretical and on practical grounds to conceive a more fundamental standpoint than this of the Many, namely that of the One that would furnish an ontological unity for their cosmological unity and ensure a teleological unity for their varied ends, in being—as it has been said—“the impersonated Ideal of every mind”¹—the One, as ultimate source of their being and ultimate end of their ends. But though we can conceive this standpoint, we cannot here attain to it or see the world from it. It is there, like their centre of gravity for the inhabitants of a planetary ring, but the aspect of the world from thence is more than we can conceive. Attempts to delineate this have been really but projections of our own eccentric and discursive views: creative synthesis as human implies aspects, creative intuition as divine is beyond them. The result of all attempts to begin with the One is only to lower our idea of the world, not to raise our idea of God. His *modus operandi*, if even this phrase is allowable, in creating, conserving, and ruling the world is beyond us.

II. As to God from the point of view of man, then, we can only regard him as Spirit, as possessing intelligence and will, and so as personal. But while we must admit such attributes carried to their limit to be beyond us, we cannot regard God

¹ Howison, *Limits of Evolution*, 2nd ed., p. xiv.

as absolute in such wise as to deprive ourselves of all personality or initiative. How God created the world, how the One is the ground of the Many, we admit we cannot tell; but since it is from the Many as real that we start we are forced to say that creation implies limitation; otherwise the world could be nothing. Such theism would be acosmism. But while we have to maintain that in determining the world—his world—God also determines himself, it would be absurd to suppose that in thus determining himself he, so to say, diminishes himself. Such determination may be negation, nay, must be, to be real at all; but it is not abnegation. God does not transform, differentiate or fractionate himself into the world, and so cease to be God. Such theism would only be pantheism, which is truly but atheism. But now, finally, if the world, though God's world, the expression and revelation of himself, is yet not God, if though he is immanent in it, he is also as its creator transcendent to it, surely the greater the world—the greater the freedom and capacity of its creatures—the greater still is he who created and sustains and somehow surely overrules it all. Oriental servility and *à priori* speculation have made God synonymous with an "Infinite and Absolute" that leaves room for no other and can brook none. To express dissent from this view, the unfortunate term "finite God," devised by those who hold up the view, has been accepted from them by its opponents. As used by the former, it implies and was meant to imply imperfection and dependence, to place God in line with the Many and to deny his transcendent supremacy. So understood a finite God is a contradiction, of course. But the term "finite God," as accepted by the latter, means for them all that God *can* mean, if God implies the world and is not God without it: it means a living God with a living world, not a potter God with a world of illusory clay, not an inconceivable abstraction that is only infinite and absolute, because it is beyond everything and means nothing. . . .

III. And now as to this living world, of which God is the ground, this realm of ends which he respects because it is his end—it is, we say, a world of self-determining, free, agents, severally intent on attaining more good or at least on retaining the good they have. We note three main characteristics—contingency in part, stability in part and progress in part—all involved in experience as epigenetic. There is con-

tingency, for a common *Modus Vivendi* is still to seek; there is stability, for all effectual cooperation is conserved as good; and there is progress, so long as the ills we have or the goods we know not of are ideal; and ideal ends are only possible on the plane of rational life: the brutes at least leave well alone, and species as soon as they are adjusted to their environment remain stationary, so long at least as that remain unchanged. Such a stationary state may be possible where progress is due solely to the *vis a tergo* of actual physical ills; it is impossible, even though these should cease, once the Good as an ideal has loomed in sight, and begun as a *vis a fronte* to draw spirits onwards. But it has taken untold ages to accomplish that finite amount of progress which the pressure of material want promotes; can we then expect the indefinite progress that spiritual possibilities open up will be easily or speedily achieved? Compared with the interval between the lowest forms of merely animal life and the highest, the interval between civilized man and man in the infancy of the race, is vast; and yet, so far as we can judge, the time it has occupied is correspondingly brief. The greater definiteness and steadiness of purpose that intelligence brings and the permanent tradition that social cooperation makes possible have then unquestionably accelerated the rate of progress on the whole.

But now struggles of a new order arise through this very progress itself. Moral evils spring up and grow apace in the rich soil of worldly prosperity; for the intelligence and social continuity that make nobler ideals possible can also subserve the ends of selfishness, injustice and oppression. Thus the greatest enemy of mankind is man: so it has always been, so it may long continue to be. Yet here too there has been progress; and the vision of a new era, when righteousness shall cover the earth as the waters cover the sea, evokes the lip-service of multitudes and the life-devotion of a few. But time, that tries all things, will assuredly bring more and more to take the lesson to heart that

Man must pass from old to new,
From vain to real, from mistake to fact,
From what once seemed good to what now proves best.

But why, we ask, must the lesson be so slowly learnt? Because to be effectually learnt, it must be learnt by heart, every jot and tittle of it by actual living experience. Advanced to the plane of social intercourse and rational discourse, man has sought out many inventions, preferring at first what looks easy

to what seems arduous, what looks near to what seems remote, what looks tangible to what seems visionary. This we call worldly wisdom. The more all its schemes are found to fail, the more clearly will stand out the one straight and narrow way—at first so hard to find and still so hard to ascend—that verily leads to life. As from geology we learn of species after species that have disappeared in the process of adjusting organism to environment; so in history we learn from the rise and fall of empire after empire that only righteousness exalteth a nation and that those that pursue evil perish. It is thus in the light of evolution that the mystery of evil becomes clearest. God is the creator of the world, we say: his end can only be the Good—no other is even conceivable. But in a world created for the Good there can be no inherent, no ineradicable evil. The process of evolution must then in itself be good, the one way possible to actual good for creatures that are created to achieve it. And if again we ask why the way is so long and the progress so devious and so slow, we can but suppose it is so because only so can the progress be thorough and the way assuredly the best; this we may well believe is why “the mills of God grind slowly and grind exceeding small.” Only after proving all things can we hold fast to that which is good.

But now—and this leads on to our last head—does this not come near to saying, it may be asked, that the best of all possible worlds is a world without God? is it not practically atheism, in short? and if not that, still if the world is left severely alone to work out its own salvation, what have we but the God-forsaken world in which the so-called deists are said to have believed? Not atheism, certainly, for faith in God as the ground of the world affords us an assurance, which we could not otherwise have, that complete harmony and unity, the good of all in the good of each, is really attainable, nay, will verily be attained. Whereas, if we stop at a plurality of finite selves in interaction, we have no guarantee, cannot even reasonably expect, that such a totality will ever attain to perfect organic unity. Nor does the theism to which pluralism points leave no place for God *in* the world; it is then not deism: creation, if we think, we shall see can be conceived only as continuous presence. If God is the ground of the world at all he is its ground always as an active, living, interested, Spirit, not as a merely everlasting, changeless and indifferent

centre, round which it simply whirls. Still God's action in the world must be for us as inscrutable as his creation of it: indeed there is no reason why we should attempt to discriminate between them. In calling God transcendent we seek only to express that duality of subject and object which we take as fundamental to all spiritual being, not to suggest that his relation to the world must be thought under the category of external causation, like the interaction of object with object. This is obviously inadequate. Nor is the relation of God to the world comparable to the interaction of one finite subject with another; for between them there is no such dependence as that which connects them both with God. We trench upon the mystical when we attempt to picture this divine immanence, "closer to us than breathing and nearer than hands and feet." It is this which stirs the "cosmic emotion" of poets like Wordsworth, Goethe, Browning and Tennyson, to this that the inward witness of the spirit refers which is the essence of religious experience everywhere. In both there opens out in varying degrees of clearness and certainty

The true world within the world we see,
Whereof our world is but the bounding shore.

This is the unseen world, the world not realized, in which faith moves.

IV. In keeping with the great principle of continuity, everywhere displayed in the working out of the world's evolution, we have found this faith foreshadowed in the upward striving that is the essence of life. Consider for a moment the development of the senses. The first clear response is to mechanical contact, and we have as the first specific sense, the sense of touch. From this is presently differentiated the sense of hearing, when objects not yet present to actual touch give premonitions of their proximity by the vibrations they set up: hearing is thus the faith of touch. As hearing to touch so smell stands to taste: it is a foretaste that further extends the objective range. A freckle or pigment-spot is all that light at first produces; but when its hints are *heeded* and the pigmented retina that first arose is furnished by the organism's own prophetic efforts with directing muscles, it exchanges its passive sight for active vision, and opens out a vastly wider objective world. In keeping with all this is the place of faith on the higher plane where it contrasts with intellectual

sight: it is like a new sense that brings us face to face with an unseen world. What does this mean? Let us go back a step. Here as everywhere—in its highest as in its lowest form—faith is striving and striving is faith. The whole conscious being is concerned: there is not merely the cognition of what is, there is also an appreciation of what it is worth, a sense of the promise and potency of further good that it may enfold; there is a yearning to realize this; and there is finally the active endeavour that such feeling prompts. It is through this faith that man is where he is to-day, through it that mountains have been removed and the unattainable verily attained. More life and fuller achieved by much toil and struggle, an ascent to higher levels, not movement along the line of least resistance—this is the one increasing purpose that we can so far discern, when we regard the world historically as a realm of ends in place of summarizing it scientifically under a system of concepts.

And how do we stand now? That the present world and progress on the plane of the present world do not and never will meet our highest needs—about this there is little question. But where in what is, in what we have so far attained, can we discern those eternal values that point upwards and beyond this present world? Surely in all that we find of the beautiful and sublime in this earth on which we dwell and the starry heavens above it; in all that led men long ago to regard nature as a cosmos; in all that is best and noblest in the annals of human life; in these very needs themselves that the seen and temporal fail to meet; and above all, in that nascent sense of the divine presence which constitutes the truly religious life, and converts faith into the *substance* of things hoped for, the *evidence* of things not seen. But now a third question at once suggests itself. Faith on the lower levels was justified by its results: can we here too apply this test of success or failure? The founder of Christianity at any rate did not hesitate to appeal to it:—"Beware of false prophets. Ye shall know them by their fruits: do men gather grapes of thorns or figs of thistles?" And, in fact, this is the test that is and will be applied; for, as I have already said, however much in theory men consider premises, in practice they consider only results.

JAMES WARD, *The Realm of Ends*, pp. 440-450. Reprinted by permission of G. P. Putnam's Sons, publishers, New York. Title mine.

SUGGESTIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Does Ward seem to you to be as much of a dualist as Alexander? Why?
2. Does Ward seem to you to be more or less friendly to science than Alexander and why?
3. Do you think Ward's idea of faith is the same as Alexander's idea of intuition?
4. Which of these two statements of spiritual pluralism do you like best and why?
5. What do you think of Ward's idea that the natural world is a living world made up of free spirits?
6. Do you think that his conception of a God that is both immanent and transcendent is consistent? Give a reason for your answer.

III. PERSONALISM AND BORDEN P. BOWNE, by *Edgar S. Brightman*.

Analysis

After stating his general purpose and giving a definition of the word personalism, Brightman distinguishes the various meanings of the *self*. He then states the relation of personalism to other forms of idealism, holding that it is at one with them in emphasizing the rationality of the universe and the objectivity of values. Where personalism differs from other idealisms is in stressing the fact that ultimate reality is personal. Moreover, it is an idealism more empirical and more like common-sense than most other types of idealism. He briefly indicates the historic roots of personalism and then explains Bowne's connection with this type of thought. A brief exposition of Bowne's philosophy is given, showing his relation to Kant and Hegel and his emphasis on the freedom and importance of the human will. The fact that will is taken as the essence of reality makes Bowne a *voluntarist* or *activist*.

The purpose of this paper is to define personalism with special reference to the thought of Borden Parker Bowne.

Personalism is a recent name for what, in various forms, has in the past been called monadology, spiritualism, neo-criticism, and personal or teleological idealism. It is the theory that to be is to be a self or a member of a self. Personalism may be singularistic or pluralistic, theistic or non-theistic. This paper deals chiefly with a theistic and pluralistic type of personalism.

By self personalism means a unitary, self-identifying, conscious agent. When the agent is regarded as a substance distinct from its experiences, the self is identified with the transcendent soul. But when it is regarded as consciousness itself,—identical, organic, individual,—the transcendent soul is abandoned for the self of self-psychology. A self capable of the realization of values may be called a person. A personalist

may recognize a hierarchy (as did Leibniz) of personal and sub-personal selves.

Personalism agrees in several respects with other forms of idealism. All idealism views synopsis as the ultimate form of intelligibility. A person cannot be understood as a mere synthesis of parts revealed by analysis. Rather, those parts can be understood only when interpreted through their membership in the whole person to which they belong. Further, all idealism holds that reality is rational and hence in some way an organic whole. Even pluralistic personalism does not regard the cosmos as a mechanical aggregate of externally related parts, but it sees the nature of the whole mirrored in the internal structure of the individuals within it. Again, personalism agrees with most idealism in giving values an ontological status and in holding that, for the final synopsis of thought, all reality must be viewed as conscious experience.

But idealists differ about the status of persons in reality. Many assign them a subordinate place and describe the cosmic order in impersonal, if ideal, terms. Thus, the nature of the whole is said to be idea, moral order, consciousness in general, the unconscious, experience, individuality, or the super-personal. Such language usually means to deny that reality is personal, although the meaning is often vague. Personalists, however, think of concrete reality always as self or person. Impersonal idealists explain personality in terms of categories; personalists explain categories in terms of personality.

Personalism, then, is idealism, but idealism of an empirical cast. Bowne has called it transcendental empiricism. In common with all empiricism, personalism emphasizes particular, concrete experiences; is suspicious of abstractions; and is, in a sense, realistic. Personalism is radically empirical in building (as against sensationalism and behaviorism) on the experienced fact that every item of experience belongs to a self, as was forcefully stated in the paper by Miss M. W. Calkins on "An Essential Factor in Every Truly Radical Empiricism," which was read before the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association at its 1923 meeting. Personalism is realistic in its epistemology in so far as it holds that idea and object are forever two. Without this epistemological dualism, self would be merged in its world and a true plurality of selves would be impossible.

The sources of personalism are in the main stream of the

history of philosophy,—in Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Berkeley, Leibniz, Kant (who probably was, at heart, a Leibnizian), post-Kantian idealists and particularly Lotze, French spiritualists, and Renouvier. But the word personalism is recent. Its earliest use as a *terminus technicus* appears to have been by Schleiermacher,² while John Grote introduced the word into English, in his *Exploratio Philosophica*. It is found in many recent writers, such as Caldecott (1901), W. James (1902), C. Renouvier (1903), Hens Dreyer (1905), L. William Stern (1906), M. W. Calkins (1907), Borden Parker Bowne (1908), and many others. The term is now incorporated into general philosophical usage.

Borden Parker Bowne made an original synthesis of the contributions to personalistic thought made by Berkeley, Kant, and Lotze,—with perhaps more of Lotze than of the others, yet more personalistic and pluralistic than Lotze. In Bowne we find a typical personalist.

Bowne was born in 1847. After graduation from New York University and a period of foreign study, he returned to America. In 1876 he became professor of philosophy in Boston University, where he remained until his death in 1910. His chief works are: *The Principles of Ethics*, *The Theory of Thought and Knowledge*, *Metaphysics*, *Theism*, *Personalism*, and *Kant and Spencer*.

Some of Bowne's characteristic ideas will throw light on personalism. With most idealists Bowne taught that the self is the datum for all thought. "Self-consciousness rests on an immediate experience of self." It may be remarked that much misunderstanding of personalism rests on a confusion of self-consciousness with self-experience. All experience is not self-consciousness, but all experience is self-experience. The self is "the personal beginning of all speculation." All theory is an interpretation of this concrete datum. Sensations, physical things, universals, and values are abstract and secondary; they are relative to self, the primary datum.

Further, under the influence of Kant, Bowne regarded all knowledge as mental activity. "The constitutive action of thought penetrates even into sensation as an articulate experience. . . . The mind fixes the dissolving impression into a single and abiding meaning." An order beyond ourselves can become an object for us only by our "constructing it in thought

² Pp. 256 f. of the first edition of the *Reden*.

and thus making it our object." The immanent principles by which experience is built up are the categories.

Bowne divides the categories into phenomenal and metaphysical. The former are space, time, motion, quantity, and number. Necessity and possibility are doubtful categories. The phenomenal categories contain the bases of mechanical science, but they set objects apart from each other without internal connection and hence furnish no metaphysical explanation. The problem of philosophy takes the form: Are there metaphysical categories? Bowne rejected the view that there are unknowable *Dinge an sich* and adopted the Hegelian doctrine that the real is rational. Being, quality, identity, causality, and purpose he regarded as metaphysical categories. They cannot be presented in sense. By them the mind transforms fleeting impressions into an abiding and internally connected order of objects. The metaphysical categories, however, have both a phenomenal and a metaphysical use. Metaphysically, causality is the self-determination of a free agent; phenomenally, the determination of consequent by antecedent, mere regularity of sequence. Science, then, is positivistic, restricted to the phenomenal. If phenomenal categories gave the final truth about reality, metaphysics would be mechanistic. But thought seeks internal connection, "a rational whole," which is attained only through purpose, the highest metaphysical category. Since he holds that the objects of science are not metaphysically real, his view is phenomenalist immaterialism. But it is also a metaphysical personalism, eventuating in theism, for a Supreme Person is the ground both of the system of nature and of the society of persons.

Bowne's empirical bent was apparent in his nominalism. He held that universals have no meaning apart from particulars. Laws are nothing, do nothing. They are but names for the ways in which particulars act. Hence he attacked the fallacies of "the abstract" and "the universal," as he called them, of which he held Spinoza, Spencer, and even Hegel to be victims. It is doubtful whether he was right about Hegel.

Bowne was also a voluntarist, although the willing person and no impersonal will was his ultimate unit. His voluntarism is manifest in his teleology, based on the category of purpose; his activism, holding that to be is to act and to act is to will; and his belief in freedom. The doctrine of the speculative necessity of freedom is one of his most characteristic contribu-

tions. Science, and all knowledge, are achievements of freedom. Truth may be true if I am not free; but unless I am free I can never elect to judge it by a valid ideal. The thinker must be free to control his thinking by the laws of rationality. Unless he is free to ratify and apply those laws, all opinions are equally necessary and scepticism results. Freedom is a necessary presupposition of any valid thinking. . . .

E. S. BRIGHTMAN in *Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy*, edited by E. S. Brightman, pp. 161-164. Published by Longmans, Green and Company. Reprinted by permission.

SUGGESTIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Can you state any advantages or disadvantages in using the name personalism for this type of idealism?
2. Can you see any important difference between personalism as here stated and the view of Ward above? Or the view of Alexander?
3. Does the distinction between self-consciousness and self-experience seem to you to be valid? Explain what you think the distinction means in terms of your own experience, and, if possible, give an example.
4. In the last paragraph the author suggests a distinction between Bowne's personal voluntarism and an impersonal voluntarism. What do you think he means by this distinction?

CHAPTER III

ABSOLUTE IDEALISM

I. THE SOCIAL NATURE OF THINKING, by *J. E. Creighton*

Analysis

Although the popular idea of thinking is that it is a process which goes on within individual finite minds, Creighton insists that it is a participation in the minds of one's fellows, and is therefore a social process. The objective social order and the order of nature are equally essential to human thinking. Without the reciprocal relation between mind and society and between mind and nature there could be no thinking. Some writers have argued that only the latter relationship is needed, but Creighton argues that the former is every bit as important. Indeed, nature as we know it is socially transmitted. Social culture hands nature over to each new generation, and other minds are needed to interpret nature and one's own mind. There are, therefore, three constituent factors in all thinking—self, fellowmen, and nature. But the give and take between minds is no mystery which needs "mental telepathy" as its explanation. Language is the medium of communication and it is also a constituent part of thinking. Every act of thought consists of three stages: (1) the formulation of the problem, (2) the ideational construction, and (3) the process of verification. In each of these stages the social nature of thinking manifests itself. An unaided individual cannot formulate a scientific problem. Even conclusions, with which we do not agree, aid us in seeing a problem aright. Similarly, in the ideational construction, oral and written discussions are indispensable social ingredients of thinking. And when it comes to verification it, too, is essentially social in character. Our conclusions are never recognized by others until they have been sifted and tried. Thus thinking is a joint enterprise at every stage of its procedure. It permeates every department of human life. Thinking is "a life where there is full and complete participation by each member in the resources of all."

. . . What is the character and reach of the individual mind within which thinking goes on? Is the individual mind which has the power of thought to be regarded as inclusive or exclusive of the mind of others? Is thinking a mere subjective turning of one's gaze inward, a searching within the depths of our own private consciousness for ideas, or does it imply a looking abroad and an actual participation in the minds of our fellowmen? When one insists that thinking goes on in individual

minds, it is difficult to avoid picturing these minds as independent entities, distinct from each other like bodies in space. In accordance with this imagery, which is adopted by the popular psychology, the mind is conceived as a particular thing or object with an inner self-inclosed mode of existence. The fact remains, however, that the popular imagery of the mind and the descriptive account of its content based on this imagery are inadequate when confronted with the actual facts of experience. This is what has still to be shown.

Physical things may be defined for some purposes in terms of their mutual exclusiveness. A body is that which excludes every other body from the space that it occupies. But this logic of mutual exclusiveness cannot be applied to minds. Of course there is a sense in which each individual mind has its own *differentia*, its own unique life. But it is of the very essence of mind to go beyond its limited and isolated form of existence, and to include what is necessary to complete and render consistent its own experience. Intelligence constantly looks outward, sharing in communistic fashion its own riches with others, and unhesitatingly appropriating the fruits of other men's labors. In other words, intelligence is openness, participation, making possible the mutual sharing and conflict of minds. Intelligence is not a private endowment that the individual possesses, but rather a living principle which possesses him, a universal capacity which expresses through him the nature of a larger whole in which he is a member.

This organic relation of the individual mind to other minds is, however, not the only element in the total process of thinking. The relation of the mind to the external order of events that we call nature cannot be left out of account. It is just as impossible to describe thinking without any reference to nature as it is to describe it without regard to the minds of other men. And the one relation is no more external than the other. This statement must not be interpreted to mean that what we call nature is itself subjective, a mere order of ideas in the minds of individuals. On the contrary, it is intended to emphasize the distinction and opposition between mind and the external order. What I wish to insist upon is just the opposite of subjectivism, namely, that the individual mind has no reality apart from such an order of nature. The thinking mind exists, as the revelation of an order that stands over against it. The world of objects, or nature, on its side, is just

that which progressively reveals itself to thought. It is opposed to mind, indeed, but yet cannot be defined merely in terms of this negative relation; as Descartes, for example, sought to define it. In spite of the fundamental opposition, or rather just because of this opposition, the relation between the two sides is complementary: thought is real and genuine just because it has the capacity to grasp and express what is not thought; and nature on its side is that which reveals its unity and significance in terms of thought.

In attempting to understand the nature of each of these complementary factors, we make the problem hopeless at the outset if we fail to recognize both their opposition and the complementary character of this opposition. We must remember that it is only *through and because* of his relation to nature that the individual is a thinking being. The touch with the outer world is not something that we could dispense with and still keep our own minds. In a very real sense we must admit that we have received all that we have; our wisdom is not our own, but has come to us from without. On the other hand, it is necessary to recognize that the objective order is capable of furnishing us with instruction only in so far as we find there replies to our questionings. What we call nature is not a miscellaneous assemblage of facts which are mechanically impressed upon us. It reveals itself to us rather as a continuous set of problems and answers, as that which affords at once the necessary stimulus and the verification of our thinking. There is thus an interplay between mind and nature, one furnishing the complement and answer to the other. This interplay is analogous in character to the complementary correspondence that is exhibited between one mind and another in social relationships.

The question may arise whether in this organic relation of subject and object we have not all the factors that are indispensable for thinking. The necessary relationship that exists between the mind and the external order may be admitted, and still it may be denied that the relation of subject to subject, the social interplay of minds, is in any way essential to thinking. Why, it may be asked, may not the thinker solve his problems alone, confronting the facts singly, and without reference to the opinions of any other man or body of men?

This question assumes that nature as we know it is quite independent of the social order, and that a relation to this

external order is sufficient in order to develop self-consciousness on the part of the individual. But both of these assumptions appear to be contrary to the facts. In the first place, what we from our modern point of view call nature has been made what it is for us through a long process of social thinking, extending back to the first beginnings of social culture. The nature which we seem to find as something immediately "given" has actually been mediated through the forms of social thinking and social description. If we think of the external world as a coherent system of uniform laws, we have to remember that it was with much labor that this conception was reached; and also that all kinds of superstitions are threatening to destroy it even in our own day. The nature which is our guide and instructor is no brute fact, but a "second nature" made over and rendered orderly and respectable by the social thinking of the race. It requires eternal vigilance and effort to maintain this rational view of nature. The tendency toward barbarism, which seems to be quite as real and potent as the tendency towards civilization, manifests itself in every age in theories that are only thinly disguised attempts to strip nature of her order and rationality and to revert to some primitive superstition akin to witchcraft or animism.

Nature itself, then, as a rational order presupposes social thinking, and is shot through and through with the results of such thinking. It thus becomes a middle term that mediates between one mind and another, or between one generation of people and another. But, in addition to this *mediated* relation to other minds afforded us by the external system that we call nature, and by objectified orders of ideas such as those embodied in systems of law and religion, thinking seems to demand a direct and living relation between individual minds. For thought involves a consciousness of self as well as a consciousness of objects. And it appears certain that without the stimulus afforded by the direct contact with other minds, the individual would not come to a consciousness of himself. We come to know ourselves through learning to know others: our fellow is the medium in which we see the nature and meaning of our own mind reflected. The consciousness of self is thus no original datum, but something progressively communicated to the individual through his contact with nature, and especially through social contact with his fellow-men.

The process of thinking may accordingly be said to involve

and to be constituted by the interplay of the three moments,—the self, fellow-men, and nature. No one of these three centres can be reduced to terms of the other; they exist and develop in correlation—each reacting upon the others, and in turn receiving through this interchange its own content and significance.

In speaking of the direct communication between individual minds, I have of course no intention of suggesting any mysterious or telepathic influence. Language is the normal means of communication between minds, and it is in this medium that thinking takes place. The impossibility of separating thinking from language is now generally recognized, and this fact might be developed at length in support of the position here advanced regarding the social nature of thinking. Thought is not complete until it is expressed in words, and thus embodied in the coin of the social realm. Communication is not something superadded to thinking, but is an essential part of it. What is incommunicable or inexpressible is for that very reason unthinkable. With what is merely private and inner, thought has no concern.

I am anxious not to seem to rest my conclusions on general considerations and arguments which some one may term “metaphysical” and feel justified in neglecting. These conclusions are, I think, borne out by an appeal to actual experience. A concrete act of thought may be divided into three parts: the formulation of the problem, the ideational construction, and the process of verification. These divisions are not, of course, to be taken as successive and external to one another, as if one were completed before the next were begun. Now I think that reflection on actual experience reveals the fact that in each of these stages of his thought the individual makes use of the mind of his fellow-men. I wish to suggest briefly certain facts relative to each of these three phases of the process of thinking.

To become conscious of a problem and to succeed in giving it exact formulation is a long step towards its solution. But this task is never accomplished by the individual unaided. Our problems are set for us by reference, more or less conscious on our part, to what others have thought or are thinking. They grow out of the interests and requirements of the society to which we belong. It is through our participation in the intellectual life of society that we attain the level where

a real problem emerges for our consciousness. The stimulus of society is required to enable us to perceive and to locate intellectual difficulties. When we say that the reading of a book or the influence of a teacher has made us think we usually mean that we have been helped in these ways to perceive new problems of which we should otherwise have remained oblivious. The value of the influence thus received does not at all depend upon our willingness to accept the conclusions of others. On the contrary, it may oftentimes have more important results if it rouses opposition. It was Hume's sceptical solution of the problem of knowledge which awoke Immanuel Kant from his dogmatic slumber and gave rise to the critical system of philosophy. Kant himself acknowledged that it was only through Hume's assistance that he was enabled to catch sight of the fundamental problem of philosophy in its complete generality.

But when the problem is once formulated, does not the individual have to solve it by his own thinking without outside assistance? It is at this point that the image of the solitary thinker is most insistent. A little reflection on our own experience will, however, convince us that in the effort to analyze a situation and solve a problem there is always involved a reference to the ideas and suggestions of others. From beginning to end thinking involves debate and discussion, the opening of one mind to another, the mutual corroboration and opposition of minds. It is just this social reference, this dialectical character, that gives point and relevancy to our judgments. Without such a social situation, actual or dramatically assumed, every judgment would lack that point and appropriateness to the situation upon which its significance depends.

The interplay of minds implied in all thinking doubtless finds its most complete and characteristic expression in oral discussion. When carried on at its highest level, this affords an almost ideal illustration of the common functioning of several minds, each member of the group having at his disposal the resources of all the others. This dialectical play of thought has as its outcome something that is essentially a common product. Every member in the discussion comes to partake of the fruits of a larger social intelligence, which has come into being by each individual uniting his mind to that of his fellows. It is of course true that the outcome of a discussion may in some

cases be nothing more than a compromise—an agreement on the part of those participating in it to support what no one really believes in. But when the object is to discover the truth rather than to find a practical measure of agreement, and when each party to the discussion is loyal to his own conviction and at the same time open-minded to the arguments of his neighbor, the individual is likely to be carried beyond the limitations of his ordinary consciousness. I have in mind, as I have already said, discussion when carried on under the most favorable conditions. For in order to appreciate the typical character and purpose of any activity whatever, it is necessary to take it in its highest and most complete form, and not to emphasize its defects and perversions.

When mind speaks to mind through the medium of the printed page, the contact is no less real, though less direct. This form of communication has an advantage, indeed, in that it enables us to overcome the limits of time and space to which oral discussions are subject. It enables us to receive instruction and stimulus from those whom we have never seen, and even to appropriate as our own the ideas of the great thinkers of past ages. But incalculably great as is our debt to the past, the instruction which we receive from it has this unsatisfactory feature: we have no opportunity of answering back or asking questions. Socrates in the *Apology* suggests that such an opportunity may be one of the chief joys of a future life. "What would not a man give to be able to examine the leader of the great Trojan expedition; or Odysseus or Sisyphus, or numberless other men and women!" And, again, it may be doubted whether without the assistance of our contemporaries we should be able to derive much instruction from the past. It is the personal and social atmosphere of our own time that constantly sustains our thinking and enables us to reconstruct the past. Even when in our reflective moods we seem to shut out the world, and call our thoughts home, we still carry into that inner world of imagination our fellow-men and their thoughts. In imagination a discussion is still carried on, in which the theories of this man, or the objections and criticisms of that man, are weighed and evaluated, as we continue to develop and modify our ideas. If we do not carry on this form of imaginary debate with our fellows, each of us carries on a dialogue with himself. One part of the self may assume the rôle of the *advocatus diaboli*, suggesting doubts, raising objections, and

mocking at conclusions. In all these cases the social process is simply transferred within us. The debate with ourselves is just the rehearsal or repetition of a debate carried on with others. Thinking still takes the form of dialectic, but instead of talking to others we talk to ourselves.

Bringing ideas to expression is accordingly a part of the thinking process, not something to which we proceed *after* the thought is complete. Until we are able to find the appropriate language in which to express our meanings, the ideas themselves lack definiteness and precision. Moreover, before they can attain the rank of knowledge, it is not only essential that our ideas should be embodied in language, but also that they should run the gauntlet of public opinion. In other words, *verification* is an integral element in thinking, and verification, like the other phases of the process, is fundamentally social in character. Our thoughts gain their certificate of truth only after being sifted, tried, and tested by a larger and more complete experience than that of any individual. The individual succeeds in criticizing and evaluating his own thoughts through the help that he receives from others. It is largely through the help of our friends that we discover what we ought to think. We feel the necessity of having friends confirm our views, and the certainty and assurance that we come to feel in our own conclusions is to a large degree a reflection of the judgments expressed by them. When they fail to agree with us, we feel that it is necessary at least to reconsider the arguments, taking account of the objections that they have brought against our position. Even when after mature consideration the individual feels obliged to maintain his conclusion in the face of the opinions of others, he still appeals to a social standard for confirmation; as, for example, to the judgment of a more enlightened society of the future.

It thus appears that thinking is a joint enterprise at every stage of its procedure, and that it is comprehensible only in the light of the social relations that it presupposes. To think is to maintain open-mindedness, to enter sympathetically into the ideas of our fellow-men, to become working partners with them in the highest and most characteristic form of social life, a life where there is full and complete participation by each member in the resources of all.

I have been maintaining that as an intellectual being, no less than as a moral, political, and religious being, man is made

for society. But it should also be added that the various sides of life to which these names apply are not separate departments operating independently of one another. Experience is a whole, and all attempts to analyze and explain it which do not keep in mind this primary fact are likely to prove misleading. We cannot, for example, divorce morality from religion, or intelligence from politics. I wish more particularly at the moment to insist that the intellectual life is not something apart from the practical activities of men. The chief danger lies in forgetting that the practical life actually lived by men as social beings is a life mediated through ideas, and made possible by intellectual agreements. Of course it is true that the unities which take the form of feeling and of practical purpose are also elements that hold society together; but it remains true that wherever there is unity of any sort among human beings there must be common ways of thinking. Intellectual opinions do indeed divide men, but the reason alone has power to heal the strifes and divisions to which it gives rise. No remedy for the evils of human life that dispenses with intelligence can be anything but a sham. Philosophy must still remain the guide of life. . . .

J. E. CREIGHTON: *Philosophical Review*, Vol. XXVII, pp. 283-292. Reprinted in *Studies in Speculative Philosophy*, pp. 56-66. Copyright, 1927, by The Macmillan Company. Reprinted by permission.

SUGGESTIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. What is the fallacy in the conception of the mind of popular psychology?
2. What is the relation of thinking to nature according to Creighton? Try to illustrate this relation with some scientific law to show that his view does not reduce nature to human ideas (subjectivism).
3. Why does an individual mind need other minds as well as nature for its full development? Does the author think that this makes Mind as Social more real than individual minds? Do you agree with the author's position on this point?
4. Analyze some complete act of thought to bring out the three stages and show how the social aspect of thinking is exhibited at each stage. Choose your example from the famous scientific discoveries with which you are familiar or from one of your science textbooks.
5. What do you regard as the chief difference between Creighton's idealism as here presented and that of spiritual pluralism as represented by the three selections in the preceding chapter? State

exactly where this difference comes to expression by quoting a passage or two from Creighton and setting it over against passages from the selections of the preceding chapter. Which type of idealism seems to you to be most friendly to science and why?

6. Compare Creighton's interpretation of thinking with that given by Hoernlé in explaining what Plato meant by an idea. See above, pp. 102 ff.

II. THE ABSOLUTE MIND, by *J. A. Smith*

Analysis

It is necessary to distinguish the problem of the nature of mind from that of describing its content, and the former can best be approached by first giving the best possible description of mind as it appears in actual life. It might seem that no general agreement on this matter is possible, but Smith thinks that a general agreement might be reached by starting with the embodiments of mind in the best literature instead of with the accounts of mind of the philosophers and psychologists. To sort and arrange this vast wealth of material is an intricate and difficult task, and the author here restricts himself to Wordsworth's description of mind. Here we find mind to be that which enjoys and creates beauty. Mind is the counterpart of Beauty, and through her partnership with beauty other beauty is created. Yet Wordsworth also sees in mind a still higher power than the enjoying and the creating of beauty, and that is its power to attain the mystic vision of the "unity of all Being." Yet this vision is rather an ideal to be realized than an actuality. Smith proposes to start from Wordsworth's emphasis on mind as appreciative and creative of Beauty to define its nature. The simplest and most basic aspect of mind is this power. In performing the work of eliciting beauty from nature mind is social. Hence mind may be defined as an active, social whole, of which all individual minds and all of their separate experiences are fragments. This great truth is what the imaginative writers teach us. Such a definition of mind is one-sided and inadequate, but it is far superior to the view of mind one gets from popular psychologies. Philosophers have attempted to define mind so as to make it include nature. This central tendency in modern philosophy Smith holds to be essentially right. He illustrates this idea of an Absolute or all-inclusive Mind with the number system of mathematics. But this is really a poor illustration. Only in history does the concrete and unique nature of Mind reveal itself. For in history Mind becomes truly social, truly self-conscious. Here it transcends Nature, becoming the dominant factor over against which Nature is the passive factor.

In order to undertake with hope of a profitable result any inquiry into the *nature* of anything, we must start not only with an agreement *that* something is, but with some preliminary notion or account of *what* it is. So it is with what we

call Mind. If we begin in ignorance or dissension as to what Mind is, we can never expect together to reach a definition of its nature. Before we attempt to formulate a definition of its nature or essence, we must procure and agree upon some description of it—its phenomena or appearances. At this prefatory stage we can afford to be less exacting than we must be when we face the properly philosophic problem of determining its nature or essence, but we must exert ourselves to get the best possible description or descriptions of it.

Where is such a description to be found? Amid the welter of discordant opinions and views the search for one on which widespread agreement may be looked for seems a well-nigh desperate enterprise. Yet I believe that such a description or set of descriptions is extant and available, and I here express the deliberate conviction that what we desiderate or require is to be found, not chiefly in the treatises of classical philosophers, still less in the textbooks of canonical psychologists, but in the great masterpieces of the fine literature of the world, in the works of its historians, orators, poets, and writers of imaginative and artistic literature generally. It is to them we must go to learn what Mind is, sure to receive from them the fullest, the richest, the subtlest, and profoundest descriptions of its ways and works. In the works of the great English poets, novelists, dramatists, essayists, of our own and earlier times, we here are provided with an inexhaustible treasury of descriptions of what Mind is, and shows itself to be. The same is true of our colleagues and fellow-students in other lands and of other tongues.

Doubtless to be used for our purpose of attaining a definition of the nature of Mind this garnered wealth of knowledge must be digested, epitomized, set in different order and system, converted from poetry into prose, from literature into science. To carry out this task of condensing the multifarious riches of description thus so abundantly offered to us in our literature into succinct and portable formulæ is far beyond any man's powers, and *a fortiori* beyond mine. But these great artists with their high gifts of speech give us large assistance, and a host of humbler but still helpful critics guide us further along the path towards our goal. For myself I can here make but a slight beginning, and can exhibit not the result but the method, and of that but the first step or two. Yet the poorest specimen may exemplify and illustrate the pattern of the whole. . . .

In this course of inquiry we may begin anywhere we please, and here it pleases me—as I hope it may please you—to begin with the works of one who knew the depths of the human mind and could express his knowledge of it, the great romantic poet of the early nineteenth century,—William Wordsworth. What do we learn from him of what Mind is, prior to and apart from any theory or definition of its nature? Definition or theory of its nature he has none, he expresses none, or, if he does so, it is only in halting and uninspired passages of his works. Yet “Mind,” as he assures us, was ever “the haunt and the main region of his *song*.” It is with that, with the view and presentation of it, that as a singer or poet he was primarily and centrally concerned, and throughout his whole life. It is this that “in song” he labors to express and does express,—as I have said, describing it and telling himself and us what it is, what it experiences, effects, and enjoys. Now to him so studying it, it manifests or reveals itself from the first as that which beholds with ever opening eyes a character in or over things which we know and love as Beauty. Mind appears as copartner in the universe with a world at first seemingly external to it, the countenance of which is suffused with Beauty all over, the two together making up the whole universe of being, each counterpart exquisitely fitted to the other, so that with the blended might of their several powers they accomplish a work which can be called by no lower name than creation. Mind and Nature work together to bring out into more and more actuality and presence the extraordinary Beauty, which is the evidence to Mind of what at first lies hidden in itself and its partner Nature. The whole life and existence of Mind may be described as the endlessly progressive search in itself and its whole environment for Beauty, a seeking which is also a finding. Such is the vision which Wordsworth sees and expresses of what Mind is and does: it is to him essentially the discoverer, the describer, the contemplator, and enjoyer of the beauty of the universe within and without its own being. That is what it is, so far as what it is is describable and expressible in song.

But he is well aware that this is not a complete or adequate or final description of what Mind is and *a fortiori* falls short of being the full account of its nature. There dwells in it another and a higher power, which can create and know something beyond Beauty, something more deeply rooted and seated in its nature and in the nature of what surrounds it. “Wedded to

this goodly Universe in love and holy passion," Mind can beget and behold products of a higher order and "a greater glory than the ideals of imaginative fiction ever fancied." Reason or understanding—"the discerning intellect of Man"—can raise Man and his world to still higher levels, nearer to that far-off consummate experience, baffling all description or definition, in which the unity of all Being is achieved and realized and enjoyed

"As indistinguishable as the cloudless East
At noon is from the cloudless West, when all
The hemisphere is one cerulean blue."

But that great consummation belongs to the future, not to the present, of Mind; only when it is reached will Mind have entered into possession and exercise and knowledge of its now partly obscured, but constantly self-revealing, nature. In the meantime "we know what we, minds, are; we know not what we shall be." And what Mind is, is in part the creator and beholder of Beauty, and later of whatever Truth and Goodness we discover or create and contemplate.

Thus we learn from Wordsworth—and well is it for us to hearken to his teaching—that the first and plainest and most certain evidence of what Mind is is to be found in the experience of Beauty contemplated and enjoyed. Beauty is the sign-manual of the presence and power of Mind in or on its works. Seriously and deliberately I propose to take the experience of the beautiful as the earliest and most fundamental indication of Mind's presence in the Universe, its most obvious, though at the same time its most superficial or insignificant, characteristic, something more primordial in its being than, say, even "sensitivity" or "docility" or "initiative." Beauty is a character or feature of things which nothing but Mind can create or behold. This is a doctrine which gains not losses by restatement in bald dry prose. For I venture to maintain that what we, when we find it on a large scale, call Beauty is a necessary character or the smallest and most humble item or fragment of the real which can be present or an object to Mind at all. For what is "Beauty" but a beautiful synonym for what is by common agreement essential to any and every datum of sense or imagination, viz., the integration of a boundless multiplicity and variety is merged without loss and reemerges in an unbroken quality which has no antecedent or parallel elsewhere, constituting a characteristic individuality or uniqueness? The generation of

such a unique datum cannot be regarded as a mere prolongation or magnification of what went before at the inframental level or premental stage: it is a miraculous birth, one of whose parents is the Mind in and to which it occurs and becomes present. The Mind is no mere passive spectator of its coming to be, it is a co-creator of it. Without the help of Mind it is powerless to be born, and Mind if it does not beget it, at least clothes it with beauty. It sets it in a light "which never was on sea or land," and invests it with a radiance that comes from within itself. That is the least we can say of any event or complex of events in the universe in which Mind is necessarily involved.

Thus the earliest and most fundamental power of Mind is that of expressing or eliciting out of its surroundings a character of things which without it would remain forever unexpressed and so non-existent or as good as non-existent, integrating into ever new individual wholes what otherwise would forever continue dispersed and distracted, and so impotent. In this work or business no Mind is restricted to the expression of anything for and to itself alone: it affects a common or public work. From the beginning to the end its expression is for other minds, all other minds, as well. Its creatures or offspring enter a public world, and the expression of them are failures, unless they are published abroad and so communicated. The results of the acts of expression of this or that mind never stick wholly in their originators, but fly abroad, cross the intervals that separate mind from mind, impinge upon recipient minds, in which they reecho or rather are regenerated or reborn, or re-created. It is surely the plainest and most indisputable of truths that as each apparently isolated mind expresses to and for itself the meaning or import of the incrowding materials of its experience, it sets at the same time the whole inter-mental ether into commotion and the entire company of minds reverberate its internal agitations, however dully and obscurely. Whether that other be physical or no, it unites as well as severs the minds enlisted within it: each is in thoroughgoing rapport with each and all. Mind is from the beginning (and, therefore, throughout and to the end) something single, whole, and active, in a degree or manner in which nothing else in the Universe is (if indeed there be anything else). Its wholeness overrides the pluralization of itself into Minds, and even the pulverization of these into

swarms or series of atomic experiences; it permits the interpolation of non-mental media between one mind and another, and within each of the gaps between its several or severed experiences. But for all this its integrity is not annihilated, it remains one indiscerptible Mind and no final or irreparable breach occurs in its self-communion and self-communication. Thus despite all its particularization or individualization it continues to be one Mind and one World: messages pass from part to part of it across all gaps and over all barriers: the estranging ocean is penetrated by lines or filaments of communication between island and island. This is simply the plainest fact and most constantly evidenced in our experience, though the extent and the manner of it justly excite our perpetual wonder and curiosity and speculation. It only appears to us an inscrutable mystery when we forget or wilfully ignore what the nature of Mind, and, therefore, of minds, is.

What we may learn from our great imaginative writers is to think habitually of minds, not as monads without doors or windows, to one another, but rather as partial differentiations from or concentrations within a whole and single Mind, in which they remain rooted, there living and moving and having their being, and through their union in it maintaining, extending, exploring, enjoying inexhaustible communion and communication with one another. It is surely an error to suppose that the conditions of such communion and communication are not "given" but have to be instituted by some impossible "social contract" between isolated individuals. No, from the beginning, throughout and to the end, minds are indissolubly linked in thoroughgoing reciprocity of sympathy and synergy. All that they can do—and it is enough, is to develop the given situation in which they stand, to explore its possibilities and avail themselves of its opportunities. Even in the secret chambers in which each elaborates the shocks and thrills which reach it from the Universe outside into apparently private objects of sense or imagination, each mind still works with and for all others, and, laboring for its private advantage, steadily, contributes to the wealth of all. At that low level of their activity where minds seemingly create for themselves alone the tiny and perishing objects which present themselves to the eyes of their senses or imagination, none works by and for itself only. Their microscopic pictures migrate into the public gallery,

enhancing and enriching the beauty of the common world, and carry with them strength, instruction, and delight.

The view I have thus on the authority of the great imaginative writers of our time and place, given of the world of Mind or Minds is, of course, quite inadequate as an account of it. It is, or contains, at best a description of the world, and but prefigures that account of its nature which in and for philosophy we seek. Yet it lies on the way to what I have called the definition of Mind's nature and of the world or environment in which it displays and enjoys its nature in at least relative clearness and fullness. Each such description is a light thrown forward on our path, and the far-off goal of our journey begins to show itself to our speculative gaze; its outlines begin to take on an increasing determination and fixity. Trust in the guidance of such leaders delivers us from the "beggarly elements" of popular psychologies, with their random collections of trivial anecdotes, and the pseudo-scientific tabulations of results got by the circulation of questionnaires among the unobservant, the unimaginative, the uneducated, and the inarticulate. Not there but in the masterpieces of our literature lie stored the garnered treasures of Man's painfully acquired knowledge of his own Mind. There our philosophic predecessors in the quest for a definition of its nature have found true materials or data, out of which they have fashioned or distilled an account of its nature which will stand criticism, and therewith an account of the nature of that opposite or other which together with it make up the universe. Different—kaleidoscopically different—as may appear the manifold expressions which on reflection have been given to that account, I believe that in essence the answers more and more tend to unanimity and identity. To be brief and dogmatic, we are ever becoming more and more certain that what surrounds and presents itself to us is not alien in nature to us, but is homogeneous with our own inmost being, is one in nature with that which is the viewer, the judge, and the knower of it, that is, is itself Mind or minds at a lower level of existence than that to which *we* have been permitted or privileged to rise. In us Mind best and most clearly reveals its nature, and the nature which it there and then reveals to us as its proper and eternal essence is that which we name "consciousness," or, with our audacious anticipation of its achievements to come, "self-consciousness." Yes, it is as it has ever been, the nature of Mind to be "self-conscious," conscious of its own nature, of its inherent powers,

of the manner of their exercise, of their effects or fruits. This its nature, with a knowledge of it co-involved, it has possessed from the outset of its existence, having had it assigned to it as its property and prerogative at its first outbreak, or inburst into the Universe. If it be true that at this present date Mind (or a mind) has reached self-consciousness (and who will be hardy enough to deny it?), then in it—in its nature—self-consciousness was present, germinally or seminally, from the start, present, as I have said, in its very first infantine glimpses of the beautiful—not before. In such an experience Mind was begotten—is eternally, because perpetually, new-born—and with it was co-generated the world in which it dwells, and therewith it made its first step towards, or rather in, self-consciousness.

This, then, according to me, is, beneath the superficial difference of vocabulary, the concordant deliverance of modern philosophy ever since the sixteenth century, viz., that the nature of Mind is to be self-conscious, to be aware, as nothing else than Mind is or can be, of its own nature. That is the first article in the modern philosophical *Quicumque Vult*. It is impossible for any thoughtful mind to go back upon it. The nature of Mind is better known to us than that of anything else whatsoever, everything else being known to us only in the light of that knowledge and as being a lower or less developed form of it. The nearer world of what we call other minds consists of the many-faceted reflections of our own mind, and the remoter face of external Nature itself is also but that Mind mirrored outside us. The whole Universe is the self-expression of Mind's nature to itself, and each reflection reveals in itself an otherwise hidden feature of Mind's own countenance. To deny or forget it, to attempt to substitute for it any other definition of the nature of Mind, is to deviate from the main track of modern thought.

There is a sort of philosophical toy of which much use has of late been made to bring home to learners this new conception of the world as it is in and for Mind. The elegant device by which mathematicians define to themselves and their pupils the world of Numbers as a self-mirroring system, every proper part of which repeats the structure of every other part and of the whole, prefigures, but does no more than prefigure, the nature of the world of Mind; does no more for the world of Number than wearisomely reiterates an empty truism, while that of Mind ever more interestingly and valuably explicates an inexhaustible wealth of truth growing more and more toward a rich and varied

self-consciousness. The most distant and dispersed movements of the Universe converge and conspire towards the realization by Mind—in fact and knowledge—of its own hidden but always self-disclosing nature. History—human and natural—is the flowing record of Mind's coming to itself, and its kingdom.

In the records of human history we read the clearest and most convincing record of the trend of this universal movement. That record is always fragmentary and episodic, its text often ambiguous or obscure, but its main or general sense appears certain, or at least there is but one interpretation which relieves it from the doubt that it is "a tale of sound and fury signifying nothing." That interpretation is that it is the record of the increasing struggle of Mind, single but working in and through an endless succession and boundless multitude of minds, advancing and securing for each, and all the maximum of self-consciousness possible under conditions constituted by its previous triumphs and failures. This is a goal that cannot be reached or even approached in isolation of its seekers from one another. The advance is essentially a collective and cooperative undertaking and to it entire communication and interaction between such minds is an indispensable condition of success. There is no end to its possibilities and potentialities. The world of Mind is the theatre of an infinite commerce in which all mental commodities circulate freely and the private gains of each mind flow into the universal stock, so that the level of Mind rises with unbroken constancy. Through the cooperation and even collision of wills, through the conference and clash of minds, the light of Mind grows ever and ever towards the perfect day. In history Mind is making itself self-conscious, conscious of itself or self-conscious. This is a process in principle endless and, however far it proceed, it will always find or create new worlds to conquer. Our Nature will always find itself surrounded by what is other than it, i.e., with what is unself-conscious or even unconscious, but nevertheless (to borrow the technical terms of biology) that other, begetting Mind behind and before, linking in the interstices between mind and mind or as it were in the pores and gaps within Mind, is the recessive factor in the Universe, while Mind is the dominant factor, subduing and transmuting it to the increasing service of Mind's self-creation which is one with its self-discovery or self-revelation. While it endures the Universe is in travail, all its striving bent and directed towards the generation of a Mind completely conscious of its

own nature as thus in outlines already foreknown with an indefectible certainty.

Nothing less or lower than what is self-conscious can justly be called by the name of Mind and beyond what is so nothing is Mind either. Self-consciousness is the very nature of Mind and no otherwise can its nature rightly be defined. Because its nature is such it necessarily differentiates itself into minds, which, no matter how individuated, never fall apart into isolation or can be cut apart from one another by any crass or recalcitrant non-mental or inframental media, but remain in unbroken rapport, communion, or communication with one another. The time process is, or contains, an unceasing development of this situation, in which minds in their several efforts to realize their natures extend and deepen their reciprocal influences on one another so that the whole which they form rises to higher levels of self-consciousness in which each and all partake. The experience of such Congresses as the present shows how, by getting each better to know the minds of others, we come each to know better his own mind, and so the Mind which is in all comes better to know, that is to be, itself.

J. A. SMITH: *Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy*, pp. 128-136. Edited by E. S. Brightman, and published by Longmans, Green and Company. Reprinted by permission. Title mine.

SUGGESTIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Why is the approach to a definition of mind through Beauty recognized as one-sided by the author? What approach do you think Creighton used above?
2. What approach to Mind is suggested by the reference to the "vision of the unity of all Being" emphasized at the end of his exposition of Wordsworth? Does Smith seem to you to value this approach? Does he make use of it later in the article?
3. Why is the conception of mind of popular psychology poor as compared with that of Wordsworth? Is this the same fallacy as the one pointed out by Creighton at the beginning of his article?
4. Why is spiritual pluralism regarded as inadequate? Does Smith seem to you to be using the same argument here as was used by Creighton?
5. Why is the number system a good illustration of the Absolute Mind and wherein is it defective as an illustration?
6. Why is history regarded as the highest level of Mind we know on earth? Explain the sense in which you think Smith here uses the word history.

III. THE ABSOLUTE SPIRIT, by *Benedetto Croce*. Translated
by Raffælo Piccoli.

Analysis

Two formerly respectable ideas of philosophy, (i) that it is the science which studies transcendent reality and (ii) that there is a final or absolute system of philosophy, are antiquated and out of touch with modern life. The root of these false ideas is mediæval theology or scholasticism. Some contemporary writers cling to these notions but they are really obsolete. The new idea of philosophy equates it with experience in all of its manifold forms. Such experience is the *Spirit*, working itself out in art, science, politics and morality. Philosophy is the study of the *categories* or *values* of the world Spirit. Since new events are always happening, the work of philosophy has to be done anew every generation. Philosophy is the interpretation of the movement of history, and it will live as long as history endures.

I believe that, if not all, at least many students of philosophy will be ready to acknowledge, as an actual fact, that there are two conceptions which have become superannuated and almost foreign to the spirit of modern thought, two words which have lost all authority, and now even lend themselves either to suspicion or to derision: the conception of metaphysics, that is, of the research of a reality which should be above and beyond experience; and the conception of a systematic or final philosophy, that is, of the construction of a closed system, which should once for all constrict reality, or the supreme reality, within its bounds.

It is a double negation which, if we look carefully into it, reveals itself as the double aspect of a single one; of the negation of a transcendent world, and, through it, of the conception of philosophy as theology. It is only in so far as we presume to know a transcendent world that we may look for a closed and final system, for truth as an immovable entity in opposition to the historical knowledge of passing facts, and of a world which is constantly either passing or becoming.

It is true that there are minds which are not yet resigned to this disaffection, to this divorce of modern thought from metaphysics and the closed systems; but I believe it to rest on solid foundations, and it would be easy for me to support my personal opinion by appealing to the consensus of the highest minds of modern times, and even to the general tendency and behavior of the whole modern epoch under its most peculiar and distinctive aspects; but an historical demonstration would be entirely out of place when speaking to a learned audience. It is well

known that the conception of metaphysics and of the closed system had its origin in antiquity and reached its climax in mediæval scholasticism; that every philosophical movement in the modern age, from the Renaissance with its appreciation of humanism, to the rationalistic and empiricistic schools of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, from the idealogical systems with their historical leanings, to positivism and its naturalistic tendencies, was in one way or another a reaction against it; and finally, that Bruno and Vico, Locke and Hume, Descartes and Kant, Hegel and Comte, though among many waverings and survivals and partial returns, all worked for the general erosion of transcendence. And the physiognomy of modern society, so different from the mediæval world and so unascetic, is before the eyes of us all. And finally, the concept of tolerance, which modern history has reached through the wars of religion, what does it import, but that truth has loosened its grasp in the depth of our conscience, since tolerance is made possible only by indifference, or at least by the fact that theology has been confined to a place of minor importance? For a counterproof it is enough to recall that the Catholic Church, with its inflexible logic, condemns both modern philosophy and modern life in its Syllabus.

If philosophy does not give us either a knowledge of the transcendent, or the final truth, it is clear that it cannot be anything but experience, as immanent as experience is, and, like experience, subject to perpetual growth and change. From these premises it has been hastily inferred that philosophy has ceased to accomplish any legitimate function, and the bankruptcy of philosophy has become something of a catchword, history and science being regarded as the modern substitutes for philosophy. But the truth of the matter is that the one which is bankrupt, or on the way to bankruptcy, is only transcendent and theological philosophy, and that by ridding itself of all theological implications, philosophy has but asserted its nature more energetically than ever before, and in greater conformity with our times.

The nature of philosophy consists in an inquiry concerning the categories of experience, the ideas or "values," as it is the fashion to call them, or, in other words, the Spirit in its forms and in the distinction and unity of its forms. For this part also it would be possible to prove, by an historical demonstration, that genuine philosophy has never been anything but this, even in antiquity, even in the Middle Ages, not to speak of modern times

which have produced the *Discours de la Méthode*, the *Scienza Nuova*, the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, and Hegel's logic. It would be possible to prove that the theological and transcendent conception, when it did not constitute the negative element against which philosophy fought and developed its strength, was a mere husk, with which, more or less unconsciously, it protected itself while opening new paths; and that all the acquisitions made by philosophy are recognizable as successive increments of our knowledge of the way in which the Spirit works to produce art and science and practical and moral actions. But I shall leave aside, for the reasons given above, any testimonials which could be drawn from the history of philosophy.

It may be useful, however, to point out that this conception of philosophy does not in the least reëstablish transcendence and the static truth in a new form, by pretending to give a final system of the eternal ideas, or categories, or "values," by which experience is governed. And indeed, if such were its task, philosophy might as well save its labors; when philosophy is presented under this aspect, there is no way of refuting, there is nothing to do but to approve, the smiling sentence, that the conclusions which philosophy reaches laboriously and abstrusely are the same which good sense or common sense already possesses without any philosophy, because the categories which our common speech designate by the words true, good, beautiful, etc., and with which we deal as with intimately known and transparent objects, are actually present in every act and in every word of ours. Categories are categories because they are that which *semper ubique et ab omnibus* is recognized as real and effectual.

This is the reason why I did not say that philosophy discovers and determines categories, but only that its inquiries concern the categories, that is, formulates and solves the ever new problems which are continually placed before our spirit by the development of life and by the necessity of observing and judging facts which are ever new, according to that saying of the poet, that we must constantly earn anew that which we already possess. A mind with a love for rather material comparisons and images might represent the categories as instruments with which we give form to matter and which are deteriorated by use, or show themselves inadequate to the task; and philosophy as the technique which repairs them and makes them efficient once more. And, stretching the comparison, one might add that just as instruments are not instruments, are not real instruments,

except in the work for which they are made and in which they wear themselves out, philosophy is not real and concrete except through experience and in experience or, to use a larger term, in history. And this addition to our comparison leads us naturally to the proposition of the unity of philosophy and historical construction, of philosophy and historiography.

I hope that, after this explanation, my definition of philosophy as the abstract moment of historiography, or the methodology of historiography, will not appear as a paradox. The knowledge that interests us truly, and which is the only kind that is of any interest to us, is that of the particular and individual things among which we live, and which we can transform and produce incessantly, since we are not immersed in reality as in an external medium, but we are one thing with reality; those particular and individual things which *are* the universe. It may sometimes appear that we can do without philosophy, or methodology; and to a certain extent this is true, as long as our judgment finds the road clear before itself, or not too crowded with obstacles, as long as the definitions implicit in its terms are vivid with light. But as soon as our judgment, through the complexity of facts, or through the passions by which it is troubled, becomes embarrassed and arrested, and seems to lose its criterion, doubt is born, and, with doubt, the necessity of new distinctions and new definitions, that is, the necessity of philosophizing. It is only by philosophy that historical thought and judgment can be started again on their course. New facts require a new philosophy; but, as the old facts live in the new ones, philosophy is at the same time transient and eternal; never static, however, never vanishing in the direction of phenomenism, philosophy has its existence not as a closed and final system, but as a perpetual chain of systematizations.

BENEDETTO CROCE: *Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy*, pp. 551-554. Translated by Raffaello Piccoli. Edited by E. S. Brightman, and published by Longmans, Green and Company. Reprinted by permission. Title mine.

SUGGESTIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Note the difference between Croce's attitude toward theology and that of Alexander above, page 119, and the difference between Croce on transcendence and Ward above, page 135 f. Do you think that the charge of atheism which Ward answered against himself would be valid against Croce? Why or why not?

2. What proof does Croce suggest in substantiation of his thesis that a philosophy which emphasizes transcendence is now antiquated? Do you think anything could be said in answer or would you agree with Croce?
3. How does Croce prove his own view in the fourth and fifth paragraphs? Do you think his proof is valid?
4. Compare the last paragraph of Croce's article with the end of Smith's article where he discusses history. Do Croce and Smith seem to you to be expressing the same view? If not, wherein do you think they differ?
5. Why does Croce think that there never can be a final or closed system of philosophy?
6. Compare Croce's position with that of Dewey and Radhakrishnan in Chapter II. To which of those positions is Croce's nearest? Give a reason for your answer.

CHAPTER IV

IDEALISTIC SOLUTIONS OF THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE AND EXISTENCE

I. INTUITION AND THE LEVELS OF DURATION, by *Henri Bergson*. Translation by T. E. Hulme

Analysis

Two kinds of knowledge are distinguished, intuition and analysis, of which the former gives us an understanding of the absolute and the latter an understanding of the relative. This distinction is illustrated (i) by a movement in space, (ii) by a character in a novel, (iii) by the photographs of a city, and (iv) by the translations of a poem. Bergson points out that the positive sciences are developed by the method of analysis whereas metaphysics uses the method of intuition. One reality which we know best by intuition is our enduring self. If we apply the method of analysis to the self we can differentiate at least three layers, (i) an outer crust of perceptions, (ii) an inner layer of memory images, and (iii) a still more inward layer of virtual or incipient actions. But using intuition we are able to penetrate beneath all three of these layers to a most peculiar and unique flux—our inner duration. Bergson uses the image of the rolling up and the unrolling of a coil to explain what our inner duration is. But this being inadequate, he uses the image of the spectrum. By means of the latter he suggests that there are several levels of duration lower than the self and one level higher, and he treats intuition as a kind of elevator by which one may lower himself to the levels of duration below or lift himself to the level above. The chart on the next page, which is based partly on other writings of Bergson, indicates what the various levels of duration are and how intuition is related to them.

A comparison of the definitions of metaphysics and the various conceptions of the absolute leads to the discovery that philosophers, in spite of their apparent divergencies, agree in distinguishing two profoundly different ways of knowing a thing. The first implies that we move round the object; the second that we enter into it. The first depends on the point of view at which we are placed and on the symbols by which we express ourselves. The second neither depends on a point of view nor relies on any symbol. The first kind of knowledge may be said to stop at the *relative*; the second, in those cases where it is possible, to attain the *absolute*.

DURATION AS A WHOLE	Living eternity or the level above man (God?)		↑	
	Our inner duration or human self-consciousness and memory	×	←	—Intuition: the act by which one lowers or lifts himself to other levels of duration than the human level.
	Animal life which knows by instinct		↓	
	Vegetable life (growth and reproduction)		↓	
	Changes of state or condition (sugar dissolving in water)		↓	
	Movement in space or cosmic evolution		↓	
	Pure materiality or homogeneity		↓	

Consider, for example, the movement of an object in space. My perception of the motion will vary with the point of view, moving or stationary, from which I observe it. My expression of it will vary with the systems of axes, or the points of reference, to which I relate it; that is, with the symbols by which I translate it. For this double reason I call such motion *relative*: in the one case, as in the other, I am placed outside the object itself. But when I speak of an *absolute* movement, I am attributing to the moving object an interior and, so to speak, states of mind; I also imply that I am in sympathy with those states, and that I insert myself in them by an effort of imagination. Then, according as the object is moving or stationary, according as it adopts one movement or another, what I experience will vary. And what I experience will depend neither on the point of view I may take up in regard to the object, since I am inside the object itself, nor on the symbols by which I may translate the motion, since I have rejected all translations in order to possess the original. In short, I shall no longer grasp the movement from without, remaining where I am, but from where it is, from within, as it is in itself. I shall possess an absolute.

Consider, again, a character whose adventures are related to me in a novel. The author may multiply the traits of his hero's character, may make him speak and act as much as he pleases, but all this can never be equivalent to the simple and indivisible feeling which I should experience if I were able for an instant to identify myself with the person of the hero himself. Out of that indivisible feeling, as from a spring, all the words, gestures, and actions of the man would appear to me to flow naturally. They would no longer be accidents which, added to the idea I had already formed of the character, continually enriched that idea, without ever completing it. The character would be given to me all at once, in its entirety, and the thousand incidents which manifest it, instead of adding themselves to the idea and so enriching it, would seem to me, on the contrary, to detach themselves from it, without, however, exhausting it or impoverishing its essence. All the things I am told about the man provide me with so many points of view from which I can observe him. All the traits which describe him, and which can make him known to me only by so many comparisons with persons or things I know already, are signs by which he is expressed more or less symbolically. Symbols and points of view, therefore, place me outside him; they give me only what he has in common with others, and not what belongs to him and to him alone. But that which is properly himself, that which constitutes his essence, cannot be perceived from without, being internal by definition, nor be expressed by symbols, being incommensurable with everything else. Description, history, and analysis leave me here in the relative. Coincidence with the person himself would alone give me the absolute.

It is in this sense, and in this sense only, that *absolute* is synonymous with *perfection*. Were all the photographs of a town, taken from all possible points of view, to go on indefinitely completing one another, they would never be equivalent to the solid town in which we walk about. Were all the translations of a poem into all possible languages to add together their various shades of meaning and, correcting each other by a kind of mutual retouching, to give a more and more faithful image of the poem they translate, they would yet never succeed in rendering the inner meaning of the original. A representation taken from a certain point of view, a translation made with certain symbols, will always remain imperfect in comparison with the object of which a view has been taken, or which the symbols

seek to express. But the absolute, which is the object and not its representation, the original and not its translation, is perfect, by being perfectly what it is.

It is doubtless for this reason that the *absolute* has often been identified with the *infinite*. Suppose that I wished to communicate to some one who did not know Greek the extraordinarily simple impression that a passage in Homer makes upon me; I should first give a translation of the lines, I should then comment on my translation, and then develop the commentary; in this way, by piling up explanation on explanation, I might approach nearer and nearer to what I wanted to express; but I should never quite reach it. When you raise your arm, you accomplish a movement of which you have, from within, a simple perception; but for me, watching it from the outside, your arm passes through one point, then through another, and between these two there will be still other points; so that, if I began to count, the operation would go on for ever. Viewed from the inside, then, an absolute is a simple thing; but looked at from the outside, that is to say, relatively to other things, it becomes, in relation to these signs which express it, the gold coin for which we never seem able to finish giving small change. Now, that which lends itself at the same time both to an indivisible apprehension and to an inexhaustible enumeration is, by the very definition of the word, an infinite.

It follows from this that an absolute could only be given in an *intuition*, whilst everything else falls within the province of *analysis*. By intuition is meant the kind of *intellectual sympathy* by which one places oneself within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it and consequently inexpressible. Analysis, on the contrary, is the operation which reduces the object to elements already known, that is, to elements common both to it and other objects. To analyze, therefore, is to express a thing as a function of something other than itself. All analysis is thus a translation, a development into symbols, a representation taken from successive points of view from which we note as many resemblances as possible between the new object which we are studying and others which we believe we know already. In its eternally unsatisfied desire to embrace the object around which it is compelled to turn, analysis multiplies without end the number of its points of view in order to complete its always incomplete representation, and ceaselessly varies its symbols

that it may perfect the always imperfect translation. It goes on, therefore, to infinity. But intuition, if intuition is possible, is a simple act.

Now it is easy to see that the ordinary function of positive science is analysis. Positive science works, then, above all, with symbols. Even the most concrete of the natural sciences, those concerned with life, confine themselves to the visible form of living beings, their organs and anatomical elements. They make comparisons between these forms, they reduce the more complex to the more simple; in short, they study the workings of life in what is, so to speak, only its visual symbol. If there exists any means of possessing a reality absolutely instead of knowing it relatively, of placing oneself within it instead of looking at it from outside points of view, of having the intuition instead of making the analysis: in short, of seizing it without any expression, translation, or symbolic representation—metaphysics is that means. *Metaphysics, then, is the science which claims to dispense with symbols.*

There is one reality, at least, which we all seize from within, by intuition and not by simple analysis. It is our own personality in its flowing through time—our self which endures. We may sympathize intellectually with nothing else, but we certainly sympathize with our own selves.

When I direct my attention inward to contemplate my own self (supposed for the moment to be inactive), I perceive at first, as a crust solidified on the surface, all the perceptions which come to it from the material world. These perceptions are clear, distinct, juxtaposed or juxtaposable one with another; they tend to group themselves into objects. Next, I notice the memories which more or less adhere to these perceptions and which serve to interpret them. These memories have been detached, as it were, from the depth of my personality, drawn to the surface by the perceptions which resemble them; they rest on the surface of my mind without being absolutely myself. Lastly, I feel the stir of tendencies and motor habits—a crowd of virtual actions, more or less firmly bound to these perceptions and memories. All these clearly defined elements appear more distinct from me, the more distinct they are from each other. Radiating, as they do, from within outwards, they form, collectively, the surface of a sphere which tends to grow larger and lose itself in the exterior world. But if I draw myself in from the periph-

ery towards the centre, if I search in the depth of my being for that which is most uniformly, most constantly, and most enduringly myself, I find an altogether different thing.

There is, beneath these sharply cut crystals and this frozen surface, a continuous flux which is not comparable to any flux I have ever seen. There is a succession of states, each of which announces that which follows and contains that which precedes it. They can, properly speaking, only be said to form multiple states when I have already passed them and turn back to observe their track. Whilst I was experiencing them they were so solidly organized, so profoundly animated with a common life, that I could not have said where any one of them finished or where another commenced. In reality no one of them begins or ends, but all extend into each other.

This inner life may be compared to the unrolling of a coil, for there is no living being who does not feel himself coming gradually to the end of his rôle; and to live is to grow old. But it may just as well be compared to a continual rolling up, like that of a thread on a ball, for our past follows us, it swells incessantly with the present that it picks up on its way; and consciousness means memory.

But actually it is neither an unrolling nor a rolling up, for these two similes evoke the idea of lines and surfaces whose parts are homogeneous and superposable on one another. Now, there are no two identical moments in the life of the same conscious being. Take the simplest sensation, suppose it constant, absorb in it the entire personality: the consciousness which will accompany this sensation cannot remain identical with itself for two consecutive moments, because the second moment always contains, over and above the first, the memory that the first has bequeathed to it. A consciousness which could experience two identical moments would be a consciousness without memory. It would die and be born again continually. In what other way could one represent unconsciousness?

It would be better, then, to use as a comparison the myriad-tinted spectrum, with its insensible graduations leading from one shade to another. A current of feeling which passed along the spectrum, assuming in turn the tint of each of its shades, would experience a series of gradual changes, each of which would announce the one to follow and would sum up those which preceded it. . . . Strictly, there might well be no other duration than our own, as, for example, there might be no other color in the

world but orange. But just as a consciousness based on color, which sympathized internally with orange instead of perceiving it externally, would feel itself held between red and yellow, would even perhaps suspect beyond this last color a complete spectrum into which the continuity from red to yellow might expand naturally, so the intuition of our duration, far from leaving us suspended in the void as pure analysis would do, brings us into contact with a whole continuity of durations which we must try to follow, whether downwards or upwards; in both cases we transcend ourselves. In the first we advance towards a more and more attenuated duration, the pulsations of which, being rapider than ours, and dividing our simple sensation, dilute its quality into quantity; at the limit would be pure homogeneity, that pure *repetition* by which we define materiality. Advancing in the other direction, we approach a duration which *strains*, contracts, and intensifies itself more and more; at the limit would be eternity. No longer conceptual eternity, which is an eternity of death, but an eternity of life. A living and therefore still moving eternity in which our own particular duration would be included as the vibrations are in light; an eternity which would be the concentration of all duration, as materiality is its dispersion. Between these two extreme limits intuition moves, and this movement is the very essence of metaphysics.

HENRI BERGSON: *Introduction to Metaphysics*, pp. 1-14 and 62-64. Translated by T. E. Hulme. Copyright, 1912, by G. P. Putnam's Sons. Used by permission of the publishers. Title mine.

SUGGESTIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Do you think that a movement has a state of mind within itself, as Bergson suggests?
2. Which of the four illustrations used to show the difference between analysis and intuition appeals to you as being the best and why?
3. Why does Bergson think the reality reached by intuition is both absolute and infinite?
4. What is Bergson's idea of the function of positive science and of metaphysics? That is, how do their functions differ?
5. Which of the two illustrations of the inner duration of the human self do you like best and why? Which does Bergson prefer and why?
6. Discuss the question of whether the level of duration above human beings is equivalent to God. Give one reason for calling this living eternity God and one against so doing.

7. Does Bergson's theory as expressed in this selection seem to you to be nearer to Spiritual Pluralism or to Absolute Idealism?
8. What in this selection is like Alexander's view above?
9. What in it is most like Smith's view above?

II. THE NATURE OF INTERPRETATION, by *Josiah Royce*

Analysis

Royce quotes Bergson to show that the latter holds a dualistic theory of knowledge which restricts us to the alternative: Either perception or else conception. Yet in real life it must be admitted that these two ways of knowing are always mixed. Only in ideal can we define either a pure perception or a pure conception. The two ways of knowing have long been recognized to be not antagonistic but mutually supplementary. Nevertheless, a synthesis of perception and conception does not really constitute a third way of knowing. This is evident from Bergson's analogy of the bank-note and the cash it represents, the former standing for conception and the latter for perception. To be sure the "promise to pay" is an active factor which unites the two just as perception and conception are synthesized. But the synthesizing action is not usually treated as a third kind of knowledge alongside of perception and conception. While it is true that some writers have regarded such action as the highest and most mature form of knowledge, others, on the other hand, have treated it as a non-cognitive, conative aspect of the mind.

When we classify knowledge according to the types of knowable objects it becomes absolutely necessary to distinguish a third kind. For perception is concerned with particulars whereas conception is concerned with universals. However, some objects, for example, the minds of one's fellows, are neither the one nor the other. We know such objects by a kind of knowledge which Royce calls *interpretation*. He returns to the analogy of Bergson and develops the idea of exchanging money from the currency of one country to that of another as an analogue of interpretation. We know one another's mind through a process of mutual interpretation. Bergson neglects this aspect or kind of knowledge and thereby misses the principal problem. It is by interpretation that one knows his own mind. Royce agrees with Peirce against Bergson that we cannot have an intuition or direct perception of our self. Interpretation is a triadic or three-term relation. This is illustrated by the translation of an inscription. The illustration brings out the fact that interpretation not only has three terms but brings them into a determinate order. Returning to self-knowledge Royce shows that it has this triadic character, since one interprets his past self to his future self. The same is true of interpretations of history, both human history and geological history. Three important differences between both perception and conception and interpretation are then indicated and developed to show that interpretation is the highest form of human knowledge just because its objects are the most significant forms of reality.

The contrast between the cognitive processes called, respectively, perception and conception, dominates a great part of the history of philosophy. This contrast is usually so defined as to involve a dual classification of our cognitive processes. When one asks which of the two processes, perception or conception, gives us the more significant guidance, or is the original from which the other is derived, or is the ideal process whereof the other is the degenerate fellow, such a dual classification is in possession of the field.

This classic dual opposition was expressed, in characteristically finished fashion, at the outset of the lectures which Professor Bergson read, in May of last year (1912), at the invitation of the University of Oxford. You all remember his words: "If our power of external and internal perception were unlimited, we should never make use of our power to conceive, or of our power to reason. To conceive is a makeshift in the cases where one cannot perceive; and one reasons only in so far as one needs to fill gaps in our outer or inner perception, or to extend the range of perception."

Here, as is obvious, there is no recognition of the possible or actual existence of a third type of cognitive process, which is neither perception nor conception. The assertion that conception is our makeshift when perception is limited, and that unlimited perception, by rendering conception superfluous, would supply us with that grade of intuition which we, in ideal, attribute to a divine being, involves the postulate that we face the alternative: Either perception, or else conception. . . .

Despite this prevalence of the dual classification of our cognitive processes, most of us will readily acknowledge that, in our real life, we human beings are never possessed either of pure perception or of pure conception. In ideal, we can define an intuitive type of knowledge, which should merely see, and which should never think. In an equally ideal fashion, we can imagine the possibility of a pure thought, which should be wholly absorbed in conceptions, which should have as its sole real object a realm of universals, and which should ignore all sensible data. But we mortals live the intelligent part of our lives through some sort of more or less imperfect union or synthesis of conception and perception.

In recent discussion it has become almost a commonplace to recognize this union as constantly exemplified in human experience. In this one respect, to-day, empiricists and rationalists,

pragmatists and intellectualists, are accustomed to agree, although great differences arise with regard to *what* union of perception and conception constitutes such knowledge as we human beings can hopefully pursue or actually possess.

Kant, assuring us that conceptions without perceptions are "empty," and that perceptions without conceptions are "blind," sets forth, in his theory of knowledge, the well-known account of how the "spontaneity" of the intellect actively combines the perceptual data, and brings the so-called "manifold of sense" to "unity of conception."

Recent pragmatism, laying stress upon the "practical" character of every human cognitive process, depicts the life of knowledge as a dramatic pursuit of perceptions,—a pursuit guided by the "leadings" which our conceptions determine, and which, in some sense, simply constitute our conceptions, in so far as these have genuine life.

When, a number of years ago, I began a general metaphysical inquiry by defining an idea as a "plan of action," and thereupon developed a theory of knowledge and of reality, upon bases which this definition helped me to formulate, I was making my own use of thoughts which, in their outlines, are at the present day common property. The outcome of my own individual use of this definition was a sort of absolute pragmatism, which has never been pleasing either to rationalists or to empiricists, either to pragmatists or to the ruling type of absolutists. But in so far as I simply insisted upon the active meaning of ideas, my statement had something in common with many forms of current opinion which agree with one another in hardly any other respect. Only the more uncompromising of the mystics still seek for knowledge in a silent land of absolute intuition, where the intellect finally lays down its conceptual tools, and rests from its pragmatic labors, while its works do not follow it, but are simply forgotten, and are as if they never had been. Those of us who are not such uncompromising mystics, view accessible human knowledge neither as pure perception nor as pure conception, but always as depending upon the marriage of the two processes.

Yet such a recognition of an active synthesis of perception and conception does not by itself enable us to define a genuinely triadic classification of the types of knowing processes. Let me illustrate this fact by another quotation from Bergson. In a passage in the first of his two Oxford lectures, our author says:

"I do not deny the usefulness of abstract and general ideas,—any more than I question the value of bank-notes. But just as the note is only a promise to pay cash, so a conception has value only by virtue of the eventual perceptions for which it stands."

In these words, as you see, the antithesis, "conception," "perception," corresponds to the antithesis, "bank-note" and "cash," and the other antithesis, "credit-value," "cash-value." All these corresponding antithesis involve or depend upon dual classifications. Now it is true, and is expressly pointed out by Bergson, that the members of each of these pairs—the credit-value, and the cash-value,—as well as the bank-note and its equivalent in gold,—are brought into a certain synthesis by the existence of a process of promising, and of redeeming the promise. A promise, however, involves a species of activity. In case of the bank-note, this activity may express whatever makes some vast commercial system solvent, or may be based upon the whole power of a great modern state.

In very much the same way, many philosophers of otherwise widely different opinions recognize that conception and perception are, in live cognitive processes, brought into synthesis by some sort of activity,—the activity of the mind whose cognitions are in question. This activity may be one of attention. Or it may consist of a series of voluntary deeds.

But in each of these cases, the members of a pair, "bank-note and cash," or "conception and perception," are first antithetically opposed to each other; and then a third or active element, a promise, a volition, or what you will, is mentioned as that which brings the members of the pair into synthesis. But this third or synthetic factor is not thus coördinated with the two opposed members of the pair.

If action, or activity, is the name given to whatever brings perceptions and conceptions into synthesis, then this third factor is not hereby set side by side, both with perception and with conception as a third form of cognitive activity. For action may be viewed as a non-cognitive function,—and classified as "conation." Or, on the contrary, action may be viewed as that grade of cognition which, being neither conception alone, nor perception alone, but the synthesis of the two, is the *only* mature and successfully completed cognitive process. Both of these views have been asserted. We need not discuss them here. But, in any case, "action" or "activity" is not itself hereby defined as a third type of cognition; any more than the activity of promising to

pay, in Bergson's illustration, is defined as a third sort of currency which is neither gold nor bank-notes.

Thus far, then, the classification of the cognitive processes as being either perceptions or else conceptions remains triumphant, and is not superseded by regarding genuine knowledge as a synthesis of these two. For the dual contrast between perception and conception dominates all such opinions.

Yet cognition may be considered from a slightly different point of view.

It is natural to classify cognitive processes by their characteristic objects. The object of a perception is a datum of some sort, a *thing*, or perhaps, as Bergson insists, a *change*, or whatever else we may be able immediately to apprehend. The object of a conception is an *universal* of some sort, a *general* or *abstract character*, a *type*, a *quality*, or some complex object based upon such universals. Now do all objects of cognition belong to one of these two classes? If so, in which of these classes will you place your neighbor's mind, or any of the conscious acts of that mind? Is your neighbor's mind a *datum* that you could, were your perception "unlimited," simply find *present* to you, as *red* or as a "change" can be present? Is your neighbor's mind, on the contrary, an abstraction, a mere *sort* of being, an *universal* which you merely conceive? If a conception resembles a bank-note in being a promise to pay, which needs to be redeemed in the gold of perception,—then what immediate perception of your own could ever render to you the "cash-value" of your idea of your neighbor's mind? On the other hand, your present and personal idea of your neighbor's mind is certainly not itself such a perceptual "cash-value" for you. Your neighbor's mind is no mere *datum* to your sense at any time.

If, then, there be any cognitive process whose proper object is your neighbor's mind, this process is neither a mere conception nor yet a mere perception. Is it, then, some synthesis or combination of perceptions and conceptions? Or is it, finally, some third form of cognitive process, which is neither perception nor conception, and which cannot be completely describable in terms of combined perceptions and conceptions? Now it appears that the word "interpretation" is a convenient name for a process which at least aims to be cognitive. And the proper object of an interpretation, as we usually employ the name, is either something of the nature of a mind, or else is a process which goes on in a mind, or finally, is a sign or expression whereby some

mind manifests its existence and its processes. Let us consider, then, more closely, whether the process of interpretation, in so far as its proper object is a mind, or is the sign of a mind, can be reduced to a pure perception, or to pure conception, or to any synthesis which merely involves these two.

We shall here be aided by a very familiar instance, suggested by the very illustration which Bergson uses in pointing out the contrast between perception and conception, and in emphasizing the secondary and purely instrumental character of the process of conception. Gold coin, as Bergson reminds us, corresponds, in its value for the ordinary business of buying and selling, to perceptions as they appear in our experience. Banknotes correspond, in an analogous fashion, to conceptions. The notes are promises to pay cash. The conceptions are useful guides to possible perceptions. The link between the note and its cash-value is the link which the activity of making and keeping the promises of a solvent bank provides. The link between the conception and its corresponding perception is the link which some active synthesis, such as voluntary seeking, or creative action, or habitual conduct, or intention, supplies. The illustration is clear. In a special way perceptions do indeed correspond to cash-values, and conceptions to credit-values. But in the world of commercial transactions there are other values than simple cash-values and credit-values. Perhaps, therefore, in the realm of cognitive processes there may be analogous varieties.

Recall the familiar case wherein a traveller crosses the boundary of a foreign country. To the boundary he comes provided, let us say, with the gold and with bank-notes of his own country, but without any letter of credit. This side of the boundary his bank-notes are good because of their credit-value. His gold is good because, being the coinage of the realm, it possesses cash-value and is legal tender. But beyond the boundary, in the land to which he goes, the coin which he carries is no longer legal tender, and possibly will not pass at all in ordinary transactions. His bank-notes may be, for the moment, valueless, not because the promise stamped upon their face is irredeemable, but because the gold coin itself into which they could be converted upon presentation at the bank in question, would not be legal tender beyond the boundary.

Consequently, at the boundary, a new process may be convenient, if not, for the traveller's purpose, indispensable. It is the process of exchanging coin of the realm which he leaves for

that of the foreign land which he enters. The process may be easy or difficult, may be governed by strict rules or else may be capricious, according to the conditions which prevail at the boundary. But it is a third process, which consists neither in the presentation of cash-values nor in the offering or accepting of credit-values. It is a process of interpreting the cash-values which are recognized by the laws and customs of one realm in terms of the cash-values which are legal tender in another country. It is also a process of proceeding to act upon the basis of this interpretation. We are not concerned with the principles which make this interpretation possible, or which guide the conduct either of the traveller or of the money-changer at the boundary. What interests us here is simply the fact that a new type of transaction is now in question. It is a process of money-changing,—a special form of exchange of values, but a form not simply analogous to the type of the activities whereby conceptions are provided with their corresponding perceptions. And this form is not reducible to that of the simple contrast between credit-values and cash-values.

Each of us, in every new effort to communicate with our fellow-men, stand, like the traveller crossing the boundary of a new country, in the presence of a largely strange world of perceptions and of conceptions. Our neighbor's perceptions, in their immediate presence, we never quite certainly share. Our neighbor's conceptions, for various reasons which I need not here enumerate, are so largely communicable that they can often be regarded, with a high degree of probability, as identical, in certain aspects of their meaning, with our own. But the active syntheses, the practical processes of seeking and of construction, the volitions, the promises, whereby we pass from our own concepts to our own percepts, are often in a high degree individual. In that case it may be very difficult to compare them to the corresponding processes of our neighbors; and then a mutual understanding, in respect of our activities and their values, is frequently as hard to obtain as is a direct view of one another's sensory perceptions. "I never loved you," so says Hamlet to Ophelia. "My lord, you made me believe so." Here is a classic instance of a problem of mutual interpretation. Who of us can solve this problem for Hamlet and Ophelia?

Therefore, in our efforts to view the world as other men view it, our undertaking is very generally analogous to the traveller's financial transactions when he crosses the boundary. We try

to solve the problem of learning how to exchange the values of our own lives into the terms which can hope to pass current in the new or foreign spiritual realms whereto, when we take counsel together, we are constantly attempting to pass. Both the credit-values and the cash-values are not always easily exchanged.

I have no hope of showing, in the present discussion, how and how far we can make sure that, in a given case of human social intercourse, we actually succeed in fairly exchanging the coinage of our perceptions and the bank-notes of our conceptions into the values which pass current in the realm beyond the boundary. What measure of truth our individual interpretations possess, and by what tests we verify that truth, I have not now to estimate. But I am strongly interested in the fact that, just as the process of obtaining cash for our bank-notes is not the same as the process of exchanging our coins for foreign coins when we pass the border, precisely so the process of verifying our concepts through obtaining the corresponding percepts is not the same as the process of interpreting our neighbors' minds.

A philosophy which, like that of Bergson, defines the whole problem of knowledge in terms of the classic opposition between conception and perception, and which then declares that, if our powers of perception were unlimited, the goal of knowledge would be reached, simply misses the principal problem, both of our daily human existence and of all our higher spiritual life, as well as of the universe. And in bidding us seek the solution of our problems in terms of perception, such a doctrine simply forbids us to pass any of the great boundaries of the spiritual world, or to explore the many realms wherein the wealth of the spirit is poured out. For neither perception nor conception, nor any combination of the two, nor yet their synthesis in our practical activities, constitutes the whole of any interpretation. Interpretation, however, is what we seek in all our social and spiritual relations; and without some process of interpretation, we obtain no fulness of life.

It would be wrong to suppose, however, that interpretation is needed and is used only in our literal social relations with other individual human beings. For it is important to notice that one of the principal problems in the life of each of us is the problem of interpreting himself. The bare mention of Hamlet's words reminds us of this fact. Ophelia does not understand Hamlet. But does he understand himself?

In our inner life it not infrequently happens that we have—like the traveller, or like Hamlet in the ghost-scene, or like Macbeth when there comes the knocking on the gate—to pass a boundary, to cross into some new realm, not merely of experience, but of desire, of hope, or of resolve. It is then our fortune not merely that our former ideas, as the pragmatists say, no longer “work,” and that our bank-notes can no longer be cashed in terms of the familiar inner perceptions which we have been accustomed to seek. Our situation is rather this: that *both* our ideas *and* our experiences, both our plans and our powers to realize plans, both our ideas with their “leadings” and our intuitions, are in process of dramatic transformation. At such times we need to know, like Pharaoh, both our dream and the interpretation thereof.

Such critical passing of a boundary in one’s own inner world is a well-known event in youth, when what Goethe called:—

Neue Liebe, neues Leben,
Neue Hoffnung, neues Sehnen,

makes one say to one’s heart:—

Ich erkenne dich nicht mehr.

Yet, not only youth, but personal calamity, or other “moving accident,” or, in a more inspiring way, the call of some new constructive task, or, in the extreme case, a religious conversion, may at any time force one or another of us to cross a boundary in a fashion similar to those just illustrated.

At such times we are impressed with the fact that there is no royal road to self-knowledge. Charles Peirce . . . maintained (quite rightly, I think) that there is no direct intuition or perception of the self. Reflection, as Peirce pointed out, involves what is, in its essence, an interior conversation, in which one discovers one’s own mind through a process of inference analogous to the very modes of inference which guide us in a social effort to interpret our neighbors’ minds. Such social inference is surely no merely conceptual process. But it cannot be reduced to the sort of perception which Bergson invited you, in his Oxford lectures, to share. Although you are indeed placed in the “interior” of yourself, you can never so far retire into your own inmost recesses of intuition as merely to find the true self presented to an inner sense. . . .

Interpretation always involves a relation of three terms. In the technical phrase, interpretation is a triadic relation. That is, you cannot express any complete process of interpreting by merely naming two terms,—persons, or other objects,—and by then telling what dyadic relation exists between one of these two and the other.

Let me illustrate: Suppose that an Egyptologist translates an inscription. So far two beings are indeed in question: the translator and his text. But a genuine translation cannot be merely a translation in the abstract. There must be some language into which the inscription is translated. Let this translation be, in a given instance, an English translation. Then the translator interprets something; but he interprets it only to one who can read English. And if a reader knows no English, the translation is for such a reader no interpretation at all. That is, a triad of beings—the Egyptian text, the Egyptologist who translates, and the possible English reader—are equally necessary in order that such an English interpretation of an Egyptian writing should exist. Whenever anybody translates a text, the situation remains, however you vary texts or languages or translators, essentially the same. There must exist some one, or some class of beings, to whose use this translation is adapted; while the translator is somebody who expresses himself by mediating between two expressions of meanings, or between two languages, or between two speakers or two writers. The mediator or translator, or interpreter, must, in cases of this sort, himself know both languages, and thus be intelligible to both the persons whom his translation serves. The triadic relation in question is, in its essence, non-symmetrical,—that is, unevenly arranged with respect to all three terms. Thus somebody (let us say A)—the translator or interpreter—interprets somebody (let us say B) to somebody (let us say C). If you transpose the order of the terms,—A, B, C,—an account of the happening which constitutes an interpretation must be altered, or otherwise may become either false or meaningless.

Thus an interpretation is a relation which not only involves three terms, but brings them into a determinate order. One of the three terms is the interpreter; a second term is the object—the person or the meaning or the text—which is interpreted; the third is the person to whom the interpretation is addressed.

This may, at first, seem to be a mere formality. But nothing in the world is more momentous than the difference between a

pair and a triad of terms may become, if the terms and the relations involved are themselves sufficiently full of meaning.

You may observe that, when a man perceives a thing, the relation is dyadic. A perceives B. A pair of members is needed, and suffices, to make the relation possible. But when A interprets B to C, a triad of members (whereof, as in case of other relations, two or all three members may be wholly, or in part, identical) must exist in order to make the interpretation possible. Let illustrations show us how important this formal condition of interpretation may become.

When a process of conscious reflection goes on, a man may be said to interpret himself to himself. In this case, although but one personality, in the usual sense of the term is in question, the relation is still really a triadic relation. And, in general, in such a case, the man who is said to be reflecting remembers some former promise or resolve of his own, or perhaps reads an old letter that he once wrote, or an entry in a diary. He then, at some present time, interprets this expression of his past self.

But, usually, he interprets this bit of his past self to his future self. "This," he says, "is what I meant when I made that promise." "This is what I wrote or recorded or promised." "Therefore," he continues, addressing his future self, "I am now committed to doing thus," "planning thus," and so on.

The interpretation in question still constitutes, therefore, a triadic relation. And there are three men present in and taking part in the interior conversation: the man of the past whose promises, notes, records, old letters, are interpreted; the present self who interprets them; and the future self to whom the interpretation is addressed. Through the present self the past is so interpreted that its counsel is conveyed to the future self.

The illustration just chosen has been taken from the supposed experience of an individual man. But the relations involved are capable of a far-reaching metaphysical generalization. . . .

The relations exemplified by the man who, at a given present moment, interprets his own past to his own future, are precisely analogous to the relations which exist when any past state of the world is, at any present moment, so linked, through a definite historical process, with the coming state of the world, that an intelligent observer who happened to be in possession of the facts could, were he present, interpret to a possible future observer the meaning of the past. Such interpretation might or might not involve definite predictions of future events. History or

biography, physical or mental processes, might be in question; fate or free will, determinism or chance, might rule the region of the world which was under consideration. The most general distinctions of past, present, and future appear in a new light when considered with reference to the process of interpretation.

In fact, what our own inner reflection exemplifies is outwardly embodied in the whole world's history. For what we all mean by past time is a realm of events whose historical sense, whose records, whose lessons, we may now interpret, in so far as our memory and the documents furnish us the evidences for such interpretation. We may also observe that what we mean by future time is a realm of events which we view as more or less under the control of the present will of voluntary agents, so that it is worth while to give to ourselves, or to our fellows, counsel regarding this future. And so, wherever the world's processes are recorded, wherever the records are preserved, and wherever they influence in any way the future course of events, we may say that (at least in these parts of the world) the present potentially interprets the past to the future, and continues so to do *ad infinitum*.

Such, for instance, is the case when one studies the crust of a planet. The erosions and the deposits of a present geological period lay down the traces which, if read by a geologist, would interpret the past history of the planet's crust to the observers of future geological periods.

Thus the Colorado Cañon, in its present condition, is a geological section produced by a recent stream. Its walls record, in their stratification, a vast series of long-past changes. The geologist of the present may read these traces, and may interpret them for future geologists of our own age. But the present state of the Colorado Cañon, which will ere long pass away as the walls crumble, and as the continents rise or sink, will leave traces that may be used at some future time to interpret these now present conditions of the earth's crust to some still more advanced future, which will come to exist after yet other geological periods have passed away.

In sum, if we view the world as everywhere and always recording its own history, by processes of aging and weathering, or of evolution, or of stellar and nebular clusterings and streamings, we can simply define the time order, and its three regions,—past, present, future,—as an order of possible interpretation. That is, we can define the present as, potentially, the interpre-

tation of the past to the future. The triadic structure of our interpretations is strictly analogous, both to the psychological and to the metaphysical structure of the world of time. And each of these structures can be stated in terms of the other.

This analogy between the relational structure of the whole time-process and the relations which are characteristic of any system of acts of interpretation seems to me to be worthy of careful consideration. . . .

Psychologically speaking, the mental process which thus involves three members differs from perception and conception in three respects. First, interpretation is a conversation, and not a lonely enterprise. There is some one, in the realm of psychological happenings, who addresses some one. The one who addresses interprets some object to the one addressed. In the second place, the interpreted object is itself something which has the nature of a mental expression. Peirce uses the term "sign" to name this mental object which is interpreted. Thirdly, since the interpretation is a mental act, and is an act which is expressed, the interpretation itself is, in its turn, a Sign. This new sign calls for further interpretation. For the interpretation is addressed to somebody. And so,—at least in ideal,—the social process involved is endless. Thus wealthy, then, in its psychological consequences, is the formal character of a situation wherein any interpretation takes place.

Perception has its natural terminus in some object perceived; and therewith the process, as would seem, might end, were there nothing else in the world to perceive. Conception is contented, so to speak, with defining the universal type, or ideal form which chances to become an object of somebody's thought. In order to define a new universal, one needs a new act of thought whose occurrence seems, in so far, an arbitrary additional cognitive function. Thus both perception and conception are, so to speak, self-limiting processes. The wealth of their facts comes to them from without, arbitrarily.

But interpretation both requires as its basis the sign or mental expression which is to be interpreted, and calls for a further interpretation of its own act, just because it addresses itself to some third being. Thus interpretation is not only an essentially social process, but also a process which, when once initiated, can be terminated only by an external and arbitrary interruption, such as death or social separation. By itself, the process of in-

terpretation calls, in ideal, for an infinite sequence of interpretations. For every interpretation, being addressed to somebody, demands interpretation from the one to whom it is addressed.

Thus the formal difference between interpretation on the one hand, and perception and conception on the other hand, is a difference involving endlessly wealthy possible psychological consequences.

Perception is indeed supported by the wealth of our sensory processes; and is therefore rightly said to possess an endless fecundity.

But interpretation lives in a world which is endlessly richer than the realm of perception. For its discoveries are constantly renewed by the inexhaustible resources of our social relations, while its ideals essentially demand, at every point, an infinite series of mutual interpretations in order to express what even the very least conversational effort, the least attempt to find our way in the life that we would interpret, involves.

Conception is often denounced, in our day, as "sterile." But perception, taken by itself, is intolerably lonesome. And every philosophy whose sole principle is perception invites us to dwell in a desolate wilderness where neither God nor man exists. For where either God or man is in question, interpretation is demanded. And interpretation,—even the simplest, even the most halting and trivial interpretation of our daily life,—seeks what eye hath not seen, and ear hath not heard, and what it hath not entered into the heart of man to conceive,—namely, the successful interpretation of somebody to somebody.

Interpretation seeks an object which is essentially spiritual. The abyss of abstract conception says of this object: It is not in me. The heaven of glittering immediacies which perception furnishes answers the quest by saying: It is not in me. Interpretation says: It is nigh thee,—even in thine heart; but shows us, through manifesting the very nature of the object to be sought, what general conditions must be met if any one is to interpret a genuine Sign to an understanding mind. And withal, interpretation seeks a city out of sight, the homeland where, perchance, we learn to understand one another.

JOSIAH ROYCE: *The Problem of Christianity*, Vol. II, pp. 117-152. Copyright, 1913, by The Macmillan Company. Reprinted by permission.

SUGGESTIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Is Royce fair to Bergson in identifying intuition with perception or do you think Bergson would include both perception and conception under analysis? Give reason for your answer.
2. Is the analogy of the bank-note a good analogy? Is Royce's interpretation of it the same as Bergson's probably would be? When Royce adds to it the conception of exchange-value is he completing the analogy or changing it altogether?
3. Explain why Royce thinks one cannot know the self through intuition as Bergson argues. Do you think that Royce is right here or would you agree with Bergson? Defend your answer.
4. Can you suggest another example of an object that can only be known by interpretation or that involves a triadic relation?
5. To what extent does Royce's theory of interpretation seem to you to be identical with Creighton's idea of the social nature of thinking? To what extent are the two views different? See above, p. 143 ff.
6. Make a classification in outline form showing the types of knowledge and the corresponding types of objects, as expounded by Royce. Where in this scheme would you place each of the following objects: the square root of two, a centaur, an angel, the bitter taste of a dose of quinine, the perfect circle of mathematics, the awareness of your own thought that two plus two equals four, the being than whom none greater can be conceived (God).

III. THE NATURE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE SENS_A, by *Norman Kemp Smith*

Analysis

Discussing the question of the status of the secondary qualities of objects, examples of which are enumerated, Smith first points out that they are not mental in the sense of being acts of sensing but are rather that which is sensed or *sensa*. It is clear that *sensa* are not states of a self for they are objects to the self as subject. Like the advocates of representative perception (see above, p. 109 f.) Smith holds that the *sensa* are transitory so far as we know. They come and go. He also holds that they are private as against the view of the man in the street who considers them to be public. In proving that the *sensa* are private he argues that Ward and James were both wrong in regarding extensity as a characteristic of all *sensa*, since they based their theory on the visual *sensa* whereas other *sensa*, especially the organic, do not support this theory. A *sensum* is the end member of a series of events which begins in nature outside the percipient organism and ends in the body or brain. Hence *sensa* are private, not because of their nature, but because, as the end members of such series of events, they can only be observed by the individual within whose body they occur. Are they, then, psychical or physical? Smith holds the latter

view, although he suggests that the *sensa* may belong in a neutral world in between the physical and the psychical. This all depends on how the physical and the psychical are defined. If we make a distinction between sensing and intuiting, meaning by the former the mere apprehension of *sensa* and by the latter their apprehension in a temporal and spatial setting, it is possible to treat some of the *sensa* as being modified by the interrelation of these two psychical activities.

Smith then develops his theory of the relation of space and time to the *sensa*. He argues that space and time are apprehended in terms of *sensa* but that they are not themselves *sensa*. In the experience of time consciousness is more comprehensive than any one *sensum*. Consequently the experience of time cannot be a *sensum*. Nor can the experience of time be derived from the contemplation of overlapping *sensa*. The argument for this is stated in two ways. This is followed by a discussion of the theory that the experience of time is due to the revival of past experiences of *sensa*, which Smith rejects. He concludes that the experience of time cannot be derived from *sensa* in any way, and that the problem of the origin of this experience is one with the problem of the origin of consciousness itself. Consciousness as the experience of time transcends all *sensa*, but once *sensa* are apprehended they are interpreted as continuous series of durations. Essentially the same argument applies to our experience of space.

(i) *The Ontological Status of the Secondary Qualities*.—What is the status of what are usually called the secondary qualities—colour, sound, taste, and the like? Upon what conditions do they rest, and can they be definitely classed either as physical or as mental?

We have already noted the ambiguity of the term sensation. It may mean, either the process of sensing, e.g., the apprehension of red, or that which is sensed, e.g., the red itself. The latter we may entitle a *sensum*. Obviously the “secondary qualities” are not processes of apprehension; they are *sensa*.

Further, though the secondary qualities may perhaps turn out to be mental in character, there is no procurable evidence that they are states of the self. If by the self we mean the subject knowing, the *sensa* are not states of the subject, but objects to the subject. They are apprehended, i.e., contemplated. Pleasure and pain may perhaps be classed as states of the self: in so far as they are feelings they would seem to belong with processes of apprehension. Considerable special argument would, however, be required to show that we can interpret a taste or a sound or a colour in that manner. We can speak of the self (or mind) as pleased or pained or angry, but not as sweet or loud or red. These latter qualities are contemplated, and though in the process they may awaken a subjective reaction, and so be

appreciated, they are in themselves genuinely "objective" existences. As objects, they terminate the processes which are directed to their apprehension.

We must agree with the supporters of the doctrine of representative perception that the *sensa*, *so far as experienced*, are transitory. They are experienced for a time, and then cease to be experienced. Whether they are in themselves transitory, coming into existence when we experience them and passing out of existence when we cease to experience them, we have no direct means of deciding; and the resulting questions raise many of the most difficult problems in metaphysics. The view to which, on general grounds, I find myself committed, is that they are events, and therefore, as capable of happening only once, essentially transitory. But since, like all events, they are "slabs of duration," their duration need not coincide with our experiencing of them. For all that we know to the contrary, they may precede and outlast it, or may cease to exist before we have ceased to contemplate them.

Are the *sensa* likewise private to each individual? When a bell is rung, does each percipient in its neighbourhood receive therefrom his own separate set of auditory *sensa*? Or can the *same* *sensa* be apprehended by different percipients—uniformly in proportion as the conditions of location and hearing are uniform, and varyingly when these conditions vary? . . . The *sensa* are events, conditioned by physical, physiological, and possibly also (for deciding this point we have no sufficient data) psychical factors. For the naïve realists the *sensa* are *public* and objective, whereas, on the view which I shall advocate, though objective, i.e., non-subjective, they are, for very sufficient, assignable reasons, open to the observation of only one percipient, and to that extent are *private*.

We may at once consider the main difficulty which stands in the way of this last view. Colour is, it would appear, apprehensible only as spread out, and therefore as involving space. Must it not, therefore, be where the space is? Can colour be an event separate from extended existences, or have a set of conditions, physical and physiological, distinct from the conditions determining the existence of that of which it is the colour? By general admission our *apprehension* of colour is thus indirectly and complexly conditioned. Can this conclusion be extended to the existence of the colour itself?

In meeting this difficulty, I shall argue that the *sensa* reduce

without remainder to the "secondary qualities"; and that though space is apprehended *in terms of* *sensa*, it can never be apprehended *through* *sensa*. . . .

Mr. Ward and Mr. William James have argued that extensity is a characteristic of *all* *sensa*. There is, for instance, they contend, in sounds and tastes a voluminousness or roominess. The data upon which this view is based may, however, be taken as pointing in the opposite direction, as indicating that *none* of the *sensa* are *in themselves* extended, that all of them tend to *acquire* a seemingly direct relation to extension, and that in the case of visual *sensa* this has gone so far that colour cannot be consciously apprehended save as spread out. For do not the *sensa* of the special senses shade more or less continuously into the organic *sensa*? The order of sequence is indeed doubtful, since some of the organic *sensa* seem to suggest extensity more definitely than, for instance, sounds usually do. Still there is a marked difference between colours and sounds or odours, and the latter are in this respect more akin to the organic *sensa* than to our visual experiences. Visual *sensa* are but one type, and a somewhat exceptional type of *sensa*; and we may endeavour to treat them on the analogy of the other types, leaving their differentiating features for special explanation. Certainly, at least on first consideration, it seems more natural to treat tastes, odours, thermal *sensa*, sounds, and organic *sensa*, as suggesting extensity only through acquired associations, and as being, not qualities of objects, but events, conditioned by, and subsequent to, processes partly outside the body and partly within the body. On this view, *sensa* occur as terminating members in certain lengthy series of events which begin by being physical and become physiological.

Further, if this view be taken, separate sets of *sensa* must exist for each observer, since the sets of conditions upon which they follow are as distinct from one another as are the bodies of the percipients. This does not, however, mean that the *sensa* must be subjective, but only that they must be private. They are private, not because they fall outside the system of nature, but because, though in themselves as integral to nature as any other events, they are yet, owing to the circumstances under which they arise, accessible only to some one observer. Just as no two individuals can touch one and the same spot at the same time, or taste the same morsel of food, so no two observers can apprehend at any one moment, or even at different

moments, the same *sensa*. They are, so to speak, in and by themselves just as public as any other natural existences; but owing to accompanying circumstances they are open only to some one individual's view, and so may be described as private.

If it be asked whether the *sensa* are physical or psychical, the answer will largely be a matter of convention, depending upon our definition of these terms. The term "psychical" is wider than the term "conscious," just as the term "physical," which applies to ether and to electrons, is wider than the term "material." The *sensa* cannot be shown to be *conscious* states, for by that we could only mean that consciousness is inseparably bound up with them; and in support of such a contention we have no sufficient evidence. Certainly their existence has never hitherto been demonstrated save on the direct testimony of immediate experience. When they are known to exist, consciousness is there bearing witness to their existence. But this is no proof that consciousness is what makes them possible of existence, and that they are unable to exist when consciousness is absent.

Nor are data available for proving that the *sensa* are *mental* or *psychical* in any precise meaning of these terms. . . . (This statement) may seem to conflict with the contention that in any division of reality into the physical and the psychical they can most fittingly be classed as falling within the former. In reply, it may be pointed out that when the term psychical is employed in its widest sense as covering not merely awareness but all those powers and dispositions which constitute the mental structures of which awareness is a function, we are on debatable ground. In the absence of a metaphysical insight into the nature of the ultimate relations holding between mind and matter we have, perforce, to proceed in a tentative manner, and, as a first approximation to truth—to use the phrase now so frequently in the mouth of the scientist—may reasonably class the *sensa* as belonging rather to the physical than to the psychical sphere. If reality can be believed to be a system, and all its factors to be more or less integrally connected, an entity can be physical, and yet may be conditioned by what is different in nature from itself.

Further, even if it be granted that *sensa* do not as a rule rest on psychical conditions, we are by no means excluded from recognizing, should evidence be forthcoming, that the psychical does yet in some degree determine the specific character which

certain of the *sensa* are immediately sensed as having. Discussion of this question involves recognition of a distinction which I regard as quite fundamental, but to which I have not yet referred, between sensing and intuiting. By sensing I mean the process through which we apprehend the *sensa*, strictly so called, and by intuition the process through which we apprehend them in a spatial and temporal setting. If, as I shall argue, the two processes, though fundamentally different and quite definitely distinguishable, never occur apart, they are likely to exercise influence on one another; and of their so doing there is a considerable amount of empirical evidence. . . .

(ii) *Time, Space, and the Sensa*.—Let us now consider the thesis which I have propounded above, namely, that we apprehend time and space *in terms* of *sensa*, but not *through* them, i.e., that we gain an articulated view of time and space by means of *sensa*, but that time and space are not themselves sensory in character. This can most easily be shown in the case of time. The passage of time is not, it would seem, absent from the field of consciousness for a single moment. It may not be specially attended to; it is at least “enjoyed” or “endured.” Further, the time of which we are always thus conscious is, to use William James’s phrase, a saddleback of time. What we are conscious of in being aware of succession is a duration within which we discriminate a past that has just passed, the now present, and a future into which it is leading. The present always defines itself in consciousness through this twofold contrast to the no longer and the not yet. Consciousness, that is to say, is never limited to the instantaneously present. In order that there may be consciousness of the present, there must be consciousness of more than the present. This, then, being the form in which consciousness of time alone occurs, I shall endeavour to show that it can never be acquired simply through contemplation of this or that *sensum*, as it comes about, as it endures for a time, or as it ceases to be, or even through contemplation of an overlapping series of such *sensa*.

Clearly, contemplation of a *sensum* in and by itself cannot yield, or account for, consciousness of its coming about. Since the awareness must take cognizance of the time prior to the happening of the *sensum*, it cannot be yielded by the not then existent *sensum*. Similarly with awareness of cessation of a *sensum*. The awareness is of a field which outlasts the *sensum*,

and it must therefore apprehend more than the sensum. Consciousness of a continuing sensum is equally complex. It presupposes awareness of a lapse of time; and since it is the same sensum that is at the earlier and at the later time, the awareness of the difference in time cannot be obtained from contemplation merely of the sensum. Thus in all cases consciousness has a field more comprehensive than any sensum, no matter in which of the three modes the sensum be taken.

Nor can consciousness of time originate in the contemplation of overlapping sensa. If in their beginning and ceasing to be they entirely coincide, they begin and cease to be at the same moment, and the presupposed consciousness of antecedent time is not any more explained by them all taken together than it is by any one of them. If, on the other hand, the times of their beginnings stand in temporal sequence, and we date the later by reference to the earlier, then while awareness of the coming to be of the first item in the series is left unconsidered, and will call for parallel treatment, that of the subsequent items would seem to be accounted for. But this is an incomplete explanation. In order to date the later by reference to the earlier we must have ground for judging it to be later, and such ground can only consist in the awareness that it has really begun at the moment specified, that is, that it has followed upon a time in which it has not itself existed. And though this antecedent time may be apprehended as the time in which another sensum occurs, what makes possible the consciousness of the later item as *making its entry into* the series is consciousness of the preceding time as a *time* otherwise specified, not merely consciousness of the nature of the preceding sensum which does thus specify it. That is to say, in all cases awareness of a temporal field supplementary to this or that sensum, and in which the sensa occur, pre-conditions the apprehension of beginning, enduring, and ceasing to be.

To state the same argument in another form: in apprehending temporal overlapping of sensa we must apprehend the point or edge at which a new sensum begins or a given sensum ceases. But the edge is not apprehended as a temporal edge save in so far as it is viewed as occurring within a time that leads into and later continues the moment of transition in which the edge itself consists. More is here experienced than what is sensuously experienced. The time-span of known durations is what makes possible apprehension of a time-limit, and

this time-span has itself to be thought of as continuing, and as continuing into, a time wider than itself.

But, it will be objected, the temporal contexts thus required can be explained as due to the revival of past experiences, and so may still be traceable to the contemplation of *sensa*. Examination of our consciousness of time suffices, however, to disprove this view. The type of context to which all such temporal contexts have to conform is a type which must in its main features be present in every case, and which is therefore as little capable of being accounted for in terms of past as in terms of present *sensa*. As conditioning *all* awareness of *sensa*, it cannot be arrived at through any amount of such awareness, not even if such awareness be thrown back into a past about which so little is known that conjecture is free to propound hypotheses, uncontrolled by any facts of present experience. If, as above maintained, consciousness of the now cannot be accounted for save by postulating a consciousness of the no longer and the not yet, there can be no way of explaining how we can win our way to it by the path of increasing experience; and consciousness of duration must therefore be accepted as having been present from the start.

This conclusion can only be challenged if we are prepared to deny that consciousness, in order to be consciousness, must in all cases have a temporal field. The problem of the origin of our apprehension of time is the problem of the origin of consciousness itself.

Such, then, as regards consciousness of time, is the thesis which I am endeavouring to maintain. In order that what is sensuously experienced may be, what it always is, a complex duration, each item within it, and it itself as a whole, must be apprehended in temporal perspective. Only if the wider, *implied*, temporal perspective, and the time-span *immediately experienced*, be thus apprehended as passing into one another, so that the texture of each is uniform in all its transitions, can the changes which manifest themselves through the abrupt qualitative discontinuities of sense still be apprehended in the manner in which they are actually apprehended, namely, as constituting a continuous medium of constant character. Accordingly, to explain consciousness of duration and change, we have to postulate that the percipient is capable of apprehending a wider, and in certain respects, such as in the type of its continuity, a different field from any that the *sensa* themselves, by

themselves (if they ever so exist), can be regarded as yielding. Consciousness, in so far as it is the apprehension of time and the modes of time, transcends any and all *sensa*, however extensive, and however, *once they are apprehended*, they may be found to be interpretable as a *continuous* series of overlapping durations.

The same argument applies to our apprehension of space. For even assuming (what I shall have to call in question) that certain *sensa*, or all *sensa*, are extended, there is one unfailing feature of our space-experience which cannot be accounted for as due merely to the contemplation of them as thus existing. The space which we sensuously apprehend, be it large or small, is always apprehended as falling within a space larger than itself, and as being conditioned in its existence by this wider whole. Consciousness of such a field cannot be conceived as first originating through observation of overlappings and delimitations. That is necessary for definitely specifying any space whether large or small, but will not suffice to account for its first apprehension. The *sensa* have indeed size and outline only in so far as they delimit or overlap *one another*; but what makes it possible that any two of them should be apprehended as thus co-terminous or overlapping is the single wider field within which both are located, and which thereby imposes conditions to which both must conform. Spatial limits, and therefore specific shapes and sizes, can be known only through a consciousness which *from the start* apprehends each of them in a wider unitary setting. The primary task of sense-perception is always—in space as in time—rather to differentiate than to synthesise.

Here, too, the remark made above in regard to time is in order. Not merely is the spatial context an *implied* wider context. While being so, it likewise with perfect continuity passes into, and maintains itself throughout, and emerges again beyond, the perceived space-span, and so enters into the very texture of what is immediately experienced in sensuous form. The field apprehended is thereby apprehended as fundamentally uniform in character, and when in mature consciousness it comes definitely to be recognized as all-comprehensive in its kind, has to be viewed as single. How this should be possible, and how in particular the *sensa*, notwithstanding their manifold and qualitatively discontinuous character, far from obscuring these features, should facilitate their apprehension, and in

certain cases should themselves take on the spread-out form, remains a matter for later discussion.

NORMAN KEMP SMITH: *Prolegomena to an Idealist Theory of Knowledge*, pp. 68-85. (All footnotes and some of the text omitted.) Reprinted by permission of Macmillan & Co., Ltd., London.

SUGGESTIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Why are *sensa* objective rather than subjective existences, according to Smith?
2. Why are *sensa* private rather than public?
3. For what reasons does Smith reject the view of both Ward and James that *sensa* all possess the quality of extensity?
4. Why does Smith consider *sensa* to be physical rather than psychical? To what extent are they neutral or in between the psychical and the physical realms?
5. Explain what you think the author means by the distinction between sensing and intuiting. Is intuiting the same as Bergson's intuition? Is it the same as Royce's perception?
6. Why does Smith hold that time and space are not sensory in character? State the main line of his argument as briefly as you can in your own words.

CHAPTER V

IDEALISTIC SOLUTIONS OF THE PROBLEM OF TRUTH AND ERROR

I. THE ABSOLUTE AND THE COHERENCE THEORY OF TRUTH, by *H. Wildon Carr*

Analysis

Although there is much in common experience to support the coherence theory of truth, the theory is really rooted in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. He held that certain basic categories, some of which Carr names, are necessary to understand experience and are *à priori*, that is, original constituents of mind prior to any sense experience. The coherence theory of truth, which the modern idealists have built upon a Kantian foundation, holds that logical consistency or the absence of contradiction among ideas constitutes truth. The Absolute is the object which embodies perfect logical consistency and the only such object. The idea of the Absolute is explained more fully by relating it to the famous *ontological* argument for the existence of God. The same argument would apply to the existence of the Absolute. In order to free ourselves from errors and illusions we must assume a self-consistent reality in which all contradictions are removed. This is the Absolute. This need of removing contradictions is first illustrated by pointing out the inconsistencies in the idea of a substance in which qualities inhere, which is the common-sense idea of an object. Carr then takes up space and time and shows how they involve contradictions or antinomies. This is followed by an interesting illustration, showing how motion and causation involve contradictions. Then he discusses the contradictions in the idea of the self. Nor can the mind find refuge in the idea of an unknowable thing-in-itself, for this, too, is a self-contradictory idea. The only escape from these contradictions is in the idea of a reality which is internally self-consistent and in which all contradictions are thereby reconciled. This is the Absolute. Carr traces the various types of reality—physical objects, mental existence, the world of spiritual values, the State and the Absolute. In understanding the first type by itself we are led to abstractions, but in each of the others we find concrete reality more and more embodied, until in the Absolute we find the unique and perfect and most concrete individuality. The proof that the Absolute exists is that it can be and must be. Therefore it is. This is the essence of St. Anselm's argument. The value of the idea of the Absolute is illustrated by the fable of the Satyr who drove his guest from his shelter.

. . . There is very much in common experience to support the coherence theory. It is by the test of consistency and coherence

that we invariably judge the truth of evidence. Also it seems a very essential part of our intellectual nature to reject as untrue and false any statement or any idea that is self-contradictory or irreconcilable with the world of living experience. But then, on the other hand, we by no means allow that that must be true which does not exhibit logical contradiction and inconsistency. It is a common enough experience that ideas prove false though they have exhibited no inherent failure to harmonize with surrounding circumstances nor any self-contradiction. The theory, therefore, requires more than a cursory examination.

Thinking is the activity of our mind which discovers the order, arrangement, and system in the reality that the senses reveal. Without thought, our felt experience would be a chaos and not a world. The philosopher Kant expressed this by saying that the understanding gives unity to the manifold of sense. The understanding, he said, makes nature. It does this by giving form to the matter which comes to it by the senses. The mind is not a *tabula rasa* upon which the external world makes and leaves impressions, it is a relating activity which arranges the matter it receives in forms. First of all there are space and time, which are forms in which we receive all perceptual experience, and then there are categories that are conceptual frames or moulds by which we think of everything we experience as having definite relations and belonging to a real order of existence. Substance, causality, quality, and quantity are categories; they are universal forms in which the mind arranges sense experience, and which constitute the laws of nature, the order of the world. Space and time, and the categories of the understanding Kant declared to be transcendental—that is to say, they are the elements necessary to experience which are not themselves derived from experience, as, for example, that every event has a cause. There are, he declared, synthetic *à priori* judgments—that is, judgments about experience which are not themselves derived from experience, but, on the contrary, the conditions that make experience possible. It is from this doctrine of Kant that the whole of modern idealism takes its rise. Kant, indeed, held that there are things-in-themselves, and to this extent he was not himself an idealist, but he also held that things-in-themselves are unknowable, and this is essentially the idealist position. Clearly, if we hold the view that things-in-themselves

are unknowable, truth cannot be a correspondence between our ideas and these things-in-themselves. Truth must be some quality of the ideas themselves, and this can only be their logical consistency. Consistency, because the ideas must be in agreement with one another; and logical, because this consistency belongs to the thinking, and logic is the science of thinking. Truth, in effect, is the ideal of logical consistency. We experience in thinking an activity striving to attain the knowledge of reality, and the belief, the feeling of satisfaction that we experience when our thinking seems to attain the knowledge of reality, is the harmony, the absence of contradiction, the coherence, of our ideas themselves. This is the coherence theory. Let us see what it implies as to the ultimate nature of truth and reality. . . . In the coherence theory, reality is itself ideal, and the ultimate ground of everything is logical. This is the theory of truth that accords with the idealist view, and this view finds its most perfect expression in the theory of the Absolute. The Absolute is the idea of an object that realizes perfect logical consistency. . . .

It will be easier to understand the theory of the Absolute if we first of all notice, for the sake of afterwards comparing it, another argument very famous in the history of philosophy—the argument to prove the existence of God named after St. Anselm of Canterbury. It runs thus: We have in God the idea of a perfect being; the idea of a perfect being includes the existence of that being, for not to exist is to fall short of perfection; therefore God exists. The theological form of this argument need raise no prejudice against it. It is of very great intrinsic importance, and if it is wrong it is not easy to point out wherein the fallacy lies. It may, of course, be denied that we have or can have the idea of a perfect being—that is to say, that we can present that idea to the mind with a positive content or meaning as distinct from a merely negative or limiting idea. But this is practically to admit the driving force of the argument, namely, that there may be an idea of whose content or meaning existence forms part. With regard to everything else the idea of existing is not existence. There is absolutely no difference between the idea of a hundred dollars and the idea of a hundred dollars existing, but there is the whole difference between thought and reality in the idea of the hundred dollars existing and the existence of the hundred dollars. Their actual existence in no way depends on the perfection or imper-

fection of my idea, nor in the inclusion of their existence in my idea. This is sufficiently obvious in every case in which we are dealing with perceptual reality, and in which we can, in the words of the philosopher Hume, produce the impression which gives rise to the idea. But there are some objects which by their very nature will not submit to this test. No man hath seen God at any time, not because God is an object existing under conditions and circumstances of place and time impossible for us to realize by reason of the limitations of our finite existence, but because God is an object in a different sense from that which has a place in the perceptual order, and therefore it is affirmed of God that the idea involves existence. God is not an object of perception, either actual or possible; nor in the strict sense is God a concept—that is to say, a universal of which there may be particulars. He is in a special sense the object of reason. If we believe that there is a God, it is because our reason tells us that there must be. God, in philosophy, is the idea of necessary existence, and the argument runs: God must be, therefore is. If, then, we exclude from the idea of God every mythological and theological element—if we mean not Zeus nor Jehovah nor Brahma, but the first principle of existence—then we may find in the St. Anselm argument the very ground of theism.

I have explained this argument, which is of the class called ontological because it is concerned with the fundamental question of being, in order to give an instance of the kind of argument that has given us the theory of the Absolute. I will now try to set that theory before the reader, asking only that he will put himself into the position of a plain man with no special acquaintance with philosophy, but reflective and anxious to interpret the meaning of his ordinary experience.

We have already seen that thinking is the questioning of experience, and that the moment it begins it gives rise to a distinction between appearance and reality. It is the asking *what?* of every *that* of felt experience to which the mind attends. The world in which we find ourselves is extended all around us in space and full of things which affect us in various ways: some give us pleasure, others give us pain, and we ourselves are things that affect other things as well as being ourselves affected by them. When we think about the things in the world in order to discover *what* they really are, we very soon find that we are liable to illusion and error. Things turn

out on examination to be very different to what we first imagined them to be. Our ideas, by which we try to understand the reality of things are just so many attempts to correct and set right our illusions and errors. And so the question arises, how far are our ideas about things truths about reality? It is very soon evident that there are some qualities of things that give rise to illusion and error much more readily than others. The spatial qualities of things, solidity, shape, size, seem to be real in a way that does not admit of doubt. We seem able to apply to these qualities a test that is definite and absolute. On the other hand, there seem to be effects of these things in us such as their colour, taste, odour, sound, coldness, or heat, qualities that are incessantly changing and a fruitful source of illusion and error. We therefore distinguish the spatial qualities as primary, and consider that they are the real things and different from their effects, which we call their secondary qualities. And this is, perhaps, our most ordinary test of reality. If, for example, we should think that something we see is an unreal phantom, or a ghost, or some kind of hallucination, and on going up to it find that it does actually occupy space, we correct our opinion and say the thing is real. But the spatial or primary qualities of a thing, although they may seem more permanent and more essential to the reality of the thing than the secondary qualities, are nevertheless only qualities. They are not the thing itself, but ways in which it affects us. It seems to us that these qualities must inhere in or belong to the thing, and so we try to form the idea of the real thing as a substance or substratum which has the qualities. This was a generally accepted notion until Berkeley (1685-1753) showed how contradictory it is. So simple and convincing was his criticism of the notion, that never since has material substance been put forward as an explanation of the reality of the things we perceive. All that he did was to show how impossible and contradictory it is to think that the reality of that which we perceive is something in its nature imperceptible, for such must material substance be apart from its sense qualities. How can that which we perceive be something imperceptible? And if we reflect on it, we shall surely agree that it is so—by the thing we mean its qualities, and apart from the qualities there is no thing. We must try, then, in some other way to reach the reality.

What, we shall now ask, can it be that binds together these

sense qualities so that we speak of them as a thing? There are two elements that seem to enter into everything whatever that comes into our experience, and which it seems to us would remain if everything in the universe were annihilated. These are space and time. Are they reality? Here we are met with a new kind of difficulty. It was possible to dismiss material substance as a false idea, an idea of something whose existence is impossible; but space and time are certainly not false ideas. The difficulty about them is that we cannot make our thought of them consistent—they are ideas that contain a self-contradiction, or at least that lead to a self-contradiction when we affirm them of reality. With the ideas of space and time are closely linked the ideas of change, of movement, of causation, of quality and quantity, and all of these exhibit this same puzzling characteristic, that they seem to make us affirm what we deny and deny what we affirm. I might fill this little book with illustrations of the paradoxes that are involved in the idea of time. We must think there was a beginning, and we cannot think that there was any moment to which there was no before. So also with space, it is an infinite extension which we can only think of as a beyond to every limit. This receding limit of the infinitely extensible space involves the character of infinite divisibility, for if there are an infinite number of points from which straight lines can be drawn without intersecting one another to any fixed point there is therefore no smallest space that cannot be further divided. The contradictions that follow from these demonstrable contents of the idea of space are endless. The relation of time to space is another source of contradictory ideas. I shall perhaps, however, best make the meaning of this self-contradictory character of our ordinary ideas clear by following out a definite illustration. What is known as the antinomy of motion is probably familiar to every one from the well-known paradox of the Greek philosopher Zeno. The flying arrow, he said, does not move, because if it did it would be in two places at one and the same time, and that is impossible. I will now put this same paradox of movement in a form which, so far as I know, it has not been presented before. My illustration will involve the idea of causation as well as that of movement. If we suppose a space to be fully occupied, we shall agree that nothing within that space can move without thereby displacing whatever occupies the position into which it moves. That is to say,

the movement of any occupant of one position must cause the displacement of the occupant of the new position into which he moves. But on the other hand it is equally clear that the displacement of the occupant of the new position is a prior condition of the possibility of the movement of the mover, for nothing can move unless there is an unoccupied place for it to move into, and there is no unoccupied place unless it has been vacated by its occupant before the movement begins. We have therefore the clear contradiction that a thing can only move when something else which it causes to move has already moved. Now if we reflect on it we shall see that this is exactly the position we occupy in our three-dimensional space. The space which surrounds us is occupied, and therefore we cannot move until a way is made clear for us, and nothing makes way for us unless we move. We cannot move through stone walls because we cannot displace solid matter, but we can move through air and water because we are able to displace them. The problem is the same. My movement displaces the air, but there is no movement until the air is displaced. Can we escape the contradiction by supposing the displacement is the cause and the movement the effect? Are we, like people in a theatre queue, only able to move from behind forward as the place is vacated for us in front? In that case we should be driven to the incredible supposition that the original cause or condition of our movement is the previous movement of something at the outskirts of our occupied space, that this somewhat moving into the void made possible the movement of the occupant of the space next adjoining, and so on until after a lapse of time which may be ages, which may indeed be infinite, the possibility of movement is opened to us. In fact we must believe that the effect of our movement—namely, the displacement of the previous occupants from the positions we occupy is moving—happened before it was caused. Now it is impossible for us to believe either of the only two alternatives—either that we do not really move but only appear to do so, or that the displacement our movement causes really precedes the movement. When we meet with a direct self-contradiction in our thoughts about anything, we can only suppose that that about which we are thinking is in its nature nonsensical, or else that our ideas about it are wrong.

It may perhaps be thought that the whole difficulty arises simply because what we are trying to think consistently about

is a reality that is external to us. Space and time, movement, cause and effect are ideas that apply to a world outside and independent of the mind that tries to think it. May not this be the reason of our failure and the whole explanation of the seeming contradiction? If we turn our thoughts inward upon our own being and think of the self, the I, the real subject of experience, then surely where thought is at home and its object is mental not physical, we shall know reality. It is not so. The same self-contradiction characterizes our ideas when we try to present the real object of inner perception as when we try to present the real object of external perception. Not, of course, that it is possible to doubt the reality of our own existence, but that we fail altogether to express the meaning of the self we so surely know to exist in any idea which does not fall into self-contradiction. As in the case of the thing and its qualities, we think that there is something distinct from the qualities in which they inhere and yet find ourselves unable to present to the mind any consistent idea of such thing, so we think that there must be some substance or basis of personal identity, some real self which *has* the successive changing conscious states, which has the character which distinguishes our actions as personal but which nevertheless *is* not itself these things. The self-contradiction in the idea of self, or I, or subject, is that it both cannot change and is always changing. As unchanging, we distinguish it from our body, which is an external object among other objects and is different from other objects only in the more direct and intimate relation in which it stands to us. The body is always changing; never for two successive moments is it exactly the same combination of chemical elements. We distinguish also ourself from that consciousness which is memory, the awareness of past experience, from present feelings, desires, thoughts, and strivings—these, we say, belong to the self but are not it. The self must have qualities and dwell in the body, guiding, directing, and controlling it, yet this self we never perceive, nor can we conceive it, for our idea of it is of a reality that changes and is yet unchangeable.

There is, however, one idea—an idea to which we have already alluded—that seems to offer us an escape from the whole of this logical difficulty, the idea that reality is unknowable. May not the contradictoriness of our ideas be due to this fact, that our knowledge is entirely of phenomena, of

appearances of things, and not of things as they are in themselves? By a thing-in-itself we do not mean a reality that dwells apart in a universe of its own, out of any relation whatever to our universe. There may or may not be such realities, and whether there are or not is purely irrelevant to any question of the nature of reality in our universe. The thing-in-itself is the unknowable reality of the thing we know. We conceive it as existing in complete abstraction from every aspect or relation of it that constitutes knowledge of it in another. The self-contradiction of such an idea is not difficult to show, quite apart from any consideration of its utter futility as an explanation. The thing-in-itself either is or else it is not the reality of phenomena. If it is, then, inasmuch as the phenomena reveal it, it is neither in-itself nor unknowable. If, on the other hand, it is not, if it is unrelated in any way to phenomena, then it is not only unknowable—it does not exist to be known. It is an idea without any content or meaning, and therefore indistinguishable from nothing. It is simply saying of one and the same thing that it must be and that there is nothing that it can be.

While, then, there is no actual thing that we experience, whether it be an object outside of us or an object within us, of which we can say this is not a phenomenon or appearance of reality but the actual reality itself, we cannot also say that we do not know reality, because if we had no idea, no criterion, of reality we could never know that any thing was only an appearance. It is this fact—the fact that we undoubtedly possess, in the very process of thinking itself a criterion of reality—that the idealist argument lays hold of as the basis of its doctrine. The mere fact seems, at first sight, barren and unpromising enough, but the idealist does not find it so. Possessed of this principle, logic, which has seemed till now purely destructive, becomes in his hands creative, and gives form and meaning to an object of pure reason.

The criterion of reality is self-consistency. We cannot think that anything is ultimately real which has its ground of existence in something else. A real thing is that which can be explained without reference to some other thing. Reality, therefore, is completely self-contained existence, not merely dependent existence. Contradictions cannot be true. If we have to affirm a contradiction of anything, it must be due to an appearance, and the reality must reconcile the contradic-

tion. The idea of reality, therefore, is the idea of perfect harmony. Knowing, then, what reality is, can we say that there is any actual object of thought that conforms to it? And have we in our limited experience anything that will guide us to the attainment of this object? The idealist is confident that we have. Some things seem to us to possess a far higher degree of reality than others, just because they conform in a greater degree to this ideal of harmonious existence. It is when we compare the reality of physical things with the reality of mental things that the contrast is most striking, and in it we have the clue to the nature of the higher reality. Physical reality may seem, and indeed in a certain sense is, the basis of existence, but when we try to think out the meaning of physical reality, it becomes increasingly abstract, and we seem unable to set any actual limit to prevent it dissipating into nothing. In physical science we never have before us an actual element, either matter or energy, in which we can recognize, however far below the limit of perceivability, the ultimate stuff of which the universe is composed. Science has simply to arrest the dissipation by boldly assuming a matter that is the substance and foundation of reality and an energy that is the ultimate cause of the evolution of the universe. On the other hand, when we consider mental existence, the pursuit of reality is in an exactly contrary direction. There, the more concrete, the more comprehensive, the more individual a thing is, the greater degree of reality it seems to have. In the spiritual realm, by which we mean, not some supposed supra-mundane sphere, but the world of values, the world in which ideas have reality, in which we live our rational life, reality is always sought in a higher and higher individuality. The principle of individuality is that the whole is more real than the parts. An individual human being, for example, is a whole, an indivisible organic unity, not merely an aggregation of physiological organs with special functions, nor are these a mere collection of special cells, nor these a mere concourse of chemical elements. The State as a community is an individual organic unity with a reality that is more than the mere total of the reality of individual citizens who compose it. It is this principle of individuality that is the true criterion of reality. It is this principle that, while it leads us to seek the unity in an individuality ever higher and more complete than we have attained, at the same time explains the discrepancy of our

partial view, explains contradictions as the necessary result of the effort to understand the parts in independence of the whole which gives to them their reality. Thus, while on the one hand the scientific search for reality is ever towards greater simplicity and abstractness, a simplicity whose ideal limit is zero, the philosophical search for reality is ever towards greater concreteness, towards full comprehensiveness, and its ideal limit is the whole universe as one perfect and completely harmonious individual. This idea of full reality is the Absolute. There are not two realities, one material and the other spiritual; the material and the spiritual are two directions in which we may seek the one reality, but there is only one pathway by which we shall find it.

The Absolute is the whole universe not in its aspect of an aggregate of infinitely diverse separate elements, whether these are material or spiritual, but in its aspect of an individual whole and in its nature as a whole. This nature of the whole is to be individual—only in the individual are contradictions reconciled. Is the Absolute more than an idea? Does it actually exist? Clearly we cannot claim to know it by direct experience, by acquaintance; it is not a *that* of which we can ask *what*? It is the object of reason itself, therefore we know that it must be. Also we know that it can be; it is a possible object in the logical meaning that it is not a self-contradictory idea, like every other idea that we can have. It is not self-contradictory, for it is itself the idea of that which is consistent. Therefore, argues the idealist, it is, for that which must be, and can be, surely exists. The reader will now understand why I introduced this account of the Absolute with a description for comparison of the St. Anselm proof of the existence of God.

There is one further question. Whether the Absolute does or does not exist, is it, either in idea or reality, of any use to us? The reply is that its value lies in this, that it reveals to us the nature of reality and the meaning of truth. Logic is the creative power of thought which leads us to the discovery of higher and higher degrees of reality. The Satyr, in the fable, drove his guest from his shelter because the man blew into his hands to warm them, and into his porridge to cool it. The Satyr could not reconcile the contradiction that one could with the same breath blow hot and cold. Nor would he reconcile it ever, so long as he sought truth as correspondence.

Truth would have shown the facts coherent by reconciling the contradiction in a higher reality.

H. WILDON CARR: *The Problem of Truth*, pp. 26-41.
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Title modified.

SUGGESTIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. What are the facts in common experience which support the coherence theory of truth?
2. State as briefly as possible St. Anselm's ontological argument and explain why it applies especially to the Absolute even more than to the Christian conception of God. What do you think of the argument?
3. Compare Carr's account of the qualities of objects with Kemp Smith's discussion of the *sensa*, above, p. 189 ff.
4. What contradiction did Berkeley see in the concept of a substance or substratum in which qualities inhere?
5. State two ideas of space which are contradictory.
6. State briefly and criticize or give your own reaction to Carr's illustration showing how the idea of motion is self-contradictory.
7. What is the self-contradiction or antinomy in the idea of the self?
8. Just why is the concept of an unknowable reality or thing-in-itself self-contradictory according to Carr?
9. What makes it possible for the human mind to discover these various contradictions in our thinking? How are we able to distinguish various degrees of individuality in the objects of knowledge?
10. Does Carr's interpretation of the Satyr fable prove the value of the Absolute? Why do you think as you do on this point?

II. THE RELATION OF TRUTH TO REALITY, by *F. H. Bradley*

Analysis

Bradley argues that truth and knowledge and reality are identical, since one cannot divide truth from knowledge and to reach a reality beyond knowledge is meaningless. But while truth and reality are identical there is still a difference between them. To judge what this difference is we require a standard and that standard must be the standard of truth itself. This standard is self-consistency, which means (i) including all of the facts and (ii) having the facts harmoniously ordered and free from contradiction. Using this standard of truth to judge truth itself we find two defects in truth. (i) Many of the facts which have to be included always remain inexplicable to the human mind. (ii) Complete inclusion of all the facts is never attained and, in fact, is not even attainable by the human mind. The felt immediacy of the knower himself can never be included nor can the whole sensible past and future ever be present to a finite mind. Yet it is just in these defects that we find the way to understand that truth

is identical with reality. For truth overcomes these defects by passing over into reality. "Truth is the whole Universe realizing itself in one of its aspects." What the whole would be apart from this aspect of truth we do not and cannot know. All we know is that the defects in truth, which were mentioned above, are rectified when truth completes itself into reality.

. . . The division of reality from knowledge and of knowledge from truth must in any form be abandoned. And the only way of exit from the maze is to accept the remaining alternative. Our one hope lies in taking courage to embrace the result that reality is not outside truth. The identity of truth, knowledge, and reality, whatever difficulty that may bring, must be taken as necessary and fundamental. Or at least we have been driven to choose between this and nothing.

Any such conclusion, I know, will on many sides be rejected as monstrous. The last thing to which truth pretends, I shall hear, is actually to be, or even bodily to possess, the real. But though this question, I know, might well be argued at length, the issue in my judgment can be raised and can be settled briefly. Truth, it is contended, is not to be the same as reality. Well, if so, I presume that there is a difference between them. And this difference, I understand is not to be contained in the truth. But, if this is so, then clearly to my mind the truth must so far be defective. How, I ask, is the truth about reality to be less or more than reality without so far ceasing to be the truth? The only answer, so far as I see, is this, that reality has something which is not a possible content of truth. But here arises forthwith the dilemma which ruined us before. If such an outstanding element is known, then so far we have knowledge and truth, while if it is not known, then I do not know of it, and to me it is nothing. On the one hand to divide truth from knowledge seems impossible, and on the other hand to go beyond knowledge seems meaningless.

And, if we are to advance, we must accept once for all the identification of truth with reality. I do not say that we are to conclude that there is to be in no sense any difference between them. But we must, without raising doubts and without looking backwards, follow the guidance of our new principle. We must, that is, accept the claim of truth not to be judged from the outside. We must unhesitatingly assert that truth, if it were satisfied itself, and if for itself it were perfect, would be itself in the fullest sense the entire and absolute

Universe. And agreeing to the uttermost with this claim made by truth, we must attempt, truth and ourselves together, to judge truth from its own standard.

I will endeavour first to point out briefly in what this standard consists. The end of truth is to be and to possess reality in an ideal form. This means first that truth must include without residue the entirety of what is in any sense given, and it means next that truth is bound to include this intelligibly. Truth is not satisfied until we have all the facts, and until we understand perfectly what we have. And we do not understand perfectly the given material until we have it all together harmoniously, in such a way, that is, that we are not impelled to strive for another and a better way of holding it together. Truth is not satisfied, in other words, until it is all-containing and one. We are not obliged here, I think, to inquire further how these aspects of the idea of system are related, and whether, and in what sense, they have their root in a single principle. It is sufficient here to insist that both aspects are essential to truth, and that any theory which ends in dividing them is certainly false.

But, when we judge truth by its own standard, truth evidently fails. And it fails in two ways, the connexion between which I will not here discuss. (i) In the first place its contents cannot be made intelligible throughout and entirely. A doubt may indeed be raised whether even in any part they are able wholly to satisfy, but this again is a question on which here it is unnecessary to enter. For in any case obviously a large mass of the facts remains in the end inexplicable. You have perpetually to repeat that things are so, though you do not fully understand how or why, and when on the other hand you cannot perceive that no how or why is wanted. You are left in short with brute conjunctions where you seek for connexions, and where this need for connexions seems part of your nature. (ii) And, failing thus, truth fails again to include all the given facts, and any such complete inclusion seems even to be in principle unattainable. (a) On the one hand the moment's felt immediacy remains for ever outstanding, and, if we feel this nowhere else, we realize at each moment the difference between the knower and his truth. (b) And on the other hand the facts before us in space and time remain always incomplete. How is it possible for truth to embrace the whole sensible past and future? Truth might understand them (do

you say?) and so include them *ideally*. Well but, if truth could do as much as this, which I myself think not possible, truth after all would not include these facts *bodily*. The ideal fact after all and the sensible fact will still differ, and this difference left outside condemns truth even as ideal. And in short we are entangled once more in our old dilemma. We have an element given which in no way we can get inside the truth, while on the other side, if we leave it out, truth becomes defective. For there seems really no sense in endeavouring to maintain that what remains outside is irrelevant.

With this at first sight we have ended in bankruptcy, but perhaps we may find that the case is otherwise and that our failure has carried us to success. For we were looking for the connexion between truth and reality, and we discovered first that no external connexion is possible. We then resolved to take truth as being the same with reality, and we found that, taken so, truth came short of its end. But in this very point of failure, after all, lies the way to success. Truth came short because, and so far as, it could not become that which it desired to be and made sure that it was. Truth claimed identity with an individual and all-inclusive whole. But such a whole, when we examine it, we find itself to be the Universe and all reality. And when we had to see how truth fails, as truth, in attaining its own end, we were being shown the very features of difference between truth and reality. And in passing over into reality and in thus ceasing to be mere truth, truth does not pass beyond its own end nor does it fail to realize itself. Hence, being the same as reality, and at the same time different from reality, truth is thus able itself to apprehend its identity and difference. But, if this is so, we seem to have reached the solution of our problem.

Truth is the whole Universe realizing itself in one aspect. This way of realization is one-sided, and it is a way not in the end satisfying even its own demands but felt itself to be incomplete. On the other hand the completion of truth itself is seen to lead to an all-inclusive reality, which reality is not outside truth. For it is the whole Universe which, immanent throughout, realizes and seeks itself in truth. This is the end to which truth leads and points and without which it is not satisfied. And those aspects in which truth for itself is defective, are precisely those which make the difference between truth and reality. Here, I would urge, is the one road of exit from

disastrous circles and from interminable dilemmas. For on the one side we have a difference between truth and reality, while on the other side this difference only carries out truth. It consists in no more than that which truth seeks itself internally to be and to possess.

Truth, we thus can say, at once is and is not reality, and we have found that the difference is not external to truth. For truth would be satisfied in its own self-sought completion, and that completion would be reality. And if you ask how truth after all stands to reality, and whether after all truth is not a copy, the answer is obvious. Apart from its aspect of truth the reality would not be the reality, and there surely is no meaning in a copy which makes its original. In truth and in other aspects of the Universe we find one-sidedness and defect, and we may go on to see that everywhere the remedy for defect lies in the inclusion of other aspects more or less left out. But as for comparing the Universe, as it is apart from one aspect, with the Universe as complete, such a comparison is out of our power. And it is even, when we reflect, ridiculous to seek to discover by thinking what the Universe would be like without thought. You cannot take reality to pieces and then see how once more it can be combined to make reality. And thus, if we are asked for the relation of truth to reality, we must reply that in the end there is no relation, since in the end there are no separate terms. All that we can say is that, in order for truth to complete itself into reality, such and such defects in truth itself would have to be rectified.

F. H. BRADLEY: *Essays on Truth and Reality*, pp. 112-117. The Clarendon Press. (Four footnotes omitted.)
Title mine.

SUGGESTIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Why does Bradley insist that truth cannot be judged from the outside but must be judged by its own standard?
2. Is it truth as a whole which fails or only human truth? Can a sharp distinction between truth as a whole and human truth be made? How do you think Bradley would answer these two questions?
3. To what extent is Bradley sceptical in the last paragraph? How do you think he might escape this scepticism?
4. Do you think that Bradley would accept the ontological argument for the existence of the "Universe and all reality? Does he attempt to prove or simply assume its existence? Is this concept the same as that of the Absolute in the selection from Carr?

5. What do you think Bradley means when he says "it is the whole Universe which, immanent throughout, realizes and seeks itself in truth"? Is the whole Universe an intelligent being, conscious of needs and trying to realize them?

III. THE PROBLEM OF ERROR AND UNREALITY, by *W. H. Sheldon*

Analysis

The paradox in the problem of error is that the object of an erroneous judgment must be and yet be unreal. Various ways of solving this paradox are briefly discussed. Common sense first treats the illusory object as subjective, but on being pressed is forced to make it the inhabitant of a realm of neutral entities. But Sheldon shows that the paradox cannot be escaped by refusing to admit an illusory object. He then expounds and criticizes the view of Holt and other realists. He holds that their neutralism theory really refuses to solve the paradox and attempts to shove it to one side. This brings him to the functional theory, according to which error is a real intellectual process of maladjustment. This is the pragmatist solution of the problem, and it merely translates the paradox into one of process and deed, instead of one of reality and unreality. Yet this functional theory is good as far as it goes. Sheldon believes that it is necessary to carry the theory further. Bradley and other idealists make the Absolute contain both truth and error in a condition of reconciliation, thereby solving the paradox. But Sheldon argues that this only solves it for the Absolute and leaves finite human thinkers still faced with it. He holds that the only way the paradox can be solved is to deny that there is any realm of unreality. Even the wildest imaginations and the most insane delusions are real. Error consists in denying that something else also is real as well as the illusory object. If I imagine a tortoise is on my desk the error is that I deny that other things are there too. "I take the tortoise's presence to exclude whatever else is there—be it a book, a pencil, or just air."

The problem of error comprises two distinct questions, viz.: (1) what is the nature of the mental process when we err and what causes lead to it, and (2) what reality, what status in metaphysics has the object of error, the illusory thing? The former may be called the psychological question, the latter the metaphysical. The psychological question has been often enough answered, and with reasonable unanimity; the metaphysical one has seldom been squarely faced. There seems to have been a feeling that when one explains how error arises he has thereby assigned the status of the erroneous object. That this is not true, a moment's consideration shows. For, no matter how the error may come about, the illusory object is equally puzzling. It is, to be sure, unreal; yet on the other

hand, it cannot be unreal, because we are really aware of it. If we are ourselves real and really have a certain relation to an object it is hard to deny that that object is real. The object is effective, makes a disturbance in our minds, and exhibits unmistakable evidence of its presence there. Hence it must *be*. In short, it contains a paradox; and that is what occasions the metaphysical problem. . . .

Let us then, passing in review the chief theories of error, seek to lay bare their inadequacies, as a basis for our own attempt to solve the paradox.

How can the illusory object be in any sense real? The natural common-sense answer is: "it is not real but is mental or subjective." And no doubt it is true that errors are subjective. But this is not sufficient to dispel the puzzle. For if we say that the mental is unreal, then we must admit that our pains are unreal, and our pleasures, our efforts, our emotions; and how can there be mental life at all? No, we cannot say without qualification that the subjective is unreal. Let us then assert that it is real as an *event* but not as a *content*. Suppose I mistakenly believe there is a tortoise on my writing-table. Then there really occurs a conscious process—my belief—and while it is a real event, the object of it, the tortoise on my table, is not something contained in that event. The tortoise on my table is not a member of the subjective world, a psychological entity. If he were so, he would be real; as real as pain or any other subjective thing. He is simply the *object* of my mental process, of my belief. But the object of a thought is not part of or in the thought as a coin is in a purse. It is somehow related to the thought but not of the same stuff with it. It belongs to the world of non-existing beings.

Thus the common-sense view loses its *naïveté*. It no longer considers the illusory object subjective. It has seen that subjective stuff is as real as any other stuff; and that therefore if the tortoise on the table is not to be real, he must be something neither material nor mental. He must be a citizen of a third country, the realm of unreal beings. This however brings us back to our original problem. For how can anything unreal be? The "subjective" device has thrown no light on that puzzle, and must be held to have failed.

But not so fast! We spoke of the tortoise on the table as an illusory object. But perhaps we put the matter in a wrong perspective. Perhaps it is not an object at all. It

may be quite incorrect to say that error is a belief in an unreal object. Is it not rather the case, that we never believe *in* an object, but believe *that* an object is so-and-so? In short, errors are not false objects, but false judgments. We spoke as if an idea could be erroneous; but surely it is only a judgment that can err. There is no such object as tortoise-on-my-table, whether in the real or mental or unreal world. The error consists in the mistaken *reference* of the tortoise *to* my table. It is in my attribution of the beast to the particular environment that the mistake lies. This attribution now is an act of mine and no property of the tortoise, and in this sense the error is subjective. The tortoise is real as a mental content, and the table is real as a physical body, and the error is my act of uniting or relating the two. Thus, it would be alleged, a better analysis of error rehabilitates the common-sense view.

What then is this act of attributing a predicate to a subject? Is it just a mystery of the mind, not further reducible? Now in the case of true judgments, the predication is more than an act of a mind; it is objectively valid. What "objectively valid" means, depends upon one's metaphysical system; it may mean that the predication corresponds to the real state of things, or that it is itself objectively real. In either case, however, it is more than a mere act; the subject and predicate are really related as our act relates them. And in false judgments, the maker of the judgment views the subject and predicate as thus really related. To him at the time of judging the judgment is not an act: his state of mind is just as saturated with objective reference as if he were correct. When I believe that the tortoise is on my table, I think reality itself contains that predication or what corresponds to it. As far as my own experience is concerned, I apprehend an objective situation as much when I am wrong as when I am right. In the psychical realm, the mere fact that I seem to see it is enough to make me see it, to call a judgment an act only is an inadequate description. It is an act, if you insist, but an act in which reality, or what purports to be reality, becomes our object. The common-sense solution cannot then escape the difficulty by refusing to admit an illusory object. For judgment is in every case about an object: no less with errors than with truths.

With this the puzzle returns. Where shall we put the precious tortoise? He is really the object of my judgment.

Or if you prefer, we can say that his being on the table is the object of the judgment: "that he is on the table" is the object of my belief. This is the *Objektiv*, as Meinong called it, of the judgment; the content or object which, in Brentano's terms, we accept or acknowledge when we make the judgment. But it matters not whether we speak of the object, the tortoise-on-the-table, or the *Objektiv*, that-the-tortoise-is-on-the-table; in either case we have something which forms the subject-matter of the judgment. And the question is, what status in reality has this "unreal" entity? If we call it a mental thing, then it is real; if we say it is no mental thing, we must devise some third region, some sort of home for wanderers, which is designed to receive these non-existent beings. . . .

Such a home has been founded by those who do not favor the subjective as an ultimate category. Different benefactors of this institution have given it different names; we may instance the "unreal subsistence" of Montague, the "heimatlose Gegenstände" of Meinong, the "neutral being" of Holt. What is the nature of this region? Does it possess such a character as to show us how the unreal can yet somehow be?

The first article in the constitution of the new establishment must be "the distinction between reality and being or subsistence." "The universe is not all real," says Professor Holt, "but the universe all is."¹ Thus we are to solve the paradox by discriminating between reality and being. What then is the difference between them? For it is by no means self-evident that there is a difference. The same author says, "Is it not evident that *being real* or *being thought* or *being* anything whatsoever is both a more complex and a more special thing than merely being?"² Now it is difficult not to think that he is here misled by the linguistic form. "To be real" adds an adjective to the infinitive, but language is often redundant. If we argue from linguistic expression to meaning, we shall have to grant that the Aristotelian logic is not valid for the Semites, Malays, Chinese, and others who use a differently constructed sentence from that of the Greeks. But the following reason also is assigned: "As to *being real* . . . we know that there is the opposed category of *being unreal*," therefore "Being real connotes more than *being*" (p. 21). Let us grant this point; let us admit that there are multitudes of things that are unreal.

¹ E. B. Holt: *The New Realism*, pp. 358 and 360. Quoted below, pp. 375 ff.

² E. B. Holt: *Concept of Consciousness*, p. 21.

But what is it to be unreal rather than real and how is it possible? That is our very problem. No definition is given, no light is thrown on the paradox. We are met by a *refutatio ambulando*, but the matter is not explained. The home for incurables seems to be divided against itself. Is it, indeed, anything more than a hell which the metaphysician constructs for the purpose of receiving the devils? But how the good God can countenance a hell, or how reality can so far contradict itself as to become unreal, we do not understand.

Professor Holt here takes the bull by the horns and declares that the paradox *need not* be solved. Errors are contradictions, yes: but contradictions may be. In fact, the world is full of them. "Whenever a moving body strikes another and is stopped or turned, the law of its motion is contradicted . . . all phenomena of *interference* are cases of contradiction. . . . At the point of interference the vibratory motions imparted to the ether or to molecules are contradictory to one another, and at that point the wave-motion ceases; and energy is said to have assumed the form of tension. All counterbalancings, as in cantilevers and Gothic vaultings, are contradictory forces in equilibrium. All collisions between bodies, all interference between energies all processes of warming and cooling, of electrically charging and discharging, of starting and stopping, of combining and separating, are processes of which one undoes the other. And they cannot be defined by the scientist except in propositions which manifestly contradict one another. All nature is so full of these mutually negative processes that we are moved to admiration when a few forces coöperate long enough to form what we call an organism; and even then *decay* sets in forthwith. We call nature everywhere consistent, and yet we admit that life is a mystery while death is none: it is none, because the antagonism of contradictory forces is the familiar phenomenon, while coöperation of forces is relatively infrequent."³ "Nature is a seething chaos of contradiction" (p. 276). We are not here concerned to deny this. To be sure, these words present a picture of the universe very like to that of the absolute idealist, of whom the above writer is the doughty foe; but one knows that extremes meet. And if one objects to the "Absolute" that we do not understand how it solves the dialectical contradictions, one may equally object here that we do not understand how nature can be real while it is so

³ E. B. Holt: *Concept of Consciousness*, p. 275.

self-destructive. A contradiction is a contradiction, whether revealed by an idealist or a realist. We cannot be at peace until we solve it, for we cannot help wishing to solve it. It is no satisfaction to an inevitable desire, to be told we ought not to have the desire. That is but an attempt to put a good face upon the mind's defeat. Once more, then, the problem of error is not solved; it is only put aside.

But there is open a quite different way of approach. It was the illusory object that made the trouble. It is somehow real, and yet it is not. And whether we call it real or mere being without reality it is equally contradictory; unreal being is a contradiction in terms. Now let us have a change of venue. Let us drop the static point of view; let us not speak of the illusory object, as if it were a rigid entity. Remember that objects are but stages in the stream of events; adopt, in short, a dynamic or functional point of view. Error now appears to be, not a static beholding of an unreal thing, but maladjustment. "Any idea," said James, "that helps us to *deal*, whether practically or intellectually, with either the reality or its belongings, that doesn't entangle our progress in frustrations, that *fits*, in fact, and adapts our life to the reality's whole setting, . . . will hold true of that reality."⁴ And by implication, an idea, or judgment, which works against our adaptation to the reality, will be erroneous. Surely there is no contradiction here, for there is no entity which is unreal. Error is failure: a real process, as real, unfortunately, as the success which constitutes truth.

What then is the nature of this process? Define the erroneous idea in functional terms, if you prefer; let it be a plan of action, or a tentative reaction upon a part of the environment. Still it is a conscious process. It differs from the incipient reaction of the coiled spring in that it entails some sort of prevision of the anticipated act. If I plan to reach out and cut off the head of the tortoise as an intruder upon my table, my intention cannot be fulfilled; but my purpose to do this is more than the tightening of my muscles and whipping the knife out of my pocket. It is the distinction of consciousness that it reaches forward into the future as well as backward into the past, and a plan of action is a case of the forward-reaching. The person who entertains the plan has before his mind a deed which is not yet real, and if he is in error, never

⁴ William James: *Pragmatism*, p. 213.

can be real. As we commonly say, he contemplates the deed. He sees it in his mind's eye. If it can be realized, there is no contradiction; if it cannot be realized, he is contemplating an impossible and therefore unreal object. It matters nothing that the object is his own act rather than an external thing; it is equally contradictory. We find that the paradox returns upon us as before, for we have only translated the whole thing into another language—the language of process and deed. But which is more unintelligible: to contemplate an impossible deed or to be aware of a non-existent thing?

We are not impugning the correctness of the functional theory. It is, we believe, in many ways the best account yet given of truth and error; it is positive, specific, and offers a verifiable criterion of each. But it does not, we submit, go deep enough to remove the inconsistency of an impossible performance, of an unreal reality.

No; there is no way of understanding errors so long as reality contradicts unreality. Well then, let us make a last stand and deny that these two are hostile. Let us say that reality admits of unreality, as light admits shadows; yes, that each interpenetrates and constitutes the other. This is the way of absolute idealism. Every finite object is to a certain extent unreal, each in its own degree. The Whole alone is real; but being the whole, it includes all the parts, and among them, our errors. "The Absolute *has* without subtraction all those qualities, and it has every arrangement which we seem to confer upon it by our mere mistake."⁵ Now suppose we admit the main theses of this view. Suppose we agree that science gives only relative truth, that sense-perception is not absolute knowledge, etc. Still what we commonly call error is on a different footing from scientific knowledge or sense-perception. That the planets travel in elliptical orbits may not be absolute truth and may contain some taint of metaphysical error, but it is not at all like the proposition that planets travel in straight lines. That is a scientific error. And my perception of the tortoise on my table is a perceptual error. In these cases it is not merely the partiality, the finiteness, of my knowledge that renders it false, but the positive attribution of a particular predicate to a particular subject which contradicts it. Error is not merely partial knowledge or ignorance but the appearance of something which is not even present as a part of the world. Taking

⁵ F. H. Bradley: *Appearance and Reality*, 3rd ed., p. 192.

a broader point of view does not lead to its inclusion, its metaphysical rescue, but to its rejection. As Mr. Bradley says, "the problem of error cannot be solved by an enlarged scheme of relations."⁶ And Mr. Bosanquet makes the same point: "Now in 'factual error' there is, in addition to such abstraction, hostility, *contradiction* by its conditions, from which abstraction has been made."⁷ Absolute idealism is thus confronted not merely by appearance, or what we may call metaphysical unreality, but by a very special sort of appearance, or factual error. We can, in a way, understand that a broader point of view will solve the contradictions of the former. To be sure, as Mr. Bradley himself urges, we cannot understand it in detail, but we can see in a general way how it is possible and necessary. But as regards factual error, which is our own present problem, we cannot see even in a general way how it can be considered real. It *must* of course be real, but it is impossible to see how it *can* be. The tortoise on my table must in some mysterious way both be and not be. We may grant that the absolutist proves that this opposition is in the Absolute necessarily solved. We may assent to his words when he says, "The one-sided emphasis of error, its isolation as positive and as not dissoluble in a wider connection—this again will contribute, we know not how, to the harmony of the Absolute."⁸ But inasmuch as "we know not how" we are no better off than when we started. The paradox of a non-existent existence remains. Of course, if this were only a case of ignorance on our part, it would be tolerable enough, for we could hope for added knowledge. But—to repeat what we said earlier—it is a flat contradiction. It is to the metaphysician's world what sin is to the moralist's; it is something which by all the rules of the game ought not to be.

We believe, then, that the metaphysical problem of error is as yet unsolved; and that being so, it becomes our duty to attempt its solution. Why did the above answers seem to fail? Because they were confronted with two mutually destructive attributes: real and unreal. The shallower views tried to hold the combatants apart by putting them into different realms—the subjective and objective; the deeper views saw the futility of this, and allowed them to fight, but were fain to extract a degree of comfort from the spectacle. And in the end no one

⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 195.

⁷ Bernard Bosanquet: *Logic*, 2nd ed., Vol. I, p. 383, footnote.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 195.

has made peace between them. It appears that there is only one resource remaining. One of the contestants must be slain, dissolved, analyzed away. As this cannot be the category of the real, it will have to be that of the unreal. If we could believe that there are no unreal things, the contradiction would be solved. This is indeed a heroic remedy; for it is to grant reality to everything, to the content of wildest imaginations, of the most insane delusions. Can we possibly carry through so desperate a programme? Let us see how it works out.

Our first assertion shall be, that there is nothing unreal; or better, everything is real. Everything then which is an object of thought is real. Anybody will grant that perhaps it is real in the subjective world, or in some "subsistent" world; but we ask, how can those worlds be unreal? They cannot; nothing *can* be unreal, for that is a contradiction in terms. To be an object of thought is to be related in a certain definite manner to some mind; and if the mind is real and the relation is real it is difficult to see how the term which is related can fail to be real. A real man cannot really hang from a non-existent rope. What then is the logical consequence? Why, that every illusory object is real—for it is the object of thought when one errs. Then the tortoise on my table is after all real. But further he is real not merely in the subjective world, but in the physical world. For it is of him as being physically real that I think when I make the error. The very gist of the error is that he is a physical tortoise on my physical table. But it seems as if we had gone too far; for wherein is any error left? Now comes our second or counter-assertion, without which the first would be futile. The error consists, not in my belief in the tortoise, but in the denial which, in my mind, goes with that belief. I take the tortoise's presence to exclude the presence of whatever else is there—be it a book, a pencil, or just air. It is in the denial of that fact or object that the sting of error lies. Error entails denial of some fact; it is a belief in the non-existence of something. This kind of a being, a negation, and this alone, can without inconsistency be unreal; for it is not, properly speaking, an entity, but a case of non-entity. And with this, we suggest, the paradox of error is solved. . . .

W. H. SHELDON: "Error and Unreality," *Philosophical Review*, Vol. XXV, pp. 335-346. Reprinted by permission.

SUGGESTIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. What are the two questions involved in the problem of error and which question does Sheldon answer?
2. State as briefly as you can the central idea in each of the theories of error discussed by Sheldon.
3. State as briefly as you can the main criticism of each of the theories which Sheldon rejects.
4. How is Sheldon's own theory related (i) to the functional theory of the pragmatists and (ii) to the Absolutistic theory of the idealists? What reasons can you give for classifying Sheldon's theory as idealistic?
5. Give your own reaction to Sheldon's theory. Do you agree with it? If so, why? If not, why not? State any defect you see in it.

CHAPTER VI

IDEALISTIC SOLUTIONS OF THE BODY-MIND PROBLEM

I. PANPSYCHISM, by *Mary Whiton Calkins*

Analysis

Miss Calkins begins with a statement of the three propositions a personalist must establish. In proving the first, that supposedly non-mental beings are really mental (panpsychism is the technical name for this view and it means literally "everything is psychical"), she uses Leibniz's method and distinguishes various types of selves. Ward and Royce are referred to as holding a similar view and Royce is quoted at some length to prove this. Extending Royce's conception of the varying time-span, Miss Calkins gives her own classification of the types of selves, which differs from that of Leibniz. She then attempts to place various kinds of beings in their proper place in this classificatory scheme. This brings her to the Body-Mind problem in the special sense of the relation of a human self to its body. This problem is discussed in the light of the preceding exposition of panpsychism. The various aspects or types of bodily existence are enumerated and the theory of Leibniz and Ward is adopted, namely, that these each represent separate selves and that the personality is a dominant self in relation to them. A brief resumé of the argument ends her discussion.

. . . A completely personalistic doctrine must maintain, not that selves exist along with other real though non-mental beings, but that the world consists wholly of persons, or selves; and that so large a part of the world is accounted impersonal simply because the selves in whom it consists are undistinguished and uncomprehended. This paper espouses the fully personalistic conception of the universe as consisting in innumerable selves, or persons, of different levels and degrees, more or less closely related to each other. To establish this conception would demand the proof first (1) that supposedly non-mental beings are really mental; second (2) that mental beings are inevitably personal; third (3) that more than one self may be known to exist. . . .

The personalist has first to show the psychological likelihood that beings exist, far less complex than we and yet significantly

described as selves. That the higher vertebrate animals are conscious beings is commonly admitted. The question is whether we are to think of earthworms and beetles, of bacteria and amœbæ, of pebbles and lichens as selves. Leibniz was first among modern philosophers in the attempt to establish the possibility of the extra-human self by emphasizing in our human experience, the wide difference (1) between inattentive and inactive and attentive, active consciousness; (2) between simple and complex; (3) between sensuous and non-sensuous consciousness. It is essential to our purpose to study these conceptions and to begin by making them vivid to ourselves. Let each of my hearers, therefore, using Leibniz's own method, contrast himself in the alert, interested, competent handling of an intellectual problem with himself in the first moments of waking from a very sound sleep, utterly dazed and unaware of where he is or what he has to do, as little recognizing a past as anticipating the future. In this sleepy state he is an inattentive, sluggish, indiscriminating, inactive self; in the other case he attends, distinguishes, compares, relates, advances, controls. Between the two experiences are innumerable grades of attentiveness, weak and strong, dispersed and narrow; innumerable variations in the importance and complexity of non-sensuous, thought-factors of experience; innumerable gradations between utter passivity and complete self-initiative. The personalist appeals to this incontrovertible experience of widely different levels of our own consciousness as confirmation of the possibility of selves of many grades or types. There well may be, he insists, selves who are even more inactively and inattentively conscious than we are in the sleepest stage which we can catch by retrospection, selves who remain at this inactive level from which we have risen, though to be sure we periodically fall back into it. These would be the relatively stable selves, which constitute what we call the inorganic world, which we conceive as unconscious mainly because there seems no hope of getting them to talk to us. And corresponding to the successively more attentive, active, discriminating levels of our own consciousness would be other types of selves—until one reached the higher vertebrates whom, implicitly or explicitly, people already treat as selves even if they do not so conceive them.

Up to this point, in our attempt, following Leibniz's clue, to attain a conception of non-human nature-selves, on the

analogy of our own widely varying types of experience, we have scarcely touched upon the temporal distinction, emphasized both by Leibniz and Ward and by Royce, which may mark off one group of selves from another. In its genuinely sleepy state every self is unaware of past and future; so far as its own present consciousness goes, it is like Melchisedec "without father, without mother, having neither beginning of days nor end of life." It furnishes therefore, the basis in human experience for Leibniz's simple self (his naked monad), *mens momentanea seu carens recordatione*, the momentary, unremembering, unrecognizing self. At the lower extreme from us, according to this view, are, or may be, momentary selves, selves whose consciousness of change does not rise to the contrast of past with present and future. They are thus selves of a moment, unremembering selves. And between them and us would be, as already suggested, an ascending scale of selves roughly rated by their capacity to recall and recognize the past and to anticipate the future. Royce's characteristic contribution to the conception of selves as temporally distinguished is well known and may best be stated in his own words. It is that of the varying time-spans. He supposes, in common with all personalists, that "when (we) deal with Nature (we) deal with a vast realm of finite consciousness of which (our) own is at once a part and an example." He next points out that "our consciousness, for its special characters, is dependent upon a fact which we might call our particular Time-Span. If we are to be inwardly conscious of anything, there must occur some change"—not too fast nor too slow—"in the contents of our feelings. What happens within what we describe as the . . . thousandth of a second necessarily escapes us. On the other hand, what lasts longer than a very few moments no longer can form part of one conscious moment to us. But suppose that our consciousness had to a thousand millionth of a second or to a million years of time the same relation that it now has to the . . . length in seconds of a typical present moment. Then, in the one case, we might say: 'What a slow affair this dynamite explosion is.' In the other case, events, such as the wearing of the Niagara Gorge, would be to us what a single musical phrase now is, namely something instantaneously present. . . . This simple consideration," Royce at once applies, suggesting, for example, that "a material region of the inorganic world would be to us the phenomenal sign of the presence of at least one fellow-creature who

took, perhaps, a billion years to complete a moment of his consciousness, so that where we saw, in the signs given us of his presence, only monotonous permanence of fact, he, in his inner life, faced momentarily significant change.”¹

The special use which Royce makes of this hypothesis, in the discussion of evolution, does not here concern us. We have simply to emphasize the fact that actual experience of the varying time-span justifies the hypothesis of still greater variation and thus the conception of selves with time spans so widened or so narrowed that we may even fail to know their existence. This speculative conception enlarges that gained by direct observation of our own inattentive, inactive, unthoughtful moments—the conception of the relatively simple, sensuous, stable, unremembering self.

The immediately preceding pages have mainly tried to show that the conception of non-human selves makes no assumptions which are not verifiable on some level of human consciousness. In other words, emphasis has fallen on the essential likeness of the human to the non-human self. In the pages which follow, the stress will fall upon the different groups of non-human selves and on the methods of distinguishing them from each other. When the super-human self, whether God or Absolute, is disregarded, it is found, as already suggested, that the non-human selves are most readily grouped, according as they are from our human standpoint (1) intercommunicating, or (2) communicating, or (3) uncommunicating selves—in other words, according as they either signal to us and are signalled back to, or as they signal to us without being aware of us or of our message, or, finally, as they are totally uncommunicative. It will be profitable to dwell for a moment on these distinctions and, in particular, to stress the difference between intercourse, or intercommunication and mere communication. Evidently, when any self (A) is in intercourse with another (B), A must be aware (conscious) of B and of B as conscious in his turn of A. Furthermore, since by self is meant *inter alia* a changing being, that is, a being of successive experiencings, this mutual awareness carries with it an awareness by A of B's changing experiences and by B of A's changes. Complete or adequate intercourse, finally, must imply a correspondence between these successive changes in A and B. Mere *communication* of A with B may be said to occur whenever A modifies B's experiences, but

¹ *The World and the Individual*, Vol. II, pp. 227-228.

full *intercommunication*, or intercourse, implies the mutual relation and the awareness of it.

From this statement of the principle of classification, we turn back to the problem of grouping the non-human selves. To begin with: everybody will agree to describe the higher vertebrates as intercommunicating selves. In this case we have strong empirical (if not metaphysical) evidence of their intercourse with each other and with ourselves. Nor is there any conclusive reason for limiting the group of intercommunicating selves to the vertebrates, to the exclusion of the higher arthropods, for example. At the other extreme are the non-human selves which make up what we call the inorganic world. We become aware of their presence through such of our sensational experiences as we do not refer to the communicative selves, men or animals. Suppose, for example, that I have at one and the same time, a great complex of sense-experience—visual, auditory, kinæsthetic—not attributed to my own initiative. Part of this experience I designate as awareness of voices, gestures, and faces; and this part I regard not merely as indication of the existence and presence of other selves but as disclosing to me their changing experience. Another part, however, of my sensational experience, the perceptual awareness, for example, of hardness and grayness or of blueness and rippliness, I describe as consciousness of pebble or of lake. But in this case I am conscious of no give-and-take of experience between pebble or lake-self and me; I find no mutually varying series of changing ideas which enables me to designate or to “feel” just this complex of sensation, as sign of a communicating self. I cannot, in other words, regard either one of these sensation complexes as indications of a single, individual pebble-self or lake-self with the assurance with which, when I am conscious of a gesturing, talking human body, I regard it as a sign of another self. It is true that, on the strength of my personalistic philosophy, I believe that my pebble consciousness indicates the presence of personal being. I have, however, no way of knowing that the pebble is, like my own body, the “phenomenal sign” of a *single* non-human self. It may, rather, indicate merely one part or aspect of a non-human self, or again, it may indicate a whole group of such selves. In other words, the pebble may correspond not to a human body, as experienced whole, but to one organ or fragment of a body or else to a group of bodies.

We have next to consider the status of the vast numbers of

living beings, lower in the scale than the intercommunicating non-human selves, yet widely different, it seems, from the stolid inorganic world.² We have, apparently, no intercourse with them, yet the more we know about them the more we incline to conceive them as conscious beings. For experiments on animal behavior show that animals of every class may learn by trial and error, in other words, may adapt their reactions to their environment. Not merely insects and crustacea but infusoria—the stentor of Jennings's classical experiments,—have learned both to vary response with changing environment and even to alter their reactions to a fixed environment. Now this acquired capacity to vary reactions to a fixed environment is the most significant indication of consciousness. By most biologists the stentor which alters its response to a harmful stimulus and the crab which learns to shorten its progress through a labyrinth are judged to be conscious animals, that is, selves. And we may go even further. Not only is an adaptively reacting animal probably conscious; it is also in a very literal sense communicating with the observer, informing him, by its forward or backward movements, let us say, of its changing experience. On the other hand, nothing suggests that the observer makes the animal aware of his own onlooking experience. The animal is, in other words, a communicating, but not an intercommunicating self; it gives but does not take. Thus experimental observation justifies the recognition of a group of communicating, non-human selves midway between the totally incommunicative and the obviously intercommunicative nature-selves.

One difficult topic suggested in the preceding pages must at least be touched on. The distinction of the uncommunicative from the communicative selves has more than once involved a reference to the human body. These casual references have now to be amplified, and the relation between self and body to be stated in personalistic terms. (It should be emphasized at the outset that the personalist does not share at all in the spiritualistic dualist's concern to show the independence of some aspect of self—memory or emotion or will—from the body.) For, to the personalist, brain and body are themselves mental, and “the experience of the body is the body.”³ Looked at *en bloc* and uncritically my body may be described as follows: It is a pe-

² Merely in the interest of brevity, the following paragraph omits any reference to the possible plant-selves.

³ D. H. Parker: *The Self and Nature*, p. 86.

cularly ubiquitous object—in the querulous words which the little girl applied to God, it is always “tagging me around”; and it has two important aspects: (1) In the first place, it is not only, like all physical things, a public object, open to other people’s observation as well as to my own, but it is a mediating, instrumental sort of object, serving to indicate my existence to other people—in Royce’s words, serving as “phenomenal sign” of me. (2) My body, in the second place, according to the uncritical observer, is not merely a visible and audible and tangible object, perceived by other people along with me. Rather, it is also a source of unshared organic sensation, the awareness, for example, of stabbing pain, of palpitation or of bodily vigor. This description of the body in terms of the every-day observer has now to be philosophically interpreted. In the terms of the impersonal idealist, plainly, my body is a persistent complex of sensations, visual and auditory and contact sensations, on the one hand, kinæsthetic and visceral sensations, on the other. The personalist goes further. He points out, first, that sensation is somebody’s sensing and that accordingly “complex of sensations” means somebody’s complex sense-experiencing. In the second place, he reaffirms the plain man’s distinction of public from private object, that is, he describes my visible, tangible, and audible body as complex experience shared by me with the other selves who are said to see, hear, and touch me. Finally, and once more in agreement with everyday observation, the personalist describes my body as that part of other people’s shared sense experience which suggests to them the existence, the presence, of *me*, a self with individuality of its own. (And conversely, the part of my sense experience which I call “consciousness of other human bodies” suggests to me the presence of other selves.) My body as directly experienced is, therefore, according to the personalist, a complex and chiefly sensuous experiencing—in part, my incommunicable experience and in part the shared experiencing of many selves which serves as the “sign” of my presence.

But this description of the human body is still incomplete. It has left out of account those portions of my body which are not, and need never be, objects or parts of any one’s direct experience. For in addition to (1) my body as seen, touched and heard, and in addition also to (2) my body as “felt” by me alone, in a toothache, for example, there remains (3) my body as inferred object—my body, as containing spleen and liver

and cerebral ganglia, for instance. I infer the existence of some of these organs when I have watched the cook drawing a chicken and of still others when I have studied the diagrams in a physiology book or have dissected a cat. By the surgeon when he operates, or by the histologist, still other organs—the adrenal glands or the white blood corpuscles—may be directly observed. Yet neither adrenal glands, nor blood corpuscles, nor brain, nor liver can be described (in the way in which my *directly experienced* body is described) as my peculiarly constant sense-experiencing, in part private but in part shared, and *serving as sign of me*. The reason, once more, why my body-as-inferred is not to be described as sign of me is clearly this: neither I, nor other people when conscious of me, are inevitably or invariably or even often aware of my caudate nucleus, blood corpuscles, adrenal glands, or even of my liver and my lungs. And yet, according to careful observation and experiment, I, the conscious self, with my experience, am closely related to this merely inferred portion of my body. In particular, that part of my experience which constitutes my directly-perceived body is closely bound, in one organic system, with the inferred portions of the body. For example, my muscular reactions (directly observed), vary with changes in the frontal Rolandic region (inferred) and my bodily vigor in anger or in rage (observed) vary with the secretions of the adrenal glands (inferred).

How then shall the personalist conceive these inferred portions of my body? Only two ways seem to be open to him. Either he must content himself with describing them in merely ideistic, not personalistic, terms, as inferences (and in part percepts) of the scientist, forming part of an ordered description of the world of actual and possible sense impressions, or (basing his speculation on the personalistic conception of body or bodily organ as sign of self) he must follow Leibniz and Ward in supposing that such parts of my body as are not signs of me must be signs of some other self or selves. To such selves I should stand in relation of “dominant” to subordinated self or selves. Such selves, other than I, would have direct experience of what for me are my inferred bodily organs. I should stand to them in no adequate relation of intercommunication. For though, truly enough, they might be said to affect me, for example in my unlocalized fatigue, and though I might be said to affect them when I took chloroform or strychnine, we should yet have no mutual awareness each of the other’s awareness of

him. It is this lack of complete intercourse which would debar me from knowing the number or the exact nature of such subordinate selves.

With this parenthetical and speculative consideration of the obscure self-body relation this rough outline study of the personalistic nature philosophy must end. To sum up its main points: It has taken the term self at its introspective face value, yet has distinguished three main groups or grades of non-human self: first, the intercommunicative selves, represented by the higher vertebrates; second, a group even less distinctly limited, of selves imperfectly and one-sidedly communicative; finally, the group of selves which constitute the reality of inorganic nature, selves whom we cannot disentangle from each other or delimit, selves with whom we are apparently related but of whom we are not directly aware, with whom we have not intercourse. . . .

MARY WHITON CALKINS in the *Philosophical Review*, Vol. XXVIII, pp. 130-138 (several footnotes omitted). Reprinted by permission. Title mine.

SUGGESTIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Make a classificatory scheme or diagram of Leibniz's and of Miss Calkins's classification of the various kinds of selves.
2. Is Miss Calkins's interpretation of Royce's time-span theory to mean pan-psychism the only interpretation of that theory which could be made? Can you suggest another interpretation?
3. Comment on Miss Calkins's placement of the various types of objects in her classification. Suggest other objects than she mentions for each type of self. Criticize her way of placing any particular object you think might properly belong elsewhere in her scheme.
4. Notice the footnote on possible plant-selves. Where in the classification would such selves have to be placed and why? For example, the self of a sensitive plant or of a lichen. Compare Shelley's poem on the *Sensitive Plant*.
5. Would the conception of the human body as a group of living cells support Miss Calkins's theory that it is a group of selves organized around a dominant self? Argue this point pro and con.

II. MIND AS INCLUSIVE OF BODY, by George Plimpton Adams

Analysis

Adams first states his central thesis and illustrates it. In elaborating this thesis he quotes the psychologist, Stout, who makes use of the

fringe theory of James to explain how meaning is really a matter of knowledge rather than of bodily behavior. In addition to the response of an organism the awareness of some total object surrounds every case of behavior higher than mere tropisms or reflex actions. Adams quotes Royce in criticism of Stout, to the effect that Stout and the pragmatists are too much under the dominance of the biologists. The brain does not generate the mind, and response of an organism is not the same as consciousness and the awareness of meaning. McDougall is quoted in support of these denials. The existence of consciousness is admittedly a mystery, but we know two significant facts about it, (i) that to be a mind is equivalent to possessing an autonomous knowledge of reality, and (ii) that the body or brain helps to determine what the content of the mind is at each moment. But the organized totality of all mental content is mind and not body, body being only an element in this totality. And this totality is identical with reality.

. . . The thesis which seems to me to hold out most hope of doing justice both to behavior and control, and to the life of knowledge and possession is this. *Every behavior interest is surrounded by a cognitive fringe. The awareness of some total situation is a matrix within which, at a focal point, the response of the organism to some particular stimulus occurs. It is this cognitive apprehension, this fringe, and not the behavior, the response to the stimulus, which is the source of all the meaning which attaches to an object attended and responded to.* Let us now expand and illustrate this principle. I sit down at my desk to write. I see my pen, take it up, and commence to use it. At the moment it is my pen to which I adjust my behavior and which exists at or near the focus of my consciousness. But, while my hand is attending to my pen, both hand and pen fall within my field of vision which includes, too, very much else besides, my desk, books, my room, etc. Now the point of this very simple illustration is that a very much larger area comes within my conscious grasp than the specific objects to which my hand, or even my body as a whole is responding. My consciousness overlaps both my body and the environment which acts as a stimulus to the adaptive responses of the organism. The *stimulus* is embedded within a more inclusive and more total *object*. If one chooses to say, then, that I am "responding" to and "behaving" towards my entire, inclusive object, and not merely to the specific, focal stimuli, well and good. But let it then be understood that the manner of my response to my residual environment, my fringe, is not the same as the manner of my response to the stimulus. I literally *behave* towards, do something with my pen; I *am aware* of a total situation, an in-

clusive purpose, which makes it necessary and meaningful that I should take up my pen. The stimulus responded to is a focal center within a larger area, which is apprehended and contemplated. How is this encircling fringe apprehended and what part does it play in our experience and our activity? For answer, we may turn to the chapters in Stout's *Analytic Psychology* entitled "The Apprehension of Form," and "Implicit Apprehension." To James, of course, belongs the credit of setting forth how pervasive and fundamental in the entire stream of consciousness is the focus-fringe situation. The analysis which Stout gives contains an abundance of suggestions as to the philosophical implications of this focus-fringe situation. We are concerned here with the relation between the apprehension of a whole, a total and inclusive situation, and our attention (response) to a specific constituent (stimulus) within that whole. The relation, then, of the awareness of whole and parts interests us. Now the first thing to observe is that, although the form of a whole cannot be apprehended without any awareness of the parts, yet "a whole with its characteristic unity may be apprehended without definitely distinguishing its several constituents from each other. It is certainly possible to think of a whole in its unity and distinctness without discerning all or even any of its component details."⁴ As, perhaps, the most striking and familiar illustration of this principle, Stout discusses the manner in which we apprehend the meaning of words. Such recognition of meaning occurs through an "imageless apprehension" of a distinct and characteristic totality. I am aware of the complexities and difficulties which attach to the problem of imageless thought. Nevertheless, Stout's description and analysis of the matter seems to me not to go beyond the verifiable features of the situation. The testimony is indeed unequivocal that "the flow of words is for the most part unattended by a parallel flow of mental imagery." We probably go too far, however, if we speak of all specific images as quite unnecessary and irrelevant. The apprehension of the whole, which is analogous to a surrounding fringe, has somewhere a focal point. It is to this focal center that the response and activity of accommodation, necessary for attention, are directed. The printed word is seen, is attended to; the activity of attending to it is the bearer and the vehicle of the mind's apprehension of meaning. The specific stimulus probably does give rise to an image, but both stimulus and image are

⁴ G. F. Stout: *Analytic Psychology*, Vol. I, pp. 76, 78.

but partial, surrounded by the fringe of meaning which is apprehended as a whole.

It is not difficult to adduce further instances of situations in which the presence of meaning arises from the implicit apprehension of a whole rather than from any specific response of the organism to a stimulus. Meaning is a matter not primarily of behavior, but of knowledge. I quote again from Stout. "When I look at a house, what is actually seen, together with what is mentally pictured, constitutes only a small part of the object as it is perceived. The actual sensations and the attendant mental imagery do not by their limitation limit the objective reference. This is possible only because an imageless representation of the whole is conjoined with the sensible appearance as its 'psychic fringe.' At the most, only the last two or three notes of a melody are perceived at its close, and yet the musically gifted are aware of it as a whole. Similarly, I may be keenly aware of the unity of a sonnet in respect of metrical form while I am reading the last lines, although the words of the preceding lines are no longer present to my mind. All perception of a series of changes as forming a whole, involves imageless apprehension. . . . In every train of thought, strictly so called, a single, central topic—a permanent object—is throughout kept in view. The orderly sequence of special apprehensions is due to the controlling influence of the persistent and central thought. . . . We have cognisance of this topic as a whole during the entire process; but its special parts or aspects are apprehended only by piecemeal."⁵ Essentially the same statement applies to the life of purpose and conation. Every partial present purpose is surrounded by a more inclusive purpose. The desire for food is really the desire for health and strength and life, and from this larger fringe of interests there streams in upon the momentary partial interest its meaning and its justification. Again in our entire social life: the economic activities of men are embedded within a more comprehensive and concrete network of relations, legal, social and moral, though they may for the most part remain quite implicit, and we have often been led to forget the fringe of these other motives and interests. What we have sought to make clear by these various examples then, is this. Something akin to the focus-fringe relationship in psychology, as set forth by James and others, also exists wherever there is any apprehension of meaning and an overt response

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 93 ff.

to a specific stimulus. The organism's behavior in the presence of the stimulus does not comprise the entire situation as it really exists. A consciousness of meaning, an awareness of some total *object* surrounds every specific instance of behavior except, it may be, a pure tropism or instinct which is entirely a matter of biology. Behavior and meaning are never commensurate. They are related as stimulus and object. The categories of behaviorism and instrumentalism become less and less adequate as one moves from biology to psychology, from brain structures and reflex arcs to the life of mind and of consciousness. Throughout our experience these two, meaning and behavior, are in some fashion wedded together. We may say (with Stout) that "though mental process as it advances in complexity becomes less and less capable of adequate expression in terms of motor process, yet some motor process is always involved in it."⁶ Consciousness is neither a picture gallery in flux, a succession of images, nor is it a series of behavior processes. It lives through its possession of wholes, through its apprehension of meanings, its participation in significant structures, its understanding of an Other. Conation itself is to be interpreted not merely as the attempt of an organism whose equilibrium is upset through the reception of a stimulus, to regain its equilibrium, not merely in terms of the satisfaction of a "vital series" (cf. Avenarius and all voluntarism) but also as a voyage of discovery, an exploration of self and of the world, an attainment of knowledge and a possession of reality. See, for a moment, what an interpretation of conation such as this would imply. Ask the question as to when, and under what circumstances the mind comes into contact with an environment, with reality. Hume answers, only at the very outset of its career, only in the process whereby the mind is furnished with "impressions." Impressions are the bearers of valid knowledge; they are a pledge of the continuity and contact of mind and world. But they constitute, in addition, a stimulus to the elaboration of "ideas." And the further you go on the journey from "impressions" to "ideas," the further do you become separated from reality. Ideas are not cognitive at all. So much of the fabric of "custom and imagination" have entered into the substance of ideas, that they are separated by a long interval from impressions, and have ceased to participate in an objective order. They belong only to the mind as a witness

⁶ *Analytic Psychology*, Vol. II, p. 103.

to the manner in which the mind responds to the stimuli of impressions. One sees the analogy between Hume's thought on these matters and the way in which the conation, the conscious striving of any organism, is often pictured. It is assumed that the environment, through a stimulus which presents a problem to the organism, upsets its equilibrium and sets in motion a conation, a vital series, a striving which is pictured essentially as a process occurring within the organism. Mental striving tends to realize *itself*, to recover the equilibrium of *the vital series*. Now, in this way of viewing the matter we are, I think, in danger of falling into the same error in which Hume and all subjectivism fall. We are likely to forget that the mind is in contact with reality throughout, and not only at the initial moment of a conation series when a stimulus upsets the organism's equilibrium. The journey from stimulus to a final response is to be described not merely as something occurring entirely within the mind, or within the organism. Both processes constitute indeed a voyage of exploration and discovery. There is no conation without some continuous objective reference, some knowledge, some participation in reality, however unquiet it may be. There is a persistent confusion in psychology and in much of our thinking about the nature of consciousness, which is here to be mentioned. There lurk many ambiguities in the concept of mental activity, ambiguities which occasioned the well-known remark of Bradley that the very concept of mental activity was a scandal in metaphysics. The chief source of these perplexities lies in our failure to distinguish causal efficacy and the apprehension of meaning. In a sustained review of the work of Stout to which we have been referring, Royce has a telling criticism of just this confusion which Stout himself has not always escaped. We tend to confuse "meaning with abstract efficacy, good sense with causal power, rationality with capacity to accomplish the causal production of deeds, and sustained significance with self-sustaining process."⁷ The radical difficulty with all extreme voluntarism and behaviorism lies just here. At bottom we suffer from a failure to free ourselves sufficiently from the dominance of biology and its categories. . . .

The brain does *not* generate the mind, the response of the organism to the stimulus is not identical with consciousness nor with the apprehension of meanings. And yet these two are intimately correlated with one another. How? I answer, the

⁷ *Mind*, 1897, p. 393.

necessities of behavior and the brain processes which control that behavior *select* but do not generate the meanings which come before my mind. What I am now doing is the vehicle through which some whole, some significant structure becomes known to me. Just as the muscular accommodation of sense organs is unquestionably *not* identical with the meaning of that which is perceived, but only the channel through which an object is presented to my consciousness, so behavior as a whole determines my ideas only in the sense that it is the vehicle and not the creator of those meanings. In speaking of what he rightly calls "the most important part of consciousness," the essential thought activity, the apprehension of meanings and the "reference of consciousness to an object," McDougall speaks thus of the sensory and motor elements of consciousness here involved: "All the sensory feelings are but the medium which brings this thought-activity into play and determines its direction from moment to moment; they are but solicitations to thought or to thinking."⁸ Just so, the entire motor and behavior processes of the body with which the brain has to do, is the medium, the solicitation, the selection of the meanings which come before the mind at any moment.

For, we are never to lose sight of the fact that the brain is an instrument not of knowledge, but of muscular response and of behavior. It is but the connecting link between sense organs and muscles. Why there should be any consciousness at all over and above the brain and the behavior of the body may and does remain a mystery, at least in the sense that it is an ultimate fact about the nature of things. The two facts of which we may be wholly certain respecting this mystery are first, that knowledge, like every ultimate value, is autonomous: it reveals an objective significant structure, and to be a mind is precisely equivalent to possessing a knowledge of reality; and secondly, what, of all the mind's possessions, come at any moment into the explicit light of consciousness depends, in some degree at least, upon what the brain, i.e., the body is doing. The brain has to do only with some stimulus; a stimulus is a gathering place, a focal center for a fringe of meanings, whose organized totality is the true object of the mind and, in the last analysis, is reality itself. . . .

G. P. ADAMS: *Idealism and the Modern Age*, pp. 186-192.

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Title mine.

⁸ William McDougall: *Psychology*, p. 55.

SUGGESTIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. How does knowledge of a total situation differ from response to a stimulus, according to Adams?
2. Give an illustration of your own of the fringe theory which Adams uses to explain the relation of the mind to the body.
3. Make a list and compare the various illustrations of the fringe theory which Adams gives and quotes from Stout.
4. Is imagery essential to knowing or does Adams hold to the doctrine of "imageless thought"?
5. Is the fringe theory restricted to knowing or does it cover action as well? Explain your answer. Note that conation is the technical word for the active side of the mind as distinct from the knowing or cognitive side.
6. State the theory of Hume to which Adams refers and give Adams's reaction to it.
7. What is the "persistent confusion" in psychology about the nature of consciousness, which Adams stresses?
8. What is the relation of the brain to the mind? What is the relation of the brain to the sense-organs and the muscles?
9. Try to state simply and briefly Adams's conception of the mind and of its relation to the brain and body. Is his view like that of Miss Calkins? If not, what seems to you to be the essential difference?

III. PSYCHOPHYSICAL INDIVIDUALISM, by *J. A. Leighton*

Analysis

Leighton begins by enumerating the chief characteristics of body. He then argues that the mind and its states have extensivity and that the mind is located in the body. Higher thought processes are pure unextended, concentrated mental activities. In these processes mind becomes a trans-spatial center of action and thereby masters space. Mind-energy is not physical but it is associated with a physical machine—the body. The essence of mind is to be found in *memory or recognition, selective choice, and analytical and generalizing thought*. To these must be added self-consciousness, being aware of one's own acts of awareness. Through these various activities the mind transcends time and becomes *transtemporal*, and it also transcends the human body and becomes trans-spatial. Hence these are two other characteristics of mind. Leighton accepts the physiological theory of a stimulus-response pattern in the nervous system, with the brain as the switchboard between the in-coming and out-going nerve currents. But the mind works through this mechanism. On the side of the stimulus it enters into cognitive relations with physical reality and on the side of the response the mind acts on the total system of things. He admits that physiological and psychological explanations of mind leave certain profound mysteries unexplained. In the end we simply have to accept both mind and body as two opposites which are indissolubly married into the concrete unity which Leighton calls psychophysical individuality.

. . . I desire to emphasize the following points: (1) Body is to be conceived in terms of activity. It is a complex of dynamic centers. (2) Actual bodies have concrete extensities. Extensity in this sense is the expression of tension or physical activity. Homogeneous and infinitely divisible space is a conceptual or ideal construction relative to the purposes of geometry and mechanics. Actual physical space is the order of inter-relations of simultaneously existing, heterogeneous, centers of activity. (3) Hence bodies are not infinitely divisible. They must consist of ultimate centers of activity. (4) All bodies are elements in the total continuum of physical reality, which is a vast system of tensions and motions. Motion is detention, that is, release of a tension. Concrete or real space means the coexistence and interrelation of centers of activity or dynamic and mobile elements.

If it is misleading to define body in terms of inert and homogeneous space, it is equally misleading to say that mind is unextended. Mind is not static extension, but neither is body. And mental processes are not nonspatial but trans-spatial. It is time that philosophy emancipated itself from the naïve distinction between matter and spirit in terms of the contrast between the extended and the unextended. This is a heritage from Greek and mediæval thought that we can well dispense with. Visual and tactual percepts obviously have extensity. Auditory, olfactory, and other forms of sensation, likewise have extensity or bigness. Moreover it seems to me that affections and emotions likewise have location and extensity. Some are pervasive and spread all over the body. Others are narrowly localized, sharp, penetrating, and so forth. Is the mind, then, which is the center of reference for all these forms of awareness, nonspatial? Clearly, I think, the mind is in the body. It is the conscious unifier and center of tension of bodily experience. Just what part of the body it commonly inhabits I am not sure. It seems to be able to expand and pervade large parts of the whole, and to gather and condense itself into narrower compass. With the ideal or higher forms of thought-activity and sentiment we seem to be in the presence of purely unextended processes. A concept, a judgment concerning abstruse matters such as the present problem, or a clearly formulated purpose, is a maximum concentration and unification of mental activity. But even such activities as these are associated with a concretely extended body which is in relation to other extensive realities. A purpose or

a plan of action are obviously concerned with the relations of the individual organism to contemporaneously existing elements of spatial reality. Such thought activities condense the past with reference to the future, but this condensation implies co-existence and interrelation or extensity. Even such "spiritual" processes as an æsthetic emotion, a moral ideal, a religious aspiration, or a metaphysical speculation, involve the relation of the mind to coexisting realities which have relative mutual independence. Mind, as a center of concentration and awareness of relationships, has a power of controlling and penetrating, of condensing and redirecting, the extensity-factors or spatial tensions of its physical environment to such a degree that we may rightly say that mind is a trans-spatial center of action. Functioning in space it can become, in increasing measure, the master of space.

There is then, an immaterial, dynamic principle in the human self. Consciousness is not a form of physical energy; but it is at once the immediate revelation of a unique kind of energy, the energy of thought; and the intermediate revelation of other forms of energy by virtue of being a focal center of awareness, selection, rearrangement, and chosen reaction. The energy of mind is expressed in intellection and volition. These cannot really be separated, since volition involves intellection and intellection is the activity of the mind in selecting, combining and valuing the materials of experience. Thus the specific character of the energy of the mind is most adequately revealed in the rational activity of synthesis and analysis and in the forms of reflective valuation which determine choice. Mind energy, or spiritual activity, is associated with a physical machine, the body, through which it receives influences from, and reacts upon, its environment. Thus the mind, although it does not seem to occupy a definite area in space, is definitely associated with the spatial order in which it carries on transactions. The mind is the soul of a dynamic configuration in space. It is *trans-spatial*, not nonspatial. Similarly the mind, as we shall see more fully later on, is not nontemporal, but *trans-temporal*. It endures through time.

Where there is no recognitive memory and selective choice, the successive phases of physical motion are mere links in an endless chain. One configuration dies away blindly into its successor. It is through selective memory that the past lives in the present, not as fatally determining it, but as reconstructed and

employed by the active mind to illumine the present, and thus to aid in the conscious direction of activity to fashion the future. Just as there is no sharp break between past and present, so there is no sharp break between present and future. The present is the future in the making. Memory is the unifying function which enables the individual in the present to control the future by the utilization of the past in the present. A being devoid of memory can have the continuity only of a succession of stages, in which the earlier always completely determine the later. Its moving spring is a *vis a tergo*, that is, a physical force. A being with memory, selectivity and reflection, by transcending its immediate present, or rather by expanding and transfusing that present from the past, is able to emancipate itself from the *vis a tergo*. Its present grows in content and meaning, and thus its future, as this becomes present, ceases to be the mere consequence of its past. A being without memory *lives* only in space although it *exists* in time. Temporal relations are for it nonexistent. It cannot transcend the immediate now, and hence, for it there is no now, since a now has meaning only by contrast with a then and a shall-be. A being with memory transcends mere spatial relationships. It becomes a temporal-historical self-determining being. Memory-consciousness is the fundamental condition of selfhood and self-determination. Space is a function of immediate interaction between individuals or monads, but time is a function of memory; time-consciousness is the condition of the suspension of the blind and inevitable march of temporal predetermination. In this sense to know time and change, through memory and reflection, is to transcend mere time and change in transcending mere spatial coexistence and determination.

In memory we find, then, as Bergson rightly says, a unique function of spirit. It is by virtue of the synthetic or synoptic and selective power manifested in memory that the individual ceases to be a mere blind link in an endless chain of becoming; that he is able to suspend the fatal operation of that *vis a tergo* by which nonmental elements of reality are pushed along, combined and broken up, made and unmade.

The mind is that sort of unique and active center or focus of relationships which is able to concentrate and illuminate, with memory and awareness, the dynamical relations of elements in the system of physical nature to its own immediate organ—the body; and, through this relation to its own organism, to inter-

pret extra-bodily relations of physical and other psychophysical centers to one another. The mind is also able to be aware of its own awarenesses, that is, to be self-conscious. It has temporal continuity and is aware of this continuity. It is a unity and a unifier which knows itself as such. Every active center in nature must be in some degree a unity and a unifier. Mind is peculiarly so, since, by reason of its bodily organ, it becomes the center of a variety and range of physical relationships to a degree such as no other thing in nature is, and since, by reason of memory and reflection, it becomes a reorganizer or redirector of the sequence of physical events. *The mind is the organism's consciousness of its actual and possible relationships in the dynamic system of reality.* Through consciousness, the organism becomes in part a controlling and an originating center of relationships. Because it can remember and bring to bear on the present situation its past recognition of relationships within the system of experience, the mind is not tied down to the treadmill of a mechanical succession. Through it the organism is freed from the bondage of mere reflex and automatic activity.

Placed temporally between the incoming stimuli which signify the action of other elements of reality on the organism, and the outgoing effectors or motor impulses which signify the reactions of the organism to other elements of reality, the mind focuses its past experience on the present, and thus determines in part the character and direction of the organism's reactions to the environment. This determination of future reaction is no blind automatic reaction or mere reflex. It signifies a redirection of organic activity, in such ways that the content of individual experience is further enriched in meaning and scope. Operating between the organism's past and its future, the mind is able in part to determine the character of that future, to enhance its life by enlarging the scope and value of its responses or adjustments. *Memory*, the synthetic or unifying function which establishes identity and continuity of meaning; *analytic* and *generalizing thought*, which distills new meanings by analysis and synthetic reconstruction of experience; and *evaluating* and *selective choice*, are thus the supreme functions of mind. They are instruments for the enlargement of insight into the organism's own nature and the nature of its environment, and thus they are the instruments for the enhancement of psychic values through intelligent action.

The body, considered as a system of sense organs, afferent

nerves and sensory brain centers, is the channel through which the mind becomes aware of those nearer and more remote environmental relationships which are significant for the life and welfare of the whole psychophysical individual. Conversely, the body, considered as a system of motor brain centers, efferent nerves, and motor organs of expression, is the channel through which mind effectuates, in terms of its consciously purposive activities, the meanings and values which it has distilled from its incoming experiences. There can be little doubt that the brain centers, as the common term in this sensory-reflective-motor are, supply a vast, complicated, and plastic system of connections, through which mind, in its functions of remembering, analyzing, synthetizing, and recombining the elements of raw experience, is able to suspend mere reflex or automatic action; to check the fatal flow of stimulus into blind reaction, and thus, by giving to consciousness an accumulation or enrichment of sensory materials joined with an indeterminate complexity of outgoing connections, to enable the conscious mind to "throw the switches"; to divert and recombine in a variety of ways the sensory-motor nerve paths. The synapses of the dendritic processes of the cortical neurone cells and the interrelations of the main system of nerve-fibers seem to give structural support to this view. Physical stimulus—physiological reaction—physical change due to motor organ—thus would run a purely reflex activity. Perception—memory—reflection—or analysis and synthesis—choice—such are the intervening factors of mind which breaks the fatal chain. The diagram of a volitional process would run thus: physical stimulus—sensory neural process—awareness—memory—reflection and choice—motor neural process and muscular movement. In the cognitive-volitional arc, mind is the conscious center for redirection, selective emphasis and control. The suspension and alternation of tension and direction in the neural processes is the work of mind.

The self is a trans-spatial center of spatial relationships, and thus positively related to extensity. Through the sensory system the mind is brought into *receptive* cognitive relations with physical reality. Through the motor system it *acts* as a member of the total system of things. From the extensity of sensations to the apparent inextensity of "pure" thought there is a series of degrees of passage, as M. Bergson would say, from more extensity with less tension to less extensity with greater tension. I should prefer to say that there is a passage, by degrees, from

a more diffused or less integrated extensity of motions to a less diffused extensity with the highest degree of trans-spatial concentration and integration or unification. Mobile extensity is not eliminated by the higher thought processes. These processes are unique concentrations or condensations, into conscious unity, of extensive dynamical transactions. Intensity is not the negation of extensity. It is the maximum concentration or focalization of extensities, which in consciousness becomes the basis of the redistribution of extensive relations in a world of mobile elements. By virtue of its power of concentration, analysis, and integration, the mind is able to redirect physical motions, so as partly to conquer space in the transportation of bodies and the intercommunication of minds. By the anticipatory power of constructive imagination, the mind is able to project itself even into the interplanetary reaches of cosmic space, and this projection may be the prelude to still vaster conquests of space, restrictions by man. Thus, though associated with a space-occupying body, and so having a local habitation, the mind is not determined and restricted as a mere physical thing is determined and restricted by external space relations. It is able to internalize, interpret and selectively choose among these space conditions, and thus, in part control them. But if any one confesses himself able to conceive reality as spaceless I confess my inability to follow such a conceptual flight into the inane.

In short, the conscious self is an active center which knows, evaluates, chooses, purposes, and acts in a physical universe. How my thought and purpose get translated into physical motions I do not know. How I perceive colors, sounds, tastes, smells, heat and cold, I do not fully understand, the physiologists' and psychologists' explanations notwithstanding. I do not understand how vibrations of ether or air occasion neural activities, and how *these* in turn occasion sensory-motor processes. I have to come back to the simple and universal fact that man sees with his eyes, hears with his ears, and smells with his nose. The universality of the fact, and the success of inferences and activities based thereon, warrant the belief that the world which man thus perceives, and which is the only physical world that he does have any immediate acquaintance with, is truly an integral part of the order of reality; although it may very well be the case that man's belief as to the place of his physical environment in the scheme of things is in part erroneous, or rather, very imperfectly repre-

sents the complete state of things. In any event any speculation which does not base itself on the belief in the reality of the physical order, as perceived, is open from the outset to the gravest suspicion. Our physical order must be a true part or constituent of the total real.

Similarly, I come back to the simple fact that I understand, evaluate and plan, choose and act through my body upon the physical things around me. The fact that we do not fully understand why minds should be conditioned by bodies, and *vice versa*, is not sufficient reason for denying that the relationship in question does obtain. Throughout the world of experience we find that life, with all its meanings and interests, involves contrast and opposition. Is not the contrast and opposition of body and mind, which yet are functionally interdependent, perhaps just the most universal marriage of opposites on which depends all the zest and significance of life? Here we seem to touch bottom facts of experience. If mind and body were absolutely identical their seeming duality or contrast would be a meaningless riddle. If they were absolutely independent, even though parallel, their mutual isolation and correspondence would be equally an insoluble riddle. Why should two such fundamental aspects of existence always run abreast but never touch? In such case they would not be two aspects but two wholly sundered universes. Cleft by an impassable chasm there would be two worlds—the one a realm of insensate masses in space—the other a realm of gibbering ghosts. The assumption of the absolute identity and the utter disconnectedness of mind and body are equally meaningless. Reality is psychophysical individuality.

J. A. LEIGHTON: *Man and the Cosmos*, pp. 369-377. Reprinted by permission of D. Appleton & Company, New York, publishers.

SUGGESTIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Mention one difference between Leighton and Miss Calkins, and one between Leighton and Adams.
2. Compare Leighton's account of the extensity of mental content with Kemp Smith's account of the extensity of the *sensa*, above, page 191 f. How do they differ?
3. Are the mysteries which Adams and Leighton admit at the end of their accounts the same or different?
4. Compare Leighton's account of the body with Miss Calkins's

account. Would Leighton be a disciple of Leibniz and Ward on this point?

5. Make a list of all the characteristics of mind based on Leighton's discussion. Explain what he means by referring to the mind as trans-spatial and trans-temporal.
6. Which of the three idealistic solutions of the Body-Mind problem appeals to you most and why?

CHAPTER VII

IDEALISTIC SOLUTIONS OF THE PROBLEMS OF VALUE AND EVIL

I. THE MEANING OF VALUE, by *J. S. Mackenzie*

Analysis

Mackenzie first explains why the word value has come into general usage to replace the terms good and ought. It has a wider scope, is capable of expressing degrees, and of covering both positive and negative values. It was the ambiguity of the word good which led Nietzsche to seek a value beyond good and evil. Likewise the term value avoids the ambiguities in the term ought. Mackenzie sketches briefly the new interest in theory of value which affects all types of philosophy. Value is especially connected with effort to secure the better and avoid the worse. Whatever helps us on our way forward is valued. But this makes it necessary to distinguish between what has value and what we value. The latter are valuations and the former are values. Real values are objectively determined whereas valuations are subjective. Nietzsche's well known doctrine of the transvaluation of all values is interpreted by Mackenzie to mean the change in valuations of an individual or even a whole culture which come as the result of a larger outlook upon life. The great social transvaluations which have had momentous effects in human history are briefly discussed. He raises the question of whether the World War was not the beginning of a similar epoch-making transvaluation. These changes, however, affect valuations rather than values since "we cannot invent values, we can only discover them." Yet there is a sense in which many values are relative. The total situation has to be taken into account and when this changes values change with it. Illustrations of this are given.

What has been stated in the preceding Book may serve sufficiently to indicate the importance of the conception of Value, both in itself and as an interpretative principle in a system of Philosophy. Its significance has, however, been somewhat obscured by ambiguities in its use and by the fact that some other terms have often been employed in its place. In particular, as we have already noted, its place has sometimes been taken by the term "Good." Some part of its meaning has also sometimes been given under the conception that is expressed by the term "Ought." We have seen how the idea of Good was emphasized by Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. Kant, on

the other hand, was chiefly responsible for laying the emphasis on what ought to be, as opposed to what actually exists. Good, Value, Ought evidently express closely related conceptions. But in recent times it is on Value that the chief emphasis has been laid; and it may be well at this point to indicate what are the grounds for this change. This may help us to clear up the meaning which the various terms have been intended to express.

The first reason for seeking to avoid the use of the term "Good" is that it has a considerable degree of ambiguity. "Good," and especially "Goodness," is often understood in the sense of Benevolence, which means the will or desire directed to what is good. When Kant declared that "the only thing that can be called good without qualification is the good will," the statement may be held to be tautological if "good" means good will. On the other hand, to say that a good will means *a will directed towards good will*, is a statement that appears to carry us round in a circle. Kant sought to avoid this circle by distinguishing between the "supreme good" and the "complete good." The good will, he held, is the *supreme* good; but the *complete* good includes happiness as well. This is a view that we are not, at this point, in a position to discuss. I refer to it only as showing that there is some ambiguity in the term. There is no similar ambiguity in the term "Value," which does not at least carry any *direct* suggestion of willing or being desired.

Further, if goodness is taken to mean benevolence, and benevolence is taken to mean the will to promote happiness, we are evidently using a term that commits us to certain theories that ought not to be accepted without careful consideration. The zealous seeker for truth or the artist who produces beautiful objects may be seeking to promote human happiness; but some at least would be inclined to think that Truth and Beauty are, in a wide sense, good, without reference to any happiness that may result from their attainment. This again is a question that I do not wish at this point to prejudge. I only seek to indicate that the use of the term "good," in so far as it means benevolence, suggests a particular theory which ought not to be accepted without careful discussion. On the other hand, if we simply say that Truth and Beauty have *value*, we are not committing ourselves to any particular theory with regard to the kind of value that they possess.

Another great advantage in the use of the term Value is that

it enables us, without any difficulty, to recognize *degrees*. "Good" is too suggestive of something absolute and unquestionable; and, in dealing with things and persons that are finite and imperfect, we can seldom feel justified in the ascription of such an absolute characteristic. Even the Christ, with all the lofty claims that he appeared to assert, was unwilling to be characterized as good; "There is none good but One, that is God." But all things and all persons, however limited and incomplete they may be, can be recognized as having some degree of *Value* (or *Worth*—a term often treated as equivalent). To express degrees of goodness we have to introduce quite different words—good, *better*, *best*; and this inconvenience is not peculiar to English, but appears in almost every language. Even when we wish to speak of goodness in action, we again have to resort to a different word: we say that a man does *well*. Now, what we seek is, in general, the *best*, which is often very different from what may, in some limited sense, be called good; and what we actually secure is usually only the better, sometimes only the best of bad alternatives. Even "the better," according to the proverbial expression, is often "the enemy of the good." Also, to express the opposite of what is good, we are again compelled to use quite different verbal forms—Good and *Bad*, or Good and *Evil*, and again Better and *Worse*. The term Value is free from these inconveniences. It does not suggest anything absolute and unqualified. It is easily recognized that there may be more or less in value; and there is no difficulty in speaking of values that are positive or negative.

It was largely owing to this difficulty in the use of the term Good that Nietzsche was led to conceive of some excellence that should be "beyond Good and Evil"; just as the ambiguity in the term "moral" led him and others to describe themselves as "immoralists"—a term which was by no means intended to imply that they did not acknowledge any ethical ideals. But neither Nietzsche nor any others have sought to get beyond Value. What they have suggested with regard to that is only that our conceptions of value need some revision. There must, according to Nietzsche, be an "*Umwertung aller Werte*," a transvaluation of all values; and of course we know that such transmutations are of frequent occurrence in the development of human experience. They can, no doubt, be referred to in terms of "good." "Time," as Lowell said, "makes ancient

good uncouth''; but this at least sounds more paradoxical than the statement that the values of things, and the values of modes of thought and action, become changed by change of circumstance.

What has to be urged, in general, is that Value is a much more fluid and adaptable expression than Good; and in a world of many changes and varying relations, this is an undeniable advantage. The adaptability of the term shows itself in many ways. It is a noun, but it can also be used as a verb. Not only do things have value, but we value them; and we thus readily see that there is both a subjective and objective aspect in the ascription of value. We can also say that things are valuable, and thus recognize that it is a quality with which we are dealing; though it is capable of being abstracted from the objects to which it is referred. Good, on the other hand, has no corresponding verb. When we want to say that we appreciate it, we have to resort to such terms as value or appreciation; and, when we turn it into a substantive, and speak of "the Good," we seem to be hypostatizing an abstraction. In the philosophy of Plato this defect is very apparent. We could hardly be tempted to speak of "the Value," in any similar fashion.

Besides the conception of Good, there is another that has played a large part in the discussion of ethical and social problems—that of what *ought to be*, as contrasted with what actually *is*. Here again it is to Kant that we have chiefly to look for the emphasis on this antithesis. It is to him that we owe the conception of a Categorical Imperative, which is set over against our natural inclinations, and even against the possibilities of achievement in the world as we know it. Kant's antithesis arose partly from a somewhat cynical view of human nature and partly from the general theory of an unbridgeable gulf between the phenomenal world and the demands of reason. In German the antithesis, between what ought to be and what is, is somewhat sharper than it is in English; since *Sollen*, the German equivalent for *Ought*, suggests not only what is better than the existing thing, but also something that is always in the future. But even in England people are often apt to think that what is ideal must always be something in front of us, like the carrot by which an obstinate donkey is sometimes tempted forward; or, let us rather say, as if the poetic light that serves as our inspiration must always be a "light that

never was on sea or land.”¹ It was against this way of thinking that Hegel entered his emphatic protest; and many of his followers—notable Dr. Bosanquet—have given fresh force to his criticisms. He urged that “the rational is actual,” meaning, as I understand it, that what has genuine value for human life tends, on the whole, to be pursued and more or less successfully achieved by us. He may sometimes have overstressed this; just as perhaps Socrates overstressed the doctrine that no man is willingly deprived of the good; and just as perhaps Carlyle overstressed his favourite contention that Right is always Might. Most original writers are apt to give undue emphasis to the ideas that seem to them to have been neglected. But I believe it will be found that all these great sayings, when carefully interpreted, contain a very solid core of truth; and even those who are not prepared to admit this will surely at least allow that it is well to have a neutral term like Value which carries no direct suggestion either of achievement or of failure, but only the suggestion of something that is *worthy to be achieved*.

At any rate, in view of what has now been stated, it can hardly seem surprising that the conception of Value has taken a very prominent place in recent philosophy, not merely in some particular schools of thought, but practically in all schools. Those who have been specially influenced by Kant have naturally followed him in setting up the idea of Value or Worth as the supreme principle of determination in human life. The ethical movement in religion has been a good deal influenced by this way of thinking. The pursuit of the supreme values tends to be opposed, not only to dogmatic theology, but even to constructive metaphysics and the realistic interpretation of history. Pragmatism and Humanism connect closely with this attitude. Value tends to become, from these points of view, not merely the guiding principle in practical life, but also in the interpretation of truth. The more pluralistic types of Idealism, such as that of Dr. James Ward, are closely related to the same attitude. But even the Absolutism of such a writer as Dr. Bosanquet assigns a high place to the conception of Value, though it identifies the supreme standard of Value with ultimate Reality. On the whole, it is clear that in all the more idealistic types of philosophy the conception of Value has a

¹ Dr. Bosanquet has well called attention to the way in which this phrase of Wordsworth is liable to be misunderstood.

central position. But the emphasis on Value is hardly less marked in the more realistic schools. One of the most eloquent affirmations of its significance is given in Mr. Russell's account of the Free Man's Worship; and it has also been much emphasized by Professor Alexander, Dr. G. E. Moore, Mr. Santayana, and others. Meinong also, who ought perhaps to be regarded as the chief founder of the neo-realistic school, has contributed a very thorough discussion of the conception of Value; and he has been followed in this by his eminent fellow-worker, Dr. Ehrenfels. The work of Dr. Urban has been largely influenced by them. These Austrian writers are closely connected with Böhm-Bawerk and other representatives of the Austrian School of economists, who have done much to elucidate the conception of Value and its significance from the economic point of view. British economists also have given increasing attention to the determination of value, not exclusively from the point of view of the market. In this they have been to some extent assisted by the pungent criticisms of Ruskin, as well as by the discussions of the philosophical utilitarians. To most of these we shall have occasion to refer more definitely in the sequel. But enough has now been said to indicate the far-reaching significance of the general conception, and to show the importance of gaining, as far as possible, a clear understanding of its meaning.

When we begin to think about Value, one of the first things that are brought to our notice is that our attitude, as human beings, is not one of peaceful attainment, but rather one of effort and strife. We are not "beyond Good and Evil," but are constantly being reminded that one thing is better than another, and that it is often necessary to put forth a strenuous endeavour to secure the better and avoid the worse. The word Value directs attention to this. It is connected with "avail," "valid," "valour," which all imply some striving towards an end that is not yet attained, and that cannot be attained without effort. When Scott asks in *Marmion* "What 'vails the vain knight-errant's brand?" we have an illustration of what is first suggested by the conception. What is valued is what *avails* in the struggle of life, what helps us forward towards some distant goal. No doubt, that goal might be still more highly valued; and we shall have to inquire whether the ultimate value may not be found in some beatific vision in which the soul can find rest. Even in our ordinary life we do find intervals

of repose; yet it seems true to say that most of the things we value are valued for the help they give in a forward movement.

When we consider the terms "valid," "value," and "valour," we see that they correspond pretty closely to what are commonly accepted as the three main aspects of our conscious life—the knowing, the feeling, and the active attitudes. A valid argument is one that avails in the effort to prove; a valiant action is one that avails for the succour of life; a valuable painting is one that is felt to be availing for ends that cannot be so easily characterized. But we shall have to consider at a later stage how far it is correct to represent value as being specially connected with feeling.

It may be well to note here that the term Worth—corresponding, in its origin, to the German *Wert*, but often used rather as equivalent to *Würde*—has some small advantages in comparison with Value. It can be used as an adjective—worth so much, worth more, worth while, etc.—but is not so flexible and much more ambiguous, being often used with reference to personal qualities that are strictly *invaluable*; as in the expression, "Worth makes the man." It may have some connection with *werden*, to become, and, if so, may be regarded as conveying a certain suggestion of growth—as in the phrase "Woe worth the day," i.e., woe has come of the day. But this is very doubtful, if not even certainly erroneous.² At any rate, it is somewhat fanciful to dwell much, as Carlyle and Ruskin were rather fond of doing, upon these verbal suggestions. They do not carry us very far; but some of them may furnish us with a convenient starting point, and may thus avail a little. They serve at least to remind us that a great deal of what we value, or what we regard as having worth, is not to be regarded as anything in which we can finally rest, but only as something that is useful as a stage in our growth. What we are growing towards, what is the goal to which we strive, is not so easy to discern.

What is thus valued, as helping us on our way forward, is generally desired. Food for instance, is desired as an instrument of growth and preservation; and what is thus desired we think of as being good. But often we desire things and think of them as good without reference to the way in which

² Etymologists seem to agree that the two uses of "worth" have no real connection with each other.

they avail or help us. Many people, for instance, have a craving for drink, and regard it as good, even though they may know very well that it does not really help them. Spinoza, as we have already noted, generalized this attitude by saying that we do not desire things because they are good, but rather we consider things to be good because we desire them. With this may be compared the saying of Aristotle, that the good has been well characterized as that at which all things aim. In such a case it would be erroneous to say that such things have value, if we mean by value what really helps us. Yet we can hardly avoid saying that we value them. Hence it is of some importance to distinguish between what *has value* and what we *value*. Valuation (*Wertung*) is not always coincident with value (*Wert*); or, in Sidgwick's language, what is *desired* is not always *desirable*. When Nietzsche spoke of the "transvaluation of all values" (*Umwertung aller Werte*), we must understand him to mean an alteration in our valuations, not a change in the values themselves; though, of course, by a change of circumstances, this also might be brought about.

From what has now been stated it appears that what has true value, or what is really good, is not simply to be identified with what is desired or chosen, but only with what is chosen after careful reflection, or, in other words, with that which is an object of rational choice. In order to understand this qualification more clearly, it may be well to compare it with the way in which Kant sought to determine what is right in human conduct. He urged that, in order to determine whether a particular line of action is right, we have to ask ourselves whether, after careful reflection, we could wish that every one else, under similar circumstances, should adopt the same line of action. In like manner, we may say that we are entitled to regard anything as truly good or really valuable when we not merely desire it for ourselves but approve of its being desired, under similar conditions, by every one else. Even with this proviso, we may still be mistaken. A man who has a craving for drink may think it right both for himself and for others to gratify such a craving; and in this he may be quite mistaken. But, if he genuinely thinks this, he is really *valuing* and not merely desiring; but his valuing may still be in need of transvaluation. Such transvaluation would have to be brought about by *objective* considerations, not merely by subjective reflection. It might be brought about, for instance, by medical advice or

by personal investigation of the influence of particular liquors on health, on capacity for work, and other vital considerations.

It may be well at this point to consider somewhat more definitely the significance of Nietzsche's phrase about the "transvaluation of values." What he had in mind was the kind of transformation that is apt to take place in our desires when there is some alteration in our general outlook upon the world. In another connection,³ I have referred to such transformations as changes in our "universe of desires." The point is that our desires and valuations are not, in general, isolated aspects of our conscious life, but hang together and form a more or less coherent system. An Indian sage and a British speculator on the Stock Exchange have not merely different desires and valuations, but their whole outlook on life is different; so that the desires of the one could hardly be made to fit into the consciousness of the other without a complete transformation of the general outlook. Such transformations do take place from time to time. A person on holiday or in a foreign country is sometimes a very different being from the same person at work among his normal surroundings. There is often a considerable change in a young man when he leaves school and goes to College, or when he leaves College and enters upon some professional work. John Bunyan may never have been quite as wicked as he would have us believe; but it is pretty certain that he enjoyed some things before his conversion which would not have had much appeal for him afterwards. The death of a friend, a failure in business, marriage, the winning of a fortune, may bring about similar changes in desires and valuations. And it is not only in isolated individuals that such changes occur. It is probably not an exaggeration to say that the outlook of whole nations before the European War was considerably different from what it has subsequently become. At any rate, it is not difficult to see that there have been several epochs in the past in which such transformations have taken place.

One of the most notable instances of such transvaluations would appear to have begun in various countries about six centuries before the Christian era. We might perhaps even say that it was about that time that definite valuations on a large scale first began. It is doubtful at least whether much before that time there was any clear appreciation of the great

³ *Manual of Ethics*, Book I, Chap. I.

conceptions of Truth, Beauty and Goodness. They were brought to light through the political, religious, literary, philosophical and artistic developments that gradually arose in Egypt, Babylonia, Judæa, India, and other countries, and that reached their culmination in Greece between the years 600 and 300 B.C. Before that time, no doubt, there were appreciations of sensuous joys and pains, there were superstitious terrors and adulations, there was the glory of power and there was slavish prostration before it, and there were sporadic glimpses of what are now recognized as the higher values. But the advance that was made within the three centuries to which I have referred seems to have been so great that everything that has happened since, so far as it concerns the apprehension of the higher values, appears comparatively trivial. We have hardly succeeded in recapturing the visions of beauty that were then created; our apprehension of truth has been extended in detail, but not much deepened in its more essential features; it is only in goodness that we can lay claim to any striking development, and even then with some hesitation. Such a growth in the recognition of the higher values as then took place must have involved great transvaluations. The things previously valued must have seemed trivial and almost contemptible. Men in general—at least those who had any real share in the progress that was made (doubtless a somewhat limited number)—must have felt pretty much as the prisoners did whom Plato describes as emerging from the subterranean cavern and coming out into the light of day.

The next change that may be regarded as having a similarly far-reaching character was that which took place at the beginning of the Christian era; and this concerned almost exclusively the appreciation of goodness. It was not an altogether sudden change. Much of the deepening that took place in the valuation of goodness had been to some extent anticipated in India, Judæa, Greece, and elsewhere; but it can hardly be questioned that the spread of Christianity had a more potent influence than any previous movement of a similar kind. And it is very clear in this case that what was at first brought about was a thorough transvaluation. The obvious way in which it had to be characterized was by the metaphor of re-birth. The “natural man” had to be re-born as the “spiritual”; and, at least at first, all that was previously valued seemed almost worthless. The “kingdom of heaven” was sharply set up against the realm of

Cæsar; the virtues of the Greeks began to look like "splendid vices," and those of the Pharisees like mere hypocrisy; the "beauty of holiness" superseded all other graces; and "the Truth" made all particular truths seem worthless. This was all probably the most complete transvaluation that has ever been known in the history of the world; and it may be said to have worked itself out in Europe throughout a period of more than ten centuries, though of course it never prevailed among more than a limited section of the people. Its general significance is best expressed in the Beatitudes, in which lowliness, meekness, and adversity are set above the more forceful and triumphant modes of life. Goethe characterized it as the *Worship of Sorrow*.

Then we come to the two great movements that are commonly referred to as the Renaissance and the Reformation. These two movements were to a certain extent opposed to each other. The former meant mainly a return to the Greek and Roman valuations; whereas the latter was, on the whole, an attempt to revive the decaying spirit of Christianity. But the general result was to bring about some degree of conciliation between the two ideals. The Hellenism of the Renaissance was saturated with Christian feeling; and the Christianity of the Reformation contained a considerable infusion of the Greek ideas of political freedom and rational investigation. I do not mean, of course, that this could be affirmed of every individual who was associated with either of these movements; but it seems clear that it became more and more true in the course of their development. Hence the valuations that were characteristic of this period must, on the whole, be regarded as being different both from those of ancient Greece and from those of primitive Christianity.

Next we find in Europe a period that is largely characterized, on the practical side, by rebellion and revolution, culminating in the great English rebellion and in the great Revolution in France; and, on the more speculative side, by intellectual doubt, best represented by Voltaire and Hume. This period corresponds to a considerable extent to that of the Sophists in Greece and, in practical life, to the type of Liberty and Equality represented in Plato's sketch of the Democratic State. But the modern doubts were more carefully reasoned and more limited in scope than their older prototypes; and most of our modern democrats, by adding Fraternity, have greatly transformed

their outlook in theory, though in practice the difference is perhaps not very conspicuous.

The next period may be best characterized as that of the Superman. Goethe in Germany, Napoleon in France, Byron in England, are types of the potent personalities that now began to appear on the stage of history, men of titanic force, largely free from conventional restraints and carried on by "demonic" impulses to great achievements. Wagner became the musical exponent of this tendency, and Carlyle in his doctrine of Heroes brought out its more philosophical significance. In a more extreme form it shows itself in the utterances of Walt Whitman and Nietzsche; the latter of whom, as we have already noted, sought to explain the transvaluations that are implied in it. Many other names might also be mentioned, such as those of Schopenhauer and Emerson, who help to connect this heroic attitude with the Eastern identification of man with God, commonly expressed in the formula "*tat tuam asi*." The megalomania of the Emperor William II. is perhaps rightly regarded as having some connection with the same attitude of mind. The whole character of this period may be taken as a confirmation of Plato's contention that a certain kind of tyranny tends to grow out of extreme democracy; but in this case both the democracy and the tyranny were more theoretical than practical. Carlyle thought of the general movement as an attempt to return to an Age of Faith after the doubts of the eighteenth century; but, if so, the result may be taken as an illustration of the saying that "the kingdom of heaven suffereth violence, and the violent take it by force." Goethe, no doubt, attained eventually to an almost statuesque calm; but Matthew Arnold's characterization of him is perhaps not altogether misleading:

"He was happy if to know
Causes of things, and far below
His feet to see the lurid flow
Of terror and insane distress
And headlong fate, be happiness."

Emerson may have reached a more genuine serenity; but few at least of the others did. It remained, on the whole, a period of "storm and stress," in which many of the old valuations were thrown aside.

It is generally felt that the great War ought to mark the beginning of a new epoch; and Reconstruction has been accepted as its watchword. Of course, all periods have had their wreck-

age; and in all ages there have been some attempts to reconstruct; but there are certainly grounds for hoping that this great catastrophe may serve to give new vigour to such efforts. It is customary at least to date the successive periods in human history from such terrible events. What we may hope is that, as the preceding epoch was one of impressive characters and struggling nationalities, the new era may be one rather of co-operation in the pursuit of a common good. If so, it may be apt to seem somewhat commonplace. Its motto will be that which Browning expressed in *Paracelsus*—"Make no more giants, Lord, but elevate the race at once." Neither men nor nations must seek to achieve any proud eminence over others. In this respect at least, it would involve a return to the Christian ideal—"If any would be chief among you, let him be your servant." No doubt, this ideal has never been altogether absent since the beginning of the Christian era. It was not even entirely unknown before that time. The highest type of man recognized in India has long been that of the renunciant. Plato's supreme rulers were to be without all the goods that are commonly prized. The true self-lover, according to Aristotle, is ready to give up everything—even the opportunity for noble action—to his friends, reserving only for himself the consciousness of having done what is right. And, of course, the Superman has also been thought of by many as a renunciant. "*Stirb und Werde*," "Die to live," was the motto of Goethe. Walt Whitman desired to have no privilege for which every one else might not have an equivalent. If there is to be anything really new in the ideal of the coming time, it will presumably be a deeper sense of the need for active co-operation, not only between individuals, but between groups and nations. The conception of co-operative groups is one that has not yet been made adequately effective; and that is what we now have the opportunity of developing in all sorts of new directions. This also will involve some transformation of human valuations.

The changes that take place in our valuations do not, however, imply any transmutation of the values themselves. The change is chiefly in the emphasis that we lay upon them. We cannot invent values; we can only discover them. On the other hand, it has to be recognized that most values are relative. There is some soul of goodness in things evil; and even things that are not counted evil depend for their values on the conditions in which they occur. The value of food, for example, is relative

to the need of the person who takes it. Not only is it often true that "one man's meat is another man's poison," but, even for the same man, what is wholesome under certain conditions is not wholesome under others. Similarly, the higher values are subject to certain changes. A glimpse of truth which is of great value at one stage of intellectual development may, at a higher stage, be seen to be erroneous or misleading. Artistic values are liable to similar variations. A simple fairy tale may be artistically better for a child than *Hamlet* or *Faust*. Goodness also is not the same for all times and for all peoples. A degree of self-assertion that is commendable in a man who has knowledge and genius might be highly reprehensible in one more ignorant or less capable. . . .

J. S. MACKENZIE: *Ultimate Values*, pp. 91-111. Reprinted by permission of Hodder & Stoughton, Ltd., London.

SUGGESTIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Make a list of the various words which are closely related to value and give a brief definition of each.
2. Explain why the term value has come into general use among philosophers to replace other terms having a similar meaning.
3. Is Mackenzie's interpretation of Nietzsche's idea of the transvaluation of all values the only interpretation which could be given of that idea? Can you suggest another?
4. Suggest other periods in human history in which highly significant transvaluations were made.
5. What evidences are there in support of Mackenzie's theory that such a transvaluation is now taking place as a result of the World War?
6. What do you think of the distinction between valuation and values? Would you agree with Mackenzie that values are objective realities? If so, are they mental or physical realities or are they both non-mental and non-physical? Discuss their relation to the illusory objects dealt with above by Sheldon.
7. What would you think of calling values "tertiary qualities" of objects, following the distinction between primary and secondary qualities mentioned by Kemp Smith and Carr above? What do you think Mackenzie would think of this description of values?

II. THE GREAT DIVIDE IN THE THEORY OF VALUE, by Wilbur M. Urban

Analysis

Urban holds that the *Great Divide* is between those who treat value as a subjective addition to reality and those who treat it as a part of

or even as the essence of reality itself. It is a mistake to look at this as a special case of the opposition between realism and idealism. Yet there is a connection between the *Great Divide* in theory of value and in metaphysics generally. For realists, however they may differ among themselves on the question of the nature of value, do tend to regard values as additions to reality. Idealists, on the other hand, although differing considerably in the ways in which they define value, all agree in holding it to be part of the very nature of reality. Yet, in spite of this *Great Divide* there is hope of bringing the extreme views together. We must admit that value and reality are not identical. This is the truth in the realist's position. But we must also admit that value and reality are inseparable. This is the truth in the idealist's view. Does this leave us with an irreducible dualism, beyond which the human intellect can never penetrate? In one sense, no. All philosophical knowledge rests on the assumption that reality is a realm in which fact and value are inseparable. We can know this axiom and more and more its truth is being admitted. In another sense, however, there is a mystery about ultimate reality. Mystic experience alone can give us the reality in which fact and value are one. Abstract reasoning can never reach it. Simmel's words are true: "An element of mysticism is an inevitable characteristic of every first-rate modern mind."

On ultimate metaphysical questions, there is a Great Divide in modern value theory and the nature of this divide is perfectly clear. It is between those who hold that value is a subjective *addendum* to reality and those who hold that it is part of the nature of anything, or, indeed, the essence of reality.

It is tempting to say that this is merely the divide between realism and idealism and that the fundamental oppositions in philosophy have simply restated themselves in value terms. In a certain sense this is so, and, from the point of view of the larger issues of metaphysics, this is the important point. But the issue is not quite so simple as this. It is precisely because of the complexity at this point that the value problem is the most difficult problem of metaphysics.

The differences of opinion among realists are, to be sure, themselves significant. There are those, as we have seen, who incline to the view that value is a psychological character which the object acquires only by a relation to the liking or disliking of a sentient subject. There are those who regard value as an indefinable quality that attaches to existences in the same way that natural qualities such as sense qualities attach to objects. There are those, finally, who hold that values attach to essences rather than to existences, either physical or mental. Despite these differences, all agree, it is true, in being realistic in a certain popular sense, namely, in rejecting the fundamental

thesis of the axiologists, that value is in any sense an ultimate character or condition of existence and of our knowledge of existents.

Like the realists, the idealists also disagree on important points. There are those who hold that values exist only in and for persons and deprecate what they call the talk about values *in abstracto*, rather than about valuing selves. Others hold that values are over-individual and impersonal and that there are absolute values acknowledged, but in no sense created or determined by valuing selves. Yet here again, despite these important differences, all are idealists in a significant sense. All see in value not a subjective *addendum*, but an ultimate character and condition of existence, part of the very nature of the perceptual, the æsthetic, and the historical object. *For all* the recognition that the very givenness of objects and their existence itself involves valuation, is the first step towards an adequate theory both of value and of reality.

This then is the *Great Divide*. Between the two views a great gulf seems to be fixed. And yet the gulf is, I am disposed to think, not wholly impassable. In the impressive "meeting of extremes in modern philosophy," idealists and realists may apparently at least signal across it. The recognition by many, in both camps, of the objective character of value and significance, however varied the terminology, suggests that up to a point, at least, they speak a common language. It is because of these hopeful signs that the character of this divide should be clearly understood.

That which is clear, to most of us at least, is that while value and reality cannot be identical, they are certainly no strangers to each other. Let us consider the first part of this proposition.

The ought and the is,—value and existence,—are and must be different. If value and existence, norm and reality, were identical, there would be an end to valuation. The alternative character of valuation, affirmation, and negation, presupposes this difference. If a merely natural necessity guided the mind only to sound conclusions, there would be no logical appreciation of true and false; if the natural process of motivation realized positive values in all volition and conduct, there would be no ethical appreciation of good and bad; if in every creation of nature and of art we had a perfect expression of significant content, there would be no æsthetic appreciation. The very fact of valuation necessarily implies a certain dualism of the valuable

and the valueless in reality. It is for this reason, as we have seen, that on the assumption that logic deals only with existents, the value judgment becomes a logical monstrosity.

The meaning of the ought and the is can then not be identical; the relation of value to reality cannot be one of complete identity. Neither, on the other hand, can the two meanings be entirely different. This is equally unintelligible. Examination of both the subjects and predicates of value judgments shows this. The predicates contain in their very meaning that bearing of essence on existence without which they become unintelligible. The subjects of value judgments involve evaluation so completely in the very constitution of their nature and meaning that to separate value and reality here leads to nonsense, to the unmeaning. With equal truth it may then be said that value and reality are not identical, but that they are also inseparable.

Are we then left with a refractory dualism of two ultimate surds? This is the view of some, for whom in the very nature of the case this final problem is necessarily insoluble. It is, in the words of Windelband, the "sacred mystery" marking the limits of our nature and of our knowledge. That there is an element of mystery here I would be the last to deny. We have here, indeed, as every competent thinker, from Plato to the present, has seen, the last and most difficult problem of human thought. And yet I cannot bring myself to believe that it is wholly insoluble.

I can but state my own general position in this matter, confident, however, that it is not only that to which one is inevitably driven by conscious lines of argument such as the preceding, but that it also represents those deeper convictions to which the less conscious thinking of the period has driven most of those who have been most constantly preoccupied with the value problem.

I hold that there can be no existence without value and no value without existence. Reality is neither mental nor material, but a realm in which thought and thing, fact and value, are inseparable, neither having any existence apart from its correlative. The acknowledgment of this relation is the condition of philosophic intelligibility. To separate value and reality leads to contradiction and unintelligibility. This much is coming to be realized, I think, by the most varied forms of philosophical thinking, by pragmatists and axiologists—by idealists, both subjective and objective; and by implication at least, even

by some forms of realism. The problem of "meaning" is fast becoming, in all quarters, the key-problem of philosophy, and it is becoming increasingly difficult to separate meaning, and its communication, from the values and their acknowledgment which meaning presupposes.

Thus far thought can reach, but I am also disposed to hold that this is as far as it can at present reach. I am, moreover, inclined to think that this limit is generally realized, even if it is not explicitly admitted. It is this tacit admission, moreover, I am inclined to believe, that constitutes the underlying motive of the revival of interest in the mystical element so characteristic of the thought of the present time. The actual "fusion" of value and existence of which Plato speaks, despite the things that make it impossible to identify them for abstract thought, is constantly accomplished in concrete experience. But it can be accomplished only by "trenching on the mystical." I am rather inclined to believe that it is for these very reasons that, in the words of Simmel, "an element of mysticism is an inevitable characteristic of every first-rate modern mind."

WILBUR M. URBAN: *Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy*, pp. 292-295. Edited by E. S. Brightman. Longmans, Green & Co., publishers. Reprinted by permission. Title mine.

SUGGESTIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. List the differences on theory of value among realists.
2. List the differences among idealists.
3. Why must a distinction be made between value and reality?
4. Why must the two realms be regarded as inseparable?
5. What axiom is essential to philosophical knowledge? Compare Urban's view here with the three postulates stated by Hocking above, p. 33.
6. By what means can man penetrate the mystery about fact and value? Compare Urban's view here with Alexander above (p. 122 f.), Bergson (p. 170 ff.).
7. Compare Urban's view of the relation of value to reality with Bradley's view of the relation of truth to reality? Is the argument the same?

III. THE REALITY OF EVIL, by *Bernard Bosanquet*

Analysis

Referring to Hegel's statement that evil is an illusion which prevails in all finite spirits, Bosanquet deals first with the objections to the statement, holding that they are based on a misunderstanding of Hegel's

meaning. Then he tells what he thinks the statement means. He discusses the nature of the bad self, quoting Dante and arguing that the bad self is one which is in conflict with the person's own dominant purpose. The vices of men are habits of their bad self which are in conflict with every possible good will. Good and evil are made out of the same stuff. There is nothing evil by nature. An illustration of this fact is given. Bosanquet then criticizes radical pessimism which is based on the evil facts of life. The pessimist overlooks the goodness in the world which is equally real. Moreover he uses false premises to support his pessimism. Justice, in the sense of dealing with all men alike, is not a law of nature. The idea of compensation in another life is really unethical. Bosanquet then criticizes the proof-text method of settling modern problems involving social evils. He argues that appeals to Scripture neglect the real modern setting of the problems. This is illustrated with the proof-text method of pacifists. Bosanquet insists that human life demands conflict and sacrifice, and he condemns the modern tendency to cushion human existence and make it altogether comfortable for everybody. Yet he denies that he is defending war. He is only condemning a certain type of reasoning on the question of war, which, he thinks, really embodies the kind of prejudice which in the end will give rise to war. He concludes that actual experience shows evil to be swallowed up in good and both to be swallowed up in perfection. In the perfection of the universe man finds an escape from the evils inherent in the very nature of finite existence.

There is a famous passage in which Hegel has said in effect that evil is an illusion which prevails in all finite spirits. Perfection is in reality achieved and does not wait upon you and me to be so, but finite beings cannot see it thus. This is just their task, and the interest which moves the world, to learn to see through the illusion. This saying has proved too hard for many who are not disinclined to reflect profoundly on the problem of evil. The essential objections to justification by faith reappear. "If the whole arrangement, as we see it, is a deception, and our only task is to believe so, the reality of the moral life, of 'works' is unmotivated and abolished, and the illusion falls dead." On the contrary, it is urged, perfection *does* wait upon you and me to be realized; it is always being realized, as alone it can be, *through our works*. Yet the meaning of the passage has always seemed to me simple and convincing, in the light of such facts as we have been reciting. Undoubtedly you are here confronted with what is a plain contradiction to reflective common sense.⁴ In it you are given

⁴ Common sense is practical and deserves all respect. Reflective common sense, or common sense theory, is neither fish nor flesh. "That wildest of all theorists, the practical man," Bonamy Price used to say.

a supreme test of courage and devotion, a supreme adventure. This is what the critics say they desire. They reject and despise a moral holiday; an easy belief, an armchair religion. Well, it seems to me, that here they have their wish. It is a hard test; but it is the supreme test of a man, and yet one . . . to which all sound and whole-hearted men respond, each after his manner. Evil is evil; once more, you have not to palter with this truth; but, all the same, it can be overcome; not at a distance, but now and here; and the secret of overcoming it is to feel that it is overcome, and to treat it practically as a conquered thing. Such is the faith of science in its battle with appearances; it does not suppose some to be intelligible, and some not. If it did, it could not work. And such must be in effect the faith of the good man, if he is in any place or time to overcome the world. He must not suppose that here and there he may light upon an absolute evil which is in principle a separate thing, unresolvable and insuperable. His faith is essentially universal and practical. If it were not universal, it could not be practical. He could not tell at what points he must let evil triumph. The critic rejects this faith on the plea that it is too easy; but we must be forgiven for suspecting that he really finds it too hard. And in a degree, in the progress of the world, you can see your faith justified, and gain sidelights on the nature of evil which reveal to you precisely how, under what conditions, it must be evil, but how also in principle it must continually lend itself to be overcome by good; continually, but, in the finite world, never completely.

One of these sidelights we will consider briefly; for it explains to us something of the nature of evil, and something of the helpfulness of trying to understand it.

What is the nature of the bad self, or the evil will? I have never seen noted the extraordinary boldness with which Dante indicated the fundamental point.

Ché se potuto aveste veder tutto
Mestier non era partorir Maria.⁵

We are not here to pause upon distinctions of intellect and will; the saying is above all that; just as Christ was when he said, "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do." The meaning is simple and is familiar; but is not enough considered. It is the narrowness of man's mind which makes

⁵ "If you (human beings) had been able to see the whole, there would have been no need for Mary to bear a son."—Purg. 3:38.

him do wrong. He desires more than he can deal with; indeed, he aspires to be self-complete. But what he can make his own, as a set of values which do not conflict, is but little. And of what is extruded something refuses to be suppressed and forms a nucleus of rebellion. Thus the good we are able to aim at is narrow and distorted, and more than that, the elements of good which our narrowness forces us to reject lie in ambush to conflict with the good we recognize, itself poor and narrow and so weakened for the struggle. Life and literature are full of examples, and every one knows this in himself. A secondary self is formed out of the conflicting stuff, rebellious, in constant readiness to embarrass and overthrow the will which represents our best. The constituents of this bad self may not be bad; so far as they are positive interests, and in the main there is nothing else they can be, they are not bad in themselves. If a girl goes to work in a hospital when—assume it—she ought to have stayed at home to help her mother, you cannot say that her interest in the hospital is a bad purpose, though she may have been selfish or self-willed in asserting it against a more imperative duty. But, you may say, this is at worst a mistake of judgment, biassed, perhaps, by a desire for freedom. You could not treat it as an example of the bad self. Well, that is the point. The question is harder than it seems at first. You may have, it seems, two conflicting selves, say family duty and a “career,” and it may be impossible to say which you are right in preferring. Then whichever you choose, you may say, you are not bad, but at worst mistaken.

I should agree that this may be so. But the mistake itself, we must remember, comes of narrowness. If we could see completely, or be complete, we should make no mistakes. And thus there is a continuity between such alternatives, and developments in which the bad self is unmistakable. Consider a biassed choice. Let one course be or involve an attachment conflicting with your position as husband or wife, and the other be the normal discharge of your duties in and to the family; and you feel at once the recurrent conflict and discord of the incompatible selves, tearing the mind in two, and tinging the lawless attachment, which may in other respects be the better and the nobler, with the colour of vice and rebellion. Need the lawless course always represent the bad self, and the other the good? Not necessarily; no rules are absolute. I shall recur

in a following chapter to the problem of what is right in conduct.

But the difficulty of judging just illustrates the continuity of the two selves. What is certain is, that there is some self in which we feel that we are doing and willing our best—affirming the greatest values which on the whole we can—and that there is some self, some habit, desire, rebellious temper, course of conduct, in which we know that we are conflicting with our best, and depressing the highest accessible values. Both might be right for us, if we could have both; but we find them to conflict, and thus one of them becomes bad. Why is it bad? Because it is in contradiction with the good. We have amply seen that it may not be bad in itself. It is not true that possible acts and feelings are painted white and black, so to speak, as good and bad in themselves, and that it is our task to choose the white and refuse the black. How easy life would be if this were so!

But from the moment that a habit, a course of conduct, a habitual desire, interferes with our best, lowers our standard, silences or weakens our will to good, then it takes on, so far and for us, the colour of evil, and certainly its own essence seems to become infected, perhaps gradually, by the evil taint, and its own character to change. It is still a positive, but it carries with it a negative, and in willing it we know that we are willing against what is good; we are negating our highest values, affirming their destruction. Is not all this, it may be asked, needlessly hesitating and artificial? Are there not a huge number of moral vices, religious sins, which are condemned by their mere names, and the willing of which, or any of them, is what distinguishes the bad self? We see at once that "*is what distinguishes the bad self*" carries us too far. You can have a very bad self without any distinct and nameable vice. But if you have vice, must you not have *ipso facto* the bad self? Practically, no doubt, it would be so as a rule. The case seems to be that vices are habits whose names are taken to imply a collision with every possible good will. Sloth, cruelty, jealousy, cowardice, lust, these are judged when their names are applied. But, of course, not all actions which look like them merit these names.

We apply them roughly and provisionally by an average external standard. But we ought not to affirm the condemnation they convey without grave reflection; and perhaps,

ultimately, not about others at all. For it is the opposition to the good will that makes the passion or habit a vice. And it cannot be pure opposition; there can no more be an opposition without a positive value behind it, than there can be a denial without a positive reason behind it. There is at the root of the opposition some positive need or desire which, if we could have united it with our main set of values, would have added value to them. But because owing to our narrowness we cannot, we are bound to suppress it, and it fights against suppression, and so far as unsuppressed it is vicious. And to many a bad self, in its main outline, you cannot apply the habitual appellation of vice. It has not taken a form which is antagonistic to every possible good will, but only one which is antagonistic to my special good will here and now. You cannot name an hour of rising in the morning to be later than which constitutes sloth; that is, is indolence incompatible with any good will. The man may be a night worker. But not to rise at six, if I am able, and bound by my vocation, to do so, is certainly of evil; and the habit of failing to do it would, in that case, prove a nucleus of bad ways and contribute to debilitate the will.

It is not necessary to dwell on the subject and its complications at greater length. The principle is clear. And returning to the proposition from which we started, we now understand, not that evil *is* good, but that it is made out of the same stuff as good; the stuff of life, its passions and values. It is evil when it is evil, that is, when it is antagonistic to good, and impairs our values or the will to them. But the same stuff is not evil in its positive nature, and the gain from understanding this is that we see how, in the actual moral progress, it can be overcome and overruled by good. Remove the exclusiveness which limits the good, give a man or a people freedom and opportunity, and much which was wrong will come right. A wider stuff will be reconcilable with the good will, a stuff which would otherwise have turned to poison and hatred. The student's tendency is not really to call evil good because of its apparent results, but where you find good in the result to look for the good in the cause. The pessimist's view of causation is generally indiscriminating. Only, the finite is finite, and can never cease to err. The step it gains, the stuff with which it widens its will to value, becomes a basis for new contradictions and new vices. Women—it is not the

only aspect of the question, but that it is a real one I fear there is no doubt—women become comfortable and economically independent—a manifest gain—and then a new terror assails society. They rebel against bearing children. Some of their reasons, we may admit, are very likely sound, but sheer selfishness is surely one of them.

Thus, as in the old controversy, "good works" are a necessary token of "saving faith," and indicate how good is present in the stuff of life. But it is not the works of finite beings which constitute the divine perfection; nor is it the fact of moral progress, though a clue to the weakness of evil, which constitutes the perfection of the universe. Rational and necessary though it is, there is no steeper and braver adventure than the faith of religion that in the perfection of the universe we have our own.

The proposition we have been discussing, that evil is "absolutely real," is closely akin to a proposition expressed or implied in much popular argument. It is this, that pessimism alone is faithful to "the facts." You gather together some of the horrors which any newspaper will furnish, and you conclude from them that what these people experience is Reality—they are the persons best qualified to have experience, and so forth. The attitude is quite common, and is usually attended by a good deal of arrogance and self-laudation. "We have no prejudice; we are not to be blinded; we see things not *couleur de rose*, but as they are."

Those who see differently, who look steadily at the great values of life, while denying none of its hazards and hardships, are treated as if what they saw in some way did not exist, as if, when you come to look at a great vista of things in their connection and significance, you in some way depart from reality and enter a province of shadow and illusion.

Pretty plainly there is here prejudice and superstition. What is its nature and motive? Shakespeare gives us the first clue. The temper is unintelligent, because malicious. "Love speaks with better knowledge, and knowledge with dearer love." Your care and interest must be wide if your intelligence is to be so. Take even the facts as balanced each to each, and say, what is ridiculously false, that they are equal on either side, the disvalues and the values. Even so; it would be sheer malice to say of the disvalues, these *are the facts, are the reality*. And of course the supposition is ridiculous. The world is full

of greatness, beauty, and love. Its tragedy—its hazard and hardship—is the price it pays for its freedom. You cannot have finite beings at a cheaper rate, so far as we can possibly understand.

But why these particular sufferers? Here is another prejudice—that justice, the equal dealing with individuals, is an ultimate law of things. Plainly it is not so. It is not so in any community, and only prejudice suggests that it should be so in the world. You cannot assert it, while admitting any individual difference at all, without being back in the old absurdity of compensation. It is of course impossible to dogmatize about the probability of a future life as a fact; but to make religion rest upon it as an instrument of compensation and as a reason for assuming a God to guarantee it, is to degrade religion to an egoistic level and deny the unity of spirits. We shall never get a popular conception of religion that is clear and sane until this perpetual hankering after a future life as a means of recompense is laid to rest. A man who is radically unhappy and out of tune with his world must probably in any case be made again and made different before he could be happy in another life. Why not simply say, “He has served his turn; he has at least explored a *cul-de-sac* of life, and tempered the world-experience by a significant negation; let him rest, and a different being take his place”?

A very popular case of this pessimism is expressed in some such saying as, “Why not try Christianity?” or “Try the religion of Christ” (implying an opposition to *de facto* Christendom). This throws a strong light on the prejudice in question. A well-known publicist headed a pamphlet with the supposition, “If Christ came to Chicago—” Another, I believe, offered as a completion of the sentence, “If Christ came to Chicago, he would see something he had never seen before, and that is a great city.”

The idea that a better life for modern peoples than that existing to-day could be evolved directly from a few unharmonized texts of Scripture, belonging to an age when no such life was possible, is of a piece with the blind pessimism we were considering. Heaven knows, the problems of modern life are difficult enough, however freely and sanely you may approach them. But if you make dealing with them a meeting point of extremes between the fanaticism of one-sided morality and the superstition of text-worshipping religiosity, their solution,

which was arduous before, has simply become inconceivable. Every one must be struck, I think, by the incredibly low level of all public discussions in which appeals to Scripture figure on either side. The reason is plain. In order to make full use of human experience you must start freely and frankly from your present position as a whole, and give to all special or historical suggestions just the value to which their rank in presence of that whole is found on discussion to entitle them. It is not only that the attention is wrongly focussed and the mind is wearied and irritated when you treat as important, for example, the texts in the Bible about marriage, and so initiate a controversy which is wholly irrelevant to the present problem of marriage law and divorce. The greater evil is that in repelling the false pretence of authority you are apt to be misled into supposing that you have refuted the substantive reasons which it was foolishly employed to corroborate. And a plain and open discussion on the merits, on the arrangements which are best for modern society in view of the freedom and happiness of men and women, is a thing hardly to be attained.

So with the whole of the Sermon on the Mount. It belongs, surely to those early aphorisms which occur to gifted hearts and minds from the beginning of recorded culture and before the stress of life had created the setting in which their main difficulty will consist. It is easy and pleasant to rest in the contemplation of such sayings. But the work of spiritual progress lies in perfecting the possibilities they suggest through the innumerable strains and stresses of a complex life. And through this process their value is not diminished, but reaches higher levels as the life to which it is a clue becomes profounder.

I take a simple example. The incredibly low level at which all popular discussion of the rightness and wrongness of war is carried on seems to me ultimately to be determined by a single false assumption. It is the assumption that love has only a single form, and excludes all use of force and all strife between those whom it unites; in other terms, that it manifests itself externally in gentleness and non-resistance only, and has no other word to say. The doctrine seems to me to be false, mean, and shallow. Love does not aim at the pleasure or ease of its object; it aims at his salvation. For its manifestation the whole gamut of passion and action is there, and it burns with the flame which the contact demands and speaks in the language

which will be understood. It has become a cheap old jest to say, "To punish you hurts me more than it hurts you"; but it is one of the mischiefs of our vulgar literature that the caricatures of deep but dangerous truths are found so piquant that the truths themselves are discredited. All deep truths are dangerous; but to live therefore with none but shallow truths is degrading and rots the soul away.

Love which avails itself of this truth to the full—and no day passes in any social bond without its doing so in part, and war is such a bond—assumes of course a terrible burden of *bona fides* as against temptations to hatred. Still, we may see it on the whole triumphant over the difficulty. The courage of hate and anger, as already the pagan knew, is a hideous and bestial courage. The true warrior is the knight of the holy spirit, and in the modern soldier at his best we find more than traces of his temper.

Now of course it may be said, "You are jesuitically defending war, separating the intention from the act." I should reply that this is just a case of the prejudice I am attacking. I have not defended war. I have, on the contrary, explained the general type of its prevention. I have only advocated the first principles of any rational discussion on the subject. If you wish to be rational, you must discuss how to avoid it, not condemn it when you have made it unavoidable. The love of man, and of God if you come to that, is a passion for achieving the highest values and the best life for all—in a word, salvation. The idea of attempting this without being ready to face pain and sacrifice is almost blasphemous. Do we really think we are to enter into life just as we happen to grow, without experience of conflict and discipline? It would be a way out, in some degree, if the conflict and discipline in which we take a part could always end with our own particular suffering and not involve that of others. But men have known since reflection began, that this is an absurdity. The unity of man forbids it. You cannot attack an evil nor achieve a good without inconveniencing some one, and the natural man resents being inconvenienced, and never more than if, rightly or wrongly, the interference aims at his salvation. Of course you want to hurt any one as little as possible. But you cannot make it a principle that no one is to be hurt at all.

No recurrence to ancient creeds will help us, except in as far as all suggestions have continually to be considered. The

point at which we stand is the outcome of our best efforts, and in any case it is from this point, and it can be from no other, that our advance has to be made. It is not "doubting the reality of evil" to say that both in actual progress, by sight, and in the whole by faith, we are assured of its subordination to good, and of the absorption, if we could see the whole, of both, together with our finiteness which is the cause of their antagonistic existences, in perfection.

BERNARD BOSANQUET: *Some Suggestions in Ethics*, pp. 103-125. Reprinted by permission of Macmillan & Co., Ltd., London. (Some footnotes omitted.)

SUGGESTIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Why do people object to Hegel's saying? What false interpretation does Bosanquet think critics put on it?
2. What does Bosanquet say Hegel meant?
3. What explanation of the evil self does Bosanquet give? What is your opinion of it? Is it in line with modern psychology, judging from what you know of modern psychology? Do you know a modern psychological theory which uses essentially the same principle of explanation?
4. Does Bosanquet deny that particular evils exist? Does he justify all of them? Does he reconcile them with the perfection of the universe?
5. Give your own reaction to Bosanquet's criticism of the proof-text method of settling modern social problems. Is this method often used by ministers and others? Do you think it will ever cease to be used?
6. What do you think Bosanquet's own attitude toward war is? Is he an advocate of the theory that might makes right? Is he a pacifist?

PART THREE: REALISM

CHAPTER I

A SKETCH OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF REALISM

I. CURRENT REALISM, by *Roy Wood Sellars*

Analysis

Sellars first gives the setting of realism. He insists that it is an older tradition in philosophy than Absolute Idealism, and that it has recently been revived to meet the needs of modern science. Idealism's strength is rapidly waning because it is really hostile to the scientific spirit. He then gives a brief account of English realism, which began with Moore's *Refutation of Idealism*. Moore's distinction between the mental act of awareness and the object of which the mind is aware, and his insistence that the latter is entirely independent of the former, constitute his most characteristic doctrine. This doctrine has been most influential in the development of English realism as distinct from American. Sellars then turns to Russell and sketches his contributions to logic. Russell deserves great credit for introducing mathematical methods into philosophy. In his theory of mind Russell leans toward the neutralism view of American realists. (See above, p. 36 ff.). Sellars next refers to the work of Samuel Alexander, who follows Moore in his theory of knowledge, but who has made a unique contribution to metaphysics in his theory of the gradual emergence of various levels or qualities from an original Space-Time matrix. The discussion of English realism ends with a list of other realists and their writings, among whom Laird and Broad are the most important (see the selections from these writers in Pt. I, Chs. I and IV). American realism is divided into two chief schools—the new realists and the critical realists. Sellars belongs to the latter school. The former have developed a different theory than Moore and they deny the existence of any mental act. Consciousness is simply the response of an organism to its environment and the content of consciousness is the real stuff of nature, which remains unchanged when it enters the field of consciousness. Critical realism is partly a protest against the new realism, but it arose at about the same time as a part of the opposition to idealism. Critical realism has a definition of consciousness as a peculiar realm of bodily organization. The differences between this view and that of the new realists and the English realists are briefly indicated. Critical realism is then distinguished from the old representative realism of John Locke. Sellars ends his discussion by pointing out the similarities between the three important types of modern realism.

It is natural to divide current realistic doctrines in the English-speaking world in some measure along national lines because, when all is said, those who live together and know each other personally influence each other most strongly. Philosophy is international and yet in its growth bears the marks of its social environment. If a certain thinker makes an analysis, he is apt to be followed therein by those who come directly under his influence. There is in this the unavoidable effect of personal prestige. Thus we shall see that the English realists have usually had a somewhat different notion of mind and mental acts than have Americans. To what does this go back? Perhaps to the influence of G. E. Moore and Russell, and perhaps from them to the work of Meinong and Brentano. In this matter, the American tradition has followed James, Hume, Mach and, perhaps, the empirical psychological and biological outlook.

There is, in short, a characteristic convergence in each country of international and intranational influences. The English thinker will not be surprised at this fact if he will bear in mind the differences between Oxford and Cambridge in these matters. Of course, we must not oversimplify the situation for there are exceptions to test the rule. Thus Mr. Russell has both influenced American thought and been in turn influenced by it. His book, *The Analysis of Mind*, illustrates this interaction very well. But, in Mr. Broad, we cannot fail to note the effects of inbreeding.

We must not forget that realism is, after all, a very old tradition in philosophy, far older than the idealism which submerged it during the latter half of the nineteenth century. This is not the place to investigate the reasons for this temporary submergence, and I shall content myself with pointing out the fact. Cartesianism passed into Lockian representative realism and thence into sensationalism. Was this a degeneration, or an advance, or something of both? In any case, English philosophy lost its vitality and fell a prey to Kant and Hegel. Perhaps, there was much in the *Zeitgeist* of romanticism and in the struggle with the inordinate claims of a mechanistic science of a reductive type to reënforce this turn which philosophy took and to give idealism a strength which is already seeming curious to the present generation.

But such an historical study is not my present task. The plain fact seems that idealism was not equal to its task. It

did not face up to the facts discovered by the sciences, and seemed to consider itself an escape from their pressure. Dissatisfaction was certain to manifest itself.

This dissatisfaction expressed itself at almost the same moment in personal idealism of a pluralistic type, in pragmatism, and in realism. The spell was broken, and a new wave of thought swept over men's minds. Thinkers who were not by nature disciples came to philosophy with the problems of the sciences in their minds and with something of its logical technique controlling their methods of approach. They felt the need of a basic reformulation, of a fresh start. It was their task to analyze, reflect, and analyze again, yet always with some attention to the larger setting. Until the biographies of this generation are written, we shall not know the full forces which directed philosophy along realistic lines; but some of us can make a shrewd guess as to their nature. We must not, of course, make the mistake of assuming that too great a homogeneity of outlook existed. The influence of a plastic naturalism is evident in some; in others, we find an almost Platonic note.

So much for the setting of realism. We must now pass to our promised survey of actual positions. And I think it will be best to begin with the English phase of the movement. While the swing toward realism was practically contemporaneous on the two sides of the Atlantic, the formulation of it in England was more precise and clear-cut. American thought was more experimental and varied. Another reason for beginning with the English development is the recognition accorded to Mr. Russell's work in mathematical logic by the American new realists. Their theory of analysis seems to have been built up largely upon it as a foundation.

Mr. G. E. Moore fired what is usually considered the opening gun of the attack upon idealism in his essay entitled, "The Refutation of Idealism." This was published in *Mind* in 1903 and has been reprinted with nine other essays of his in a book called *Philosophical Essays*, dated 1922. Mr. Moore, who is now professor of mental philosophy in the University of Cambridge, has not been a prolific writer but has been very influential. He owes this influence to his painstaking analysis of problems, his refusal to be satisfied with the superficial. Whether he has shown as much power in construction is doubtful. But he might well reply to a critic that he was persuaded

that the first task was that of analysis since the foundation had first of all to be laid.

The distinction upon which Mr. Moore puts so much stress is characteristic of this English type of realism. It is that between the mental act of awareness and the object of that act. He speaks of this mental act as a sensation because he has in mind its difference from thought of a more developed kind. He argues that the mistake of the idealist has been the assumption that what we are aware of is the content of our sensations, an inseparable aspect of them. But such a position, he maintains, involves a denial that we can be *aware* of anything. The idealist is logically involved in solipsism. In contrast, Moore stresses the basic importance of a relation which he calls "awareness of anything." Every experience includes this factor. It is that which justifies us in calling any fact mental. This doctrine of a transparent cognitive relation which is mental but is not itself the object of a mental act stands out as a thesis which had tremendous influence upon other English realists. It gave a simple structure to their analysis of cognition. The act of awareness is mental, the object is not necessarily so; and the object is unmodified by this act of apprehension.

Those who wish to read a characteristic exposition of his views at the present time should read his statement of them in the *Second Series of Contemporary British Philosophy*, which is entitled, "A Defense of Common Sense."

Whether this distinction between act and object was suggested by Brentano and Meinong or was worked out by himself I do not know. His development of it is, however, peculiar to himself and had its influence upon Alexander, Broad, Laird and Russell.

Bertrand Russell has probably been the most conspicuous figure of the English movement. He owes his prominence to various factors among which we may mention his pioneer work in the fusion of mathematics and logic. It would, I think, be generally granted that his contributions to symbolic logic were marked by careful scholarship and ripe reflection. We would select for special mention *Principles of Mathematics*, *Principia Mathematica* (with A. N. Whitehead), and *Our Knowledge of the External World*. In the domain of theory of knowledge, his little book, *The Problems of Philosophy*, helped to direct attention to a position very similar to

Moore's. Mr. Russell has been a prolific writer, seemingly able to touch upon almost every subject and gifted with a strikingly clear style. His very virtuosity may have robbed us of systematic works comparable to his *Principles of Mathematics*. His latest definitely philosophical contribution is his *Analysis of Mind*. In it he shows a swing in the direction of the American approach in so far as it took its departure from William James's famous essay, "Does Consciousness Exist?" The psychological position called behaviorism has also exerted influence upon him. In our summary discussion of Russell it will be best to confine our attention to his logic and to his view of mind.

In his contribution to the *First Series of Contemporary British Philosophy*, Russell describes his philosophy as logical atomism, preferring this description to that of realism. He has always stressed the importance of relations for logic and for our thought of reality. The tendency to monism in the past is, he believes, due in no small measure to the emphasis upon the subject-attribute structure. Logical atomism means distinction of *type* in facts and propositions. Terms must not be confused with relations. They are distinct and irreducible. Logic is the study of recurrent forms. The influence of mathematics is shown in his adoption of the expression, "propositional function," for the logical form which contains variables which may be replaced by specific terms. "X is mortal" is a favorite instance of such a propositional function. In place of X we may put Socrates or Wilson or John Smith.

It is his contention that a large number of the paradoxes which afflicted philosophy were due to bad logic and bad mathematics. On the whole, he seems to have established this contention, though it is probable that the last word has not been said in mathematical theory upon infinite numbers and upon continuity. This incursion of mathematical methods into philosophy has been most stimulating and useful.

In his theory of knowledge, Russell has moved from a position akin to that of Brentano and Meinong to one which approaches American neo-realism. He writes as follows: "My own belief—for which the reasons will appear in subsequent lectures—is that James is right in rejecting consciousness as an entity, and that the American realists are partly right, though not wholly, in considering that both mind and matter are composed of a neutral-stuff which, in isolation, is neither mental nor material.

I should admit this view as regards sensations: what is heard or seen belongs equally to psychology and to physics. But I should say that images belong only to the mental world, while those occurrences (if any) which do not form the part of any 'experience' belong to only the physical world."¹ It should be noted that this is a structural view of mind and consciousness.

S. Alexander deserves space in such a survey as ours because he was one of the first to work out realism in a systematic way and to connect it with cosmology. His two-volume work, *Space, Time and Deity*, has much in it that is admirable. We must, however, confine ourselves to the epistemological side of his speculation.

Alexander developed his realism gradually, and we have articles of his in the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* and in *Mind* which reveal the line of his advance. It is clear that he begins by rejecting the possibility of a new type of representative realism. His statements to this effect are explicit. He finds himself in harmony, then, with Moore and with other English realists in the theory that the object of awareness is non-mental and that awareness is a contentless act. Even images are in some sense physical. It would seem that this theory leaves little to psychology. And it is not surprising to find that Alexander is favorable to behaviorism. A distinction of his which has attracted attention is that between enjoyment and contemplation. This distinction corresponds to the difference between the mental act and its object. The object is contemplated; the act is enjoyed. So long as we are concerned with the apparent structure of a simple act of cognition, this contrast seems a natural one. But it may be questioned whether it is any more than a functional division. We have already noted that Russell and the American neo-realists, following James, are inclined to question even its functional existence. In this they are probably going too far. But we should note that Alexander makes of it an opposition of stuff.

Having determined his epistemology and given it an empirical, immediate content, Alexander proceeded to disclose its cosmic context. Under the influence of relativity notions, he makes space-time the ultimate reality. It is the stuff out of which all particular things are made; even universals find their place in it as a spatio-temporal pattern. We now meet with the theory of emergence which postulates the rise of new quali-

¹ Russell: *The Analysis of Mind*, p. 25.

ties in an evolutionary way. Thus mind is a term for the mental acts intrinsic to the brain. So far as possible, we find Alexander seeking to merge knowing into the general relation of compresence, which characterizes all things in the world. Yet he recognizes the special nature of awareness and puts it high up in the scale of evolution.

Alexander is a systematic, ingenious and daring thinker. He has exercised marked influence upon the work of such important thinkers as Whitehead and Lloyd Morgan.

There are many other philosophers in England whose epistemological work deserves mention. Percy Nunn is one of the pioneers in the field. His little book, entitled *The Aim and Achievements of Scientific Method*, has been influential. John Laird is a defender of the essentials of common sense. His position savors very strongly of the traditional Scottish school. His *Problems of the Self* is probably his best work. As regards theory of knowledge, he follows fairly closely in the footsteps of Moore and Alexander. This is seen in his *Study in Realism*, which is a clear statement and defence of the essentials of neo-realism. Dawes Hicks is a keen critic much of whose work has been done in articles and reviews. He emphasizes the discriminative capacity of the mind. L. A. Reid has developed a position very close to that of American critical realism. His *Knowledge and Truth* is in many ways an admirable piece of reasoning. C. D. Broad of Cambridge is a realistic thinker who has remarkable balance. He has shown himself able to follow the recent developments of mathematical physics and to interpret them to the general reader. In this ability he resembles Russell. In fact, no one could fail to place him in the group associated with Cambridge. His epistemology represents in many ways a return to Locke but, of course, with a difference. He accepts the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, thus breaking with neo-realism, and adds to the primary qualities such a factor as energy. In accordance with the English tradition, he makes much of the sense-data which are given in perception. These data seem to be thought of by him, not as discriminations but rather as definite entities which are non-mental, though not physical. He seems to continue to hold a restricted idea of mind. Sense-data are a *tertium quid* between mind and physical object. His chief works are *Perception*, *Physics and Reality*, *Scientific Thought*, and *The Mind and its Place in Nature*.

In the United States the realistic movement began in a broad

and tentative way. James, Santayana and Woodbridge were among the first on the field. Shortly thereafter, appeared most of those who have since made contributions. Gradually a division between the "new realists" and the "critical realists" became evident and was sharpened by means of the coöperative volumes which the two groups published. It will be most convenient to consider the doctrines as a whole and to mention the writings of the particular thinkers incidentally.

James and Woodbridge sought to interpret mind realistically as a kind of relation between objects existent in their own right. It was an attempted return to naïve realism combined with an attack upon the traditional realm of the subjective. In fact, the subjective has been in bad repute with American thinkers as a whole. James's doctrine was called by him radical empiricism and assumed that the raw stuff of reality was immediately given and that the difference between the physical and the psychical was merely one of relationship or perspective. We have already noticed that Russell has come under the spell of this theory.

Meanwhile, a younger group were working away at a systematic analysis of knowledge from the realistic standpoint. Distinctly intellectualistic in their approach, they laid emphasis upon symbolic logic and upon what Russell has called logical atomism. Their chief doctrine was similar to that of the English movement, *viz.*,—that the object itself is given in the field of experience. In other words, they, also, rejected the possibility of making a fresh start along the lines of a mediate, or representative, type of realism. It has become customary to call their position epistemological monism to signalize this literal presence of the object in no sense dependent upon my perception for its existence. Its being perceived is just an external relation into which it has temporarily entered. This doctrine demanded the development of the logic of relations and it was for this reason that these thinkers gave so much time to symbolic logic, believing, as they did, that the logic of analysis gave their epistemology its foundation. It may be that they were deceived in this belief, but it cannot be denied that it helped to bring about that efflorescence of mathematical logic so characteristic of Harvard, as it is of Cambridge.

The new realists drifted in the direction of behaviorism by denying the peculiar mental act so conspicuous in the English theory. Mind is increasingly conceived in terms of the response of the organism. Such a development led in the direction of

the complete denial of consciousness as peculiarly private and subjective. The intraorganic is simply harder to get at and to make an object of knowledge.

One other point should be noted. Like all theories of immediate realism, the new realism holds that the very stuff of reality is given in the field of experience. And this stuff is analyzable into particulars, universals and spatio-temporal relations. There is the minimum element of skepticism and agnosticism in such an outlook. This perspective is also indicated by their dislike of the category of substance and their adoption of the mathematical term "function." In this they agree with Russell who rejects both substance and the non-legal conception of causality.

The chief exponents of the new realism in the United States are Holt, Marvin, Montague, Perry, Pitkin, and Spaulding. Besides the coöperative work, to which they contributed in common, called *The New Realism*, we may mention Holt's *Concept of Consciousness*, Montague's *The Ways of Knowing*, Spaulding's *The New Rationalism*, and Perry's *General Theory of Value*.

I presume that it would be improper not to mention the work of A. N. Whitehead, who now teaches at Harvard. Yet his outlook is hard to classify for it combines cosmology with epistemology in a tantalizing way. Undoubtedly influenced by Alexander and Russell, he yet quickly made evident his own insights. Like all who have come under the sway of relativity views, he substitutes the category of events for that of substance. Does this simply mean an activating of the notion of substance? It is difficult to say. On the whole, Whitehead falls in line with English neo-realism. Take this statement from *Science and the Modern World*: "This creed is that the actual elements perceived by our senses are *in themselves* the elements of a common world; and that this world is a complex of things, including our acts of cognition, but transcending them." Whitehead has been of late a prolific writer, and we may mention his *Concept of Nature*, *Principle of Relativity*, and *Principles of Natural Knowledge*. His books are not easy reading because he develops his own vocabulary as he goes along. Many find a great stimulus in his work and lectures. I imagine his final influence will be greater in cosmology than in epistemology.

Critical realism arose almost contemporaneously with neo-realism, but it systematized itself later and partly in opposition

to neo-realism's doctrines. It is a strict form of realism in that it teaches that we know objects which exist external to the fact of knowing and independent of it. But the division comes with the question of the actual presence of the objects themselves in the field of experience. Does knowing involve this? Do the facts permit such a belief? After carefully considering the whole situation, the advocates of critical realism decided that epistemological dualism was more plausible than epistemological monism. We make things objects, we mean, select, affirm them in a specific and definite way; and yet these objects do not literally enter our consciousness. Rather are they interpreted in terms of the meanings and characters which stand out in our perception and in our thought of them.

Perhaps the best way to get clearly in mind the difference between the new realism and critical realism is to note the divergent theories of consciousness. Critical realism thinks of consciousness as a function of the organism in its interpretative response to objects and regards it as an intraorganic realm of a peculiar kind, while the new realism thinks of consciousness as a term for a selection of entities. In other words, critical realism falls more in line with psychological tradition but adds a keener sense of the organic activities which find expression in the field of consciousness and of the structure, distinctions and references which characterize such a domain. We may say that it puts an extrospective consciousness, engaged in knowing objects, in place of an introspective consciousness, such as traditional psychology has stressed in line with its purely analytic efforts.

This divergence in their theory of consciousness finds expression in their views of the nature of knowing. While the new realist holds that knowing is the givenness of the object, its literal presence to inspection, the critical realist regards knowing more as an interpreting of a selected and meant object by means of characters discriminated in the field of consciousness. Such knowing is a complicated affair with its meanings and its categories which have gradually been developed in the human mind in its continued response to things.

It may be well to contrast critical realism with English neo-realism also. One important difference lies in the greater scope which critical realism gives to the mental act. While neo-realism has traditionally limited the mental act to a peculiar, and almost transparent, activity of something thought of as mental in a substantial, cosmological way, critical realism does not introduce

such problems at the beginning. It takes the mental act as an empirical affair and gives it the content and structure it apparently has. In other words, the mental act seems to the critical realist to be a complex process of interpretation rather than a simple awareness. This difference leads him to take the data of perception as discriminations within the field of consciousness in the act of knowing rather than as entities of a non-mental sort.

It is essential that the interpretation of knowing characteristic of critical realism be sharply distinguished from that of the older (and traditional) representative realism. It will be admitted, I think, that it was the inadequacies of this that led to both idealism and its opponent, the new realism. Remove these inadequacies and the *raison d'être* of both of these positions is at the same time destroyed. This has at least been one of the convictions of the critical realist.

On the whole, representative realism has been tinged with subjectivism and has tended to assume that we know our ideas first and that it is by a sort of inference that we pass to the extra-mental object. Now this approach led to insuperable difficulties. It was impossible to justify such an inference as a purely logical matter, and it was equally impossible to verify the similarity between ideas as primary objects of thought and external things not given. Having carefully studied the actual situation in knowing, the critical realist stresses the direction of the complex act of knowing. He holds that a sense of an object is a specific ingredient in the act of cognition and that this sense of an object goes with the interpretation of the characteristics of the object. In other words, knowing has a definite structure and content and is by no means reducible to the two operations set up by Locke. It is the external physical thing which we from the first are engaged in interpreting, and this interpreting is a complex affair revealed in consciousness. We have pointed out the differences between critical realism and the new realism; let us now turn to the similarities.

For both, mind is conceived organically in terms of responses of the higher nervous centres. Thus the setting is psychological. For both, the object is independent of the act of perceiving. There is a strong tone of naturalism in the outlook of both. And yet even here come the differences again. The new realism swings in the direction of extreme behaviorism and is skeptical of an intraorganic, subjective realm, while the

critical realist accepts such a realm and considers it natural and intrinsic to the total organic response. This choice in psychology reflects a choice in epistemology. If objects are given and so constitute consciousness, there is no need of a subjective microcosm. If, however, objects are not given but are interpreted in terms of given characters, then such a peculiar, intraorganic domain is needed. I do not see, therefore, how psychology can remain indifferent to epistemological disputes.

A similar comparison between critical realism and English neo-realism may be of value. It will be remembered that, for the English neo-realist, the mental act is simple and transparent—even for Alexander it is not much more than an enjoyed sense of direction. We may say that American neo-realism sought to do without even this mental act while keeping the direct givenness of the object, while critical realism enlarged the mental act to take in concrete content and to make of it a structured process of interpretation of an object meant and selected but not literally given. Since the basic theory of knowledge is so different in the latter case, I suppose that the natural line of evolution of English neo-realism is in the direction of the new realism. It would appear that both Alexander and Russell are turning toward it. On the other hand, it would seem equally natural for a position like Broad's to swing toward critical realism. . . .

ROY WOOD SELLARS: *Philosophy Today*, pp. 20-34. Edited by E. L. Schaub. Reprinted with the permission of the Open Court Publishing Co.

SUGGESTIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. What is Sellars's criticism of idealism? What is Moore's criticism of idealism?
2. What does Russell mean by logical atomism? What is a propositional function?
3. What is Russell's theory of mind? How does he differ from Moore?
4. Compare Alexander's theory of mind with that of Moore. What is Alexander's most important contribution to realism?
5. Compare what Sellars says about Broad with the selection from Broad above, p. 69 ff.
6. How are James and Woodbridge related to the American new realism? What are the chief characteristics of the new realism as distinct from English realism? Where does Whitehead belong?
7. State the essential differences and similarities between the new and the critical realists, and between the latter and the English realists.

8. Why do critical realists object to being classed with traditional representative realism? Compare Sellars's account of representative realism with Hoernlé's account of representative perception above (p. 109 f.) and with Montague's account of epistemological dualism above (p. 67).

II. THE GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF MODERN REALISM, by *Bertrand Russell*

Analysis

The name realism Russell regards as misleading, since some of the realists hold views similar to the idealism of Berkeley. However, they all tend toward the view that both mind and matter were made out of a simpler and more primitive stuff—a view which is really due to James. Russell points out that there were really two separate movements in opposition to Idealism. One was that of the pragmatists—James, Dewey and Schiller,—who attacked idealism as impractical. The other was a highly technical defense of the ideas which the idealists said were self-contradictory (see Carr's article above, p. 198 ff.). Realism is an outgrowth of the later attack on idealism. Hence it is an abstruse and technically difficult philosophy. But its general characteristics can be stated rather simply. It gives up the idea of a special philosophic method and aims to extend the method of science into philosophy. (By a special philosophic method Russell here means the Hegelian dialectical method which is well exemplified by the selections from Bradley and Carr above.) This means that realism treats knowledge as a natural fact having no metaphysical significance other than any other natural fact. Realism substitutes logical atomism for the organic conception of knowledge of the idealists which identifies knowledge and reality. Mathematical methods are employed and mathematical ideas are accepted as true. Realism has developed a special method of exact reasoning, known as symbolic or mathematical logic, and realists are greatly interested in the detailed analysis of propositions. Physics, especially the new physics due to Einstein's theory of relativity, has greatly influenced the more recent developments of realism. The conception of time inherent in Einstein's theory is revolutionizing our ideas of the universe. Russell explains what time means in the new physics, and adopts this view of time as that of realism. This means a new notion of progress, distance, matter and force. But the new conceptions in physics also support James' idea of a neutral stuff out of which both mind and matter were constructed. He concludes by pointing out that realism is not especially interested in the traditional problems of philosophy which were inherited from theology.

Meanwhile, from many directions, a philosophy grew up which is often described as "realism," but is really characterized by analysis as a method and pluralism as a metaphysic. It is not necessarily realistic since it is, in some forms, compatible with

Berkeleian idealism. It is not compatible with Kantian or Hegelian idealism, because it rejects the logic upon which those systems are based. It tends more and more to the adoption and development of James' view, that the fundamental stuff of the world is neither mental nor material, but something simpler and more fundamental, out of which both mind and matter are constructed.

In the 'nineties, James was almost the only eminent figure, except among the very old, that stood out against German idealism. Schiller and Dewey had not yet begun to make themselves felt, and even James was regarded as a psychologist who need not be taken very seriously in philosophy. But with the year 1900 a revolt against German idealism began, not from a pragmatist point of view, but from a severely technical standpoint. In Germany, apart from the admirable works of Frege (which began in 1879, but were not read until recent years), Husserl's *Logische Untersuchungen*, a monumental work published in 1900, soon began to exert a great effect. Meinong's *Ueber Annahmen* (1902) and *Gegenstandstheorie und Psychologie* (1904) were influential in the same direction. In England, G. E. Moore and I began to advocate similar views. His article on "The Nature of Judgment" was published in 1899; his *Principia Ethica* in 1903. My *Philosophy of Leibniz* appeared in 1910, and *Principles of Mathematics* in 1903. In France, the same kind of philosophy was vigorously championed by Couturat. In America, William James' radical empiricism (without his pragmatism) was blended with the new logic to produce a radically new philosophy, that of the New Realists, somewhat later in date, but more revolutionary, than the European works mentioned above, although Mach's *Analyse der Empfindungen* had anticipated part of its teaching.

The new philosophy which was thus inaugurated has not yet reached a final form, and is still in some respects immature. Moreover there is a very considerable measure of disagreement among its various advocates. It is in parts somewhat abstruse. For these reasons, it is impossible to do more than set forth some of its salient features.

The first characteristic of the new philosophy is that it abandons the claim to a special philosophic method or a peculiar brand of knowledge to be obtained by its means. It regards philosophy as essentially one with science, differing from the special sciences merely by the generality of its problems, and by the

fact that it is concerned with the formation of hypotheses where empirical evidence is still lacking. It conceives that all knowledge is scientific knowledge, to be ascertained and proved by the methods of science. It does not aim, as previous philosophy has usually done, at statements about the universe as a whole, nor at the construction of a comprehensive system. It believes, on the basis of its logic, that there is no reason to deny the apparently piecemeal and higgledy-piggledy nature of the world. It does not regard the world as "organic," in the sense that, from any part adequately understood, the whole could be inferred, as the skeleton of an extinct monster can be inferred from a single bone. In particular, it does not attempt, as German idealism did, to deduce the nature of the world as a whole from the nature of knowledge. It regards knowledge as a natural fact like another, with no mystic significance and no cosmic importance.

The new philosophy had originally three main sources: theory of knowledge, logic, and the principles of mathematics. Ever since Kant, knowledge had been conceived as an interaction, in which the thing known was modified by our knowledge of it, and therefore always had certain characteristics due to our knowledge. It was also held (though not by Kant) to be logically impossible for a thing to exist without being known. Therefore the properties acquired through being known were properties which everything must have. In this way, it was contended, we can discover a great deal about the real world by merely studying the conditions of knowledge. The new philosophy maintained, on the contrary, that knowledge, as a rule, makes no difference to what is known, and that there is not the slightest reason why there should not be things which are not known to any mind. Consequently theory of knowledge ceases to be a magic key to open the door to the mysteries of the universe, and we are thrown back upon the plodding investigations of science.

In logic, similarly, atomism replaced the "organic" view. It had been maintained that everything is affected in its intrinsic nature by its relations to everything else, so that a thorough knowledge of one thing would involve a thorough knowledge of the whole universe. The new logic maintained that the intrinsic character of a thing does not logically enable us to deduce its relations to other things. An example will make the point clear. Leibniz maintains somewhere (and in this he agrees with modern idealists) that if a man is in Europe and his wife dies in India, there is an intrinsic change in the man at the moment of his

wife's death. Common sense would say that there is no intrinsic change in the man until he hears of his bereavement. This view is adopted by the new philosophy; its consequences are more far-reaching than they might appear to be at first sight.

The principles of mathematics have always had an important relation to philosophy. Mathematics apparently contains *à priori* knowledge of a high degree of certainty, and most philosophy aspires to *à priori* knowledge. Ever since Zeno the Eleatic, philosophers of an idealistic caste have sought to throw discredit on mathematics by manufacturing contradictions which were designed to show that mathematicians had not arrived at real metaphysical truth, and that philosophers were able to supply a better brand. There is a great deal of this in Kant, and still more in Hegel. During the nineteenth century, the mathematicians destroyed this part of Kant's philosophy. Lobatchevsky, by inventing non-Euclidean geometry, undermined the mathematical argument of Kant's transcendental æsthetic. Weierstrass proved that continuity does not involve infinitesimals; Georg Cantor invented a theory of continuity and a theory of infinity which did away with all the old paradoxes upon which philosophers had battered. Frege showed that arithmetic follows from logic, which Kant had denied. All these results were obtained by ordinary mathematical methods, and were as indubitable as the multiplication table. Philosophers met the situation by not reading the authors concerned. Only the new philosophy assimilated the new results, and thereby won an easy argumentative victory over the partisans of continued ignorance.

The new philosophy is not merely critical. It is constructive, but as science is constructive, bit by bit and tentatively. It has a special technical method of construction, namely mathematical logic, a new branch of mathematics, much more akin to philosophy than any of the traditional branches. Mathematical logic makes it possible, as it never was before, to see what is the outcome, for philosophy, of a given body of scientific doctrine, what entities must be assumed, and what relations between them. The philosophy of mathematics and physics has made immense advances by the help of this method; part of the outcome for physics has been set forth by Dr. Whitehead in three recent works.² There is reason to hope that the method will prove

² *The Principles of Natural Knowledge*, 1919; *The Concept of Nature*, 1920; *The Principle of Relativity*, 1922. All published by the Cambridge University Press.

equally fruitful in other fields, but it is too technical to be set forth here.

A good deal of modern pluralist philosophy has been inspired by the logical analysis of propositions. At first this method was applied with too much respect for grammar; Meinong, for example, maintained that, since we can say truly "The round square does not exist," there must be such an object as the round square, although it must be a non-existent object. The present writer was at first not exempt from this kind of reasoning, but discovered in 1905 how to escape from it by means of the theory of "descriptions," from which it appears that the round square is not mentioned when we say, "The round square does not exist." It may seem absurd to spend time on such a ridiculous topic as the round square, but such topics often afford the best tests of logical theories. Most logical theories are condemned by the fact that they lead to absurdities; therefore the logician must be aware of absurdities and on the lookout for them. Many laboratory experiments would seem trivial to any one who did not know their relevance, and absurdities are the experiments of the logician.

From preoccupation with the logical analysis of propositions, the new philosophy had at first a strong tincture of Platonic and mediæval realism; it regarded abstracts as having the same kind of existence that concretes have. From this view, as its logic perfected itself, it became gradually more free. What remains is not such as to shock common sense.

Although pure mathematics was more concerned than any other science in the first beginnings of the new philosophy, the most important influence in the present day is physics. This has come about chiefly through the work of Einstein, which has fundamentally altered our notions of space, time, and matter. This is not the place for an explanation of the theory of relativity, but a few words on some of its philosophical consequences are unavoidable.

Two specially important items in the theory of relativity, from the philosophical point of view, are: (1) that there is not a single all-embracing time in which all the events in the universe have their place; (2) that the conventional or subjective part in our observation of physical phenomena, though much greater than was formerly supposed, can be eliminated by means of a certain mathematical method known as the tensor calculus. I

shall say nothing on this latter topic, as it is intolerably technical.

As regards time, it must be understood, to begin with, that we are not dealing with a philosophical speculation, but with a theory necessitated by experimental results and embodied in mathematical formulæ. There is the same sort of difference between the two as there is between the theories of Montesquieu and the American Constitution. What emerges is this: that while the events that happen to a given piece of matter have a definite time-order from the point of view of an observer who shares its motion, events which happen to pieces of matter in different places have not always a definite time-order. To be precise: If a light-signal is sent from the earth to the sun, and reflected back to the earth, it will return to the earth about sixteen minutes after it was sent out. The events which happen on the earth during those sixteen minutes are neither earlier nor later than the arrival of the light-signal at the sun. If we imagine observers moving in all possible ways with respect to the earth and the sun, observing the events on the earth during those sixteen minutes and also the arrival of the light-signal at the sun; if we assume that all these observers allow for the velocity of light and employ perfectly accurate chronometers: then some of these observers will judge any given event on earth during those sixteen minutes to be earlier than the arrival of the light-signal at the sun, some will judge it to be simultaneous, and some will judge it to be later. All are equally right or equally wrong. From the impersonal standpoint of physics, the events on earth during those sixteen minutes are neither earlier nor later than the arrival of the light-signal at the sun, nor yet simultaneous with it. We can only say that an event A in one piece of matter is definitely earlier than an event B in another if light can travel from A to B, starting when the earlier event happens (according to A's time) and arriving before the later event happens (according to B's time). Otherwise the apparent time-order of the two events will vary according to the observer, and will therefore not represent any physical fact.

If velocities comparable with that of light were common in our experience, it is probable that the physical world would have seemed too complicated to be tackled by scientific methods, so that we should have been content with medicine-men down to the present day. But if physics *had* been discovered, it would have had to be the physics of Einstein, because Newtonian

physics would have been obviously inapplicable. Radio-active substances send out particles which move very nearly with the velocity of light, and the behaviour of these particles would be unintelligible without the new physics of relativity. There is no doubt that the old physics is faulty, and from a philosophical point of view it is no excuse to say that the fault is "only a little one." We have to make up our minds to the fact that, within certain limits, there is no definite time-order between events which happen in different places. This is the fact which has led to the introduction of the single manifold called "space-time" instead of the two separate manifolds called "space" and "time." The time that we have been regarding as cosmic is really "local time," a time bound up with the motion of the earth, with as little claim to universality as that of a ship which does not alter its clocks in crossing the Atlantic.

When we consider the part that time plays in all our common notions, it becomes evident that our outlook would be profoundly changed if we really imaginatively realized what the physicists have done. Take the notion of "progress": if the time-order is arbitrary, there will be progress or retrogression according to the convention adopted in measuring time. The notion of distance in space is of course also affected: two observers who employ every possible device for ensuring accuracy will arrive at different estimates of the distance between two places, if the observers are in rapid relative motion. It is obvious that the very idea of distance has become vague, because distance must be between material things, not points on empty space (which are fictitious); and it must be the distance at a given time, because the distance between any two bodies is continually changing; and a given time is a subjective notion, dependent upon the way the observer is travelling. We can no longer speak of a body at a given time, but must speak simply of an *event*. Between two events there is, quite independently of any observer, a certain relation called the "interval" or "separation" between them. This interval will be differently analyzed by different observers into a spatial and a temporal component, but this analysis has no objective validity. The interval is an objective physical fact, but its separation into spatial and temporal elements is not.

It is obvious that our old comfortable notion of "solid matter" cannot survive. A piece of matter is nothing but a series of events obeying certain laws. The conception of matter arose at

a time when philosophers had no doubts as to the validity of the conception of "substance." Matter was substance which was in space and time, mind was substance which was in time only. The notion of substance grew more shadowy in metaphysics as time went on, but it survived in physics because it did no harm—until relativity was invented. Substance, traditionally, was a notion compounded of two elements. First, a substance had the logical property that it could only occur as subject in a proposition, not as predicate. Secondly, it was something that persisted through time, or, in the case of God, was outside time altogether. These two properties had no necessary connexion, but this was not perceived because physics taught that bits of matter are immortal and theology taught that the soul is immortal. Both, therefore, were thought to have both the characteristics of substance. Now, however, physics compels us to regard evanescent events as substances in the logical sense, i.e., as subjects which cannot be predicates. A piece of matter, which we took to be a single persistent entity, is really a string of entities, like the apparently persistent objects in a cinema. And there is no reason why we should not say the same of a mind: the persistent ego seems as fictitious as the permanent atom. Both are only strings of events having certain interesting relations to each other.

Modern physics enables us to give body to the suggestion of Mach and James, that the "stuff" of the mental and physical worlds is the same. "Solid matter" was obviously very different from thoughts and also from the persistent ego. But if matter and the ego are both only convenient aggregations of events, it is much less difficult to imagine them composed out of the same materials. Moreover what has hitherto seemed one of the most marked peculiarities of mind, namely subjectivity, or the possession of a point of view, has now invaded physics, and is found not to involve mind: a photographic camera has it to precisely the same extent. Two cameras in different places may photograph the "same" event, but they will photograph it differently. Even chronometers and measuring-rods become subjective in modern physics; what they directly record is not a physical fact, but their relation to a physical fact. Thus physics and psychology have approached each other, and the old dualism of mind and matter has broken down.

It is perhaps worth while to point out that modern physics knows nothing of "force" in the old or popular sense of that

word. We used to think that the sun exerted a "force" on the earth. Now we think that space-time, in the neighbourhood of the sun, is so shaped that the earth finds it less trouble to move as it does than in any other way. The great principle of modern physics is the "principle of least action," that in going from one place to another a body always chooses the route which involves least action. (Action is a technical term, but its meaning need not concern us at present.) Newspapers and certain writers who wish to be thought forceful are fond of the word "dynamic." There is nothing "dynamic" in dynamics, which, on the contrary, finds everything deducible from a law of universal laziness. And there is no such thing as one body "controlling" the movements of another. The universe of modern science is much more like that of Lao-tze than that of those who prate of "great laws" and "natural forces."

The modern philosophy of pluralism and realism has, in some ways, less to offer than earlier philosophies. In the Middle Ages, philosophy was the handmaid of theology; to this day, they come under one heading in booksellers' catalogues. It has been generally regarded as the business of philosophy to prove the great truths of religion. The new realism does not profess to be able to prove them, or even to disprove them. It aims only at clarifying the fundamental ideas of the sciences, and synthesizing the different sciences in a single comprehensive view of that fragment of the world that science has succeeded in exploring. It does not know what lies beyond; it possesses no talisman for transforming ignorance into knowledge. It offers intellectual delights to those who value them, but it does not attempt to flatter human conceit as most philosophies do. If it is dry and technical, it lays the blame on the universe, which has chosen to work in a mathematical way rather than as poets or mystics might have desired. Perhaps this is regrettable, but a mathematician can hardly be expected to regret it.

BERTRAND RUSSELL: *Dial*, Vol. LXXVII, pp. 282-290. Reprinted in *Sceptical Essays*, published by W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. Used here with their permission. Title mine.

SUGGESTIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. What was the basis of the technical revolt against idealism?
2. How can you reconcile Russell's statement that realism "abandons the claim to a special philosophic method" with his statement "it

has a special technical method of construction, namely, mathematical logic"?

3. Why are topics such as "round squares" regarded as having special importance by realists?
4. To what extent does realism accept the new physics of Einstein? How does this affect the charge sometimes made that realism is a new form of materialism?
5. What is the attitude of realism toward the "theological problems" of philosophy, according to Russell?

CHAPTER II

REALISTIC SOLUTIONS OF THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE AND EXISTENCE

I. KNOWLEDGE AND EXISTENCE, by *G. Dawes Hicks*

Analysis

In order to maintain itself as a philosophy Hicks thinks that realism must free itself from the causal theory of perception (see Hoernlé above, p. 109 f.), and develop a theory of perception according to which what is experienced will be regarded as different from (1) any effect of physical stimulation, (2) any construct of the mind, and (3) any act or process of the perceiving mind. He sketches a theory of perception which he thinks meets these requirements. While the *occurrence* or *thatness* of a perception is due to bodily stimulation its *character* or *whatness* is not. A general account of the occurrence is given and illustrated to show that perception is not identifiable with any of the three things mentioned above. Turning to the cognitive act Hicks argues that its origin gives us no clue to its content. To understand this we must describe what takes place in our own mind when we have a cognition. So considered cognition is not a constructing of something out of fragments but an act of discriminating the features of a situation. Instead of Kant's theory that synthesizing *was* the very act of knowing Hicks argues that discriminating *is* really the act of knowing. Wherever cognition occurs it has this character of being an act of discriminating.

This leads the author to distinguish between the "content apprehended," "the content of the object" and "the content of the mental act." Then he explains with an example "the content of the object." The "content apprehended" is shown to be different from this and from the content of the awareness itself. What is reproduced in memory is always the "content of the mental act" (awareness) and not the content of the object or the content apprehended, the former never being present in memory and the latter being evanescent and non-recurring. The fact that only the contents of awarenesses can be reproduced in memory is illustrated with the difference between Robinson Crusoe's and Friday's experiences of the ship. Due to the influence of our memories on our acts of apprehension these become less and less direct and more and more influenced by the content of previous acts the older we grow. This results in an economy of labor, since a very few discriminations suffice for cognitive purposes after things become familiar.

In the light of this discussion Hicks gives an account of what is apprehended in memory and imagination. The latter is of one piece

with perceiving, only it contains a larger proportion of revived factors clustered around a small nucleus of actual discriminations. This explains all sorts of images, including dream and memory images. The cognitive act is of one piece and even the simplest of such acts is already an act of discrimination and hence a judgment. However, we may, if we choose, restrict the term thinking or judging to the higher forms of the cognitive act.

So long as realism is combined with a crudely mechanical account of the generation of experience it is certainly not in a position to withstand the fire of destructive criticism. The only realism which at the present day can lay claim to a respectful hearing must, it seems to me, be grounded on a theory of knowledge, in conformity to which it is possible to maintain that real things may be, and are, directly perceived without owing either their being or their nature to the circumstance of such perception. And that means that the content apprehended in perception must not be regarded as either a produced effect brought about by physical stimulation or as a construct on the part of the mind. This further implies that the content perceived must not be confused with, but carefully distinguished from the act or process of perceiving, which is, of course, a state or condition of the mental life itself. I have tried in various publications to work out in detail a view of the nature of perception which fulfils these requirements, and in what follows I propose briefly to indicate the main features of that view.

I start with a distinction which dates indeed from Aristotle, and which, thanks to Bradley, has become sufficiently familiar in current philosophical discussion—the distinction, namely, between existence and essence or content, between the “that” and the “what” of any concrete fact. The *occurrence* of any act of perception, the occasioning condition of its *existence* as a state of the mental life, is, I have allowed, doubtless traceable to the physiological event of bodily stimulation; its *character* or *nature*, on the other hand, is not thus to be accounted for, but is explicable only by viewing it from within and as in relation to that upon which it is directed.

As regards the mode of occurrence, it will suffice to note certain general considerations. I am gazing (say) at the brown table at present in front of me. On scientific grounds, we are justified in asserting that a complicated network of physical and physiological events has been instrumental in bringing about this mental state of mine. From the table there have emanated

modes of energy, and through them my visual organ has undergone impression or stimulation. In consequence of that stimulation, delicate changes, probably chemical in character, occur in the cones of the retina, the fibres of the optic nerve are thereby affected, and the influence, whatever it is, is conveyed by the optic-nerve fibres to the cerebral centres in the cortex with which the optic nerve is connected. What happens then? What is the next link in this chain of events? According to the mechanical theory to which I have referred, it is assumed that then, in a way admittedly mysterious, a transition is made, either in the brain or in the mind, from molecular motion to a so-called sense-quality. Under cover of the ambiguous term "sensation," there is supposed then to be produced both the brown colour and the awareness of it, though why, in that case, the brown should be projected into the object in front of me is confessedly no less an enigma than its mode of production. As a matter of fact, however, this supposed final stage in the sequence of events is nothing more than a gratuitous assumption. All we are justified in asserting is that either concomitantly with or in consequence of the cerebral change there arises, not a brand new quality nor even the awareness of one, but a mental state or activity, in and through which, *when a certain other set of conditions has been fulfilled, and not until*, there ensues awareness of a definitely coloured object. The entire sequence of physical and physiological events might have occurred as in this instance, and even have incited a mental act, but unless that act had been directed upon something, in this case the table, the awareness in question would not have come about.

Turn now to the cognitive act itself. In attempting to determine its nature, we have got to dismiss all reference to the way in which it has come about, and to describe it not as it might conceivably present itself to an external spectator, but as it reveals itself to us conducting our analysis, so to speak, from within. A self-conscious subject is able, more or less, to take up this reflective attitude; it is possible for him to turn his attention upon his own mode of procedure in the act of perceiving, and to convince himself as to how it is that the state of mind in which he finds himself achieves its end, and becomes a definite act of awareness. What report, then, does the cognitive act give of itself when thus reflectively treated? Not at all, so far as I can determine, the report which it has sometimes been thought to yield. It does not reveal itself as an act of construct-

ing, or of putting together the parts of, that of which it comes to be aware. Viewed from within, it invariably evinces itself as a process, not of manufacturing an object, but of differentiating the features of an object, of gradually discerning distinctions which were not at first discerned. In other words, it evinces itself as in its essential nature an act of *discriminating*. Just as for Kant the act of synthesizing *was* the very act of knowing, so I would maintain that the act of discriminating *is* virtually the act of knowing, or, at all events, the fundamental characteristic of that act *qua* act. And I am prepared to carry this interpretation right down the scale of conscious existence, and to insist that wherever cognitive activity is exercised it is essentially a process *generically* the same as that which we find the process to be in our own mental lives. Undoubtedly, however, in the history of mind, discrimination exhibits the most varied stages of development—starting with the crudest possible distinction of that which appears as an obscure somewhat from the vague indefinite background, and extending to the deliberate use of ideas of relation, such as we are familiar with in conceptual thought.

In the situation, then, which we describe as “perception of an object,” two concrete facts are involved—on the one hand, the given object, and, on the other hand, the act or process of perceiving it. Each of these concrete facts exhibits the two aspects of existence and content. But, in view of what occurs in this situation—the gradual discrimination, namely, by the conscious subject, of the content of the object—a further distinction is here requisite. It is requisite, that is to say, to distinguish that which I have been in the habit of calling the “content apprehended” both from the content of the object and from the content of the mental act. To bring out the import of this distinction, James Ward’s well-chosen illustration (employed by him, however, in a different context) of bestowing in the course of a few minutes half a dozen glances at a strange and curious flower will serve. Assuming that the act of apprehension is directed upon the actual flower, as a concrete fact in the external world, we may assert that the cognizing subject will gradually discriminate a multiplicity of its features—at first the general outline, next the disposition of petals, stamens, etc., afterwards the attachment of the anthers, position of the ovary, and so forth—he will, in other words, become aware by degrees of a variety of features constituting the content of the flower.

And this *awareness* of the features of the flower is not, it is clear, something that can be severed from the act of being aware—i.e., the act of apprehending. If one describes it as the content of the act of apprehending at a particular stage of its progress, or as that which gives to the act in question its specific character and enables it to be distinguished from other cognizing acts of the same conscious subject, one will be doing no violence either to language or to the facts. No one would wish to maintain that this awareness is that which in the instance we are considering is cognized, that *it* is the object upon which the act of apprehension is directed. No one would, I should suppose, wish to deny that such awareness is a characteristic of the act of apprehension, when that act has reached a certain measure of completeness. In contrast with this, the “content apprehended” is that which is frequently designated the “appearance” of the object to the percipient. It, likewise, is not the object upon which the act of apprehension is directed. For the object is, *ex hypothesi*, the actual flower—an object which the conscious subject gradually comes to recognize has a variety of characteristics—shape, size, colours, etc. But the sum of the characteristics which the conscious subject will be aware of at any specific moment will be different from the sum of characteristics which he will be aware of at another moment, and either of these will only be a fragment of the much larger sum of characteristics which there are good reasons for believing the flower itself possesses. Clearly, therefore, the sum of *apprehended* features (i.e., the content apprehended, or the “appearance” of the object) is *distinguishable* from the larger sum of characteristics constituting the *whole* content of the object. Just as clearly the former cannot be an existent fact, be it called a “presentation” or a “sense-datum,” or what not. For it is, if one may use the term in this connexion, a selection from the features forming the content of the object, and we have already premised that the content of nature of any concrete fact, such as a flower, is not to be confused with its existence, that its “what” is distinguishable from its “that.” So far, then, from this selection of features being there, as an existent fact, prior to the act of apprehension, and in some way calling forth that act, it only comes to be in virtue of the act of apprehension having been first of all directed upon the actual object, and apart from such act would have had no “being” of any sort.

A further point is worth emphasizing. In the threefold dis-

inction just insisted upon, the term "content" has been employed quite consistently and unambiguously. Throughout it has signified a sum of characteristics. The content of the given thing is the sum of its characteristics or properties; the "content apprehended" is, we may say provisionally, so many of these characteristics as are, for the time being cognized; and the content of the act of perceiving is the sum of those characteristics of the said act which is described as awareness of the features just referred to.

So far I have been speaking of perception, and for the sake of simplicity it was permissible to do so as though it took place on each occasion *de novo*. The conclusion reached as regards its essential character will be in no way invalidated by now introducing a factor I have been deliberately neglecting. The act of perceiving remains from first to last an act of discriminating and of thus becoming aware of the features of its object. But that process is enormously furthered by the circumstance that it takes place in a mind which by dint of long and repeated practice has come to perform such acts more or less habitually and by aid of the facility of retentiveness or revival. Now, if the foregoing analysis be on the right lines, it can alone be the *awareness*—the content, namely, of a mental act—that is capable of being revived or "reproduced." The "content apprehended" cannot itself persist after the act through and by means of which it has its being has ceased to exist. It cannot persist in the mind, because it has never been "in" the mind, in the strict sense of the term. On the other hand, the contents of our own cognitive acts, the awareness, if one may so name them, which we live through, or *erleben*—these are the mind's own property, or rather go to constitute its very being, and these we are forced to recognize it has the power of retaining in some form, and of reviving, and of utilizing the retained awareness in the life of the present. A well-worn illustration of Hutchison Stirling's will here suit my purpose. When one fine morning a ship unexpectedly appeared on the horizon, *what* to Crusoe was a ship was to his man Friday only an amorphous blur, a perplexing, confusing, frightening mass of detail, which would not assume for him the form of a definite coherent object. There was, that is to say, a tremendous difference between the contents apprehended by these two individuals confronted though they were by one and the same object. The external conditions were similar; the dissimilarity between what they respectively per-

ceived was largely traceable to their previous mental histories. Crusoe had seen ships scores of times before, and a revival of his former awareness came at once to his aid. What he was actually discriminating at the moment was probably far less than what Friday was discriminating, and yet Friday was at a loss to make out what the mysterious thing out there could possibly be. This instance is typical. In ordinary perception there can be no question, a vast deal of what we suppose ourselves to be immediately discerning is not, as a matter of fact, immediately discerned, it is discerned through the aid of the revival of previous awareness of similar objects. In other words, the perception of a mature mind is interpenetrated with what accrues to it from a long series of perceptive acts.

Thus, as the mental life develops, our apprehension of things tends to become less and less immediate and direct. The contents of what we call our knowledge, of what we are said to know about objects, gradually come to assume the form of an inward possession, constituting almost an instrument wherewith we proceed further to differentiate and to grasp the nature of the world to be known. Consequently, in the case of a familiar object—and the great majority of objects we encounter are familiar—we do not require on each occasion to discriminate afresh its manifold characteristics. The act of perception is certainly directed upon that object, but its familiarity saves us from the necessity of going through the whole process of discriminating anew. It is enough that we discriminate at the moment only a relatively small number of its features; these immediately suggest the awareness of features previously discriminated; and the apprehension in question is attained with an ease and rapidity that would otherwise have been impossible. We have here, in fact, an example of that economy of labor which consciousness throughout its procedure exemplifies. In short, our perception tends to become less and less dependent upon what, at the time, is actually given; we bring to bear upon what is given a wealth of awareness which ensures that no perceptive act is ever, even in its incipient stage, devoid of specific content.

Pursuing this line of reflexion, I have further tried to offer an explanation of the content apprehended in the case of memory and imagination. The process of imagining is, in truth, I have argued, of one piece, so to speak, with the process of perceiving, the chief difference being that in imagination a relatively larger proportion of revived factors are involved. It is easy to make

the transition from the one process to the other by means of instances in regard to which this is manifestly true. An imaginative child is, let us suppose, gazing at a mass of fleecy clouds in the play of the sunlight. Soon the shapes and forms of its various parts will assume for him the appearance of chariots, and horses, and warriors, like a scene in ancient legend. The child will, that is to say, be apprehending the given object through the medium of his revived experiences of pictures, story-books, tales to which he has listened, and so forth. To put it briefly, there is here, as there is in perception, a certain nucleus, if we may so express it, of actually discriminated fact, although considerably less than what is usually discriminated in normal perception. And round this nucleus of actually perceived fact, there is, in consequence of the revived awareness suffusing, as it were, the act through which the discrimination takes place, a penumbra, so to speak, of features that seem to share with the nucleus the characteristic of objectivity. That a large number of so-called "images" which appear to stand over against the conscious subject as objects are thus susceptible of explanation is, I take it, scarcely open to question. And I believe that it is a mode of explanation which may be extended to a variety of other cases where its applicability is less obvious. It is surprising how readily the phenomena of dream-images, for instance, lend themselves to this mode of explanation, and the same is true, I think, of memory-images in all their variety. The gist of the explanation, it will be observed, is not merely that sense-stimulation is involved, but that in imagination, where objective imagery is present, there is, as in perception, a real object upon which the act of discriminating is directed, and that this accounts for the objective character which the content apprehended seems to possess, although the number of the features of this object actually discriminated is considerably less than in perception, and the portion of apprehended content traceable to revived awareness considerably greater and more arbitrary and haphazard. It is necessary, no doubt, to recognize that bodily factors, and not only extra-organic things, may, in many situations, function as objects.

One way of expressing the central position of the theory of knowledge of which I have been trying to give a sketch would be to say that cognition is, in all its various forms, essentially of one piece, essentially of one character, that even the simplest

and most rudimentary modes of cognitive activity are already in essence acts of judgment. For no one doubts that an act of judging is fundamentally an act of discriminating. There is, however, a psychological disadvantage in extending too widely the scope of the terms "thought" and "judgment." If it be recognized that the primary function of discriminating, comparing and relating is present from the beginning of cognitive apprehension, the terms "thought" and "judgment" may be restricted to the higher developments of cognitive activity, which involves both this primary function and the results attained by it in the sphere of sense-perception. The terms "thinking" and "judging," as ordinarily understood, denote, of course, an extremely complex reflective act, which depends for its exercise on definite recognition of the distinction between the inner subjective experience of the individual and the real world apprehended by him about which his judgments turn. But in "thinking" as thus understood, there is carried to a greater range of adequacy and completeness just that same activity, the character of which I have sought to exhibit in dealing with sense-perception.

G. DAWES HICKS in *Contemporary British Philosophy*, 2nd. Series, pp. 118-126. Edited by James H. Muirhead. Reprinted by permission of George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., London. (New York: The Macmillan Company.) Title mine.

SUGGESTIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Compare Hicks's view with that of Moore as given by Sellars above, p. 282.
2. Do Hicks's three requirements seem to you to be reasonable? Do they rule out the idealistic solutions of perception given in Part II, chapter III, above? Do they commit Hicks to realism?
3. What do you think of the theory that the origin of a perception gives no clue to its content? Would you agree with Hicks on this point?
4. Does Hicks's analysis of perception as revealing three different contents seem to you to be true of a simple perceptual experience of your own?
5. Discuss the illustration of Crusoe and Friday. Does it prove Hicks's point? Do you see anything faulty in his reasoning here? Can you suggest any different interpretation of the illustration?
6. Would the idea that memory-images are a labor-saving device imply that consciousness is merely a by-product of the body, produced for the purpose of making the organism more efficient? Or might consciousness have a unique function of its own?

7. What do you think of the view that the simplest act of cognition or perception involves judgment? Is this in agreement with current psychology's theory of perception?
8. Do you think that Hicks proves that all imagination has a perceptual basis? Or does he simply assume this to support his theory? Would you agree with him on this point? Give a reason for your answer.

II. TIME AND THE EXPERIENCE OF TIME, by *Evander Bradley McGilvary*

Analysis

Time as experienced by the man of action is the most certain of all realities, but to the man who reflects upon its nature it has always been a profound mystery. Following the statement of this opinion McGilvary gives an account of what time is to him, holding that others may be right in thinking it to be something else. He begins with the view of William James that time is "a duration, with a bow and a stern," within which duration-block we perceive the relation of succession. Within the duration-block as we experience it there are some elements which have a duration of their own and others which do not. McGilvary illustrates the way in which the latter exhibit relations of magnitude. Those elements which have no perceptible duration of their own he calls *minima sensibilia of duration*, following the analogy of *minima sensibilia of spatial extension*. The fact that Hume had such elements in mind to the exclusion of those which have a duration character of their own led him to his erroneous theory of time. McGilvary then points out that the duration-span moves and grows and this continuity of time is a genuine experience which cannot be reduced to anything else. In James language time "grows by finite buds or drops." Yet this is misleading in that it leaves the impression that the continuity of time is like a series of drops of water with intervals between them. Succession is only one aspect of the continuity of time. Simultaneity is equally important and this makes a linear theory of time untrue. Time is really a stream with breadth as well as length. Both succession and simultaneity are ultimately indefinable. The simultaneous has to be distinguished from the dimensions of space. Time as thus experienced is part of an infinite continuum. This is also indefinable but McGilvary describes some of its characters. He omits the number continuum, and describes the continua of space and time. Their chief characteristic is that "they are capable of partition in such a manner that the parts exist in the continuum without destroying its continuity." He then compares the two continua of space and time, indicating certain similarities. This is followed by an account of the chief difference between them. The temporal continuum he calls eternity. Only present time grows. Past and future time, infinitely vaster than present time, neither gain nor lose as the present gains and loses. He concludes with a restatement of time as experienced by the man of action who does not reflect on its nature, con-

trasting it with that of Royce that time is seen all at once by the Absolute and Bergson's theory of eternal duration.

Time is a promise and a threat: the stream we breast holds in solution our hopes and our fears. Time is regret and relief: the solution precipitates some beautiful crystal, but alas! we are swept onward and to our sorrow must leave the treasure behind. Or the solution deposits some noisome ooze which clears the flood and we move forward rejoicing in the purified and sweetened bath. Such is time for the man who does not reflect on the nature of time. It is literally a matter of course. *Die Zeit versteht sich von selbst; der Mensch versteht die Zeit nicht.* Such would seem to be the conclusion to be drawn from the various conclusions man's intellect has arrived at in seeking to understand time. To the man who reflects time has always been a problem, a challenge which the deepest thinkers have had constantly thrown in their face. Some like Parmenides meet the challenge with supercilious disdain. Some like Heraclitus accept service under the inscrutable challenger and fight by his side. Almost every philosopher worthy of his spurs has entered the list in support or in defiance of the cause which to the man of action seems to be so obviously just that it is not worth fighting about. Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, St. Augustine, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant, Hegel—this is only a selection from the roster of heroes in this war of the ages. . . .

That in some sense we all have an experience of time every one admits. The real problem comes when we attempt to state what it is that we experience when we experience time, and to set forth what the critical intellect has to say about what is thus described. Any one who seeks to justify the ways of time to logic must first make clear what it is that he undertakes to justify. Time described one way may be logically indefensible, and the man who thinks he experiences it that way must reject time as being unreal or he must abjure logic as an arbiter of reality. Now when different persons come to describe what time presents to their experience, the result is a surprising medley of variances. It is easy thus to see why time should be a great divide in philosophical topography. Whether it be a principle of externality or not, it is the source of a vast amount of mutual externality on the part of philosophical systems.

Were it not for the hopelessly incurable optimism of philosophers, were it not for their ineradicable faith that every-

body's experience of time is at bottom of the same type and that an accurate description of this common experience by any one will ultimately meet with the acceptance of all, the easier conclusion would long ago have been drawn that man is the measure of his own time—of the time that is, that it is; of the time that is not, that it is not. A common time experienced by all, or different times severally experienced and yet fundamentally similar to each other even though the different descriptions thereof disagree, this has been the common postulate of all previous discussions of time. When a philosopher has given what he believes to be a true account of time as he experiences it, he assumes forthwith that any divergent account given by some one else is incorrect. It might be worth while to ascertain by experiment whether such personal idiosyncrasies as manifest themselves in color-experiences do not also occur in the experience of time. But this would be a task for the psychologist. This evening I shall in the empirical part of my paper deal with my own experience alone, telling you how I think time appears there. You as philosophers will of course exercise your prerogative in agreeing with me, or in thinking me in error.

I cannot do better than begin with a familiar quotation from William James's famous chapter on "The Perception of Time." The "practically cognized present is no knife-edge, but a saddle-back, with a certain breadth of its own on which we sit perched, and from which we look in two directions into time. The unit of composition of our perception of time is a *duration*, with a bow and a stern, as it were—a rearward- and a forward-looking end. It is only as parts of this *duration-block* that the relation of *succession* of one end to the other is perceived. . . . The experience is from the outset a synthetic datum, not a simple one; and to sensible perception its elements are inseparable. . . ."¹ The experienced present is thus a series of events interrelated as some before and some after others. Some of these events are experienced as themselves having a duration; others, paradoxically, are not so experienced. In other words, there are experiences in which, within the present as thus described, events are experienced as some shorter and some longer than others, and there are other experiences in which the events have no experienced length at all.

In the former case the comparative length of the temporal

¹ *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. I, pp. 609-610.

events is a quantitative distinction. In saying this I do not mean that there is always a recognition of an analogy, of a similarity of ratios, obtaining between the comparative length of events and the comparative length of things in space. Of course the fact that temporal magnitude has similarity to spatial magnitude is something we could learn only by comparison of temporal duration with spatial length. But there is a distinction experienced between the different temporal events themselves which, when compared with the distinctions in space, is explicitly recognized as of a common type with the latter, and has as much right to be called a distinction of magnitude. Thus in a musical measure what we call the half-note, the quarter and the two eighths are experienced as having different characters, and when we come to name these characters in quantitative terms we are not importing into them a foreign element. Without recourse to spatial analogies we have in the very experience of a melody itself the materials sufficient to provoke comparison between one note and another and to force recognition of one note as longer than another. Magnitude is indeed a relative matter, but within the present moment there may be several temporal events to be compared solely with each other; and the result of such a comparison is the recognition of relations of magnitude among them.

But there are experienced durational wholes whose parts are not all experienced as themselves having duration. These parts come in succession but do not seem to last at all. Their sequence is experienced, but they do not have in the experience any of the spread or protension that the moment as a whole has. For instance very short taps, whose duration is capable of being measured by instruments, may appear in experience as succeeding one another, but may not appear as having a temporal length. They come and go but do not make any stay. If later in our theory we attribute length to them we say that they were so short that their length was not capable of being perceived as such. If now these short taps are interspersed with longer beats the paradoxical character of the experience is intensified. The short ones are experienced as not so long as the long ones, and yet when we attend to any short tap by itself we cannot discover any duration in it. It has enough magnitude to admit of comparison with another magnitude, but not enough magnitude to be detected alone. Such events are experienced, and are not experienced, as having magnitude.

All such temporal events as seem to take no time for their occurrence are the *minima sensibilia* of duration, sharing with the *minima sensibilia* of spatial extension the perplexing character of being perceived as parts of a continuum without being perceived as having the quality which for reflection ought to belong to them as parts. In these *minima* we find perhaps the basis of empirical fact which Hume used for his theory of space and time. He was unfortunate in building his theory on just such facts alone, without taking into account other facts equally important.

Not only has my experience a durational span within which certain events are before others, but this span is a moving span. The earlier contents drop out of experience and what was previously the latest element has its privilege of novelty taken from it by the appearance of still newer events. To use a common metaphor, there is a ripening and dropping of the fruit of time, and new burgeonings appear at the growing point. With such change we say that a new moment has arisen, in that the later moment appreciably differs from the former. It is less than the former moment by what has disappeared; it is more by what has appeared. And yet it is not altogether a new moment; for it shares with its predecessor the latter's last term and whatever lay between that last term and the vanished term. It is part of its predecessor with more added. There is no gap between the two moments, any more than there is a gap between the two lines ac and bd when the points a, b, c , and d lie on a longer line in the order named. In the continuum of duration traversed by our waking life the successive moments thus overlap. From one moment we get to another that does not overlap it only by going through intervening moments which do overlap one another.

But this is not all that the continuity of time is experienced as being. What we have spoken of as successive overlapping moments do not differentiate themselves from each other in such fashion that the moments always come by jerks, one moment lasting unchanged and then being suddenly followed by another, with static demarcations. When for instance we look out of the window of a moving train, our field of experience changes, and yet the moments which succeed each other do not follow by instantaneously in stated seconds or fractions of seconds. In this sense there is no moment which can be said to be just the next moment. Referring again to the spatial

analogy used above, let one moment be represented by the line *ac* and a succeeding moment by the line *bd*, the points *a, b, c*, and *d* being disposed as before. As *ac* moves forward it is not suddenly replaced by *bd*; it glides into *bd*. There is of course such a thing as the experience of the sudden emergence of a new moment, as when a thunder clap breaks in upon us unexpectedly or when things which have continued for a while in our experience incontinently disappear. With such experience of jerkiness I cannot deal in this paper. What I wish to bring out here is that such experiences are by no means the only kind we have. We often experience a continuity of the type exemplified by the continuously shifting scene of the railway passenger. Here attention may divide the continuity into a definite number of succeeding moments, which may or may not overlap. But between the high tides in the successive pulses of attention there are the gradual ebbs and flows.² This gliding character which marks the transition from accentuated moment to accentuated moment cannot be analyzed into something else. It is experienced as something *sui generis*. It is an irreducible feature of time's nature, or what James would have called an "empirical fundamentum of our knowledge" of time's continuity.

I should like to borrow another of James's picturesque phrases to indicate what I mean. Time indeed does "grow by finite buds or drops."³ But it should be remembered that of at least some buds and drops it cannot be said that either nothing comes at all or certain units of amount burst into being at a stroke.⁴ Whoever watches a slowly leaking faucet with the drops forming and breaking away gets a typical experience of the continuity of time. The new drops do not come into being all at once; they grow, swelling visibly and lengthening out, they gradually thin at the top, and they fall away, each leaving at the instant of its fall the beginning of a new drop above. The drops may come faster and faster, but never so fast as drops but that the same process is repeated in a different rhythm. If they come too fast for their turgescence to be experienced they cease to be experienced as drops; they are lost

² Still another feature of the moving moment should be noticed in passing; its posterior terminus is not always clearly defined. The rear of the present may melt into the past instead of having an abrupt termination.

³ *Some Problems of Philosophy*, p. 154.

⁴ *Ibid.*

in a stream, which still more clearly embodies the continuity of time. The mistake of James, I cannot but think, was that in the employment of this figure he regarded the growth of time as represented by the filling of a cask which receives the full-grown drops or receives nothing at all.⁵ Time is not the cask under the faucet; it is the process of drop-formation and drop-deposition at the faucet. The cask, if it is to have a place in the figure at all, is past time, not the present. But even for the past the cask is, as we shall see, an inadequate symbol.

There is still another feature of time which must be noted before our description can be offered as a sufficiently adequate description of time for our purpose. Time is not only experienced as a continuous succession of events; it is a succession of events not all of which are successive one to another, for some events are experienced as simultaneous with each other.⁶ In other words the comparison of time with a line fails to do justice to what may metaphorically be called the solidity of time. Time is not a line; it is a stream in which events stand in transverse as well as in longitudinal direction *inter se*. Simultaneity like succession cannot be defined; it must be experienced to be known. But when experienced it can be contrasted with succession, as being a temporal relation which is non-successive. Its contrast with succession can be compared with the interrelation of the different dimensions of space. The different dimensions of space are all but qualitatively indifferent in our experience; i.e., they are interchangeable. While right feels different from left and front from back, a turn of the body can reverse these directions. But by no tergiversation can the experience of simultaneity be changed into that of succession or that of succession into that of simultaneity. The directions of time permit no change of front.⁷ Neither does the direction of simultaneity have what the mathematicians call different senses. The simultaneity of *a* with *b* has the same sense as that of *b* with *a*: the difference is merely verbal.⁸ In calling simultaneity a direction we must be on our guard against sup-

⁵ *Some Problems of Philosophy*, p. 172.

⁶ This is of course empirical simultaneity, and will be later distinguished from another kind of simultaneity.

⁷ A motion of translation of the body, and one of rotation, will accomplish a change of empirical simultaneity into empirical succession or *vice versa*, as instanced in the lightning-flash and the thunder.

⁸ The same statement holds for many other relations often treated as having different senses. Real difference of sense seems to belong only to asymmetrical relations.

posing that it is on all fours with the two directions of succession or with spatial directions.

Not many events that occur at the same time occur at different places. For this reason it has been suggested that time and space are mutually complementary, in such wise that succession should be considered the fourth dimension of space, or the three dimensions of space specifications of temporal simultaneity. That time and space are intimately connected is indubitable; but there are two considerations that prevent a literal acceptance of this particular view of their interrelation. One is that there may be simultaneity of qualities without difference of spatial position, as when roughness and heat are experienced at the same time in the same part of the same object, and the other is that there are differences in spatial position which cannot be stated in terms of simultaneity, as when the same body is in different places at *different* times. It will therefore better serve our purpose of empirical description if we distinguish quite sharply between simultaneity and spatial dimensions, while recognizing their mutual complications. . . .

Experienced time I have already shown to be continuous in the sense indicated. This continuous time I believe to be a part of a real infinite continuum. And here we are face to face with what has been regarded by many as a hopeless contradiction, or rather a jumble of contradictions. You are all familiar with the dialectic in this matter, and I will not stop to rehearse the venerable arguments. I will merely attempt to state a view of the temporal continuum, a view which is based on the empirical description I have given, and which I venture to believe is not self-contradictory.

What is a continuum? It would be rash to attempt to define the indefinable, but at least we can describe some of its characters. In giving this description, I purposely leave out of account the number continuum for reasons which I cannot here state. I shall have in mind only the continua of space and time. Both these continua are stretches or reaches, and the nature of a stretch or reach whether temporal or spatial is an ultimate fact incapable of analysis. It is something we experience. But in experience we get what we regard as only parts of stretches, there being more of either stretch beyond the limits of experience. The qualitative nature of either continuum is revealed in the portion which appears in experience; but what is revealed is only a portion. In short our view

commits us to the position that a continuum is capable of partition in such a manner that the parts exist in the continuum without destroying its continuity. The partition of the continuum does not break it up into discrete fragments.

Before considering the temporal continuum let us take a brief glance at the continuum of space, for the nature of either is more clearly apprehended when it is compared with the other. The spatial continuum is not made up of parts; these arise by its partition. The continuum is not a whole formed by the aggregation of parts; or, as Kant put it, these parts cannot be considered as antecedent to the one and all-embracing space, but can be thought of as existing only within it. The continuum is not a whole, for a whole in the strict sense of the term is something complete and rounded off. There is no reason to think that space is such; nor, so far as I can see, is there any contradiction in supposing that it is not such. A contradiction would arise only in case we asserted that a continuum is made up by an aggregation of its parts. In other words there would be contradiction only if "part" were exclusively correlated with "whole." We must limber our conception of part and not allow it to remain in such rigid correlation with whole. Parts are sometimes parts of wholes, and sometimes they are parts of a non-total, unending continuum. The coming into being of parts of space by partition of the spatial continuum is not the coming into being of the spatial stretches found in the parts when the latter arise as parts; it is merely the demarcation of these stretches within the continuum. The stretches are already there as stretch before they are marked off.

What is said in the last two sentences does not hold good of the continuum of time; or in other words the temporal continuum cannot, like the spatial continuum, be expressed in terms of one tense. Of space we may say that it was a continuum, and we have uttered a truth that requires no qualification. We may further say that it *is* a continuum; this adds to what we have just said, but does not modify it. We may go on to say that it *shall be* a continuum; we then state an additional truth; but each of these three truths are truths without reserve and without mutual compromise. We cannot, however, make the three corresponding statements about time and have each statement true as it stands in its separateness from the rest. Perhaps the best we can do with the language at our

disposal is to express the continuity of time by the use of the awkward hyphen. Time was-is-and-shall-be a continuum. The present moment parts this continuum, and only of this portion of the continuum can the present tense be used in its strictness. This part *was not* a temporal stretch till the partition *takes* place. You will please pardon the unidiomatic sequence of tenses; it is not my fault; I am only trying to be true to time's nature. The past is not; it was. The future is not; it shall be. Only the present is; but it is *only as part of a continuum whose stretch included the past and shall include the future*. This temporal continuum—here I drop the past and future tenses for brevity—this continuum is eternity, of which only the present is extant.

This continuum is sometimes spoken of as a growing continuum. Such a mode of statement expresses a truth; but like all statements about time made in terms of one tense it is incomplete and therefore inaccurate. The *present* indeed advances at the expense of the future; it recedes to the gain of the past: the *past* has grown. Now as the only part of time's stretch to which we can strictly and empirically apply the present tense is the present moment, we must speak of time as moving forward, leaving more past behind: this is exactly what the present is always doing; and what the present is doing time is doing, the present being all there *is* of time. But time has been more than the present which loses; it shall be more than the present which gains. And of this time, infinitely vaster in either direction than the present, gain and loss cannot be predicated. Time has transcended the losing present; it shall transcend the gaining present. . . .

To look forward with bated breath or to stand on tip-toe of expectation; to strain our eyes for the first blush of dawn after our sorrows have endured through a long night; to watch by the bedside of a friend sick it may be unto death, and have our hearts rise and fall with each unforeseen turn; to be stunned by the blow that falls upon a beloved child prattling by our side—in short not to know what is before us and to have our horizon change; to wonder, to hope, to fear, to be surprised, to be cast down, to be uplifted by the unanticipated; to be swept off our feet by time's tumultuous rapids or to be borne into some delicious unsuspected pool sparkling in the sunlight—such are the crises in which for all of us the experience of time culminates. The Absolute can have no inkling of

what lies on the inside of such experiences. To see all at once is to fail to feel the temporal sequence as genuinely temporal. The Absolute lacks experiential verisimilitude: our time is an unredeemed promise, an unwreaked threat.

As the Absolute has no genuine future, he has no genuine past.

All things are taken from *us* and become
Portions and parcels of the dreadful past.

All things have rest, and ripen toward the grave
In silence; ripen, fall, and cease.

But for the Eternal Experience, and also for Bergson, time is not a medium in which losses are sustained. From us, though the years may bring the philosophic mind, they have taken the hour of splendor in the grass, of glory in the flower. The clouds that gather round the setting sun *do* take a sober coloring from an eye that hath kept watch o'er man's mortality. Of all this, in the feel of it, the Absolute of Royce and the Time of Bergson wot not. They lack experiential verisimilitude: our time is relief and regret.

E. B. MCGILVARY in the *Philosophical Review*, Vol. XXIII, pp. 121-145 (with important omissions). Reprinted by permission.

SUGGESTIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Analyze your own experience of time. To what extent does your own experience agree with the James-McGilvary theory?
2. Compare McGilvary's account of time with that of Russell above. Do the two views seem to you to be the same?
3. Why does he distinguish "experiences of jerkiness" from "the gliding character" of time? Which of these forms of the experience of time best support his own theory and why?
4. Why does McGilvary object to the faucet analogy?
5. Why does he object to making time the fourth dimension of space? Is there any truth in this theory, according to McGilvary?
6. Note that McGilvary speaks of three continua—the number continuum, space, and time. He speaks of time as a real infinite continuum. Do you think that he would call each of the others infinite? If so, would the assertion of three real infinite continua be a contradiction? Give a reason for your answer.
7. State briefly each of the chief similarities and differences between space and time.
8. Explain McGilvary's statement that the present grows without the past gaining or the future losing. Do you think that this conception is self-consistent?

9. Compare what McGilvary says about time with Carr's account above, p. 203, with Kemp Smith's account above, p. 193 ff., and with Alexander's account above, p. 125.
10. Do McGilvary's concluding paragraphs seem to you to be pessimistic? Why or why not? Does the theory of time he has developed commit him to these concluding statements? Compare these two paragraphs with the last paragraph of the selection from Royce above, p. 187.

III. REALISM'S SOLUTION OF THE ONTOLOGICAL PROBLEM, by *Edward Gleason Spaulding*

Analysis

Stating three questions Spaulding distinguishes three different ontological theories, defines each and tells which types of philosophy exemplify each. All monisms have to *reduce* the varieties of things in the universe to one kind or to one thing or to both one kind and one thing. Spaulding enumerates a number of the most varied realities which monistic thinkers would have to reduce as a proof that such a view is really contrary to actual experience. Since these different things are all discovered by actual experience and since the supposed one is not so discovered but is reached by speculation, realists reject monism and adopt pluralism in ontology. But realists admit that the things in the world are related and this makes the world a cosmos.

In the presentation of our own scheme of constructive Realism we begin, not with the epistemological, but with the *ontological* problem, and with those solutions which Realism finds for this problem.

This problem has to do, . . . with the question as to *what* is the ultimate nature of reality. Is it *one* both in *kind* and *number*, and if so, *what* is this kind; or is it *many* in *number* while yet *one* in *kind*; or is it *many* both in *kind* and *number*? The answer "yes" to the first question gives qualitative and numerical monism; to the second, qualitative monism and numerical pluralism; to the third, both qualitative and numerical pluralism. Modern transcendental Idealism, as the doctrine that everything is One Spirit or Consciousness, is an example of the first position; atomistic Materialism and Berkeleian Idealism are examples of the second; and Realism is an example of the third.

Each of these solutions, however, is an answer to a question that is directed to the *universe*, and that concerns, therefore, *all* the entities of the universe. Nothing can escape this inclusion, no matter what it may be. The problem raises the question, therefore, as to whether certain entities really are what

they seem to be, and whether they may not be *reduced* either to one kind or to one entity, or to both one kind and one entity.

With the problem thus stated, it is illuminative to remind ourselves of *some* of the types of entities that are *contained* within this universe, and that, *if* there is to be a reduction, must be reduced, either to a qualitative, or to a numerical One, or to an entity that is *both* qualitatively *and* numerically *one*. For, that *everything* must be *considered and included* is made clear by the fact, that were even one entity omitted, it might prove *refractory* to that *reduction* to which all other entities may submit themselves, with the result that *monism* would be impossible, and a dualism or a pluralism of some sort would be the ontology that we would have to accept.

The difficulty of the task that thus lies before the philosopher who would reduce all "things" to One, either in quality or in number, is made impressive by a survey of even a small part of the entities that must suffer such a fate—if this fate be theirs to suffer. But by this survey there becomes evident, also, the delicacy of the task of discovering the *relations* and the *systems* of entities of the universe, whether they are "*reducible*" or not. For, if they *are* reducible, the problem of their relationship as *appearances* still persists, while, if they are *not* reducible, the same problem stands in respect to their "face value."

Among the most interesting entities that must be thrown into *that total which is the universe*, and for which place must be found, is *error*. For within the universe *error is*; it is a fact of some kind. Therefore, if one is a "reductionist" and a monist, and his *opponent is not*, then must either the error of the latter find its *niche* in the *monistic* Hall of Fame, or the error of the former must be distinct and different from the truth of the latter's position and find *its place* in the Rogues' Gallery of pluralism.

But there is not alone error and truth. There are also words, and judgments, and attempts to know; proofs, refutations, agreements, disagreements, convictions, beliefs, hypotheses, "things" to know, states of affairs, etc., etc. These are all "*somethings*"—although whether they are real or unreal, true or false, actual or possible, possible or impossible, may be difficult to ascertain. But at least they are *entities of some kind* that must in some manner be recognized in any attempt to reduce everything to One.

But in addition to judgments, to the attempts to know, and the like, there are also *difficulties*, and *alternative* ways of solving philosophical problems. Also, there are other human beings whom we would oppose or convince. And there are *systems*,—not one, but many,—and postulates and *assumptions*. Then, too, there is society, and custom and tradition, and hopes and desires, and also, the *influences* of all these on that which some of us believe or hold to be true. This leads us to recognize that there are discoveries and inventions, works of art and mechanical constructions, “things good” and “things evil,” opinions and points of view. *All of these are facts in some sense and have to be taken account of in any system of philosophy that deals with the universe.* Systems of philosophy other than our own may be mere errors or inventions, but even then they are *some kind* of fact or occurrence within the universe, so that our system is not innocent of their guilt.

But just as there are many philosophical systems, so also there are science and religion and logic, and *different “positions”* within these. *All the entities* which have appeared in these developments have some sort of *status*, either of error, or of invention, or of discovery. In a monistic system *all* these must be *reduced*, while in a pluralistic system their reduction is found impossible and they all exist or subsist, although, perhaps, at different places and times, or in other different universes of discourse.

Science and logic have given us an almost inexhaustible list of entities only the most important of which can be indicated. For example, there are simple and complex, real and unreal, existent and subsistent, inorganic and organic, physical and mental entities; there are individuals, classes and series, things, events, qualities and relations; there are continuity and discontinuity, infinity, finiteness, and endlessness; numbers, space and spaces, and time; dimensions, correspondences, variables and constants; intensity, extensity, quantity, magnitude and measurement; unity and plurality, fields and domains, universes of discourse, the positive and the negative, conditions, connections and meanings. And one cannot neglect consciousness, sensations, judgments, reason, emotions, instincts, behavior, satisfaction, illusions, electrons, atoms, molecules, particles, forces, energies, directions, laws. Formidable also is the field of relations in its resistance to the effort to reduce all “things” to One, for in some sense there *are* the relations of identity,

similarity and difference, inclusion, exclusion and contradiction, cause and function, dependence and independence, implication and consistency, whole and part, logical priority, symmetry and asymmetry, and transitivity and its lack.

Finally, for religion and art, there are goodness and beauty, evil and ugliness, worth and its opposite; divinity, the supernatural, creation, emanation, immanence and transcendence, heaven and hell, God and immortality, death and salvation. Be these errors or truths, inventions or discoveries, they must find their place in The One, if there be One, or must resist reduction, if there be Many.

This rather long list of entities that in some sense are facts is merely illustrative of the tremendous manifold of "things" which make up the *totality* of the universe, and which *must be reduced* in some manner, if Monism is to succeed.

Yet there are those that are not without hope in this task, as we have already seen, though, in the opinion of the writer, this hope is not realized. All attempts to ground a Monism in solution of the ontological problem fail, because they are all attempts which are based solely on an *argument*, from specific postulates, that becomes *self-contradictory at a certain point*. And a One that is single numerically and qualitatively is *not* discovered empirically.

The realist, therefore, can accept *no one quality* or *substance*, no *one* "stuff," either mind or matter, or some unknown or unknowable underlying entity, to which all other entities are *reducible*, and which they ultimately *are*, or of which they are *manifestations*. Rather, for him, there are *kinds* that are *irreducibly different*, and there is an *irreducible plurality of these kinds*.

In accepting this *pluralistic ontology* the realist and the modern rationalist do not, however, deny that the numerically distinct and qualitatively different entities of the universe are *related*. Indeed it may be that there are no two entities that are not related in one or more ways. But it is found that mere *relatedness* does not carry with it either the (causal) dependence of term on term, or the necessity of an underlying reality to mediate any relation. Were there such a dependence, and were it *causal*, then each related term would partake of the nature of all the others, all terms would fuse, there would be not many terms, but One, and this One would be *homogeneous* in character. Qualitative and numerical monism could

thus be inferred, if it could be shown that, because all terms are related, they causally affect one another. But this is precisely what empirical evidence refutes, since, as we have previously discovered, there are undeniable instances of external and functional relations, i.e., of terms related and yet independent. Also, a monistic ontology could be established provided it were an *empirical* fact of either sense or reason that an *underlying reality* mediates the relation between terms.

Other systems that are *monistic ontologies* in one way or another have also been found not to stand the test of criticism. Chief among these are Subjectivism, Positivism, Materialism, Psychism, and the mystical Evolutionism of some modern philosophers. All these positions collapse when put to the test of a critical method whose *principles* are *presupposed* as valid by each of the systems in question.

For our acceptance, then, there remains only an *ontological pluralism*, provided that no empirical evidence, as distinct from the *artificial* character of the above mentioned systems, can be found against this. *And none can.* No all-inclusive, all-entity-constituting Being, *One* in kind *and* number, is empirically discovered; neither is an entity that is *one in kind, but many in number*, nor is an entity that is *many in kind, but one in number*. Indeed there is not even *one principle, one proposition, or one state of affairs, implying all others*, that is empirically discoverable, i.e., there is no *logical monism*. Implication is found to be a relation that is widespread in its subsistence, but it is not universal. For even as *terms* are related without being causally dependent, so are some *propositions* related without there being *implication* between them.

One may conclude, therefore, that, from the proposition *that the entities of the universe form a system, no more unity can be deduced (as present in the universe)* than that there is a *system* of individuals, classes, series, and the like, that *subsist* side by side "at" some kind of *loci*, are merely consistent with one another, and *do not imply* one another. In other words, from the *relatedness* of the entities of the universe, one can no more conclude to the universality of the implicative relation, than one can to that of the causal relation, or to the subsistence of one underlying, all-relation-mediating entity. By empirical means one cannot go beyond the specific type of relation that is found in each case. And relations that are neither implicative nor causal are found a-plenty.

To accept this empirical method and the *specificity* of relations thereby discovered is the procedure of Realism and of Rationalism. But it is a procedure that leads to the conclusion that Monism of any kind can be grounded only *artificially*, and that a *Pluralism of many entities, of many kinds, in many different relations, at many different loci is the only ontology which stands the test of empirical investigation. Such an ontology*, is, however, also a *Cosmology*. For a universe of entities that are related in any way is a *cosmos*. . . .

E. G. SPAULDING: *The New Rationalism*, pp. 432-437.
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SUGGESTIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Compare Spaulding's view with Carr's argument to prove the Absolute above, p. 198 ff. Carr's view is one type of monism. Which do you think it is?
2. Does Spaulding's idea of reduction carry with it the idea that monism has to neglect some of the actual facts of the world in order to reach a monistic ontology? If so, do you think that this is a begging of the question in the direction of pluralism? Would a monist call the process reduction? What did Carr call the process by which we reach the Absolute?
3. Do you think listing the various types of objects or entities actually observable in the world proves pluralism? Do you think that Spaulding thinks it proves pluralism? What observable or empirical facts could a monist list that would indicate the truth of a monistic view?
4. In admitting that these things he mentions are related so as to form a cosmos has Spaulding really abandoned his pluralism? Explain your answer.
5. Does he prove or only assume that we cannot experience the Absolute or any other monistic view of reality? What do you think Carr would say in answer to Spaulding's argument here? Compare Adams's idea of the fringe above, p. 233 f.

CHAPTER III

REALISTIC SOLUTIONS OF THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE AND EXISTENCE (Concluded)

I. THE DISCOVERY OF ESSENCE, by *George Santayana*

Analysis

Santayana contrasts "transitive knowledge," which scepticism doubts, with intuitive knowledge, which is indubitable. He illustrates his point with the child's attitude when he first sees dummies dressed as living people. The sceptic is one who knows that all we ever see of nature are her garments. There are three ways to find release from this situation. One is death which destroys the sceptic as well as all illusion. Another is the acceptance of customary beliefs. This is an intolerable solution to a reflective mind because it leaves the sceptical attitude unresolved and like a skeleton in a closet. The third way is to entertain the illusions, knowing them for what they are. When the error of taking illusions for something other than what they are is washed out they become ideas or essences. Whatever essences any mind finds are indubitably real. The pure sceptic confines himself to the intuitive knowledge of essences. Lacking substantial existence essences nonetheless have being. Any essence or ideal quality of being has just those characters we intuit in it and it has them eternally. Our choice of essences is determined by our temperament, and the values they possess are due to their being experienced. But they are eternal beings. The realm of essences is infinite and the sceptic revels in this sphere where "all things are crystallized into the image of themselves, and have lost their urgency and their venom."

The sceptic, then, as a consequence of carrying his scepticism to the greatest lengths, finds himself in the presence of more luminous and less equivocal objects than does the working and believing mind; only these objects are without meaning, they are only what they are obviously, all surface. They show him everything thinkable with the greatest clearness and force; but he can no longer imagine that he sees in these objects anything save their instant presence and their face-value. Scepticism therefore suspends all knowledge worthy of the name, all that transitive and presumptive knowledge of facts which is a form of belief; and instead it bestows intuition of ideas, contemplative, æsthetic, dialectical, arbitrary. But whereas transitive knowledge, though important if true, may

always be challenged, intuition, on the contrary, which neither has nor professes to have any ulterior object or truth, runs no risk of error, because it claims no jurisdiction over anything alien or eventual.

In this lucidity and calmness of intuition there is something preternatural. Imagine a child accustomed to see clothes only on living persons and hardly distinguishing them from the magical strong bodies that agitate them, and suddenly carry this child into a costumer's shop, where he will see all sorts of garments hung in rows upon manikins, with hollow breasts all of visible wire, and little wooden nobs instead of heads: he might be seriously shocked or even frightened. How should it be possible for clothes standing up like this not to be people? Such abstractions, he might say to himself, are metaphysically impossible. Either these figures must be secretly alive and ready, when he least expects it, to begin to dance, or else they are not real at all, and he can only fancy that he sees them. Just as the spectacle of all these gaunt clothes without bodies might make the child cry, so later might the whole spectacle of nature, if ever he became a sceptic. The little word *is* has its tragedies; it marries and identifies different things with the greatest innocence; and yet no two are ever identical, and if therein lies the charm of wedding them and calling them one, therein too lies the danger. Whenever I use the word *is*, except in sheer tautology, I deeply misuse it; and when I discover my error, the world seems to fall asunder and the members of my family no longer know one another. Existence is the strong body and familiar motion which the young mind expects to find in every dummy. The oldest of us are sometimes no less recalcitrant to the spectacle of the garments of existence—which is all we ever saw of it—when the existence is taken away. Yet it is to these actual and familiar, but now disembowelled objects, that scepticism introduces us, as if to a strange world; a vast costumer's gallery of ideas where all sorts of patterns and models are on exhibition, without bodies to wear them, and where no human habits of motion distract the eye from the curious cut and precise embroideries of every article. This display, so complete in its spectacular reality, not a button nor a feather wanting or unobserved, is not the living crowd that it ought to be, but a mockery of it, like the palace of the Sleeping Beauty. To my conventional mind, clothes without bodies are no less improper than bodies without

clothes; yet the conjunction of these things is but human. All nature runs about naked, and quite happy; and I am not so remote from nature as not to revert on occasion to that nakedness—which is unconsciousness—with profound relief. But ideas without things and apparel without wearers seem to me a stranger condition; I think the garments were made to fit the limbs, and should collapse without them. Yet, like the fig leaves of Eden, they are not garments essentially. They become such by accident, when one or another of them is appropriated by the providential buyer—not necessarily human—whose instinct may choose it; or else it is perfectly content to miss its chance, and to lie stacked for ever among its motley neighbours in this great store of neglected finery.

It was the fear of illusion that originally disquieted the honest mind, congenitally dogmatic, and drove it in the direction of scepticism; and it may find three ways, not equally satisfying to its honesty, in which that fear of illusion may be dispelled. One is death, in which illusion vanishes and is forgotten; but although anxiety about error and even positive error, are thus destroyed, no solution is offered to the previous doubt: no explanation of what could have called forth that illusion or what could have dissipated it. Another way out is by correcting the error, and substituting a new belief for it: but while in animal life this is the satisfying solution, and the old habit of dogmatism may be resumed in consequence without practical inconvenience, speculatively the case is not at all advanced; because no criterion of truth is afforded except custom, comfort, and the accidental absence of doubt; and what is absent by chance may return at any time unbidden. The third way, at which I have now arrived, is to entertain the illusion without succumbing to it, accepting it openly as an illusion, and forbidding it to claim any sort of being but that which it obviously has; and then, whether it profits me or not, it will not deceive me. What will remain of this non-deceptive illusion will then be a truth, and a truth the being of which requires no explanation, since it is utterly impossible that it should have been otherwise. Of course I may still ask why the identity of this particular thing with itself should have occurred to *me*; a question which could only be answered by plunging into a realm of existence and natural history every part and principle of which would be just as contingent, just as uncalled-for, and just as inexplicable as this accident of my being; but

that this particular thing, or any other which might have occurred to me instead, should be constituted as it is raises no problem; for how could *it* have been constituted otherwise? Nor is there any moral offence any longer in the contingency of my view of it, since my view of it involves no error. The error came from a wild belief about it; and the possibility of error came from a wild propensity to belief. Relieve now the pressure of that animal haste and that hungry presumption; the error is washed out of the illusion; it is no illusion now, but an idea. Just as food would cease to be food, and poison poison, if you removed the stomach and the blood that they might nourish or infect; and just as beautiful things would cease to be beautiful if you removed the wonder and the welcome of living souls; so if you eliminate your anxiety, deceit itself becomes entertainment, and every illusion but so much added acquaintance with the realm of form. For the unintelligible accident of existence will cease to appear to lurk in this manifest being, weighting and crowding it, and threatening it with being swallowed up by nondescript neighbours. It will appear dwelling in its own world, and shining by its own light, however brief may be my glimpse of it: for no date will be written on it, no frame of full or of empty time will shut it in; nothing in it will be addressed to me, nor suggestive of any spectator. It will seem an event in no world, an incident in no experience. The quality of it will have ceased to exist: it will be merely the quality which it inherently, logically, and inalienably is. It will be an *ESSENCE*.

Retrenchment has its rewards. When by a difficult suspension of judgment I have deprived a given image of all adventitious significance, when it is taken neither for the manifestation of a substance nor for an idea in a mind nor for an event in a world, but simply if a colour for that colour and if music for that music, and if a face for that face, then an immense cognitive certitude comes to compensate me for so much cognitive abstention. My scepticism at last has touched bottom, and my doubt has found honourable rest in the absolutely indubitable. Whatever essence I find and note, that essence and no other is established before me. I cannot be mistaken about it, since I now have no object of intent other than the object of intuition. If for some private reason I am dissatisfied, and wish to change my entertainment, nothing prevents; but the change leaves the thing I first saw possessed

of all its quality, for the sake of which I perhaps disliked or disowned it. That, while one essence is before me, some one else may be talking of another, which he calls by the same name, is nothing to the purpose; and if I myself change and correct myself, choosing a new essence in place of the old, my life indeed may have shifted its visions and its interests, but the characters they had when I harboured them are theirs without change. Indeed, only because each essence is the essence defined by instant apprehension can I truly be said to have changed my mind; for I can have discarded any one of them only by substituting something different. This new essence could not be different from the former one, if each was not unchangeably itself.

There is, then, a sort of play with the non-existent, or game of thought, which intervenes in all alleged knowledge of matters of fact, and survives that knowledge, if this is ever questioned or disproved. To this mirage of the non-existent, or intuition of essence, the pure sceptic is confined; and confined is hardly the word; because though without faith and risk he can never leave that thin and bodiless plane of being, this plane in its tenuity is infinite; and there is nothing possible elsewhere that, as a shadow and a pattern, is not prefigured there. To consider an essence is, from a spiritual point of view, to enlarge acquaintance with true being; but it is not even to broach knowledge of fact; and the ideal object so defined may have no natural significance, though it has æsthetic immediacy and logical definition. The modest scope of this speculative acquaintance with essence renders it infallible, whilst the logical and æsthetic ideality of its object renders that object eternal. Thus the most radical sceptic may be consoled, without being rebuked nor refuted; he may leap at one bound over the whole human tangle of beliefs and dogmatic claims, elude human incapacity and bias, and take hold of the quite sufficient assurance that any essence or ideal quality of being which he may be intuiting has just the characters he is finding in it, and has them eternally.

This is no idle assurance. After all, the only thing that can ultimately interest me in other men's experience or, apart from animal egotism, in my own, is just this character of the essences which at any time have swum into our ken; not at all the length of time through which we may have beheld them, nor the circumstances that produced that vision; unless these

circumstances in turn, when considered, place before the mind the essences which it delights to entertain. Of course, the choice and the interest of essences come entirely from the bent of the animal that elicits the vision of them from his own soul and its adventures; and nothing but affinity with my animal life lends the essences I am able to discern their moral colour, so that to my mind they are beautiful, horrible, trivial, or vulgar. The good essences are such as accompany and express a good life. In them, whether good or bad, that life has its eternity. Certainly when I cease to exist and to think, I shall lose hold on this assurance; but the theme in which for a moment I found the fulfilment of my expressive impulses will remain, as it always was, a theme fit for consideration, even if no one else should consider it, and I should never consider it again.

Nor is this all. Not only is the character of each essence inalienable, and, so long as it is open to intuition, indubitable, but the realm of essences is infinite. Since any essence I happen to have hit upon is independent of me and would possess its precise character if I had never been born, or had never been led by the circumstances of my life and temperament to apprehend that particular essence, evidently all other essences, which I have not been led to think of, rejoice in the same sort of impalpable being—impalpable, yet the only sort of being that the most rugged experience can ever actually find. Thus a mind enlightened by scepticism and cured of noisy dogma, a mind discounting all reports, and free from all tormenting anxiety about its own fortunes or existence, finds in the wilderness of essence a very sweet and marvellous solitude. The ultimate reaches of doubt and renunciation open out for it, by an easy transition, into fields of endless variety and peace, as if through the gorges of death it had passed into a paradise where all things are crystallised into the image of themselves, and have lost their urgency and their venom.

GEORGE SANTAYANA: *Scepticism and Animal Faith*, pp. 70-76. Copyright, 1923, by Charles Scribner's Sons. Reprinted by permission.

SUGGESTIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Does Santayana seem to you to mean by *intuition* what Bergson means? (See above, p. 170.)

2. Does he mean by an *essence* what McGilvary means by a duration-block?
3. What in the analogy of the child seeing the dummy do you think would represent the essence?
4. Compare what Santayana says about our choices endowing essences with values with Hocking's criticism above, p. 36 f. Which side of the "Great Divide in the theory of value" (see Urban above, p. 262 ff.) does Santayana take?
5. Can you suggest any other way of avoiding scepticism besides the three defined by Santayana?
6. Compare Santayana's treatment of illusion with Sheldon's discussion above, p. 214 ff. Do you think they mean the same thing by this term?

II. ON THE NATURE OF THE DATUM, by C. A. Strong

Analysis

Strong states six different theories of the *datum* or what we are immediately conscious of in sense-perception, and adds his own view that the datum is a logical essence. In a footnote he explains that he took the idea of essence from Santayana. He then argues that data are not the real things themselves since perceptual errors would then be real (see Sheldon above, p. 214 ff.). He considers heat, cold, color, space, qualities and time and he shows that such data are not real physical things. By this line of argument five of the historic theories as to the nature of the datum are excluded. Strong then considers the remaining historic theory, that data are psychical. This theory is refuted by pointing out that the psychical aspect of data can never be discovered by introspection nor in any other way that would prove its *existence*. What we find by introspecting is always an *essence*, never an existing fact. He deals with the classic doctrine of Berkeley that the being or *esse* of data is their being perceived or *percipi*, and argues that this makes essences existences. They are universals and do not exist. He proves that essences cannot exist in space and time. The ability to think of the past shows that essences may have being in thought without being actually existing things. To be sure when we think of universals or of past events there is a psychic existent present but this is not identical with the essence. It is just a vehicle which carries the essence. He states and interprets William James' famous example of the after-image of the sun to emphasize the distinction between the psychical image and the essence in a perceptual experience. This is followed by his stating and answering two objections. All this shows that *vividness* does not make essences existents since it is connected with the vehicle or image more than with the essence itself. Nor can the idea or essence be identified with a memory image any more than with an after-image. He concludes that memory would be impossible if we did not possess essences over and above the psychical existents. The essence is much more substantial than the psychical material which bears it. Logically the essence is identical with the object and this fact explains how we know.

The crucial question, in the problem of sense-perception, is as to the nature of the datum. By "datum" I mean what we are immediately conscious of. Six different views as to this have succeeded each other in the course of modern philosophy: (1) That the datum is the real thing; (2) that it is an ideal representative of the real thing; (3) that it is an ideal thing, psychological in its nature; (4) that it is an ideal thing, logical in its nature; (5) that it is a thing of psychological nature, but real; (6) that it is a thing of logical nature, but real—*naïve realism, representationism, psychological subjectivism, logical subjectivism, psychological objectivism, logical objectivism*. The view I shall try to recommend in this article, distinct from any of these, is (7) that the datum is the logical essence of the real thing. By "essence" I mean its *what* divorced from its *that*—its entire concrete nature, including its sensible character, but not its existence. To establish this, it will be necessary to show (1) that the things we are conscious of in sense-perception, as distinguished from the things we believe or affirm, are not the actual external existences; (2) that, on the other hand, they are not internal or psychical existences, either representative of the external ones or non-representative; (3) that, while they are logical entities—entities of the logical type—they are not identifiable with the things we perceive, but are only the detached concrete natures or "essences" of those things.¹ Thus the three divisions of our discussion are marked out for us.

DATA ARE NOT THE REAL THINGS THEMSELVES

That they *are* the real things is of course the conviction of common sense. Common sense will not admit that objects are not really coloured, and sonorous, and hot and cold; and the leading motive of some recent philosophers seems to be a desire to justify common sense in this point. This can be done only

¹ As I have elsewhere explained, I owe this precious conception to Mr. Santayana. I had long been convinced that cognition requires *three* categories for its adequate interpretation; the intermediate one—between subject and object—corresponding to the Kantian "phenomenon" or "appearance." At one time I used to designate this category as "content," since it agrees with the current conception of a "content of consciousness"; but, in my efforts to conceive it clearly, I was continually falling off either into the category of "object" or into that of "psychic state." What was my relief when at last I heard Mr. Santayana explain his conception of "essence," and it dawned upon me that here was the absolutely correct description of the looked-for category.

by contradicting common sense on a much weightier point, namely, by asserting that objects are capable of possessing at the same moment and in the same spot contradictory qualities. For it is undeniable that an object which one person perceives as red another perceives as green, or as so like green as to be indistinguishable from it, and that where most people perceive a variety of colours some persons see only a more or less uniform grey. It is undeniable that a straight stick thrust in water looks bent, quite apart from any process of interpretation asserting that it actually *is* bent, and that the datum in this case (however much its character may be explicable by the operation of physical laws) consequently contradicts the object. It is undeniable that insane people hear sounds where there is no external sound, or none such as they hear. These are all cases of *perceptual* (as distinguished from intellectual) *error*, and it is evident that they can be harmonized with the view that the data are the real things only by partially contradicting this view and asserting that whenever we are perceptually wrong they are not the real things, or else by entertaining the far from common-sense theory that because a thing is red that is no reason why it should not be also green (in the same place and at the same moment), and that because a thing is white that is no reason why it should not be also black.

It is worth noting *why* perceptual error is possible. It is possible because data are directly dependent on the individual organism, not on the external object, varying in their character with the constitution of the sense-organs and the way in which these are affected, and only secondarily and indirectly with the external thing. Thus the insane person hears hallucinatory sounds because his auditory brain-centre is abnormally irritated; the colour-blind person sees red as green because his retina or his visual brain-centre is not normally constituted; the straight stick appears bent because the light-rays have been accidentally refracted at the surface of the water, etc. We have no power of penetrating to the object itself and intuiting it immediately, but are dependent for our information concerning it on the effects which it is able to produce within the body. In a word, *data are subject to the law of psychophysical correlation*.

There is, then, a fundamental opposition between data and physical things, as science conceives these—physical things conceived as in a continuous time and space and as possessing

no characters that contradict each other. An opposition such that, if we say that data are real, we are forced to say that physical things are not real—that they are arbitrary selections from data, or intellectual constructions made on the basis of data; while, if we say that physical things are real—as I think we must—we are forced to conclude that data, as such, are not real. Either heat and cold just as we feel them are real, and then those vibrations of molecules which physicists assign as their objective cause are not real—except as other data of touch or as data of sight; or else the molecular vibrations are real, and then the data are not so. Either colour is real, and then the oscillations of the luminiferous ether, reflected from the surfaces of objects, by which science explains it, are not real—and what we are told about the velocity of light, and its source in the sun and the stars, and the activity of atoms as its cause, is only so much intellectual deduction from and gloss upon the phenomena of colour and luminosity; or, if the physical facts, just as science describes them, are real, then the data are not so. Reality is something *attributed* to the data, solely in the sense that there are objects of which they are data; and when we learn that other somewhat different data—namely, those asserted by science—would more accurately present these objects, all excuse disappears for holding that the data themselves are real, i.e., continuously existent.

How impossible it is to identify physical things with data simply as such, appears with especial clearness when we consider the spatial and temporal characters of data and of physical things respectively. As regards space, a consequence of the dependence of data on the organism is that, as objects move farther and farther away from us, the data presenting them become smaller. Thus a human being becomes half and then quarter his normal size, and finally a mere speck on the horizon. We cannot suppose, consistently with physics or even with everyday sense, that the size of his body actually changes. Here is, then, a series of changes and differences in data corresponding to no real changes or differences in objects—a proof positive that the two cannot be identical. Data are presentments of objects from the point of view of the organism, they are not objects themselves.

Out of this principle of the diminution of apparent size with distance arises the whole element of *perspective* in visual perception. Some parts of a solid object are necessarily farther

away from the eye than others, with the result of appearing proportionately smaller; in other words, the object is seen in perspective. Perspective represents a distortion of real things, which fails to strike us as in glaring contrast with their proper constitution only because we are so familiar with it. It has also its practical value: if the relative distance of different things from us did not appear on their face, we could not make that distinction between what is at hand and what is farther away which is so essential to practice. It is none the less evident that the world as sense-perception presents it and the world as it is by no means coincide.

When we pass to time, this disparity becomes, if possible, even more evident. The distance of objects from us involves a difference in the time it takes them to produce impressions on us; a nearer object is perceived sooner than a farther one, but when the medium of action on us is light, the difference is so slight as to have no practical significance. It is only in the case of the stars that we perceive simultaneously events that are really years and even centuries apart. Yet, theoretically, and on a vastly minuter scale, the falling flakes of a snowstorm or the apparently simultaneous sounds of a battlefield are equally non-coincident temporally. When we see a gun fired at some distance, and hear the report several seconds after seeing the flash, the temporal displacement of the datum with reference to the real event is brought sensibly home to us.

All these (or the like) are well-worn examples in present-day controversy. It will be time to cease insisting on them when all parties recognize their inevitable consequence, that the physical thing cannot be identified with the datum as such. If, in the present section, we have now succeeded in proving this, the following among the views mentioned at the beginning of this paper will thereby have been excluded and disproved: (1) that the datum is the real thing—*naïve realism*; (3) and (4) *psychological* and *logical subjectivism*, (5) and (6) *psychological* and *logical objectivism*, in so far as they assert that the physical thing is identical with the datum. Consistently with the above considerations, the physical thing can only be either an intellectual construction made on the basis of data, or a real existence brought before us by data. Which of these it is will depend very largely on the nature of data. Once these are recognized not to be physical things, the most natural supposition, or at least the one that historically has proved the

most tempting, is that they are psychological in their nature, that they are perceptions-of-things, or perhaps sensations.

DATA ARE NOT PSYCHOLOGICAL IN THEIR NATURE

A psychical fact is commonly conceived to be a vision that flashes before the mind, the seeing and the thing seen being fused together into the unity of a single entity. In this way an emotion, as of anger; a sensation, as of pain or cold; a mental image, as of some one's face, is supposed to exist. But the trouble is that, when we see faces, we do not see our seeing of them—we see only the faces; and the question therefore arises whether the consciousness is really given in and with the face, or the anger, or the pain, as this conception supposes it to be. James, after fruitless attempts to assure himself that he introspected it, bravely declared that it is not. What we take for consciousness, that thin, ethereal seeing of internal things, is, in his view, the sensations of attending, etc.

In short, when we speak of anything as a "datum," that which makes it a datum, the givenness, is not given along with the thing. It is an "external denomination," it consists in a relation between the thing given and something else. What this something else is, is perfectly clear, verbally at least; it is "I," myself—anything given is given to *me*. And the relation of being given, the givenness or awareness (these are names for the same thing viewed from opposite ends), is not given along with the things.

"Datum" is therefore a treacherous word to use for what is given, since it suggests that the givenness is given along with the thing. Here lies the immense advantage of the term "essence." For the first time we get the datum characterized with absolute logical sharpness. But the assumption that the givenness is given is the whole basis of the claim that the datum as such is psychological in its nature. Hence, with the replacing of the term "datum" by that of "essence," the thing designated is recognized not to be psychological, and, since we have shown it not to be physical, the chances are that it is logical, an entity of the peculiar type belonging to logic.

It will perhaps be argued that a pain or an anger does not cease to be psychological because we recognize that, when we introspect it, we perceive no awareness. In other words, *what* we see, apart from the seeing (introspecting), is in itself

psychological. The reply is that, while this is true in the case of the pain and the anger, it is not true in the case of the face; what is given there is a physical thing (I mean the essence of a physical thing, not its existence). Still more obviously is this true when we do not merely imagine, but actually see, faces; if we abstract from the seeing or givenness, the entire datum is physical (in the sense of essence, not of existence), or, to put it in the usual way, it is "objective." Nothing can be more justified than the insistence of neo-realists, and indeed of all sound epistemologists, that the original datum of sense-perception has nothing subjective about it in the psychological sense—largely as we have shown it to be often (if not always!) subjective in the logical sense.

The psychical character of some data, then, does not lie in the fact that they are data, but in the accidental fact that a psychical thing, and not a physical thing, is given. Data as such, accordingly, are even in the case of psychological perception or introspection not psychological in their nature. And, once more, since they are also not physical (but at most presentments of the physical), the probability is that they are entities of logic.

DATA ARE NOT EXISTENCES

Before exploring this hypothesis further, let us look for a moment at the characteristic terms and propositions in which the psychological account of the datum has usually been formulated. Objects have been defined as "perceptions," their *esse* has been set down as *percipi*. Now a "perception" or, better, a "percept" means, in full, something perceived by me; hence to assert that the *esse* of a thing is *percipi*, if we take the assertion quite literally, is to say that *it* consists in a relation between *it* and something else. This is obviously absurd. It is only if you conceive consciousness as a dimension of things, or things as made of consciousness, that the strict identification of *esse* and *percipi* becomes possible. But this is notoriously the current conception of consciousness; when we are told that "the perception is in the object" or that the fundamental data are "experienced-things," it is evident that the conceptions of experience or perception involved contain no essential reference to an organism or ego. Whether this defect does not constitute a damning criticism of the subjec-

tivist and objectivist theories in question, the judicious psychologist may be left to judge.

The proposition that the *esse* of objects is *percipi* may, however, have a different sense; it may mean merely that objects continue to exist only so long as they are perceived. This, on the whole, I think, is the main intent of Berkeley. What is to be said of the proposition understood in this sense? In the first place, since the thing perceived is the physical thing, and since this is not identical with the datum, it does not follow in the least from the fact that, when perception ceases, there is no longer a datum or anything given, that the physical thing whose essence was given no longer exists. The utmost that could be thought to follow is that the datum no longer exists. But the datum, i.e., the essence given, *no longer* exists only in case it did exist when it was given—in case its givenness made it temporarily to exist. Givenness, however, as we have seen, is an external relation to an ego, and it is not obvious how the addition of this relation—how our awareness, in other words, of the essence—can raise it from a state of non-existence to one of existence. On the contrary, the very nature of awareness seems to imply that what we are aware of remains the same, either as existent or non-existent, whether we are aware of it or not, and that what is changed is only ourselves, by our enjoyment or awareness of it.

Nevertheless it might perhaps be maintained that what in the intervals of our non-awareness has no existence, but is only a possibility of thought or perception, does by virtue of its givenness to us acquire a temporary kind of existence. And, in favour of this view, two principal arguments might be urged: (1) that through its givenness an essence acquires a definite position in time and space; (2) that the sensible vividness with which the perceptual essence is given proves it an existence.

Before examining the value of these arguments, let us represent to ourselves a little more definitely the alternative possibility—that the datum is *not* an existence. There can be no question that we are capable of having things given to us which are not existences—e.g., centaurs, perfect squares, ideas of virtue. To deny the possibility that the mind can fix itself on what is not an existence and occupy itself for the moment solely with that, would involve the most extravagant consequences, and contradict the commonest facts. These non-existents are

of course in the broadest sense universals. Yet they vary greatly in their degree of concreteness; a centaur is more concrete than a perfect square, a perfect square is more concrete than virtue. The question will be whether a datum can be so concrete as even to have sensible vividness, and yet not be an existence, but only an entirely concrete universal, a universal of the lowest order. This would mean that the *same* datum exactly might be given to another person, or to the same person at a different time and place; in such wise that the datum as such would not be in time and space. That the data of perception are in fact universals of this description is the thesis of this paper, and is what has been meant by calling them essences. This view, and this view alone, seems to me to permit a satisfactory solution of all the difficulties connected with sense-perception.

Now let us consider first the objection that the data of sense-perception are existences because they are in time and space. That a visual datum has a certain internal extension—being the vision of a large or a small object, a near or a distant one—is undeniable, and likewise that, if my body as well is given, I may be justified in affirming that the object, as close to my body, is “here.” But unless both the object and my body are real, and not dreams or hallucinations, the affirmation would not be valid; and this is something that can only be *believed*. In other words, the affirmation of locality has reference only to the physical things that the visual data bring before us, not to the visual data as such; the visual data as such are neither here nor there. They have no spatial relations to other possible visual data, but only spatial relations among their own parts—none, in short, that are not at this moment given. The fact that an essence is given, then, does not give it a position in space.

Nor does it give it a position in time. Perceptual data doubtless have a certain internal duration, but their relation as wholes to other data, or to existences that are not data, is no part of them, and can consequently only be matter of affirmation. And the affirmation, as in the case of space, is really with reference to the temporal position of the *physical thing* given, not to that of the datum as such. The datum as such has no temporal position except that which lies in the fact of its givenness, and the temporal position is that of the givenness (or, more strictly, of the state of the ego to which it is given), not that of the essence.

That the givenness of anything does not turn it into an

existence belonging to the moment when it is given, may be shown by two arguments. If it did, then I could not think of the past without turning it into a present fact; in short, I could not think of the past at all. Existences, again, are always particular facts; and if thinking of anything turned it into a present existence, then in thinking of man in general or of virtue I should turn them into particular present existences; in other words, I could not think of them at all. That a particular present existence is involved in thinking of a universal or in thinking of the past I do not mean to deny; this is the psychic state which is the vehicle of the thought (about which more later); but at present we are concerned solely with *what is thought of*, the datum or essence.

This may suffice to dispose of the argument that present data are necessarily in time and space; now for the argument that they are existences because they are sensibly vivid. This phrase marks the difference between imagining a thing and actually perceiving it; and there is undoubtedly a strong temptation to suppose that, when a thing is actually perceived, even the datum must be real. Our very idea of the unreal is the imaginary; while of the actually perceived we say, "Seeing is believing." But note that this very maxim confesses that the real is not seen to be such, but believed upon the evidence of sight. In other words, it is hard for the hallucinated person to believe that he is so; the dreamer scarcely knows that he dreams. The datum in dreaming and hallucination is only a candidate for affirmation, a means of affirming the reality of the physical thing—it is not itself real.

The main source of our tendency to think the datum an existence on the ground of its sensible vividness is, I think, our confusing it with the psychic state which is its vehicle. As we should not perceive if we had not sense-organs, so no data would be given if these and the connected brain were not endowed with sensibility. There are states of our sensibility which do not bring before us objects other than themselves—e.g., anger, or pain, or, in some cases, chill. An emotion of anger is not a perception of a state of our body; it is a floating psychical condition, representing to be sure our reaction to an object. A pain, such as toothache, is apt to be localized in a definite spot, and, in so far, serves to bring before us the morbid process occurring at that spot; but this element of locality and physical reference is extraneous to the pain itself, and we can, if we

wish, attend solely to the latter, in which case what we have before us is a pure state of our sensibility. Similarly with cold: it may bring before us a cold object, or it may be taken in itself as a state of our sensibility.

Now states of our sensibility do not cease to be such when they are used to bring before us objects. When I touch ice, I still feel, and feel in the particular way called feeling cold; when I hear an external sound, I still hear; and when I see, I do so by means of states of my sensibility which I know not how to describe except as visual sensations. At any moment I can turn my attention, at will, from the seen, heard, or felt object to the visual, auditory, or tactile sensation, the mere state of my sensibility; and, if my hypothesis is correct, this last is not brought into existence by the fact of my attending to it, but is simply brought under view. This state of my sensibility is indeed an existence, though a transitory one; if it did not exist, it would be impossible for the external object, the ice, or the bell, or the spray of leaves, to appear before us as a datum. But because the vehicle of the givenness of this essence is an existence, it does not follow that the essence itself is one. If it were, we should have *three* existences concerned in sense-perception—the physical thing, the state of our sensibility, and the essence—which even the most determined multipliers of metaphysical entities will think too many.

The example that seems to me to bring out most clearly the difference between the perceptual essence and the sensation is that given by James, of the after-image of the sun projected successively on the thumb-nail, on the wall of the room, and on a mountain-side, and bringing before us thus three (false) external objects of very different size. Throughout this experience I seem to myself to be able to observe that the after-image retains the same *sensible* size. If so, the variation in the size of the objects—which is an essential part of what is given (when we do not introspect the sensation but perceive the false objects)—*must be something which the after-image has as a symbol and not as a sensible fact*. What is given to us, in other words, in sense-perception is the sensation as a meaning and not the sensation as a fact—or, to speak more correctly, what is given is the meaning and not the sensation. It is just as in reading, where what is present to the mind is the significance and not the mere printed characters. Now that this significance, or meaning, or essence, is not an existence and not in time and space,

but, like the meaning when we think of a universal, a purely logical entity, is quite credible.

Two objections may be made to my treatment of this example. First, it may be said that I am venturing unjustifiably beyond experience in suggesting that the after-image exists and retains its size when my attention is turned, not to it, but to the false objects. The sensation—granting that we can attend to a pure sensation—exists only when we experience it; a sensation which no one has is absurd. And since the sensation cannot exist when we are attending to the objects, it cannot have a size. I admit that an unfelt sensation, in the sense in which the word sensation is ordinarily used, is absurd; but I persist in thinking that *that which* we feel, when we feel, i.e., distinctly attend to, a sensation, is capable of existing when it is not felt, and does so exist in all vision, hearing, and touching of external objects. This is a realistic view of introspection which is not popular. But it rests on the principle, now at last obtaining recognition, that knowledge is of its essence adventitious to what is known; and it may appeal to the argument that, for us to know by experience that the *esse* of feelings is *sentiri* (and not, let us say, *sentire*), we should have, in experiencing them, to be conscious not only of the quality or state but of the consciousness, which according to James is not a datum of experience at all.

Moreover, the facts are difficult to construe on the idealistic hypothesis. If, for instance, I allow the after-image to fall half on the thumb-nail and half on yonder wall, the part falling on the wall still appears vastly larger than the part falling on the thumb-nail; and yet it is, and can be observed to be, an exact half of the total image: I cannot persuade myself that between the time of my taking the half as a false object obscuring part of the wall, and so as different in size from the other false object, and my taking it as a sensation, it has undergone a change in size such that now the two halves are equal. It seems to me much more consonant with the facts to suppose that the size of the false object was itself false—that it was matter of imagination, or projected action, and not of sense.

To this it may be replied—and here we come to the second objection—that the size of the false objects is *felt*. I am inclined to think that this objection rests on a foundation of fact. Visual distance is not a mere matter of thought or projected action, but seems to be felt; and size, which varies with distance, is consequently also felt. On the other hand, there is an un-

mistakable heterogeneity between distance and the other two visual dimensions, length and breadth: distance does not appear spread out before us, as length and breadth are. The following hypothesis therefore suggests itself. It is well known that the chief factor in the visual perception of distance—with the blurring caused by binocular disparity—is convergence and accommodation of the eyes. The sense that distance is actually felt may then be due to the fact that it is brought before us by the muscular sensations of convergence and accommodation. Distance, in that case, would be felt but not visually felt. And the instance would constitute a beautiful example of the way external objects and relations are known by means of sensations which have in them little of the characters of the external things, but are simply used as signs.

These considerations contain the reply to the argument that the datum must be an existence because it is sensibly vivid. The datum is sensibly vivid, because it is brought before us by a sensation and not by a mental image, but it is not properly a sensible fact. That is, we cannot actually find it as a feeling, as we can find an emotion or a pain; we can only tend towards it or mean it. Here we come to the function of the intellect (in a wide sense) in connection with sense-perception, which is no less important than that of sense. In other words, a meaning here is not to be understood as a peculiar kind of feeling that can be met with introspectively in the same way that a visual sensation or a pain can, but as a *function* which the feeling discharges in bringing us into mental relation to an external thing. When, having a sensation caused by an object in our minds, we are disposed (in virtue of the connected nervous arrangements) to act as with reference not to it but to the object, then that object is, in so far, before the mind as a datum. And it is because the datum is a functional fact that *the same* object may be brought before the mind with sensible vividness, by means of a sensation, as something now present, or faintly, by means of a mental image, as merely imagined.

I trust I have now made out a case for the view that perceptual data must be distinguished from the sensations by the use of which they are given; that, while the sensations are in time and perhaps space, the data are not so; and that only the sensations are existences, while the data are logical entities or "essences."

DATA OF MEMORY

Before drawing the consequences which follow from this view it may be worth our while to consider briefly the parallel distinction that exists in the case of memory between the datum, which here, too, will be found to be a mere essence, and the mental image by means of which the datum is given.

It has been proved, in one of the earlier of these essays,² against the pragmatists, that in memory the object known cannot be identified with the idea of it which the subject has before his mind when he remembers, since it has to be admitted to be an inaccessible past fact which can only be "meant," not directly experienced. What I shall now try to show is that this idea—if we mean by "idea" what is actually before the mind—must be recognized to be distinct from the mental image, visual, auditory, or other, by means of which we conceive it; that this mental image alone is a present fact, an existence; and that the idea is the mere character which we conceive the past fact to have, without its existence—in short, an essence. If the past fact *itself* cannot be given in memory, and if, on the other hand, it and nothing else must somehow be seized or before us in order that there should be memory at all, then what is before us must be its character without its existence: the datum must be a mere essence.

In the essay referred to Mr. Lovejoy argued that the datum in memory is not something merely present, but "present-as-absent." While there can be no objection to this simply as a vivid phrase or metaphor, I would point out that the word "present" has at least three meanings: (1) present to me in space—"here"; (2) present in time, and not past or future—"now"; (3) present to the mind, or "given." The relevant meaning in the present instance is "given," and it will be conducive to clearness of thought if we substitute this technical term for the more vague and metaphorical "present," and say that the past is "given-as-absent"—or "given-as-past." I will not here take up the question whether the pastness is a true part of the essence given, or comes in rather through our placing of the true essence, our referring it to a particular temporal position; I shall assume, for the purposes of this argument, that it is a part of the essence.

If, then, we try to analyze exactly what is given to us when

² See A. O. Lovejoy's article in *Essays in Critical Realism*.

we remember, I think we shall recognize, first, that at least there is no conscious contrasting of the past with the present—no conceiving of it as being not-now, but at most a conceiving of it as *then*. In so far as we merely remembered, we do not think of the present at all. Hence it will be better not to use the formula “given-as-absent,” which seems to imply some awareness of the relation between the past and the present, but to speak of the datum in memory as “given-as-past.” And of course we have no awareness (so far as we merely remember) that the past is *given*. So the true datum of memory is just simply “the past.”

Now, how can it be maintained that this datum, this mere airy vision which must appear before the mind if we are to grasp the real past at all, is a present psychic state or existence? What is there in common (as to fundamental category) between something whose central essence is pastness, something *not* now real, and a visual or auditory image which is a present psychic existence? Such an image is, of course, necessary to determine what it is we remember—I must imagine the flash, if I am to remember striking a match a moment ago—but this present psychic state is the mere vehicle of the meaning “the past,” it is not itself in any way an object of awareness when we remember. Similarly, we can conceive a class of things—“man”—but the image of a particular man, Socrates or other, or the sound of the word “man” heard internally, is not the datum at the moment; the datum is “man-in-general.” In a word, we must distinguish, in memory and conception as much as in sense-perception, between the datum of the cognition, a mere essence, and the psychic state which is the vehicle of the datum.

When once this distinction is clearly made, it becomes evident that the datum, while not identifiable with the object in this sense, that we can argue that wherever a datum appears there must be a real object and that in contemplating the datum we are actually beholding the object as an existence, is yet and must be identical with the object in this other sense, that, if the knowledge is true, the essence given is the true essence of the object—so that in contemplating the datum we *virtually* behold the object. How could there be knowledge at all unless we managed somehow virtually to behold absent things, to behold the past and the future, and, in the case of sense-perception, to behold objects existing separately from ourselves?

This logical or essential identity is thus the keystone of a

correct theory of knowledge; and it is the substitute we must offer for the literal and absolute identity asserted by the neo-realists and the pragmatists.

APPLICATION OF THE CONCEPTION OF "ESSENCE" TO THE PROBLEM

In recent American discussion the view defended by the authors of this book has been opposed, as "epistemological dualism," to the "epistemological monism" represented especially by the neo-realists. This way of formulating the issue seems to me not in all respects happy. My colleagues have, indeed, guarded themselves carefully against being thought to advocate *ontological* dualism—a charge to which my way of speaking of physical things and psychic states in the preceding pages might seem to render me liable, though not with justice, since I hold that the two form a single world and that what appear to us as physical things are in themselves of psychic nature. The question I would raise is, however, whether even in epistemology the word "dualism" correctly expresses the relation between what is given and the real thing. For this is the relation which in epistemology we are especially concerned about.

The physical thing and the psychic state or sensation by means of which I perceive it are unquestionably two, and mutually independent—as much so as the physical thing and my organism or ego, of which the psychic state is a state. Nothing can obscure the fundamental fact that sense-perception is a means of adjusting the organism to its environment—of making the ego aware of his friends and enemies—and that the ego and the environment are two, not one. It is quite another question whether the datum, the vision of the object that is given to the ego by means of his psychic state, is distinct from the object, in such wise that the object and the *essence* are two. If the essence is truly the essence of the object, as it should be in order that knowledge may be correct, the essence given and the essence embodied in the object are not two but one.

Here appears the immense advantage we have gained, in point of epistemological theory, by recognizing that the datum is a mere essence, a universal. If the datum were an existence—as it would necessarily be if its givenness were given in and with it, or if it were itself in time and space—it would necessarily be a second existence, independent of the object, and then, in being aware of it, we should not be aware of the object. It is pre-

cisely because it is a mere universal that the essence given and the essence embodied in the object may be the same, and that the mind in sense-perception may therefore be able to rest directly on the object. Hence it is only when we are wrong, and the essence given betrays or mis-presents the object, that there is epistemological dualism; when we are right, epistemological monism—in this carefully limited sense—is the truth.

C. A. STRONG in *Essays in Critical Realism*, pp. 223-240.
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SUGGESTIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Define each of the six views of the datum given in italicized words on p. 334.
2. Why do perceptual errors refute naïve realism? What makes such error possible?
3. State your own opinion of Strong's argument that data are dependent on the organism perceiving them.
4. Compare Strong's discussion of the question of whether data are psychical with Kemp-Smith's discussion above, p. 192. Do they hold the same view? If not how do they differ?
5. How does Strong interpret and criticize the *esse est percipi* principle?
6. Outline briefly Strong's argument against the theory that sensible vividness makes a datum an existent.
7. What do you think of Strong's distinction between the three meanings of the word present? Compare what he says on this point with McGilvary above, p. 318 f.
8. What advantage does Strong claim for the essence theory over the view of the new realists?

III. THE MEANING OF EMERGENCE, by *Arthur O. Lovejoy*

Analysis

Lovejoy lays down five conditions any one of which will constitute emergence. These define five different types of emergence, the first of which he calls functional and the other four existential emergence. He then answers the criticism of functional emergence that it rests on our imperfect knowledge and is not objectively real, by holding that it may be real and that the hypothesis that it is real is more plausible than the hypothesis that it is unreal. Turning to existential types of emergence he points out that they can actually be observed, as in the case of a qualitative change resulting from a chemical synthesis. Such an example at least proves the reality of existential emergence. To the objection that calling a thing emergent is giving up the attempt to explain it, he insists that it depends on what is meant by explanation. It rules out only those types of explanation which deny the possibility

of emergence but it does not rule out any other type. And all objections which rest on theoretical considerations and beg the question at issue must be abandoned in the face of the actual observable cases of emergence. He argues that *sensa* (see Kemp-Smith above, p. 189) emerge out of a set of conditions existing prior to their appearance. This is the "generative theory of *sensa*." In conclusion, he asserts that while emergence has actually taken place on earth, and possibly to some extent in other parts of the universe, nevertheless "cosmic meliorism" is unjustifiable. Yet in the millions of years that still remain for life on earth who knows but what still higher levels of reality may emerge, such as we cannot now foresee?

. . . It is useful to consider what types of emergent there conceivably *may* be—what, in other words, are the ways in which it is possible to think of a consequent as differing positively, otherwise than in the rearrangement of the same elements, from its causally necessary antecedent. In distinguishing these modes of possible emergence I shall—in order to gain brevity by combining two definitions—put the enumeration in the form of a statement of the meaning of "emergent evolution," that term in general here signifying the occurrence as a feature of the evolutionary process of *any* of the modes of emergence. An "Emergent evolution" may, then, be said to have taken place if, upon comparison of the present phase (called Ph. N), of earth-history (say that since the appearance of *homo sapiens*) with any prior phase (called Ph. A), there can be shown to be present in Ph. N any one or more of the five following features lacking in Ph. A. (1) Instances of some general type of change admittedly common to both phases (e.g., relative motion of particles), of which instances the manner or conditions of occurrence could not be described in terms of, nor predicted from, the laws which would have been sufficient for the description and (given the requisite determination of the variables) the prediction of all changes of that type occurring in Ph. A. Of this evolutionary emergence of laws one, though not the only conceivable, occasion would be the production, in accordance with one set of laws, of new local integrations of matter, the motions of which, and therefore of their component particles, would thereupon conform to vector, i.e., directional, laws emergent in the sense defined. This first mode differs from the others in that it implies no quantitative variability of the prime or irreducible *existents* (other than relations) in the system under consideration. (2) New qualities and, especially, classes of qualities (e.g., the so-called secondary qualities) attachable

as adjectives to entities already present, though without those accidents, in Ph. A. (3) Particular entities *not* possessing all the essential attributes characteristic of those found in Ph. A, and having distinctive types of attributes (not merely configurational) of their own. (4) Some type or types of event or process irreducibly different in kind from any occurring in Ph. A. (5) A greater quantity, or number of instances, not explicable by transfer from outside the system, of any one or more types of prime entity common to both phases.

In the enumeration of types of possible emergence included in this definition, the most significant point is the contrast between the first, which may be called functional, and the remaining four, which may be called existential, emergence. Several writers have recently declared that any attempt to prove the reality of the first mode is subject (for familiar reasons, inherent in the notion of a "law," which need not be recalled here) to an intrinsic logical limitation. Our inability, they remark, at any given time to discover, or even conceive of the general nature of, any single law or set of joint laws from which all the motions of matter in its differing integrations would be deducible, is not conclusive proof that no such law is formulable; "within the physical realm it always remains logically possible," Broad has said, "that the appearance of emergent laws is due to our imperfect knowledge of microscopic structure or to mathematical incompetence." This *non possumus* does not seem to me to be itself conclusively established; but as there is no time to give reasons, I shall not here challenge it. Even supposing it true, it would not follow that the emergence of laws can be said to be improbable. Such emergence would, to be sure, imply the impossibility of a complete unification of science; and there is for this reason, we are often told, a decisive methodological presumption against it. But here we must distinguish between heuristic rules and propositions of fact. It is the business of the scientific investigator to look for identities of law in seemingly diverse phenomena, and to find as many of them as he can; it is not the business of the philosopher to assume *à priori* that nature must to an indefinite degree lend itself to the gratification of this ambition. Though rigorous and conclusive proof of the first mode of emergence be impossible, the hypothesis of its occurrence seems to me to be patently the more probable in the present state of our knowledge. But with these cursory dogmatizings I leave to others the

question of functional emergence, in order to consider somewhat less summarily that of existential emergence.

Concerning this the first thing to remark is that an attempt to prove it is not subject to the same general logical disability said to inhere in any argument for emergent laws. An existential emergent would be a quality, or a thing or event possessing distinctive non-configurational qualities, which was found in the subsequent and not in the prior phase of some causal process; and its presence in the one case and absence in the other would be facts determinable either by observation or by inference from observed data. Where observation of both phases is possible the proof of existential emergence can be direct and virtually complete, as in the case of the qualitative changes (whether they be "objective" or "subjective") incident to chemical synthesis, which have long been recognized, under a different terminology, as examples of such emergence. This simplest instance—which, however, is not quite so simple logically as it looks—obvious and commonplace though it is, has a crucial importance which some writers on the subject do not appear to realize; for it alone suffices to show that there can be no general and decisive theoretical presumption against *other* hypotheses of existential emergence, that nature is assuredly no affair of mere rearrangements. In less simple but philosophically more consequential and controversial cases, the argument for existential emergence may involve somewhat complex and difficult reasonings, and therefore attain a less high degree of probability; but even in these cases, to which I shall shortly return, the difficulty is of a kind different from, and less fundamental than, that said to infect all reasonings concerning emergence of laws.

With the distinction between functional and existential emergents in mind we are also in a position to deal with the commonest general or antecedent objection brought against theories of specific emergence. The objection was raised, in differing terms, by several participants in the recent discussion of the subject by the English philosophical societies. To characterize an effect as "emergent," it is urged, is to give up the attempt to "explain" it; and since science cannot give up this attempt, the characterization can have, at best, no more than a provisional validity, as a way of admitting that certain things have not as yet been completely "explained." Now, what sort of explanation is it that these critics desiderate in theories of emergence? "Causal explanation" in the empirical sense—the

assumption that every event follows upon some other *nach einer Regel*, the "determinism of the experimentalist"—is, as we have seen, entirely compatible with the belief in emergence. The sort of explanation which specific emergence, or emergent evolution, would exclude, is simply . . . the conception of an event as *neither* (a) manifesting any law, or mode of uniform behavior, *nor* (b) containing any existent, not found in the antecedent phase of the sequence to which it belongs. To maintain then, that everything is "explicable," in the sense incongruous with emergence, is to raise a definite, though by no means simple, question of fact; it is to imply, for example that, barring mere summations or rearrangements, there is to be found in the present phase of terrestrial history no existence whatever—no quality, type of entity, or kind of process—which could not already have been discerned by a scientific angel observing the cold-gaseous-nebula stage of the development of our solar system. This proposition cannot be said to have a high degree of *prima facie* plausibility; and its truth cannot be assumed *à priori* merely because it is one of the two conceivable ways of satisfying the demand for a special type of so-called "explanation" which is not practically indispensable to science.

Wholesale attempts to rule out, *ab initio*, all specific hypotheses of existential emergence by *à priori* assumptions of this sort being excluded, both assertors and deniers of any such hypotheses must address themselves to the analysis of definite empirical data. The assertor must (if the question be that of emergent evolution) point out some type of observable entity, event, or quality—call it E—existent in Ph. N which does not appear to be adequately describable in the same terms as would describe any entity, event, etc., which we can with probability suppose to have existed in Ph. A. The denier must attempt to show that everything in E is describable in the same terms as some class of entities, events, or qualities in Ph. A; to this end he may employ either of two methods, which may be termed the reductive and the retentive; i.e., he may either (1) seek by analysis to reduce E to the same descriptive terms as are sufficient for certain events, etc., admittedly found in Ph. A; or (2) admitting that E has the characters attributed to it by the assertor of emergence, he may maintain that these characters were already present in the earlier phase—in other words, must be supposed to be present in all phases—of the process.

The general logical nature of the problem being thus formu-

lated, we may consider a particular hypothesis of existential emergence, which I hold to be true. It is nowise original, being substantially the same as the theory to which Broad has given the name of "emergent materialism." . . . According to this hypothesis, both the third and fourth modes of emergence—i.e., emergence of new types of entities and of new kinds of event or process—have appeared in evolution, in the form, but only in the form, of what may be called "trans-physical" emergence. By this I mean the production, as effects of the formation of certain complex and late-evolved integrations of living matter, when acted upon by certain forms of radiant energy, of psychical events and psychical objects. An example of a psychical event is an act of awareness. By psychical objects I mean individual entities empirically existent, having extension and certain other of the properties commonly called psychical, but differing from true physical objects in that they do not conform to the laws of physics, have individually only an ephemeral existence, have collectively no quantitative or numerical constancy, have no direct dynamical relations with one another, and are grouped into "private" sets, i.e., each is accessible only to an act of awareness of an individual organism. Examples of such entities are *sensa* and images, both delusive and veridical. In other words the "generative theory of *sensa*," recently defended by a number of writers, is a part of the hypothesis of existential emergent evolution I am presenting. The initial cases of trans-physical emergence were followed by a further evolution of the same type, conditioned upon the formation of new and still more complex integrations of matter and (or) energy, and the process thus far apparently culminates in the cognitive and affective functions of the human organism. . . .

We have, therefore, abundant reason to believe that in the history of our planet there have occurred genuine new births of time, a sheer increase and diversification and enrichment of the sum of things here. And no reason, except an arbitrary pseudo-axiom, can be given for assuming that this has been merely a cosmical game of beggar-my-neighbor. On the other hand, we have no empirical reasons for asserting—and serious reasons for doubting—that a similar process is the general rule throughout the physical universe, or that the higher emergents occur at all frequently in space and time. Yet, even though no knowledge which we possess concerning evolution justifies that

generalized or cosmic meliorism which now so widely does duty for a religion, there nevertheless lies before our terrestrial race in its own little corner of the world, a future which, if dim with uncertainties and beset with perils, is not necessarily devoid of possibilities immeasurably transcending all that the past has brought forth. There perhaps yet remain to mankind we are told, some thousand million years; if it be so, before this long day ends it is possible that, besides all that man's laboring reason may achieve, there may yet emerge out of the latent generative potencies of matter, as there quite certainly have emerged before our strange planetary history, new and richer forms of being, such as no prescience of ours could foresee and no contrivance of ours create.

A. O. LOVEJOY in *Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy*, pp. 26-32. Edited by E. S. Brightman. Published by Longmans, Green & Co. Reprinted by permission.

SUGGESTIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Compare Lovejoy's definition of emergence with Sellar's account of Alexander's use of this idea above, p. 284 f. See below, p. 553 ff.
2. What is the essential difference between functional and existential emergence?
3. What is Broad's argument against functional emergence and how does Lovejoy answer it?
4. What is the commonest general objection to existential emergence and how does Lovejoy answer it?
5. How does Lovejoy formulate the general logical motive of the problem with which those who affirm and those who deny existential emergence are confronted?
6. What is "cosmic meliorism"? What is Lovejoy's attitude toward this doctrine? Do you agree with him?

CHAPTER IV

REALISTIC SOLUTIONS OF THE PROBLEM OF TRUTH AND ERROR

I. THE DEFINITION OF TRUTH OR "TRUENESS," by *Arthur Kenyon Rogers*

Analysis

Holding that truth is correspondence between idea and reality, Rogers proceeds to justify this general theory. In defining truth our interest is not in concrete truths nor in the criteria by which truths may be distinguished from falsehoods. It is rather in the nature of "trueness." What are the conditions which constitute "trueness"? Rogers analyzes the knowledge situation into four elements, each of which is briefly characterized. First, there is the independently real object which various traditional theories of knowledge ignore. Secondly, there is the psychical existent, a bit of psychological stuff constituting the experience of the object, the existence of which is denied by certain contemporary thinkers. Thirdly, there is the meaning which belongs to the realm of mind but is, nevertheless, more a part of the object than it is of the mind and is best named an *essence*. Perhaps it is neither mental nor physical but a timeless entity. The fourth element in the knowledge situation is the mental act. Although it is difficult to say what this is, there is unquestionably *something* which Rogers thinks can best be differentiated by the term mental act. He then gives an illustration and analyzes it to show what in it stands for each of these aspects of the knowledge situation. This enables him to state his idea of trueness. He first states what he thinks perception is, namely, "a process of recognizing, implicitly, a certain character or essence as belonging to an object." There are two phases here: (i) the presence in experience of the essence, which Rogers calls apprehension, and (ii) the reference of this to an external object not in the mind at all. He turns aside to state the defects and values in the accounts of perception of subjective idealism and the new realism. Then he defines more fully an essence. It is not an existing thing but a *description*. He rejects the neutralism view of the new realists, and argues that the realm of non-existence is a mind-made fact which rests upon our human power of abstraction. Yet the essence is not merely psychical. Every psychical existent has a distinguishable essence of its own, which is used in interpreting the object outside of experience. Such an interpretation is *cognition*. The various sense qualities or *sensa* are passive psychical existents. But when we experience them we *react* to an external world believed to exist on the basis of an instinctive will to live. The reference to reality arises out of organic impulses and it is in them rather than in purely intellectual conditions that knowledge is rooted. But

when we react we have to react by referring the essence we abstract from our psychic state to some external object. Thus an "object" is the essence plus existence, the essence *as such* being our abstraction of the nature of the object from its existence. This is why trueness is correspondence. The essence of the psychic state being identical with the essence of the object to which it is referred makes the psychic state and the object correspond. While in the original experience the two are identical, reflection shows them to be different. Hence the fact of their correspondence is a discovery of thought. Rogers explains the sense in which his is a "copy theory" of truth. He insists that he has given a natural and plausible account of perceptual knowledge.

In the preceding pages I have constantly presupposed a certain doctrine which at the present day is widely disputed. This is the notion of truth as a correspondence between idea and reality. I propose in the present section to make an attempt to justify this more fully.

First it is desirable to be clear about what it is that the definition tries to tell us, since a misunderstanding here has sometimes, it is likely, prejudiced the doctrine. In such a definition we are not at all concerned with what concretely is *the* truth, nor with a working criterion to distinguish truths from falsehoods. Perhaps the special nature of the problem can be suggested by saying that it is a question about the definition of "trueness." Every belief, that is, makes a claim to being true; what does it mean abstractly by such a claim, irrespective of whether or not the claim is justified? Thus it does not for our present purpose make the slightest difference whether sense qualities like sound or color really belong to the physical world or not; in our unsophisticated moods we believe they do, and the question is what such a belief implies or means. What are the conditions that must be met if the belief is to have the "trueness" which belief always assumes itself to have?

I shall begin by distinguishing four elements in the knowledge situation which an empirical analysis seems to reveal—distinctions which are perfectly easy to draw, and which all alike have enough apparent claim at least to stand for facts, to put the burden of proof upon the one who shall reject them. First, there is the object perceived, the real thing with its status in the world of reality independent of the knowledge relation. This various traditional theories of knowledge have persistently tended to ignore or to deny, but evidently only at the cost of a sharp break with normal human belief.

Over against the object stands a second fact, which common

sense also in the past has been accustomed to accept, and to think of as an independent and—in a specified sense of the term—subjective entity, belonging to the realm of psychological experience—the “state of consciousness,” or the psychical state, as an existent. Here again we have a sort of fact that is nowadays not universally admitted; and it will be a part of my task to defend it, incidentally, against the current disposition to extrude it from the universe. But meanwhile I find no excuse for any one pretending that he does not know what the phrase is meant, at least hypothetically, to stand for. It may be identified summarily as that which constituted the whole stock in trade of the traditional English introspective psychologists—the bits of psychological stuff into which it was their business to analyze the conscious life.

About the next point there is more excuse for misunderstanding; but recent philosophy in particular has made some sort of a distinction here a commonplace. It concerns what in familiar language may be called our “meanings” or “ideas.” A real possibility of confusion lies in the fact that “meanings” have two different aspects, which it will be one main purpose of what follows to try to adjust. On the one hand, a meaning is distinctly “our” meaning; it belongs, that is, in *some* sense to the realm of psychological experience. We talk about our “ideas,” in the sense of the traditional psychology, as events in the stream of consciousness with a particular existential locus. But on the other hand a meaning, from a different angle, does appear to have a non-psychological objectivity. It is always on the point of breaking loose from its local embodiment in the psychical series. When we subject it to ordinary psychological introspection it tends to elude us, leaving us simply with the “image”; and between the image, a plain psychological existent, and the meaning, there is, however close the connection, no identity. Indeed the meaning seems to belong rather to the object than to the image; it is the object’s nature, or “essence.” Or it may even claim a status as a timeless entity, inhabiting a logical world of its own independent of any attachments; thus we may speak of it as the “same” meaning no matter who thinks it, and no matter to what particular object it is referred, or whether it is referred at all.

The fourth distinction is that of the “mental act.” This is a concept confessedly obscure. But whatever the interpretation, it seems tolerably clear that there is *something* for which the

expression stands, worthy of entering into a complete analysis. Without an element of "activity," we do not get the complete fact that experience seems to present; psychological states become a bare disjointed string of Humian bits of mind stuff, and "meanings" an unchanging skeleton world of logical abstractions, or Platonic ideas.

There is not intended to be anything abstruse in the foregoing analysis, and if there has seemed to be, I can perhaps dispel the impression by translating it into a concretion. I recall or think about my dinner of yesterday. Here there is, first, the dinner itself, an actual experience of eating which is now past and done with, and, therefore, not now to be discovered as an actual presence. The ideal content of this past experience however, its "character," or "nature," or "essence," is present for me now in the focus of my attentive consciousness as an idea or meaning. Distinguishable from this, again, is the imagery which may be said somehow to "carry" the meaning—a species of psychological fact which differs from the latter in that I am unaware of it at the moment of remembering, but which examination reveals as actually having been present, whether as visual, gustatory, verbal or what not, being relatively unimportant to the significance of the memory itself. And, finally, over and above all these aspects, singly or collectively, is the fact that *I am remembering*, or the "act" of memory. There may be a reasonable doubt about the interpretation of some or all of these aspects. But that each of them stands for *something* that the plain man can easily identify as a part of, or as directly involved in, the total fact he is familiar with as the thinking of a past event, I do not believe can fairly be disputed.

I am now in a position to state in a preliminary way what I consider to be the nature of an act of belief on the side of its claim to truth. And as perception is the original form of that which takes itself as knowledge, and is, besides, the storm center of the epistemological controversy, it will form the natural starting point for the inquiry. Perceptual experience, then, is a process of recognizing, implicitly, a certain character or essence as belonging to an object, or to a real existent. This existent is something not itself immediately apprehended; it does not enter literally in its bodily presence into the flow of direct psychological experience where knowing is located. The real chair which I see, no more than the real dinner which I remember, is identical with anything that at the moment is an

“experienced,” as distinct from a “known,” fact. For one thing, if in knowledge the actual object were literally inclosed within the experience which knows it, it would be bound in so far to exist precisely as it is known, and error would be impossible. Consequently, as opposed to subjectivism, the “existence” to which knowledge refers must be postulated as having a life of its own, untouched by, and existentially independent of, the knowledge process.

On the other hand the specific dress—the complex of qualities and relations—in which for knowledge the object is clothed, *must* somehow be immediately grasped, or intuited, or apprehended, or given. The true object of knowledge cannot accordingly be understood except in terms of an intimate union of two aspects. In its construction we have to distinguish two separate processes or phases—the apprehension, or direct presence in psychological experience, of the character or essence which describes it, *and* the outgoing reference which locates this as an attribute of an independently real world. The fundamental defect of neo-realism—and, I believe also, of objective idealism—is that it stops with the character apprehended, and so turns existence into logic—a complex of attributes or “data.” In point of fact what we do when we “see” an apple is not merely to have a complex awareness of redness, roundness and the like; this redness and roundness we feel as *really existing* out there as the qualities of an actual “thing,” where the thinghood or existence is not itself reducible to apprehended characters of which we are aware in the same way that we are aware of redness. On the other hand, the neo-realists are unquestionably right in holding that these “characters” are truly objective, in the sense that they are not sensations or mental states. An apple is not a collection of my sensations and images; nor do I attribute sensations to it as its qualities. At the moment of perceiving, no reference to the mental is present to my mind at all. The content which specifies or describes the particular kind of reality I am in contact with is a complex of purely abstract, logical, and therefore non-existent entities; it is made up not of red and round sensations, but of *redness* and *roundness*.

And yet from a different standpoint subjectivism also has something to say for itself. For while it is so that in the description of the known object there is no question of a red sensation, it does not follow that we should have it in our power to

see redness in the object were it not that actually physical processes have given rise to red sensations in our personal experience, so that we can somehow utilize such "mental" facts to make the knowing process concretely possible. This, as I have said before, is what in appearance at least we find to be the case. And I propose to go on now to inquire just what such a claim will involve. More specifically, I wish to consider the exact status of a "meaning" or an "essence," and what its relation is alike to the object, and to the mental state.

I have said that an essence is not as such an existence. It is rather a *description*; and we do not refer existences to the real world as its describable "character." But then what does constitute its metaphysical standing? I see here only two roads open. On the one hand this status of "non-existence" may represent an ontological fact, in the sense of something like a realm of Platonic ideas. To this, with its hypostasization of logic, neo-realism seems inevitably to swing. Or else non-existence is purely a mind-made fact, and depends upon our human power of abstraction.

This last is the road which, in so far at least as the knowledge situation is concerned, I prefer to follow. The "character" of an object is not an existent, simply because we have left its existence out of account in thinking of its bare descriptive nature. There seems no particular difficulty so far; all we need to postulate is the power to lend attention to partial aspects of experience, and ignore for our selective thought the rest. If we were asked how we arrive at the description of an apple, for example, assuming now the "apple" as a part of the already accepted world of real things to which we react, we should naturally say that we note by the abstracting eye the redness of the apple, the taste, the shape, and, ignoring the fact that these are embodied in a particular existential form, we hold them before the mind in their own right just as characters. They really do, for our naïve belief, belong to the apple, exist there—that is why we can reassign them to it objectively as its very nature. But also we can think them as qualities without at the same time intending to think of any particular instance in which they really inhere.

But while the status of the essence in so far is not particularly abstruse, whether as embodied in the object, or as attended to in abstraction from it, its connection with the process of *perception* is more difficult. For a point of view at any rate which accepts

a real difference between psychical and physical existence, the presence of the essence in the knowing experience cannot be accounted for merely in terms of its existence in the object, without abandoning the whole distinction between the real world as existing and the world as it enters into the knowing state—without leaving out, that is, the human fact of knowing altogether. We have to find, accordingly, an embodiment of essences not in things merely, but in connection with the human knowledge of things as well. And such a point of attachment has already been recognized in the preceding analysis; *somehow* they are “ideas of ours,” which we can hold before the mind and attribute on occasion to various “things.” I have however granted the impossibility of simply identifying this meaning with the psychical state; what then are we to take to be the relationship between the two more or less discrepant facts?

The simplest answer seems to me to be the true one. The sensation is actually there as an existent psychical fact, though we are not aware of this at the time, and it is not the sensation as such that we refer to the thing. But the sensation also, like the object, has a certain character, or an essence. And as, in viewing an object, we can ignore the object’s existence in favor of its qualities, so when we have a sensation it is possible that, without any reference whatever to the fact *that* we have it, or to its existence, our attention may automatically be held by certain special characters attaching to it, which we use then for interpreting the extra-experiential object in which on other grounds we have reason to believe. And this, I suggest, constitutes the experience of cognitive perception, and explains the ontological status of the essence in human belief. Of course the same explanation would equally apply, with modifications to be noted later, to non-sensuous knowledge, where the “image” would take the place of the sensation.

Before going on to justify this thesis more at length, it will be well to say something first about the other aspect of the knowing process that has been distinguished, for the sake of getting the entire situation before us. And for this it is only necessary to turn to certain facts about the human constitution which are a matter of general acceptance. The foundation of essences in the knowing process has been located in the variously qualified psychical experiences—color-sensations, sound sensations, and the like—which arise in connection with the action of the outer world on the organism under specifiable conditions.

That undulations set up by a vibrating body, and impinging on the sense organ, condition thus the appearance of sound sensations not identical in character with the physical changes in the nervous substance, is to be accepted because we find it to be so.

These qualitative effects, however, may as such be called passive; and if they stood alone they would not constitute knowledge at all. They would be no more than transient pulses of psychic existence of which one could only say that they *are*. But the organism has another and more aggressive side. It is constituted by outward-going impulses, which need for their expression the material of the outer world. And this relationship of active tension in which the organism stands to the world which it finds only indirectly amenable to its own purposes, is the immediate occasion for that which translates itself into the inner life as a reference to, or an acceptance of, a real extra-experiential universe of existents. It is not that we reason to, or infer, such a fact beyond experience. The belief is rather an assumption which we make by instinct, since it is only by taking for granted that we are in relation to realities on which the needs of life depend that we are able to maintain ourselves alive at all. But also we do not simply *react* to this world; we have an intellectual or conscious recognition of its being there, as something to be taken into account. . . . That it is *somehow* in connection with the life of organic impulse that the reality reference arises seems to me, in the light of all we know about the world, hardly to be open to reasonable doubt; and an account of knowing which ignores this, and which tries to derive all that is essential in knowledge out of intellectual or non-practical conditions, is necessarily doomed to failure.

If, however, to return now to the earlier point, we are to come in thus for some practical benefit, it is not enough that we should merely recognize reality in general; we must find reality clothed with certain specific features, in case our recognition is to help us in adopting the action appropriate to any situation in particular. We must, that is, qualify reality by distinguishable predicates. And we have no material whatever for this purpose, except in the form of those characters which we directly experience, ultimately through the effects that outer objects exert upon the organism. We cannot characterize existence except in experienced terms, which means in terms of the essences of our experienced psychical feelings. And if on certain occasions we

are led to react at the same moment that we find ourselves experiencing a sensation of redness, why should we *not* automatically characterize the existent to which the reaction points by redness, and so have a mental tool for future discriminations in conduct.

This, again, distinctly does not mean that we first recognize the psychical state as an existent. Rather what is presupposed is, that while the psychical state *is there* all along, all that comes to the surface, rises to our attentive consciousness, is one or more of its essences; for attention these are given *apart from* the fact of their psychical embodiment, which last can only be noted by a second introspective act of knowledge. Normally and originally—for until it happens we have no case of knowledge at all—these essences are present to our awareness, or are “given,” as descriptive not of sensation but of an independent object, the recognition of the object being due once more to the practical needs of life, which force us to take account of what we find affects us for weal or woe. An “object,” therefore, is constituted by a group of the characters with which psychological experience makes us familiar, *plus* the instinctive sense that there is something present of which we have to take account, the latter aspect being an outcome of that state of muscular tension which is conditioned by our nature as active beings dependent on an enviroing world, while the characters are used, also instinctively, to give to this a specific form. Meanwhile the essence *as such* is the product of our later moments of reflection when we abstract the nature of the object from its existence of thinghood—the two things being originally given in conjunction—and direct attention to this just as an essence, or abstract character, or universal.

It is here, I may note in passing, that the ground exists for the conclusion that true knowledge is in terms of “correspondence.” This character of the psychical state which the mind “intends” in its ideas must really be identifiable with the character of the object to which it is referred, or else in so far our knowledge is in error; and if the essence in the two cases is identical, the things which have such an identical essence “correspond.” In this way we may answer the familiar objection that if by definition an object lies outside experience, there is no method of getting hold of it to compare it with the mental state, and so to discover the correspondence. Correspondence is *discovered* not in the original act of knowing, which is a unitary

act of reference or identification, but through a subsequent reflective thought, to which both the terms alike are on the side of their *existence* external; but also both object and mental state alike are now present in *idea*, that is, in their essence, and so can be compared. This of course still leaves the claim to correspondence without any final testing; but the *claim* nevertheless remains as a verifiable part of any natural account of knowledge, with an origin which it is possible to trace. If accordingly we wish to say that our ideas "copy" the real world, we must be careful not to imagine that there is an original in knowledge which the idea then sets itself to reproduce; it is a copy if it is a true idea, but it does not do any conscious copying. Meanwhile the connection with reality which belief presupposes is not dependent on a recognition of this correspondence. It is direct and instinctive, and a consequence of the way in which, not reality merely, but reality localized and particularized, is forced upon us by specific practical needs under specific conditions of their satisfaction.

In terms of specific qualities of sense, at least, I think that the foregoing account of the relationship between essence and mental state is sufficiently simple not to need further laboring; and it seems a perfectly natural and plausible conception. Evidently a "red sensation," as a psychical existent, is neither identified with the red object, nor attributed to the red object as its quality; it is *redness* we find in the existing world. But how could we ever have the meaning "redness" before us unless we had somehow *experienced* redness as the quality of an actual psychical state? . . .

A. K. ROGERS: *What Is Truth?*, pp. 55-69. Copyright, 1923, by Yale University Press. Reprinted by permission.

SUGGESTIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Compare Rogers's four elements of the knowledge situation with Hicks's analysis above, p. 301 ff.
2. Compare Rogers's definition of an essence with Santayana's use of this idea and with Strong's use of it. Do the three writers seem to you to mean the same by this concept?
3. What does Rogers regard as the fundamental defect in the new realism? What in idealism?
4. What is the relation of the essence to the psychical existent from which it is abstracted and to the physical object? Does Rogers's view here commit him to one, to two or to three ultimate realities? Give a reason for your answer.

5. If the psychical content and the physical are identical at the time of experience and a correspondence between the essence and the object is a later discovery of the mind, can Rogers's theory be called a correspondence theory of truth?
6. Give your own opinion of this account of the correspondence theory. Does it seem to you to be as good a theory of truth as that expounded by Carr above, p. 198 ff.?
7. Give your own opinion of Rogers's idea of trueness. Can true-ness be separated from the things which are true? Is trueness an essence?

II. TRUTH AND FALSEHOOD, by *Bertrand Russell*

Analysis

Russell gives three reasons why the question of truth and falsehood has been enshrouded in mystery in traditional philosophy. He then states two questions into which the problem naturally divides itself. Answering the question: "What are the objects to which the predicates true and false apply?" he holds that they apply to sentences as bearers of a certain kind of meaning. He gives a simple illustration to show the complexity of meaning in a single sentence. He thinks that single words embody knowledge although they do not make assertions. He explains briefly such kinds of words as proper names, adjectives and relations, and words indicating structure. Having briefly analyzed words, he defines the truth of a statement. A present statement is true when it agrees with what we remember or with what we are perceiving, and a past statement is true if it raised expectations that are now confirmed. These are not the only grounds on which statements are regarded as true, but they are typical and important. Examples are given to show that these are the *direct* ways by which we determine the truth of statements. This leads to a statement of the *indirect* grounds for testing assertions. These consist in tracing the consequences of *beliefs*, as pragmatism does. This he calls verification. It applies to beliefs, not assertions, and to beliefs about the future, not to those about the present or the past. Beliefs refer to more than one kind of occurrence. He classifies the different kinds and gives a definition relating belief to emotion. At this point Russell analyzes the problem of truth into four different problems, and he argues that in trying to answer any one of the four we get entangled in the other three. This is shown by an example. He then discusses the difference between truth of a belief and the truth of a statement. Statements are assertions or imperatives intended to evoke belief, but they often simply express beliefs without reference to their effects on others. Hence statements either express or aim to create beliefs. Russell then defines belief more fully than was done above, treating it as a characteristic of a string of actions. But he finally admits that belief is indefinable. Only when beliefs are expressed in words and become statements can we determine formally whether they are true. To determine the truth of beliefs we have to assume the truth of statements. He explains how the truth of statements is determined. In conclusion Russell admits

that his theory is too crude to be true, but he insists that it is along the right lines.

The question of truth and falsehood has been wrapped in unnecessary mystery owing to a number of causes. In the first place, people wish to think that their beliefs are more apt to be true than false, so that they seek a theory that will show that truth is normal and falsehood more or less accidental. In the second place, people are very vague as to what they mean by "belief" or "judgment," though persuaded that they know beliefs or judgments to be the objects to which the predicates "true" or "false" apply. In the third place, there is a tendency to use "truth" with a big T in the grand sense, as something noble and splendid and worthy of adoration. This gets people into a frame of mind in which they become unable to think. But just as the grave-diggers in *Hamlet* became familiar with skulls, so logicians become familiar with truth. "The hand of little employment hath the daintier sense," says Hamlet. Therefore it is not from the logician that awe before truth is to be expected.

There are two questions in our present subject: (1) What are the objects to which the predicates "true" and "false" apply? (2) What is the difference between such as are true and such as are false? We will begin with the first of these questions.

Prima facie, "true" and "false" apply to statements, whether in speech or in writing. By extension, they are supposed to apply to the beliefs expressed in those statements, and also to hypotheses which are entertained without being believed or disbelieved. But let us first consider the truth and falsehood of statements, following our practice of going as far as we can with the behaviorists before falling back on introspection. We consider the meaning of words earlier; now we have to consider sentences. Of course a sentence may consist of a single word, or of a wink; but generally it consists of several words. In that case, it has a meaning which is a function of the meanings of the separate words and their order. A sentence which has no meaning is not true or false; thus it is only sentences as vehicles of a certain sort of meaning that have truth or falsehood. We have therefore to examine the meaning of a sentence.

Let us take some very humble example. Suppose you look in a time-table and find it there stated that a passenger train leaves King's Cross for Edinburgh at 10 A.M. What is the

meaning of this assertion? I shudder when I think of its complexity. If I were to try to develop the theme adequately, I should be occupied with nothing else till the end of the present volume, and then I should have only touched the fringe of the subject. Take first the social aspect; it is not essential that anybody but the engineer and fireman should travel by the train, though it is essential that others should be *able* to travel by it if they fulfil certain conditions. It is not essential that the train should reach Edinburgh: the statement remains true if there is an accident or breakdown on the way. But it is essential that the management of the railway should intend it to reach Edinburgh. Take next the physical aspect: it is not essential, or even possible, that the train should start *exactly* at ten; one might perhaps say that it must not start more than ten seconds before its time or more than *fifty* seconds after, but these limits cannot be laid down rigidly. In countries where unpunctuality is common they would be much wider. Then we must consider what we mean by "starting," which no one can define unless he has learnt the infinitesimal calculus. Then we consider the definitions of King's Cross and Edinburgh, both of which are more or less vague terms. Then we must consider what is meant by a "train." Here there will be first of all complicated legal questions; what constitutes fulfilment of a railway company's obligations in the way of running "trains"? Then there are questions as to the constitution of matter, since evidently a train is a piece of matter; also of course there are questions as to methods of estimating Greenwich time at King's Cross. Most of the above points have to do with the meaning of single words, not with the meaning of the whole sentence. It is obvious that the ordinary mortal does not trouble about such complications when he uses the words: to him a word has a meaning very far from precise, and he does not try to exclude marginal cases. It is the search for precision that introduces complications. We think we attach a meaning to the word "man," but we don't know whether to include *Pithecanthropus Erectus*. To this extent, the meaning of the word is vague.

As knowledge increases, words acquire meanings which are more precise and more complex; new words have to be introduced to express the less complex constituents which have been discovered. A word is intended to describe something in the world; at first it does so very badly, but afterwards it gradually

improves. Thus single words embody knowledge, although they do not make assertions.

In an ideal logical language, there will be words of different kinds. First, proper names. Of these, however, there are no examples in actual language. The words which are *called* proper names describe collections, which are always defined by some characteristic; thus assertions about "Peter" are really about everything that is "Peterish." To get a true proper name, we should have to get to a single particular or a set of particulars defined by enumeration, not by a common quality. Since we cannot acquire knowledge of actual particulars, the words we use denote, in the best language we can make, either adjectives or relations between two or more terms. In addition to these, there are words indicative of structure: e.g., in "A is greater than B," the words "is" and "than" have no separate meaning, but merely serve to show the "sense" of the relation "greater," i.e., that it goes from A to B, not from B to A.

Strictly speaking, we are still simplifying. True adjectives and relations will require particulars for their terms; the sort of adjectives we can know, such as "blue" and "round," will not be applicable to particulars. They are therefore analogous to the adjective "populous" applied to a town. To say "this town is populous" means "many people live in this town." A similar transformation would be demanded by logic in all the adjectives and relations we can know empirically. That is to say, no word that we can understand would occur in a grammatically correct account of the universe.

Leaving on one side the vagueness and inaccuracy of words, let us ask ourselves; in what circumstances do we feel convinced that we know a statement to be true or false as the case may be? A present statement will be regarded as true if, e.g., it agrees with recollection or perception; a past statement, if it raised expectations now confirmed. I do not mean to say that these are the only grounds upon which we regard statements as true; I mean that they are simple and typical, and worth examining. If you say "it was raining this morning," I may recollect that it was or that it wasn't. One may perhaps say that the words "this morning" are associated for me with the word "raining" or with the words "not raining." According to which occurs, I judge your statement true or false. If I have neither association, I do not judge your statement either true or

false unless I have material for an inference; and I do not wish to consider inference yet. If you say "the lights have gone out," when I can see the lights shining, I judge that you speak falsely, because my perception is associated with the words "lights shining." If you say "the lights will go out in a minute," you produce a certain familiar kind of tension called "expectation," and after a time you produce a judgment that you spoke falsely (if the lights do not go out). These are the ordinary *direct* ways of deciding on the truth or falsehood of statements about past, present, or future.

It is necessary to distinguish between direct and indirect grounds for accepting or rejecting statements. Pragmatism considers only indirect grounds. Broadly speaking, it considers a statement false when the consequences of accepting it are unfortunate. But this belongs to the region of inference. I ask you the way to the station, you tell me wrong, and I miss my train; I then *infer* that you told me wrong. But if you say "the lights are out" when I see them shining, I reject your statement without inference. In this case, something in my present circumstances is associated with words different from yours, and different in ways which I have learnt to regard as involving incompatibility. The ultimate test of falsehood is *never*, so I think, the nature of the consequences of a belief, but the association between words and sensible or remembered facts. A belief is "verified" when a situation arises which gives a feeling of expectedness in connection with it; it is falsified when the feeling is one of surprise. But this only applies to beliefs which await some future contingency for verification or refutation. A belief which is an immediate reaction to a situation—e.g., when you are waiting for a race to begin and presently you say "they're off"—has no need of verification, but verifies other beliefs. And even where the confirmation of a belief is in the future, it is the expectedness, and the pleasantness, of the consequences that confirms the truth of the belief.

I think it is a mistake to treat "belief" as one kind of occurrence, as is done in traditional psychology. The sort of belief which is based upon memory or perception alone differs from the sort which involves expectation. When you find in the time-table that a train leaves King's Cross at ten, your belief that this statement occurs in the time-table does not await future confirmation, but your belief about the train does: you may go to King's Cross and see the train start. A belief which concerns

an event may be a recollection, a perception, or an expectation. It may be none of these, in the case of an event which you have not seen and do not expect to see—e.g., Cæsar crossing the Rubicon, or the abolition of the House of Lords. But such beliefs always involve inference. I do not at this stage consider logical and mathematical beliefs, some of which must be, *in a sense*, non-inferential. But I think we shall find that this sense is different from that in which memories and perceptions are non-inferential.

A belief, I should say, interpreted narrowly, is a form of words related to an emotion of one of several kinds. (I shall give a broader meaning later.) The emotion is different according as the belief embodies a reminiscence, a perception, an expectation, or something outside the experience of the believer. Moreover, a form of words is not essential. Where the emotion is present, and leads to action relevant to some feature of the environment, there may be said to be a belief. The fundamental test of a belief, of no matter what sort, is that it causes some event which actually takes place to arouse the emotion of expectedness or its opposite. I do not now attempt to decide what an emotion is. Dr. Watson gives a behaviouristic account of emotions, which would, if adopted, make my definition of “belief” purely behaviouristic. I have framed the definition so as not to involve a decision on the question of introspection.

The subject of truth and falsehood may be subdivided as follows:

- a. *Formal Theory*.—Given the meanings of the component words, what decides whether a sentence is true or false?
- b. *Causal Theory*.—Can we distinguish between truth and falsehood by (a) their causes, (b) their effects?
- c. *Individual and Social Elements*.—A statement is a social occurrence, a belief is something individual.
How can we define a belief, and what is it when not composed of words?
- d. *Consistency and Truth*.—Can we get outside the circle of beliefs or statements to something else which shows them true, not merely consistent? In other words, what possible relation is there between propositions and facts?

It is very hard to disentangle these questions. The first question, as to formal theories, leads to the fourth, as to the relations of propositions to facts. E.g., “Brutus killed Cæsar” is true

because of a certain fact; what fact? The fact that Brutus killed Cæsar. This keeps us in the verbal realm, and does not get us outside it to some realm of non-verbal fact by which verbal statements can be verified. Hence our fourth problem arises. But this leads us to our second problem, and to causes and effects of what is true or false, for it is here that we shall naturally look for the vital relation between propositions and facts. And here again we must distinguish between *thinking* truly and *speaking* truly. The former is an individual affair, the latter a social affair. Thus all our problems hang together.

I will begin with C, the difference between a belief and a statement. By a "statement" I mean a form of words, uttered or written, with a view to being heard or read by some other person or persons, and not a question, interjection, or command, but such as we should call an assertion. As to the question what forms of words are assertions, that is one for the grammarian and differs from language to language. But perhaps we can say rather more than that. The distinction, however, between an assertion and an imperative is not sharp. In England, notices say "Visitors are requested not to walk on the grass." In America, they say "Keep off! This means you." Effectively, the two have the same meaning: yet the English notice consists only of a statement, while the American notice consists of an imperative followed by a statement which must be false if read by more than one person. In so far as statements are intended to influence the conduct of others, they partake of the nature of imperatives or requests. Their characteristic, however, is that they endeavour to effect their aim by producing a *belief* which may or may not exist in the mind of the speaker. Often, however, they *express* a belief, without stopping to consider the effect upon others. Thus a statement may be defined as a form of words which either expresses a belief or is intended to create one. Our next step, therefore, must be the definition of "belief."

"Belief" is a word which will be quite differently defined if we take an analytic point of view from the way in which we shall define it if we regard the matter causally. From the point of view of science, the causal point of view is the more important. Beliefs influence action in certain ways; what influences action in these ways may be called a belief, even if, analytically, it does not much resemble what would ordinarily be so called. We may therefore widen our previous definition

of belief. Consider a man who goes to the house where his friend used to live, and, finding he has moved, says, "I *thought* he still lived here," whereas he acted merely from habit without thought. If we are going to use words causally, we ought to say that this man had a "belief" and therefore a "belief" will be merely a characteristic of a string of actions. We shall have to say: A man "believes" a certain proposition p if, whenever he is aiming at any result to which p is relevant, he acts in a manner calculated to achieve the result if p is true, but not otherwise. Sometimes this gives definite results, sometimes not. When you call a telephone number, it is clear that you believe that to be the number of the subscriber you want. But whether you believe in the conservation of energy or a future life may be harder to decide. You may hold a belief in some contexts and not in others; for we do not think in accordance with the so-called "Laws of Thought." "Belief" like all the other categories of traditional psychology, is a notion incapable of precision.

This brings me to the question whether the truth or falsehood of a belief can be determined either by its causes or by its effects. There is, however, a preliminary difficulty. I said just now that A believes p if he acts in a way which will achieve his ends if p is *true*. I therefore assumed that we know what is meant by "truth" as applied to a form of words. The argument was as follows: From observation of a person's acts, you infer his beliefs, by a process which may be elaborate as the discovery of Kepler's Laws from the observed motions of the planets. His "beliefs" are not assumed to be "states of mind," but merely characteristics of series of actions. These beliefs, when ascertained by observation, can be expressed in words; you can say, e.g., "This person believes that there is a train from King's Cross at 10 A.M." Having once expressed the belief in words of which the meaning is known, you have arrived at the stage where formal theories are applicable. Words of known meaning, put together according to a known syntax, are true or false in virtue of some fact, and their relation to this fact results logically from the meanings of the separate words and the laws of syntax. This is where logic is strong.

It will be seen that, according to what we have said, truth is applicable primarily to a form of words, and only derivatively to a belief. A form of words is a social phenomenon, therefore

the fundamental form of truth must be social. A form of words is true when it has a certain relation to a certain fact. What relation to what fact? I think the fundamental relation is this: a form of words is true if a person who knows the language is led to that form of words when he finds himself in an environment which contains features that are the meanings of those words, and these features produce reactions in him sufficiently strong for him to use words which mean them. Thus "a train leaves King's Cross at 10 A.M." is true if a person can be led to say, "It is now 10 A.M., this is King's Cross, and I see a train starting." The environment causes words, and words directly caused by the environment (if they are statements) are "true." What is called "verification" in science consists in putting oneself in a situation where words previously used for other reasons result directly from the environment. Of course, given this basis, there are innumerable indirect ways of verifying statements, but all, I think, depend upon this direct way.

The above theory may be thought very odd, but it is partly designed to meet the fourth of our previous questions, namely, "How can we get outside words to the facts which make them true or false?" Obviously we cannot do this within logic, which is imprisoned in the realm of words; we can only do it by considering the relations of words to our other experiences, and these relations, in so far as they are relevant, can hardly be other than causal. I think the above theory, as it stands, is too crude to be quite true. We must also bring in such things as expectedness, which we discussed earlier. But I believe that the definition of truth or falsehood will have to be sought along some such lines as I have indicated. . . .

BERTRAND RUSSELL: *Philosophy*, pp. 254-263. Published by W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. Reprinted by permission.

SUGGESTIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Make a classification of the different things that may be true.
2. Do you think that Russell's own view of truth is entirely free from mystery? To what extent does he admit that there is an indefinable mystery about truth?
3. Do you think that Russell's statement of the three causes of mystery in the problem of truth constitute a belief about the idealistic theory of truth of Carr and Bradley? If so, is it intended to

- invoke a belief in the reader or to express one of Russell? Is the element of emotion present in it?
4. What advantage does Russell gain by analyzing the problem of truth into four interrelated problems? Would this mean that there are really different varieties of truth, each of which would have to be defined differently?
 5. Do you think that Russell's theory of truth is a correspondence theory like Rogers's or a coherence theory?
 6. To what extent would Russell accept the pragmatist theory of truth?
 7. Why does he say that the fundamental form of truth must be social? Is Rogers's theory above consistent with this statement?

III. THE PROBLEM OF ERROR, by Edwin B. Holt

Analysis

Holt distinguishes reality and being or subsistence and holds that realism believes that everything is as it is but not that everything is real. The ancient solution of the problem of error made all errors subjective and the external world was regarded as error-free. This is still the popular view. Idealism has failed to solve the problem of error. Holt holds that all errors are cases of contradiction and that we cannot restrict contradiction to some person's field of consciousness. The subjective theory of error does so restrict contradiction, thereby denying that error is in any sense objective. This is taken to be self-evident. Holt denies that it is self-evident, and claims that it is false. The contradictions are not things which can be visualized or imaged. Nor is it possible even to think of them as actually existing in the real world of terms in relation. They subsist in a world of propositions. "The thought of the round-square is a *propositional* content about a strictly *unthinkable IT*." Propositions that are mutually contradictory may subsist in a set even though it is unthinkable that they can ever be realized in a set of terms in relation. Thus Holt sets up a third world that differs from the subjective and from the real world, and he calls it the world of being or subsistence. He cites several examples of propositional contradiction among natural laws to prove that contradictions are "quite as plentifully manifested in the objective physical world (reality) as in the subjective sphere of mind." Hence the problem of error is not a problem of knowledge at all. Reality equals existence or "some very comprehensive system of terms in relation." Unreality subsists and does not exist, but it is no more subjective than reality. Being equals the whole realm of reality, unreality and subjective mind. In this world of being all things subsist. They have no substance. For this world of being is a *neutral substance*. A mind is a group of objects within the subsisting universe. A physical object is another group. The same entity can belong to two or more groups at the same time.

The realist does not assert that an unreal thing (image or whatsoever) is a real thing. And here the realist insists on

the conscientious observance of a distinction which logic and mathematics have long since known and scrupulously observed, which even some idealists have perhaps heard of, but which not one anti-realist nor yet all realists seem even remotely to appreciate. This is the distinction between reality and being or subsistence. . . .

Now for realism by no means everything is real; and I grant that the name realism tends to confuse persons who have not followed the history of the term. For the gist of realism is not to insist that everything is real, far from it, but to insist that everything that is, is and is as it is. . . .

The earliest (and very ancient) "solution" of the problem of error seems to have been that errors are all matters of opinion, are merely subjective, found only in consciousness: but that the objective world is error-free, so that no one need worry lest the universe totter and collapse. This remains to-day the comfortable popular view of the matter. Nor can I see that the triumphal progress of idealism has brought enlightenment. Rather has idealism thrown us back on the original difficulty by asserting that everything is subjective, from which the conclusion must be that error is again ubiquitous. Yet many idealists, and especially the leather-patch school of Professor Karl Pearson and his associates, profess not to draw this conclusion, since they continue to dispose comfortably of error on the ground of its "subjectivity." It is true that Hegel undertook to treat error much more responsibly, but his solution seems to have evolved a checkmate of thought and intellection *überhaupt*, so that his followers have no course left to them save to sing the cradle-song of the Absolute, and, so lulled, to surmount error by oblivion. Yet error remains a problem for persons who have kept awake, and one observes that the hated name of realism suffices to arouse even the Hegelians to a disturbed consciousness: "If you won't repose ineffably¹ in the Absolute, what are you going to do with error?"

Now it may be admitted that "errors" are all of knowledge, or are in experience; but the important point is another: that all errors are cases of contradiction or contrariety. One has met error who has experienced that A is B and that the same A is not B. But the experiencing is not the significant fact,

¹ *Vide* H. M. Sheffer, "Ineffable Philosophies." *J. of Phil., Psychol., etc.*, 1909, Vol. VI, pp. 123-129.

and that all errors are of knowledge is true merely by definition, since contrariety or contradiction is called "error" only when it occurs in some person's field of consciousness. The actual problem is the contradiction or contrariety itself: what is the significance of a universe that holds such things? And here, once more, the only solution which appeals in practice to any one is the ancient one: that only one of two incompatible propositions *is* in the universe, the other is "only subjective." It is for this reason that every one of the recent writers against realism centers his attack about the problem of error or contradiction. I shall base my remarks on their own assumption that there can be no contradiction in an objective (or "real") universe.

This last proposition is always expressed, or tacitly implied, with an assurance which shows that these gentlemen assign to it axiomatic validity; and if they were to be asked how they know so interesting a fact about the universe, they would infallibly reply that it is self-evident. On which I should remark that so far from being self-evident, it is categorically untrue. "Are you," say they, "crazy enough to think that you have ever seen an existing object move both up and down at the same moment? Have you ever met the round-square, or the A that was at the same time not-A?" and I reply, "No; are you so crazy as to be able to *think* these objects?"

An answer to this is, that while it may not be easy to visualize or image an A-not-A, yet that one can easily think of an A that should be, or might be, also not-A. This is a mere defect of imagery, just as it is an accident of *vita brevis* that one cannot enumerate an infinite series although one thinks it readily enough. Now this is the core of the matter. It is *not* a "defect of imagery" which prevents us from visualizing the round-square or the A-not-A as readily as we visualize a hippogriff, the whale discussing Jonah, or even a Cook at the north pole. The thought of the round-square is a *propositional* content about a strictly *unthinkable IT*:—that it is to be square, and it is to be round, and so forth. Further than this even thought cannot go: even the inner eye cannot grasp the square which is also round. One can think of a point which *should* move up and move down at the same moment, but when one images the point, it moves either up or down, or the two successively. Now this "defect of imagination" is not a psychological matter at all, but rests on a fundamental distinction which symbolic

logic and mathematics have more or less recently made out, between *propositions* or postulates on the one hand and *terms* in relation on the other. It is found here that propositions may subsist together in a set although they are mutually contradictory, but that such contradictory propositions can never generate, or be realized in, a system of terms in relation. Indeed, so harmless, oftentimes, are the contradictions between propositions that the only certain test that propositions *are not* contradictory is the discovery of a system of terms in relation of which the propositions all hold true, or in which they are exemplified. Thus if one undertook to define a figure such that it should be the portion of a plane surface included between three straight lines; that it should possess four (internal) angles; that the sum of these should equal 180 degrees; and that the sum of its external angles should equal ten times 180 degrees;—one would have no means of discovering whether a contradiction² had been posited except by appealing to the corresponding system of terms (plane, lines, et cæt.) which such a set of postulates *undertakes* to define. This is of course an appeal neither to physical existents, nor to the faculty of imagination: nor are propositions more “subjective” than terms. This distinction between sets of propositions and systems of terms is of the most profound importance; it sheds light, for instance, on analysis and synthesis, the meaning of verification, concreteness, empiricism, and on the triviality of the “geometrical method,” or any other, when the propositional sequence of the argument swings free from the patient exhibition of terms in their relations. Now this fact that propositions oppose one another freely while such opposition or contradiction is never exemplified in a system of terms in relation, does not, I admit gladly, tell us all that we wish to know about contradiction and negation. On the contrary, it merely opens up a field of study most stimulating to the appetite, and one which at the present juncture I conceive to be the most promising of any, for both logic and philosophy. But the considerations just adduced are important in two respects; they do not purport to explain “error” (contradiction) *away*; and they do show that the problem of contradiction (error) has nothing

² I take no pains here to differentiate between contradiction and contrariety, because both contain a common and more fundamental element of *negation*, for which we so far have no good name, but which is one of the secrets of this difference between sets of propositions and systems of terms.

whatsoever to do with the problem of knowledge or epistemology.

The dichotomy proposition-term, fundamental as it may be, coincides in no wise with the dichotomy mind-matter, subject-object, nor yet with unreal-real. Conscious images, like physical objects, are terms in relation, and as the round square or A-not-A is not found among physical systems of terms, so it is (and for precisely the same reason) not found among mental systems of terms. What is in the one case called physically impossible ("unreal") is in the other case found to be mentally impossible, i.e., unthinkable. On the other hand, the mind can and does entertain the most contradictory propositions *about* terms, precisely as physical laws, which have obviously the nature of propositions, are *habitually* in a state of contradiction.

I say "habitually," although I know how shocking a heresy it is to speak of contradiction in any connection with the physical world. This does not contain, it is true, A's that are not-A's. Neither does the mental world contain them; and the expression A-not-A, or round-square, has no meaning at all save as symbol for a little pair of contradicting propositions. But having discovered this valuable fact, apparently, at some pains, natural science conceived such an animus against the name "contradiction" that it devised means for disguising the true cases of (propositional) contradiction among natural laws; of which every case of collision, interference, acceleration and retardation, growth and decay, equilibrium, *et cætera, et cætera*, is an instance. This is as follows. A law of motion states always that a physical particle (or series of them) moves (or shall move) thus and so. If now two wave-motions are progressing along the same straight line and toward each other, there will be a moment when a certain particle will be "acted on" by both motions at once. The law of one motion will state that the particle moves up (or shall move up), while that of the other motion states that it moves down (or shall move down) at the same moment. Each law opposes the other, and although the relation is called one of contrariety, this contrariety is in fact *more* than contradiction; for if one law says *up*, the other not only says *not-up*, but further specifies *down*. Logic cannot show a negation more thorough. And while the impossible-unthinkable does not happen, the result which is characteristic of all contradictions ensues, namely, zero motion; or in the cases

of different amounts of energy one motion is reduced toward zero by as much as the opposing motion has energy to contradict it. To say that because no energy has been "lost" there has been no contradiction is nothing whatsoever to the point. Two laws of motion have met in contradiction, and this is precisely the appointed signal for energy of one sort to be transformed into energy of another. Because a third law can be framed (in terms of transformation, strain, or elasticity) to describe what shall continue to happen *when* a contradiction arises, should not blind us to the fact that it is not until the first two laws do meet in contradiction that the third law goes into operation. The case is paralleled in the game of chess, where the laws governing the moves of the several men often come in contradiction with the rule that no two men shall simultaneously occupy one square. To meet this case a *further* law declares that the second comer shall "take" or annihilate the earlier occupant; and the whole game hinges on such contradictions. To imagine that in this way contradiction has been forestalled, is to do like the fatuous master who commands: "Stand up, but if you won't stand up, lie down; my orders shall be obeyed." Not even from the point of view of a static logic is contradiction in this way avoided; and modern logic is not static. Contradiction is after all a tame and harmless thing, although a very interesting one. The pretension of many natural scientists that they find no contradictions is uncommonly absurd, because in fact they find little else. That is, all natural motions are the result of so many partially contradictory laws operating together that it requires a fabulously clever technique to produce a motion which is simple or uncontradicted enough to allow any one of the component laws (or constant functions) to be determined. The natural scientist may conceive this as he likes, but if our idealist opponents object to the above considerations I will beg them to take down the gospel according to Kant and read what the latter-day Immanuel had to say in his "Essay toward the Introduction of the Concept of Negative Quantities into Natural Science," it is one, but only one, of the authorities for what I have ventured to present above.

The gist of the whole matter is, that the impossible-unthinkable never happens anywhere, but that every variety of contradiction, contrariety, repugnance, opposition, and negation which logic itself recognizes is quite as plentifully manifested in the

objective physical world as it is in the subjective sphere of mind. A thought, then, which negates another thought is neither more nor less significant than a physical law which negates another law. The problem of error, as that of "reality," is in no way involved in the problem of knowledge.

Now the image in consciousness does not assert anything about itself, nor does the realist, as it seems to me, assert of it that it is necessarily real; still less would he assert that all the propositional contents of consciousness are real. But what I suppose that realism insists on is that every content, whether term or proposition, real or unreal, subsists of its own right in the all-inclusive universe of being; it has being as any mathematical or physical term or proposition has being; and that this being is not "subjective in its nature" (a phrase indeed to which in this connection I can attach no meaning). I believe, further, that no content is "constituted" by a metaphysical knower or ego, for I believe that no knower, or ego, such as metaphysics means, exists. I believe also that no conscious content is "constituted" even by the knowing process, in the sense commonly attached by metaphysics to the word "constitute." If the knowing process ever constitutes its content, it is, I believe, only as a ripple of water in assuming successive forms may be said to constitute these forms (if that appears either significant or interesting to any one, as it does not to me). But particularly meaningless is the assertion of idealism that a mental content is "subjective" in its substance or nature, or is constituted by a metaphysical knower or ego.

As to what reality is, I take no great interest; nor do most other persons, for if they had done so, they would have taken more pains to define it sharply as against the equally and perhaps even more prevalent unreality. But if challenged, I should hazard the guess that perhaps reality is some very comprehensive system of terms in relation. For by reality we seem to mean the thing most remote from contradiction, and this is with certainty found only in systems of terms. This would make reality closely related to what logic knows as "existence." If this is correct, probably all of the terms found in the physical world, also some and possibly all of the terms found in minds, are real. But all this, so far as I know, has been far too little studied. Certain it is that unreality is no more subjective than reality; for a thing may be objective and

yet unreal, as is commonly asserted of certain numbers and of some systems of geometry. . . .

The picture which I wish to leave is of a general universe of being in which all things physical, mental, and logical, propositions and terms, existent and non-existent, false and true, good and evil, real and unreal *subsist*. The entities of this universe have no substance, but if the spirit is weak to understand this, then let the flesh, for a season, here predicate a neutral substance. These entities are related by external relations, and man has as yet no just ground for doubting that the analytic method of empirical science can proceed without limit in its investigation of this universe. The dimensions of this universe are more than the three dimensions of space and the one of time: how many more is not known. The line that separates the existent and the non-existent, or the false and the true, or good and evil, or the real from the unreal, seldom coincides, and *never significantly* coincides with the line that distinguishes mental and non-mental, subject and object, knower and known. A mind or consciousness is a class or group of entities within the subsisting universe, as a physical object is another class or group. One entity or complex of entities can belong to two or more classes or groups at the same time, as one point can be at the intersection of two or more lines: so that an entity can be an integral part of a physical object, of a mathematical manifold, the field of reality, and one or any number of consciousnesses, at the same time. As the class of physical objects is defined within the subsistent universe by principles known to science, so the class of consciousnesses is defined within this universe by principles which are partly known, and which are coming to be more fully known, by empirical psychology. A consciousness is the group of (neutral) entities to which a nervous system, both at one moment and in the course of its life history, responds with a specific response.

E. B. HOLT in *The New Realism*, pp. 358-373 (with several omissions). Copyright, 1912, by The Macmillan Company. Reprinted by permission.

SUGGESTIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Compare Holt's theory of error with that of Sheldon above, p. 214 ff.
2. What basic error is present in the idealistic solution of the problem of error?

3. What is the importance of Holt's distinction between sets of propositions and systems of terms? How is thinking related to these two different facts?
4. Do you think Holt's notion of a propositional content which cannot be thought is itself free from contradiction? Justify your answer.
5. How does Holt prove that contradictions are just as manifest in the physical as in the mental world? Does this mean that they exist as actual events in both of these worlds?
6. What is Holt's attitude toward the theory that there is an Absolute Knower in the universe? In *Pragmatism* William James called this theory *noetic monism*. Can you explain why he used this expression?
7. What do you think of Holt's classification of the various meta-physical realms in the last two paragraphs? Work out a diagram of it. Indicate how some one or two neutral elements could each be a member of two or more groups of such entities at the same time.

CHAPTER V

REALISTIC SOLUTIONS OF THE BODY-MIND PROBLEM

I. THE REALM OF MIND, by *Frederick J. E. Woodbridge*

Analysis

Woodbridge states his thesis, which is that the mind is not something inside the body and distinct from it, but the "realm of being in which thinking occurs." He then enumerates reasons for distinguishing between the mental and the physical, holding that the distinction has never been successfully challenged. But it is a distinction between activities and not between objects. However, it gets transferred to objects. "It is what the man does that divides him into body and mind." Originally the two are one. If we would only remember this the body-mind problem would be solved. But we get to worrying over how the same thing can both think and walk, and how the body can carry a man to the place his mind chooses. Then we are involved in the body-mind problem. Woodbridge then discusses the meaning of body to the ordinary man, and how he comes to conceive of nature as being made up of bodies whose activities are physical. Thus the physical world becomes the real world for us, and most practically minded men treat it as the only real world. Yet the fact remains that thinking goes on in it, which makes it necessary to admit the reality of thinking as an activity. How can we make the thinking activity of the mind compatible with a physical world? This is the great problem of metaphysics since Locke and Newton. To solve the problem it is necessary to begin with thought processes, since they discover the physical world. It is not a question of the origin of thought or of its nature in terms of psychology, but it is a question of its reaches. He argues that thinking equals the entire content of what is thought. The realm of mind is everything which can be thought. Mind is a field of objects held together by thought. When we try to explain this fact we get blinded in the cloud of dust we ourselves have raised. We must simply accept the fact that mind is everywhere in space and time and elsewhere that thought can roam.

The contention of the following essay is, that when we attempt to define the mind, we are led ultimately to consider, not an individual agent or being which thinks, but the realm of being in which thinking occurs. The thinking agent is evidently ourselves, or beings like ourselves, so it is not unnatural to speak of ourselves as many minds taking thought of the

world. And it was, doubtless, the fact that we think, which originally prompted human speech to utter such words as "mind," and to enrich the literature of many languages with an imposing vocabulary of spiritual terms. Yet when we proceed to analyze ourselves with the purpose of discovering what it is we think with, we find nothing to explore except our bodies. They proclaim themselves to be the agents of thought and the subjects of all our experiences. Although we may still call ourselves minds, we should be under no illusion that thereby we had discovered in our bodies something different from them which could properly be called a mind. We discover in them no mind at all. And yet they think. To explore this fact carries us beyond ourselves to what we think about, to the realm of being in which our thinking is an event and to which our bodies belong. Then it is that this realm of being discloses itself as so connected that we can discover what one fact or event in it implies in terms of other facts and events. We discover ourselves to inhabit a realm of being which has a logical structure. That I take to be the discovery of the essential nature of mind.

In analyses of the kind here proposed, it is common to operate with the distinction between the mental and the physical. The distinction is not the invention of philosophers. Each of us is led to make it when we express in words what we do. We think, perceive, remember and imagine; we walk, sleep, digest and breathe. Our activities are many, and when we attempt to classify them, they fall naturally into two major classes which are distinct enough to be denoted by distinct names. Thinking, perceiving and remembering are so different from walking, digesting and breathing, that it strikes us as inappropriate to call them all by a common name without any qualifying adjective. The one set is mental, and the other, bodily or physical. So obvious and so insistent is the distinction that it has never been successfully challenged. The mental has never been successfully reduced to the physical although there are good reasons for believing that it is always associated with the physical. Nor has the physical ever been successfully reduced to the mental, although some philosophers have attempted so to do, impelled by the logic of their own speculations.

The distinction is primarily between activities and not between objects. The history of language is one proof of this. It is clear that originally words which expressed the mental

and the physical, expressed what objects do rather than what they are. Common speech no less than poetry keeps the habit still. The great ship responds quickly to the rudder's bidding, and the wind bloweth where it listeth. With the growth of language objects took on the character of their activities and could be named in terms of what they did. That which moves could be called physical and that which thinks, mental. A second proof may be found in our scientific habits. We deal experimentally with the mental and the physical in objects primarily in terms of their behavior and motions rather than in terms of their qualities. Man is a thinking being and a walking being; he is both mental and physical. He has a mind and a body, not because one object properly called a body and another, a mind, have conspired to produce him, but because he thinks and walks.

So the distinction gets transferred to objects. One could make long lists of things called either mental or physical: thoughts, ideas, sensations, concepts, feelings, hopes, fears, loves, hates, hypotheses, theories, memories, images; bodies, motions, places, times, energies, forces, earth, air, fire, water. There may be doubt of the proper classification in some cases even in so brief a list, but the list is illustrative. There may be doubt also whether each term in such a list represents the concretion into a noun of what was originally a verb, but at least the suspicion of it is there. This suspicion is strengthened rather than weakened whenever we try to tell what each of these things is wholly apart from the activities the terms imply. What is a thought unless there is something thought about, what is a motion, unless there is something moved? What is a mind unless there is mental activity, or a body unless there is physical activity?

It is tempting to pursue the distinction between the mental and the physical further, following its lead as it has dominated human living. It has shaped man's literature, art, society, religion, science and philosophy, his whole civilization, indeed—all which is sufficient proof of its validity and its power. But I am engaged in a rather technical piece of analysis. Not the glory of the mind, but its metaphysical status, is my theme. Here, too, the distinction between the mental and the physical is primarily a distinction of activities. Although we may distinguish objects also by these terms, the distinction is transferred to them, not derived from them. We may, for example,

distinguish the mind from the body, but back of that distinction lies the fact with which we really begin, namely that we think and so are minds, we walk and so are bodies. Or if we should use a noun instead of a pronoun for the subject, then it is man that thinks and man that walks, so that man comes to be regarded as a mental and a physical thing, to be a mind and a body. That is, it is what the man does that divides him into body and mind. Metaphysics, no matter how much it has exalted the mind and set it over against the body, has never succeeded in revealing by analysis a mind and a body as primary facts from which the distinction between the mental and the physical is derived. We may give a man a mind to explain his thinking and a body to explain his walking, but these gifts are not analytical discoveries. Man is not found possessing them, even if they are claimed as property rightfully his.

For analysis, then, the object which thinks and walks, which acts mentally and physically, is one and undivided. If, after analysis, we are constrained to convert him into two objects joined together, we find ourselves defining these objects in terms of what the man does, in terms, that is, of activities which were distinguished in him before these objects were invoked to explain them. Metaphysics thus follows and may refine the uses of common speech. We need not be metaphysicians to claim mind and body as our rightful possessions. For just as it is natural for us to speak of a man who walks far and lustily, as a great walker, and to endow him with a strong body, so it is natural for us to speak of him who thinks profoundly, as a great thinker, and to endow him with a great mind. Thus, common speech condenses into single words meanings which require many sentences for their full expression. Such words economize speech and give to language its wealth of significance. They come to denote rich fields for exploration. Originally, however, they arise through a transfer of meaning and not in the discovery of something new to be denoted. And this is true whether we are metaphysicians or not.

If in the analysis of the mind we were content to be rigidly controlled by such obvious considerations as these, we might avoid many ambiguous, although possibly delightful, excursions in philosophy. There would not be lacking philosophical opportunities. To explore the reach of man's thinking and walking, to discover where he has been and might be led, to find

out what his thinking and walking implies about the make-up of the world he inhabits—all this could occupy all our leisure. The distinction between the mental and the physical would increase in richness, man's mind and man's body would mean more and more. Man might walk earth as a body and as a mind claim heaven, without, however, so disjoining his original unitary being into two component parts, that he leaves earth and loses heaven in his efforts to get the parts together. In simpler language we may say that it is possible to examine the mental and physical in man's life in terms of what he does, for undoubtedly he thinks and walks; and such an examination can proceed without supposing that man is made up of two distinct parts, one a mind which thinks and the other a body which walks. If, however, this supposition is made, it becomes increasingly difficult to understand how the same being can both think and walk, or how his body can possibly carry him to the place which his mind chooses.

Such a supposition, however, we seem often impelled to make. The distinction between the mental and the physical in terms of what we do, is obvious enough. Equally obvious is the distinction between mind and body, if by mind we mean only all that is mental, and by body, all that is physical, and so come to speak of ourselves as having a mind and a body. These distinctions, however, become complicated on reflection. The body is, perhaps, the chief source of complication. For we use the term not only to denote ourselves as physical in distinction from ourselves as mental, we use it also to denote our bulk, the assemblage of the head and trunk and limbs. This body occupies space, endures in time, has cubical contents, and is built in a definite way. As such, it is not strictly *the* body in distinction from the mind, but *a* body in distinction from other bodies, other bulks, other things which occupy space and endure in time, the bodies of other men, of trees, of rocks, of the earth, of the stars. Space is full of such bodies, and, as we contemplate them, our interest is not primarily in any contrast with mind, but in their shapes and sizes, their composition, their motions and their relations to one another. Taken together they compose our first view of the world we live in. Or perhaps I ought to say, we soon discover that we live in such a world, and seek to understand it both to satisfy our curiosity and in order to live well in it.

Our first efforts at comprehending it are, doubtless, very

naïve. Primitive men and children think of it as peopled by the bodies which fill it. Angry storms rage in it and the sun shines with consideration. It has, however, become largely depopulated through exploration. As a world of bodies simply, we have come to think of it no longer in terms which lend a passion to the thunder. It has become the physical world. So physical has it become that any attempt to impart to it the motions of a mind is apt to be regarded as altogether unnecessary. For when we address ourselves to what these bodies do, and expect an answer in terms of their relations to one another as bodies, we find that their activities are physical. We do not say that they walk, for that smacks too much of the physical activity of those that think. We say that they move, they separate and they combine. The sciences of physics and chemistry aim to exhaust all we can know about them without once invoking mental activity as an item in their behavior. The physical world is not a mental world.

And yet it is the world we live in. Our bodies inhabit it along with other bodies. In it we do our thinking. In it the sciences of physics and chemistry pursue their triumphant way. We might, possibly, be content to take this situation resolutely, without anxiety. For, evidently, the physical world should be construed in physical terms. To construe it in mental terms would be to vitiate its character as physical. Why attempt the profitless? And since no matter how we construe the physical world, it does not prevent our thinking about it, why not take the fact of our thinking as the simple fact it is? Most of us do. And we take physics and chemistry along with it, never disturbed by the suspicion that thereby we have made real knowledge of the physical world impossible or made the mind's hopes illusory. In this we are practically wise, for we reap the benefits of science and enjoy the exercise of the imagination.

But practical wisdom is not theoretical insight. To construe the world of bodies as wholly physical, and yet to live in that world, to think about it, to hope, envy, threaten, pardon, spare, is to be confronted with a situation which thoughtful men have taken seriously. The situation is complicated. Our thinking cannot be denied. Nor can it be denied that it is we who are bodies that do the thinking. And yet, to the constitution of the physical world, of which our bodies are parts, anything like mental activity seems to be wholly irrelevant. How can the situation be construed so that the facts of mental activity and a

physical world are compatible? This is a question for metaphysics. More than any other, perhaps, it has engaged the attention of philosophers since the days of Locke and Newton. . . .

If the mind—and, for that matter, the physical world also—is to be metaphysically construed, we must begin with the processes of thought. Whatever the physical world may be, they discover it. Our thinking is intimately connected with it, constructs it, if you will, but, in constructing it, we never deal with anything except the immediate objects of thought itself. Consequently, if mind means anything more than the fact that we think, some additional meaning may be expected from a consideration of what we think about. We are thus led to explore a realm of being, the realm in which our thinking occurs in all its obvious concreteness. We take the point of view of unsophisticated inquiry. We are not concerned with any speculations about the origin of thought. We are not concerned with the natural history of our experience or a psychological exposition of how we think. We are concerned only with the reaches of thought as we think about the common objects of every day and try to gain some understanding of them and their relations to one another. We take the world as common sense takes it and ask ourselves what we think about. . . .

What, then, do we think about? The complete answer to that question would comprise the encyclopedia of human knowledge. The question is not asked here, however, in order to undertake such an unlimited excursion. It is asked, rather, to bring home to us at once the vastness and immensity of a comprehensive and accurate answer. It is asked . . . to show how hazardous an enterprise it is to reduce everything we think about to a common denominator, and to exhibit the rash folly of supposing that by giving to that everything a common name, we have done something significant. If such names, rendered colorless by their so vast extension, are denied us, we should do well to come to particulars.

We think about the discovery of America and the next appearance of Halley's comet. We think about the North Pole and the other side of the moon. Although our days are numbered and our steps measured, we can think of times when we neither were nor shall be, and of places far beyond the possible tread of our feet. Thinking finds no limits in time or space. To say this is not necessarily to indulge in rhapsody, although rhapsody has often been provoked by saying it. We are noting an obvious and

commonplace fact. Kant was so impressed by it that he tried to find for it a transcendental explanation. Others also have converted it into a problem, asking how it is possible for our thinking, which is a present fact, to refer to facts which are not present. I have no desire to convert it into any such problem, for when I do, I can find no solution of it. All solutions with which I am familiar take the fact for granted and then speedily forget that they have done so. They run somewhat as follows: I think of a past event; now my thinking is in the present and its object in the past, there is a time interval between them; this interval is bridged by the reference of the present event to the past event, the former is the representative of the latter; the present event thus transcends itself either because it is its nature so to do, or because the ground of its transcendence is time. Such an argument appears to me only to affirm that I, who am here and now, think about what is neither here nor now. If it is offered as a solution of a problem, it perplexes me. I am perplexed, for example, about that time interval. Is it also an object of my thinking? If it is, how is my thinking of it explained by the solution? It is not explained by stoutly insisting that a present event transcends itself and represents a past event, for that is only to insist that as a matter of fact we do think about the past. The Kantian position appears to be more profound, since there is something quite genuine in the claim that all spatial and temporal thinking presupposes time and space. It is only the nature of the presupposition which is troublesome. Kant made of it a mystery which an impressive vocabulary could do little to alleviate. In the end it appears to mean no more than the fact that thinking finds no limits in time or space. Although we are here and now, we think about events and facts remote.

This fact is taken here as defining in some measure the domain or realm in which thinking goes on. It is taken, naïvely, without sophistication. Accepting the fact that we think, any consideration of the possibility of thought carries us, if we follow the lead of what we think about, to the acceptance of thinking as an event in time and space, as an event, that is, in the same realm of being in which are the objects of thought. Although we may walk with our legs, we do not walk in them. Likewise, although we may think with our brains, we do not think in them. It is the world of time and space in which we think, just as much as it is that world in which we walk. Our brains

and legs are instruments of different types of activity, but they can no more operate of themselves than a hammer can drive a nail of itself. They operate in connection with the rest of things, they operate in space and time. Yet we have a habit of saying that thinking goes on in the mind. If this is more than a fashion of speech, if the mind is, metaphysically, the domain of thought, then, in considering it, we are evidently not considering an agent which thinks, we are considering a realm of being in which thinking occurs. At any rate, thinking is so bound up with the objects of thought that we find ourselves dealing with their world in every attempt to deal with its. It seems idle, therefore, to say of the mind: "Lo, it is here, or lo, it is there." Since we think beyond our body's place and our life's duration, there is no intelligible divorcing of time and space from the realm of mind.

F. J. E. Woodbridge: *The Realm of Mind*, pp. 1-24 (with omissions). Copyright, 1926, by the Columbia University Press. Reprinted by permission.


SUGGESTIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Compare Woodbridge's discussion with Creighton's account of the social nature of thinking above, p. 143 ff. Are they advocating essentially the same or a different view? Defend your answer.
2. Does the fact that the distinction between the mental and the physical is originally due to a recognition of two different types of activity, rather than a distinction between two kinds of objects, a real solution of the body-mind problem? Give a reason for your answer.
3. In admitting that "we must begin with the processes of thought" does Woodbridge admit the primacy of the mental over the physical and become virtually an idealist?
4. If the realm of mind is nature in its entirety and this may exist without being thought about, what importance would mind have in the universe?
5. Compare Woodbridge's with Hoernlé's idea of mind as the most inclusive level of reality above, p. 112 f. Do they seem to you to have the same view of the relation of mind to physical nature?

II. INTERACTION, by *James Bissett Pratt*

Analysis

Pratt gives his idea of the nature of the self, quoting Miss Calkins, McDougall, and Laird, and enumerating a list of the various characteristics of a self. He points out that the self of a human being is "organic to a body," and refers to the body as a tool of the mind. However, this analogy cannot be pressed too far, since the interaction



THEORIES OF THE RELATIONS OF MIND AND BODY

Note—In each case the arrows in the upper line represent mind, those in the lower line matter or physical energy. The light arrows indicate a real entity, the heavy black an epiphenomenon, appearance, or aspect. (From J. B. Pratt: *Matter and Spirit*, p. 7. Copyright, 1922, by The Macmillan Company. Reprinted by permission.)

of the self or mind and the body is much more intimate and intricate than the relation between a tool and the person who uses it. If we want to understand the mind we must study the body and its behavior, but this is no reason against studying the mind as distinct from the body. This means accepting a dualism, not of substance, but of process. Such a dualism is entirely compatible with some forms of idealism as well as with realism. We must recognize that there are two kinds of laws in the universe. In physical nature the laws of physics and chemistry have absolute sway. But at least here on the earth are selves who have their own ways of acting and their own laws which are not reducible to physical laws. In the human body both kinds of laws meet. Will, reason, purpose can and do change the behavior of human bodies. This can be explained mechanically *after* it happens but it was not caused by any mechanical sequence. Pratt admits that his theory and mechanistic evolution are incompatible and that one must choose between them. Mechanistic evolution denies that we can either choose or know. The author concludes by applying the dualistic theory to religion, holding that it makes it possible to believe in human immortality.

I shall not seek, then, to furnish you with any careful definition of self or personality, but simply point you to your own unspoiled intuition. By the self I shall mean that which has ideals and purposes, which wills and suffers and strives and knows. By defining it thus I am merely using the method by which we define and know most of the objects of our thought and action,—namely by the things which it does. That a thing *is* what it *does* has been a commonplace of thought since the days of Aristotle. Nor can it be said that the self is a mere “*that which*”; for the things that it does are not to be separated from it. It is by no means the unqualified blank substance of some of the scholastics, nor merely the pure perceiving subject of some of the idealists. Each self has its own very definite characteristics which are to be learned only empirically. Some of the characteristics shared by every self have been enumerated by Professor Calkins. “First, the self of each of us to some extent persists. . . . In the second place, the self with all its persistence truly changes, develops. . . . Third, and very significantly, I am a unique self; there is only one of *me*; I am an individual; no one, however closely she resembles me, *is* I. The possibility of this enumeration shows, in the fourth place, that I am a complex self, a unity of present with past,—yes, and with future,—self and a totality, also, of many different experiences; I am a perceiving and remembering and thinking and feeling self. These different experiences or aspects of me do not, however, exist apart from me; I obviously am not what Hume called me, a bundle of perceptions, but each of the perceptions

or emotions or thoughts is the expression of me who am inclusive of them. Finally, I am a self related to the world in which I seem to myself to be placed. . . . And these characters, it must be added, are immediately experienced. The self, thus described, is observed and not merely inferred.”¹

From this enumeration of some of the characteristics of the self it will be noted that the self is not to be confined within or found within any single moment and that its qualities are such as could not be attributed to any cross section of the stream of consciousness. One must take a longitudinal section of the time stream if one is to find the self. It is the sort of thing that changes and grows; change and growth are a part of its nature. Unlike *things*, whether material or physiological, and unlike what theology sometimes teaches concerning God, the human self

“partly is and wholly hopes to be.”

Each self is of course characterized by the present conscious state, but its present conscious state forms only a small portion of its nature. Much more important in making it what it is are its memories, tendencies, sentiments, its purposes and ideals. These do not exist in the form of present consciousness. To make room, then, for the most significant portions of the personality or character we must have recourse to unconscious mental organization. If there be a self at all, character is surely a part of it, and character is much more than consciousness. Any given passing conscious state is thus merely an aspect or activity of the self. The self may be called a center of psychic powers whose characteristics necessarily transcend any given section of conscious content or phase of conscious experience, and which are essentially inexhaustible by any passing moment.

The reader will probably note in this discussion of the self, and indeed in a large part of this book, the close relation of my position to that of Professor McDougall,—a relation which at many points means an indebtedness which I am eager to acknowledge. It may not be out of place, therefore, to quote here his careful statement of the nature of the self or soul as he understands it, a statement that includes within it most of the things that I could wish to say and which have always seemed to me particularly enlightening. “We may describe a soul as a being

¹ “The Case of the Self Against the Soul,” *Psycholog. Rev.*, Vol. XXIV, pp. 279-80.

that possesses, or is, the sum of definite capacities for psychical activity and psycho-physical interaction, of which the most fundamental are (1) the capacity of producing, in response to certain physical stimuli (the sensory processes of the brain), the whole range of sensation qualities in their whole range of intensities; (2) the capacity of responding to certain sensation-complexes with the production of meanings, as for example the spatial meaning; (3) the capacity of responding to these sensations and these meanings with feeling and conation or effort, under the spur of which further meanings may be brought to consciousness in accordance with the laws of reproduction of similars and of reasoning; (4) the capacity of reacting upon the brain-processes to modify their course in a way which we cannot clearly define, but which we may provisionally conceive as a process of guidance by which streams of nervous energy may be concentrated in a way that antagonizes the tendency of all physical energy to dissipation and degradation.”²

The self then is a genuine reality with a unity and identity of its own, a center of influence and energy, and not to be confounded with a mere sum of qualities or of states. In the words of Mr. John Laird, whose recent study of the “Problems of the Self” has gone into the matter with painstaking and critical judgment, “if anything has a right to be called a distinct particular thing, the soul has such a right preëminently. While the distinctions which we draw between things in the physical world are true and important, there seems to be no good reason, apart from momentary convenience, why we should fix on one boundary rather than another, and that is why scientific thought tends more toward a monism of matter. It is otherwise with the self. Despite the difficulties of personal identity, despite the fact that no self is a perfect or full-rounded whole, there is a greater independence and a more ultimate distinction between selves than between any other beings.”³

One more empirical fact about the mind or self. To use Green’s phrase, it has somehow become “organic to a body.” Through this body it comes in touch with the material world; by means of this body it expresses itself. The body may in this sense be called the *tool* of the mind. The expression must be taken with a certain degree of caution. The relations of mind and body are much more intimate and much more intricate than

² *Body and Mind*, p. 365.

³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 362-63.

any of those existing between the hand and its material tool. Yet complicated as are the relations between them, it still is true that the body is not the mind, and that it is used by the mind, and in this sense may not improperly be called its tool. Being limited in its expression to this one very wonderful but still imperfect tool, the mind must, to a considerable extent, submit to the laws of the tool. Moreover, we can study the activities of the mind in objective and scientific fashion only through its bodily expressions. The inter-weavings of the mind with its physical mechanism are intricate in the extreme, so that it is often very difficult to separate out the strands and say, This is of the mind and this is of the body. But though this is often very difficult I am not at all sure that it is always impossible. The psycho-physical organism has, of course, a functional unity; but there is no justification for the conclusion so often drawn from this fact, that therefore analysis is impossible. It is at least conceivable that the really important psychological discoveries of the future will consist quite as much in the sifting out of the purely physical from the purely spiritual features of psycho-physical life, and in exhibiting the exact ways in which the two are interdependent and coöperative, as in the field of measuring sensations and muscular responses which at present occupies so much of the time of our experimentalists. By this suggestion I do not mean to favor a return to the fruitless "rational psychology" of the pre-Kantians. The problems I have in mind should be and may well be investigated in purely empirical and scientific fashion.

The view that I am here presenting is of course frankly dualistic. It is, however, a dualism of process and not necessarily of substance. It is as compatible with Idealism as with Realism. So far as the mind-body problem is concerned, plainly there are many ways in which Idealism can easily adapt itself to Interaction. Thus Busse,⁴ an enthusiastic idealist, holds that reality contains two kinds of beings—both to be taken idealistically—namely, *things* and *souls*. The difference between the two is this: that things affect perception and appear as occupying space; while souls, which are centers of consciousness, neither occupy space nor directly affect perception. The two kinds of beings mutually influence each other; yet there is no such invariable concomitance of psychical with spatial events as is called for by Parallelism. On such a view the purely physical

⁴ *Geist und Körper*, pp. 170-73; also 475-82.

world of course would not be a complete and closed system, explicable by itself alone. But while physical nature would not be a complete Whole, Reality as such would be; it is not Idealism nor Monism but Naturalism that calls for unbroken mechanical explanation of all events in the physical world. Both Interaction and the related Dualism of Process which I would defend are thus perfectly compatible with Idealism and even with a certain form of Idealistic Monism, a Monism namely that has room within it for conscious and active selves.

What I mean by a Dualism of Process is now, I trust, plain enough. Whether reality is made up of one kind of stuff or whether there are two or more kinds of being within it, there are at any rate two kinds of laws, two kinds of processes to be found in the activities of the real beings of the world. Throughout the vast spaces of the physical universe where matter and energy come into no immediate relation with conscious persons, the laws of physics and chemistry have absolute sway. Here no energy is created or destroyed, regular mechanical sequence holds, and on the basis of the eternal physical laws and the actual configurations of matter and energy an omniscient mechanic could predict with unerring exactness the whole course of the future. But matter and physical energy do not constitute the whole of reality. However it may be with the other planets and with the infinite starry host, here at any rate, upon this tiny sphere, this mote of earth, tracing its insignificant path through the immensities of space, there are beings who are not altogether subject to the laws of matter and motion. The beings we know as persons have their own ways of acting, their own "laws," if we insist on preserving the word and transferring it to a new realm—ways of acting which are not reducible to physical laws. These personal beings have, as I said above, become "organic" to parts of the physical world. In the activities of the human body, therefore, the two forms of process, the two kinds of "law," meet. The result is both coöperation and conflict. Many of the activities of the body take place according to purely physical laws. But not all. The determining power in some of the acts of human bodies is to be found not in the physical and chemical processes but in processes of an utterly different nature, namely, those of the rational and purposive will. At many a juncture personal will, reason, purpose, interfere with the working of mechanical law and contravene it. Of course the resulting action of the human body in question will be capable,

after the fact, of being described in mechanical terms. But it was not caused by mechanical forces or conditions, it was not a part of any regular mechanical sequence, and it never could have been predicted by the most miraculously omniscient mechanist, even if he had been in possession of all the facts and all the laws of the physical universe.

The question whether such a view is compatible with the evolutionary doctrine will be dependent for its answer upon the meaning one gives to evolution. If evolution be taken to mean a process of continual change in the time stream such that, at certain junctures, something genuinely new may arise, then evolution and the Dualism of Process are by no means incompatible. If, on the other hand, by evolution we mean a perpetual unrolling of the eternally given, such that each new stage was predictable from the preceding one, that no really new thing is possible, and that

"With the first clay He did the last man make,"

then plainly we must choose between evolution and dualism. They can hardly both be true. For conscious selves and their ways of acting are different in kind from material things and their mechanical laws. The material world with its laws may precede and the world of selves may follow, but the material and mechanical world cannot out of its own resources, and acting in its own way, produce and give birth to the world of selves. Purely mechanical processes cannot account for that which is by definition non-mechanical.

One must choose, then, between Dualism and mechanistic evolution. But more is involved in the choice than appears upon the surface. Thereby one must also choose between the efficiency of consciousness and the consequences of denying it which we have dwelt upon in the preceding lectures. One must choose between Interaction and its rivals. And I believe that even more than this is involved in the choice. One must, in the last analysis, choose between a theory of knowledge which describes consciousness as we find it and makes possible our reference to the distant, the future, and the past, and a theory which denies all such power of "transcendence," thus making knowledge unintelligible, and which is ultimately forced to identify consciousness with its objects or to reduce it to a mass of unrecognizable mind-dust. This is a serious indictment of mechanistic evolution, but I believe it is an inevitable one. For if the mind

be actually capable of transcending itself in such fashion as it plainly seems to do in every judgment which it makes concerning the future and the past, it is altogether a different sort of being from all material things and its ways of acting are far removed from mechanical causation and sequence as the heavens are above the earth. . . .

If it be true, as we have found reason to believe, that the body is in a real sense the tool of the mind, why must we believe that when the tool is destroyed the mind which used it also perishes? To be sure, as we know them here, the two coöperate, and the mind can express itself only by using the material tool to which it has become organic. In no instance, therefore, can we find an expression of the mind or self which is purely spiritual. Always it must submit itself, to some extent, to the nature of the tool which it uses. To do this is the precondition of its expressing itself at all in this world and as we know it here. But all this is no argument for identifying the self with the body or for concluding that when the body ceases to function the self also ceases. The tones which we hear from the violin when the master plays it—are they due to the artist or to the instrument? Surely to both united, each limiting and each aiding the other. Yet for all that we do not identify the one with the other nor say that since the tones come immediately from the violin, therefore there is no master and none is needed. To say this would be the wisdom of Monism. But we who are not monists believe that behind the wood and horse-hair and cat-gut of the machine we can trace the hand,—yes, and the personality—of the master. Suppose now the violin be broken; must we conclude that therefore the violinist also ceases to exist, or that, at any rate, he can never play again? Surely not if we be good dualists. We know that in this universe there are other instruments on which the master may play. And have we reason to be sure that only violins can be replaced?

But I need not dwell longer upon this aspect of the question. For it must be obvious to all that if Dualism be true, then, as Socrates said long ago, “it behooves us to be of good hope about death.” And indeed we can do no better than turn back to our Plato; for almost all his many arguments upon the subject come really to this: that the mind being different in nature from the body and subject to different laws, there is no good reason to suppose that the death of the body is relevant to the life of the mind.

A quarter of a century ago there were discovered in Southern Italy a number of graves made by the ancient Orphics. In each there was found, bound round the neck of the dead man, or clasped in his hand, a golden tablet, with an inscription which combined directions for his entrance into the next world and a brief epitome of his faith. One of them reads thus:

Thou shalt find on the left of the House of Hades a well-spring;
And by the side thereof standing a white cypress.
To this well-spring approach not near.
But thou shalt find another by the Lake of Memory,
Cold water flowing forth; and there are Guardians before it.
Say: I am a child of Earth and of Starry Heaven.
But my race is of Heaven alone.

The inscription is incomplete. Another tablet, of which much is lost, begins abruptly:

I am parched with thirst and I perish. Nay, drink of me,
The well-spring flowering forever on the Right where the cypress is.
Who art thou?
Whence art thou? I am a child of Earth, and of Starry Heaven.

In these last words, repeated from tablet to golden tablet, and held in the pathetic grasp of hand after clinging hand, as if the whole hope of the future hung, as indeed it does, upon the truth of the line, there is expressed the central faith not only of the Orphic religion but of all religion, the fundamental assertion of the mind's self-consciousness and of the heart's desire, as well as the essential teaching of the dualistic philosophy. I am a child of Earth—yes, that is plain, alas, all too plain; but a child of Starry Heaven too.

J. B. PRATT: *Matter and Spirit*, pp. 176-188, 227-230.
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SUGGESTIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Compare Pratt's view of the self with Miss Calkins's view as given above, p. 224 ff. Do you think that Pratt believes that animals, plants and inorganic objects have souls as Miss Calkins argues?
2. Make lists of the various characteristics of the self-based (i) on the quotation from Miss Calkins, (ii) on the quotation from McDougall, (iii) on the quotation from Laird, (iv) on what Pratt himself says. Compare the four lists. Are they compatible?
3. Discuss Pratt's "tool theory" of the body. How does it differ

- from the evolutionary theory that the mind is a by-product of the body? Is this doctrine compatible with Pratt's tool theory?
4. What is your opinion of the use Pratt makes of the tool theory of the body in his discussion of immortality at the end?
 5. On the theory that mind and body constitute a dualism of process, rather than of substance, do you think his view is the same as that of Woodbridge above? Give a reason for your answer.
 6. Why must one choose between dualism and mechanistic evolution? State the various consequences of this choice.
 7. Do you think that Pratt proves that interaction is compatible with both idealism and realism? Why or why not so?

III. A CORRELATION THEORY, by *C. Lloyd Morgan*

Analysis

Morgan presents his view in the form of "acknowledgments" and he implies that others have a right to make different "acknowledgments." His basic acknowledgment is the correlation of psychical with physical events, and he denies that this means either interaction or parallelism. Correlation does not begin at some late stage in the evolution of men. The entire world of evolution is psycho-physical from top to bottom. A corollary of this acknowledgment is that in every differentiated physical system there is a correlated psychical system. This can neither be proved nor disproved, since one must be a psycho-physical system in order to know such a system. He admits that most scientists and philosophers would *not* acknowledge this universality of psycho-physical correlation in nature, but he accepts it as an assumption. He confines his statement to psycho-physical correlation at the human level. Morgan rejects Huxley's theory that for every neurosis there is a psychosis, because this restricts the correlation to the brain. (This view of Huxley's is sometimes called epiphenomenalism.) Morgan calls this a restricted form of correlation. On Morgan's own view absolutely every physico-chemical change in a living being has a psychic correlate. The total psychical system, when it reaches a certain level, he calls mind. This is an unrestricted correlation as contrasted with that of restricted correlation. Both the physical and the psychical evolve and form a single evolving process, but they do not interact. In conclusion he admits that his view is a modernized form of Spinoza's view.

I acknowledge correlation of psychical with physical events. When certain physical events occur in the cortex of the brain there is what is commonly spoken of as consciousness, sometimes as sentience, or what Mr. Alexander speaks of as enjoyment. Correlation in this sense just names, adequately or inadequately, that which I here acknowledge as nowise contradictory to such evidence as is available. It must not be confused with parallel-

ism, or with interaction, which have this in common: that they imply two disparate orders of being. That is a different acknowledgment—no less speculative than this one.

And this acknowledgment is, for my constructive scheme, without reservation or restriction. In accordance with it there are no physical events—there are no integral systems of such events—that are not also psychical events and integral psychical systems. There is one evolution in both attributes—distinguishable, but nowise separable. There is not some stage of physical evolution at which correlation begins; there is no stage of physical evolution at which correlation is absent. Hence there are not two worlds—a physical world and a psychical world—but one world, psycho-physical from top to bottom.

It unquestionably follows from the acceptance of this acknowledgment that there is a correlated psychical system in the atom, the molecule, the crystal, the bacterium, the fertilized ovum—in every differentiated physical system, according to its integral status in the evolutionary hierarchy. But of this there is and can be no evidence. It lies beyond either proof or disproof. For all the stuff and substance of a psychical system is wholly intrinsic thereto. One must *be* a psychical system in its integral entirety (no less and no more) in order to “know” it in the only way in which it can be “known”—immediately, by intuition, through enjoyment, or however else it may be phrased. Sober science quite wisely ignores any such perfectly useless speculation. Even sober philosophy may well regard it as only an implication to such ubiquitous correlation as Spinoza advocated.

Let it then be freely admitted that by most men of science and by the majority of philosophers such thoroughgoing correlation is *not* acknowledged. So be it. It is for them to work out their policy or their constructive scheme, evolutionary or other, on the basis of a different acknowledgment. This is not the occasion, nor have I the requisite space, to defend the thesis or to submit the dualistic antithesis to criticism. I am forced therefore to ask that it be provisionally entertained as *one* of the assumptions under which evolutionary continuity may be interpreted—e.g., the psychical continuity correlated (on this assumption) with the organic continuity of parents and children.

We may leave the implications with respect to the atom, the molecule, the crystal, and the rest, on one side. The one psy-

chical system that each one of us "knows" at first hand is that which he is, though he may acknowledge others. It suffices, then, to lay stress on the correlation of *this* psychical system with the physical system which he also is. This is the focal centre of acknowledged correlation. And here the feature which I am concerned to emphasize is that in which it differs from such correlation as was advocated by Huxley, which one may speak of as "restricted correlation"—that of psychosis with neurosis (*Essays*, II, p. 158). Where does neurosis occur? In the sensorium. And where is that? In the brain. "The brain is the sole seat of consciousness" (VI. pp. 258, 317). I think the view is still not uncommon that the psychical system is the correlate of physical events in the cortex of the brain, *and there only*. That is the seat of the neuroses with which psychoses are correlated. The brain, it is said, is the "organ of mind." Such is what I have called the restricted form of correlation.

On the assumption of unrestricted correlation, here acknowledged, there are psychical correlates of *all* the physical and physiological transactions within the organism. There is no physico-chemical change in the living body the correlate of which is not, under normal conditions, integrated within the total psychical system that, when it reaches an assignable level, we call the mind. On this view the mind includes not only processes of experiencing, but all that is experienced in mental symbolism—as signs, for example, of occurrences in the external world as a physical system. Thus there are correlates of those chemical changes in the retina or the choroid which are the physical basis of colour vision no less than correlates of the transactions in the visual centre of the occipital cortex. If this be not grasped the whole purport of my acknowledgment of ubiquitous correlation will be misunderstood.

This only need be added: that, under such acknowledgment, there is, at no level, any interaction between the physical and the psychical attributes. There is one determinate evolutionary advance in both attributes. *Ex hypothesi* there is no lower stage at which it may be said that psychical correlates do not count for progress; and there is no higher stage at which it may be said that physical events count any less than heretofore. Exigencies of space force me to leave these Spinozistic statements thus baldly enunciated. Indeterminists will, of course, reject un-

restricted correlation, and this implication thereof. They will develop their constructive scheme on other lines. . . .

C. LLOYD MORGAN in *Contemporary British Philosophy*,
1st. Series, pp. 277-280. Edited by J. H. Muirhead.
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Ltd., London. (New York: The Macmillan Company.)

· SUGGESTIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Is Morgan's denial that his view is parallelism consistent with his statement that there are two attributes of one evolving process, which do not interact? Why or why not?
2. In holding that the entire universe has had both attributes from the beginning is Morgan committed to the view known as panpsychism, such as that of Miss Calkins above, p. 224 ff.? If you think he is not a panpsychist what objection do you think he would make to it?
3. State clearly the difference between restricted and unrestricted correlation. Which does Pratt hold?
4. Place Morgan's theory on Pratt's chart.

CHAPTER VI

REALISTIC THEORIES OF VALUE

I. A DEFINITION OF INTRINSIC VALUE, by *G. E. Moore*

Analysis

Moore begins by giving the utilitarian theory of intrinsic value. It is necessary to distinguish the view that pleasure constitutes intrinsic value from the view that pleasure is a criterion or sign of intrinsic value. Utilitarianism implies the former. But Moore points out that the probabilities are against pleasure being a sign of intrinsic value. He thinks the utilitarians were led to their theory that pleasure constitutes intrinsic value because they were convinced that pleasure is a sign of intrinsic value. He then draws the consequences of the extreme utilitarian view—that pleasure constitutes intrinsic value. Once he sees what these consequences are, Moore thinks almost any one would reject the theory from which they follow. One reason why some thinkers have accepted extreme utilitarianism on this point is that they have not really understood fully what its consequences are. Another reason is that they think pleasure is an essential ingredient in any whole which has intrinsic value, and from this they infer that the amount of value is proportional to the amount of pleasure. These two views are quite different. Moore accepts the first as probably true but argues against the inference based upon it. He believes that a whole can be increased in intrinsic value without changing the amount of pleasure it contains. "The amount by which the value of a whole exceeds that of one of its factors is not necessarily equal to that of the remaining factor." Moore then states that intrinsic value is not in proportion to any one thing that may be added to a whole. There is no single thing which constitutes intrinsic value, therefore. There are an immense variety of intrinsic values.

Obviously on any theory which maintains, as this one (utilitarianism) does, that right and wrong depend on the intrinsic value of the consequences of our actions, it is extremely important to decide rightly what kinds of consequences *are* intrinsically better or worse than others. And it is on this important point that the theory in question seems to me to take an utterly wrong view. It maintains, . . . that any whole which contains *more pleasure* is always intrinsically better than one which contains less, and that none can be intrinsically better, *unless* it contains more pleasure: . . . Is this proposition true or not? and if

not, what is the right answer to the question: What kinds of things are intrinsically better or worse than others?

And first of all it is important to be quite clear as to how this question is related to another question, which is very liable to be confused with it: . . . I mean, the proposition that quantity of pleasure is a correct *criterion* of right and wrong, or that, *in this world*, it always is, as a *matter of fact*, our duty to do the action which will produce a maximum of pleasure, or (for this is, perhaps, more commonly held) to do the action which, *so far as we can see*, will produce such a maximum. This latter proposition has been far more often *expressly* held than the proposition that what contains more pleasure is *always* intrinsically better than what contains less; and many people may be inclined to think they are free to maintain it, even if they deny that the intrinsic value of every whole is *always* in proportion to the quantity of pleasure it contains. And so, *in a sense*, they are; for it is quite possible, *theoretically*, that quantity of pleasure should always be a correct *criterion* of right and wrong, here in this world, even if intrinsic value is not always in exact proportion to quantity of pleasure. But though this is theoretically possible, it is, I think, easy to see that it is extremely *unlikely* to be the case. For if it were the case, what it would involve is this. It would involve our maintaining that, where the total consequences of any actually voluntary action have more intrinsic value than those of the possible alternatives, it *absolutely always* happens to be true that they *also* contain more pleasure, although, in other cases, we know that degree of intrinsic value is by no means always in proportion to quantity of pleasure contained. And, of course, it is theoretically possible that this should be so: it is *possible* that the total consequences of actual voluntary actions should form a complete exception to the general rule: that, in their case, what has more intrinsic values should *absolutely always* also contain more pleasure, although, in other cases, this is by no means always true: but anybody can see, I think, that, in the absence of strict proof that it is so, the probabilities are all the other way. It is, indeed, so far as I can see, quite impossible absolutely to *prove* either that it is so or that it is not so; because *actual* actions in this world are liable to have such an immense number of indirect and remote consequences, which we cannot trace, that it is impossible to be quite certain how the *total* consequences of any two actions will compare either in respect of intrinsic value, or in respect of the quantity of pleasure they

contain. It *may*, therefore, *possibly* be the case that quantity of pleasure *is*, as a matter of fact, a correct *criterion* of right and wrong, even if intrinsic value is *not* always in proportion to quantity of pleasure contained. But it is impossible to *prove* that it is a correct criterion, except by assuming that intrinsic value always *is* in proportion to quantity of pleasure. And most of those who have held the former view have, I think, in fact made this assumption, even if they have not definitely realized that they were making it.

Is this assumption true, then? Is it true that one whole will be intrinsically better than another, whenever and only when it contains more pleasure, no matter what the two may be like in other respects? It seems to me almost impossible that any one, who fully realizes the consequences of such a view, can possibly hold that it *is* true. It involves our saying, for instance, that a world in which absolutely nothing except pleasure existed—no knowledge, no love, no enjoyment of beauty, no moral qualities—must yet be intrinsically better—better worth creating—provided only the total quantity of pleasure in it were the least bit greater, than one in which all these things existed *as well as* pleasure. It involves our saying that, even if the total quantity of pleasure in each was exactly equal, yet the fact that all the beings in the one possessed in addition knowledge of many different kinds and a full appreciation of all that was beautiful or worthy of love in their world, whereas none of the beings in the other possessed any of these things, would give us no reason whatever for preferring the former to the latter. It involves our saying that, for instance, the state of mind of a drunkard, when he is intensely pleased with breaking crockery, is just as valuable, in itself—just as well worth having, as that of a man who is fully realizing all that is exquisite in the tragedy of King Lear, provided only the mere quantity of pleasure in both cases is the same. Such instances might be multiplied indefinitely, and it seems to me that they constitute a *reductio ad absurdum* of the view that intrinsic value is always in proportion to quantity of pleasure. Of course, here again, the question is quite incapable of proof either way. And if anybody, after clearly considering the issue, does come to the conclusion that no one kind of enjoyment is ever intrinsically better than another, provided only that the pleasure in both is equally intense, and that, if we *could* get as much pleasure in the world, without needing to have any knowledge, or any moral qualities, or any sense of

beauty, as we can get *with* them, then all these things would be entirely superfluous, there is no way of proving that he is wrong. But it seems to me almost impossible that anybody, who does really get the question clear, should take such a view; and, if anybody were to, I think it is self-evident that he would be wrong.

It may, however, be asked: If the matter is as plain as this, how has it come about that anybody ever has adopted the view that intrinsic value is always in proportion to quantity of pleasure, or has ever argued, as if it were so? And I think one chief answer to this question is that those who have done so have *not* clearly realized all the consequences of their view, partly because they have been too exclusively occupied with the particular question as to whether, in the case of *the total consequences of actual* voluntary actions, degree of intrinsic value is not always in proportion to quantity of pleasure—a question, which, as has been admitted, is, in itself, much more obscure. But there is, I think, another reason, which is worth mentioning, because it introduces us to a principle of great importance. It may, in fact, be held, with great plausibility, that no whole can ever have any intrinsic value *unless* it contains some pleasure; and it might be thought, at first sight, that this reasonable, and perhaps true, view could not possibly lead to the wholly unreasonable one that intrinsic value is always *in proportion* to quantity of pleasure: it might seem obvious that to say that nothing can be valuable *without* pleasure is a very different thing from saying that intrinsic value is always *in proportion* to pleasure. And it is, I think, in fact true that the two views are really as different as they seem, and that the latter does not at all follow from the former. But, if we look a little closer, we may, I think, see a reason why the latter should very naturally have been *thought* to follow from the former.

The reason is as follows. If we say that no whole can ever be intrinsically good, *unless* it contains some pleasure, we are, of course, saying that if from any whole, which is intrinsically good, we were to subtract all the pleasure it contains, the remainder, whatever it might be, would have no intrinsic goodness at all, but must always be either intrinsically *bad*, or else intrinsically indifferent: and this (if we remember our definition of intrinsic value)¹ is the same thing as to say that this remainder actually *has* no intrinsic goodness at all, but always *is* either

¹ Quoted by Tufts below, p. 520.

positively bad or indifferent. Let us call the pleasure which such a whole contains, A, and the whole remainder, whatever it may be, B. We are then saying that the whole $A + B$ is intrinsically good, but that B is *not* intrinsically good at all. Surely it seems to follow that the intrinsic value of $A + B$ cannot possibly be greater than that of A by itself? How, it may be asked, could it possibly be otherwise? How, by adding to A something, namely B, which has *no* intrinsic goodness at all, could we possibly get a whole which has *more* intrinsic value than A? It may naturally seem to be self-evident that we could not. But, if so, then it absolutely follows that we can never increase the value of any whole whatever except by adding *pleasure* to it: we may, of course, *lessen* its value, by adding other things, e.g., by adding pain; but we can never *increase* it except by adding pleasure.

Now from this it does not, of course, follow strictly that the intrinsic value of a whole is always *in proportion* to the quantity of pleasure it contains in the special sense in which we have throughout been using this expression—that is to say, as meaning that it is in proportion to the *excess* of pleasure over pain. . . . But it is surely very natural to think that it does. And it *does* follow that we must be wrong in the reasons we gave for disputing this proposition. It does follow that we must be wrong in thinking that by adding such things as knowledge or a sense of beauty to a world which contained a certain amount of pleasure, without adding any more pleasure, we could increase the intrinsic value of that world. If, therefore, we are to dispute the proposition that intrinsic value *is* always in proportion to quantity of pleasure we must dispute this argument. But the argument may seem to be almost indisputable. It has, in fact, been used as an argument in favour of the proposition that intrinsic value *is* always in proportion to quantity of pleasure, and I think it has probably had much influence in inducing people to adopt that view, even if they have not expressly put it in this form.

How, then, can we dispute this argument? We might, of course, do so, by rejecting the proposition that no whole can ever be intrinsically good, *unless* it contains some pleasure; but, for my part, though I don't feel certain that this proposition *is* true, I also don't feel at all certain that it is *not* true. The part of the argument which it seems to me certainly can and ought to be disputed is another part—namely, the assumption

that, where a whole contains two factors, A and B, and one of these, B, has no intrinsic goodness at all, the intrinsic value of the whole cannot be *greater* than that of the other factor, A. This assumption, I think, obviously rests on a still more general assumption, of which it is only a special case. The general assumption is: That where a whole consists of two factors A and B, the amount by which its intrinsic value exceeds that of one of these two factors must always be equal to that of the other factor. Our special case will follow from this general assumption: because it will follow that if B be intrinsically *indifferent*, that is to say, if its intrinsic value $= 0$, then the amount by which the value of the whole $A + B$ exceeds the value of A must also $= 0$, that is to say, the value of the whole must be precisely *equal* to that of A; while if B be intrinsically *bad*, that is to say if its intrinsic value is less than 0, then the amount by which the value of $A + B$ will exceed that of A will also be less than 0, that is to say, the value of the whole will be *less* than that of A. Our special case does then follow from the general assumption; and nobody, I think, would maintain that the special case was true without maintaining that the general assumption was also true. The general assumption may, indeed, very naturally seem to be self-evident: it has, I think, been generally assumed that it is so: and it may seem to be a mere deduction from the laws of arithmetic. But, so far as I can see, it is *not* a mere deduction from the laws of arithmetic, and, so far from being self-evident, is certainly untrue.

Let us see exactly what we are saying, if we deny it. We are saying that the fact that A and B *both* exist together, together with the fact that they have to one another any relation which they do happen to have (when they exist together, they always must have *some* relation to one another; and the precise nature of the relation certainly may in some cases make a great difference to the value of the whole state of things, though, perhaps, it need not in all cases)—that these two facts *together* must have a certain amount of intrinsic value, that is to say must be either intrinsically good, or intrinsically bad, or intrinsically indifferent, and that the amount by which this value exceeds the value which the existence of A would have, if A existed quite alone, *need* not be equal to the value which the existence of B would have, if B existed quite alone. This is all that we are saying. And can any one pretend that such a view necessarily contradicts the laws of arithmetic? or that it is self-evident that it cannot be

true? I cannot see any ground for saying so; and if there is no ground, then the argument which sought to show that we can never add to the value of any whole *except* by adding pleasure to it, is entirely baseless.

If, therefore, we reject the theory that intrinsic value is always in proportion to quantity of pleasure, it does seem as if we may be compelled to accept the principle that *the amount by which the value of a whole exceeds that of one of its factors is not necessarily equal to that of the remaining factor*—a principle which, if true, is very important in many other cases. But, though at first sight this principle may seem paradoxical, there seems to be no reason why we should not accept it; while there are other independent reasons why we should accept it. And, in any case, it seems quite clear that the degree of intrinsic value of a whole is *not* always in proportion to the quantity of pleasure it contains.

But, if we do reject this theory, what, it may be asked, can we substitute for it? How can we answer the question, what kinds of consequences are intrinsically better or worse than others?

We may, I think, say, first of all, that for the same reason for which we have rejected the view that intrinsic value is always in proportion to quantity of pleasure, we must also reject the view that it is always in proportion to the quantity of any other *single* factor whatever. Whatever single kind of thing may be proposed as a measure of intrinsic value, instead of pleasure—whether knowledge, or virtue, or wisdom, or love—it is, I think, quite plain that it is not such a measure; because it is quite plain that, however valuable any one of these things may be, we may always add to the value of a whole which contains any one of them, not only by adding more of that one, but also *by adding something else instead*. Indeed, so far as I can see, there is no characteristic whatever which always distinguishes every whole which has greater intrinsic value from every whole which has less, *except* the fundamental one that it would always be the duty of every agent to prefer the better to the worse, if we had to choose between a pair of actions, of which they would be the *sole* effects. And similarly, so far as I can see, there is no characteristic whatever which belongs to all things that are intrinsically *good* and only to them except simply the one that they all *are* intrinsically *good* and *ought* always to be preferred to *nothing at all*, if we had to choose

between an action whose sole effect would be one of them and one which would have no effects whatever. The fact is that the view which seems to me to be true is the one which, apart from theories I think every one would naturally take, namely, that there are an *immense variety* of different things, *all* of which are intrinsically good; and that though all these things may perhaps have some characteristic *in common*, their variety is so great that they have none, which, *besides* being common to them all, is also *peculiar* to them—that is to say, which never belongs to anything which is intrinsically bad or indifferent. All that can, I think, be done by way of making plain what kinds of things are intrinsically good or bad, and what are better or worse than others, is to classify some of the chief kinds of each, pointing out what the factors are upon which their goodness or badness depends. And I think this is one of the most profitable things which can be done in Ethics, and one which has been too much neglected hitherto. But I have not space to attempt it here.

G. E. MOORE: *Ethics*, pp. 233-249. Published by Henry Holt & Company in the Home University Library. Reprinted by permission.

SUGGESTIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. How does Moore state the utilitarian theory of intrinsic value?
2. What led these thinkers to make pleasure the sole constituent of intrinsic value?
3. What are the consequences of this theory, according to Moore?
4. Can the theory be disproved? Why does Moore take the opposite view?
5. How does Moore explain the fact that thinkers accept the extreme utilitarian view?
6. Criticize Moore's principle stated in italics near the end of the selection or defend it against criticisms you think might be made against it.
7. What sole common characteristic is possessed by all intrinsic values, according to Moore?

II. VALUE AS ANY OBJECT OF ANY INTEREST, by Ralph Barton Perry

Analysis

Perry gives the name *interest* to the characteristic of living mind of being for or against things, which is an all-pervasive characteristic of all affective-motor life. That which is an object of interest or stands in relation to any interest is thereby invested with value. The

term object here includes imaginary objects and "neutral entities." Value is relational and comes into existence whenever any interest stands in the valuing relation to any object whatsoever. The variety of values is explained by variety of interests. Perry quotes Santayana and Prall as holding a similar view of the nature of value. He argues that most writers have not adopted this conception of value because they have never really dealt with the question of the generic nature of value, but only with some special type of value. Hedonism is used to illustrate this point.

It is characteristic of living mind to be *for* some things and *against* others. This polarity is not reducible to that between "yes" and "no" in the logical or in the purely cognitive sense, because one can say "yes" with reluctance or be glad to say "no." To be "for" or "against" is to view with favor or disfavor; it is a bias of the subject toward or away from. It implies, as we shall see more clearly in the sequel, a tendency to create or conserve, or an opposite tendency to prevent or destroy. This duality appears in many forms, such as liking and disliking, desire and aversion, will and refusal, or seeking and avoiding. It is to this all-pervasive characteristic of the motor-affective life, this *state, act, attitude or disposition of favor or disfavor*, to which we propose to give the name of "*interest*"²

This, then, we take to be the original source and constant feature of all value. That which is an object of interest is *eo ipso* invested with value.³ Any object, whatever it be, acquires value when any interest, whatever it be, is taken in it; just as anything whatsoever becomes a target when any one whosoever aims at it. In other words, Aristotle was fundamentally mistaken when he said, that as a thing's "apparent good" makes it an object of appetite, so its real good makes it the object of "rational desire."⁴ By the same token Spinoza was fundamentally correct when he said that "in no case do we strive for, wish for, long for, or desire anything, because we deem it to be good, but on

² Cf. p. 27 f. The term "interest" has been employed for technical purposes by various psychologists, but by none, I think, in the precise sense in which it is employed here. W. Mitchell, in his *Structure and Growth of Mind*, 1907, defines interest as our "feeling towards" an object, or, as how the object "strikes or affects us" (p. 64); whereas I propose to use the term to embrace desire and disposition as well. G. F. Stout, in his *Groundwork of Psychology*, 1903, uses the term for organized and permanent forms of the emotional life, such as sentiments (pp. 221 ff.). More commonly "interest" is employed by psychology to mean *attention*.

³ An object is valuable when *qualified* by an act of interest; relation to interest assuming, in the experience or judgment of value, the rôle of adjective.

⁴ *Metaphysica*, XII, Ch. 7, trans. by W. D. Ross, 1072a.

the other hand we deem a thing to be good, because we strive for it, wish for it, long for it, or desire it."⁵

The view may otherwise be formulated in the equation: x is valuable = interest is taken in x . Value is thus a specific relation into which things possessing any ontological status whatsoever, whether real or imaginary, may enter with interested subjects.

This is value *simpliciter*,—value in the elementary, primordial and generic sense. It follows that any variation of interest or of its object will determine a variety of value; that any derivative of interest or its object will determine value in a derived sense; and that any condition of interest or its object will determine a conditional value. In short, interest being constitutive of value in the basic sense, theory of value will take this as its point of departure and centre of reference; and will classify and systematize values in terms of the different forms which interests and their objects may be found to assume.

This view has rarely found a perfectly clear and consistent expression. It is, however, essentially conveyed in an early work of Mr. George Santayana:

Apart from ourselves, and our human bias, we can see in such a mechanical world no element of value whatever. In removing consciousness, we have removed the possibility of worth. But it is not only in the absence of all consciousness that value would be removed from the world; by a less violent abstraction from the totality of human experience, we might conceive beings of a purely intellectual cast, minds in which the transformations of nature were mirrored without any emotion. . . . No event would be repulsive, no situation terrible. . . . In this case, as completely as if consciousness were absent altogether, all value and excellence would be gone. . . . Values spring from the immediate and inexplicable reaction of vital impulse, and from the irrational part of our nature. . . . The ideal of rationality is itself as arbitrary, as much dependent on the needs of a finite organization, as any other ideal."⁶

A more recent statement, and one more explicitly in accord with the view here proposed, is the following:

Anything is properly said to have value in case, and only in case, it is the object of the affective motor response which we call being in-

⁵ *Ethics*, Part III, Prop. IX, Note, trans. by R. H. M. Elwes, 1901. It is, of course, possible to desire a thing because it is good, where its goodness consists in its being desired by other subjects, or by some other interest of the same subject. But in the last analysis good springs from desire and not desire from good.

⁶ *The Sense of Beauty*, 1899, pp. 17-19. Cf. also William James: "*The essence of good is to satisfy demand*" (*Will to Believe*, etc., 1898, p. 201).

terested in, positively or negatively. . . . The being liked, or disliked, of the object is its value. And since the being liked or disliked, is being the object of a motor-affective attitude in a subject, some sort of a subject is always requisite to there being value at all—not necessarily a *judging* subject, but a subject capable of at least motor-affective response. For the cat the cream has value, or better and more simply, the cat values the cream, or the warmth, or having her back scratched, quite regardless of her probable inability to conceive cream or to make judgments concerning warmth.”⁷

It may appear surprising that a doctrine so familiar, if not banal, as that just stated, should have received so little authoritative support. Rarity is the last thing that would have been expected of it, either by its advocates who regard it as sound common-sense, or by its opponents who regard it as vulgar error. It is none the less a fact that this doctrine has rarely been explicitly avowed by philosophers. The reasons for this fact are extremely illuminating, and although they have been repeatedly alluded to, a brief recapitulation of them at this point will serve to sharpen the meaning of our definition.

All of these reasons are traceable to an imperfect conception of the problem itself. Theory of value in the contemporary sense has asked a new question, to which none of the traditional philosophical doctrines is precisely relevant. It may, perhaps, be fair to say that this question has been *tacitly* asked and answered; but it is evident that a tacit answer cannot be quoted. This new question, is the question, *In what consists value in the generic sense?* It is because neither philosophy nor common-sense has ordinarily been explicitly and unambiguously concerned with this question that so few explicit and unambiguous answers to it can be found. Most theories of value are intended not as answers to this question, but as answers to some one or more of the following questions: What is uniquely valuable? What is superlatively valuable? What is reflectively or consciously valuable? The history of thought abounds in opinions which identify value with interest, but in nearly all cases these opinions are formulated in terms of one of these questions, and cannot, therefore, be cited as generic definitions of value in the sense here proposed.

Perhaps the most ancient and persistent notion of value is *hedonism*, which construes good in terms of pleasure, and evil in

⁷ D. W. Prall: *A Study in the Theory of Value*, Univ. of California Publications in Philosophy, Vol. III, No. 2, 1921, pp. 215, 227. The present writer is in essential agreement with the whole of this admirable monograph.

terms of pain. But hedonistic writers cannot be cited in support of the doctrine here proposed, because they have been primarily concerned to show that only pleasure and pain *possess* value. If we turn to the authoritative formulation of this doctrine by Bentham, we read that "nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, *pain* and *pleasure*."⁸ John Stuart Mill begins with the assertion that "questions about ends are . . . questions what things are desirable"; adds that "the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable, is that people do actually desire it"; and presently concludes "that there is in reality nothing desired except happiness."⁹ Bentham, in other words, asserts that pleasure and pain are the only governing motives in human action; and Mill, that only happiness is desired. They are both concerned to show that pleasure and pain are the *unique objects* of interest. It is doubtless true that they both assume a more fundamental principle, to the effect that value means motive-power, or object-of-desire-and-avoidance. Without such a major premiss the argument would be palpably incomplete, and would have none of the moral implications which they impute to it. But since this major premiss is only tacitly or dogmatically avowed by the utilitarian school, and since it is the very question at issue in a general theory of value, the members of this school cannot be cited as in clear and explicit agreement with the view here proposed. . . .

R. B. PERRY: *General Theory of Value*, pp. 115-119.
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SUGGESTIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. On the basis of the first paragraph and the first footnote formulate a definition of an interest, covering Perry's use of the term and distinguishing his use from that of Mitchell and the psychologists generally.
2. How might Perry use his conception of interest to distinguish between positive and negative values, and between intrinsic and instrumental values?
3. How could varieties of value, such as economic, moral, religious and æsthetic values, be distinguished from each other, according to Perry's idea of value.

⁸ *Principles of Morals and Legislation*, Ch. I.

⁹ *Utilitarianism*, 1863, pp. 51, 52, 56. There is a further ambiguity in Mill, since he does not clearly distinguish between the view that only happiness is desired, and the view that *whatever* is desired yields happiness.

4. Indicate at least one respect in which what Prall says is more explicitly in accord with Perry's view than what Santayana says. Is what Santayana says here consistent with his theory of the essence, given on p. 330 above? Note that the quotation here given is from a much earlier work of Santayana, so that it is a question of whether he has changed his views.
5. What is Perry's chief objection to hedonism?

III. THE IMPORTANCE OF ÆSTHETIC VALUES IN EDUCATION, by *Alfred North Whitehead*

Analysis

Holding the general theory of education that it should emphasize concentration even to the point of great specialization but, at the same time, that it should emphasize generalization so as to make the student appreciate the wide variety of values, Whitehead argues for more emphasis upon art in education. To offset the influence of the practical values and of the thin specialized values of technical scholarship, he thinks the student must be taught to appreciate "the infinite variety of vivid values" of art. He defines art in the most general sense as "any selection by which the concrete facts are so arranged as to elicit attention to particular values which are realizable by them." Examples are given. Whitehead then criticizes Adam Smith's economic theory, and argues that the de-humanizing of industry due to that theory is only one example of a general danger inherent in all modern science. He holds that the spirit of change and the spirit of conservation are the two fundamental complementary aspects of all reality, and especially of reality at the human level. If the human soul is not exposed to the stimulating influences of vivid æsthetic values, as well as to the abstractions of science, it will surely wither. Art satisfies the desire for change. Science emphasizes *things* but art emphasizes *values*. Referring to a controversy between Macaulay and Southey, Whitehead repudiates the view that "æsthetic values form an adventitious, irrelevant addition" to an object.

There is no easy single solution of the practical difficulties of education. We can, however, guide ourselves by a certain simplicity in its general theory. The student should concentrate within a limited field. Such concentration should include all practical and intellectual acquirements requisite for that concentration. This is the ordinary procedure; and, in respect to it, I should be inclined even to increase the facilities for concentration rather than to diminish them. With the concentration there are associated certain subsidiary studies, such as languages for science. Such a scheme of professional training should be directed to a clear end congenial to the student. It is not necessary to elaborate the qualifications of these statements.

Such a training must, of course, have the width requisite for its end. But its design should not be complicated by the consideration of other ends. This professional training can only touch one side of education. Its centre of gravity lies in the intellect, and its chief tool is the printed book. The centre of gravity of the other side of training should lie in intuition without an analytical divorce from the total environment. Its object is immediate apprehension with the minimum of eviscerating analysis. The type of generality, which above all is wanted, is the appreciation of variety of value. I mean an æsthetic growth. There is something between the gross specialized values of the mere practical man, and the thin specialized values of the mere scholar. Both types have missed something; and if you add together the two sets of values, you do not obtain the missing elements. What is wanted is an appreciation of the infinite variety of vivid values achieved by an organism in its proper environment. When you understand all about the sun and all about the atmosphere and all about the rotation of the earth, you may still miss the radiance of the sunset. There is no substitute for the direct perception of the concrete achievement of a thing in its actuality. We want concrete fact with a high light thrown on what is relevant to its preciousness.

What I mean is art (and æsthetic education). It is, however, art in such a general sense of the term that I hardly like to call it by that name. Art is a special example. What we want is to draw out habits of æsthetic apprehension. According to the metaphysical doctrine which I have been developing, to do so is to increase the depth of individuality. The analysis of reality indicates the two factors, activity emerging into individualized æsthetic value. Also the emergent value is the measure of the individualization of the activity. We must foster the creative initiative towards the maintenance of objective values. You will not obtain the apprehension without the initiative, or the initiative without the apprehension. As soon as you get towards the concrete, you cannot exclude action. Sensitiveness without impulse spells decadence, and impulse without sensitiveness spells brutality. I am using the word "sensitiveness" in its most general signification, so as to include apprehension of what lies beyond oneself; that is to say, sensitiveness to all the facts of the case. Thus "art" in the general sense which I require is any selection by which the concrete facts are so arranged as to elicit attention to particular values which are realizable by them.

For example, the mere disposing of the human body and the eyesight so as to get a good view of a sunset is a simple form of artistic selection. The habit of art is the habit of enjoying vivid values.

But, in this sense, art concerns more than sunsets. A factory, with its machinery, its community of operatives, its social service to the general population, its dependence upon organizing and designing genius, its potentialities as a source of wealth to the holders of its stock is an organism exhibiting a variety of vivid values. What we want to train is the habit of apprehending such an organism in its completeness. It is very arguable that the science of political economy, as studied in its first period after the death of Adam Smith (1790), did more harm than good. It destroyed many economic fallacies, and taught how to think about the economic revolution then in progress. But it riveted on men a certain set of abstractions which were disastrous in their influence on modern mentality. It de-humanized industry. This is only one example of a general danger inherent in modern science. Its methodological procedure is exclusive and intolerant, and rightly so. It fixes attention on a definite group of abstractions, neglects everything else, and elicits every scrap of information and theory which is relevant to what it has retained. This method is triumphant, provided that the abstractions are judicious. But, however triumphant, the triumph is within limits. The neglect of these limits leads to disastrous oversights. The anti-rationalism of science is partly justified, as a preservation of its useful methodology; it is partly mere irrational prejudice. Modern professionalism is the training of minds to conform to the methodology. The historical revolt of the seventeenth century, and the earlier reaction towards naturalism, were examples of transcending the abstractions which fascinated educated society in the Middle Ages. These early ages had an ideal of rationalism, but they failed in its pursuit. For they neglected to note that the methodology of reasoning requires the limitations involved in the abstract. Accordingly, the true rationalism must always transcend itself by recurrence to the concrete in search of inspiration. A self-satisfied rationalism is in effect a form of anti-rationalism. It means an arbitrary halt at a particular set of abstractions. This was the case with science.

There are two principles inherent in the very nature of things, recurring in some particular embodiments whatever field we ex-

plore—the spirit of change, and the spirit of conservation. There can be nothing real without both. Mere change without conservation is a passage from nothing to nothing. Its final integration yields mere transient non-entity. Mere conservation without change cannot conserve. For after all, there is a flux of circumstance, and the freshness of being evaporates under mere repetition. The character of existent reality is composed of organisms enduring through the flux of things. The low type of organisms have achieved a self-identity dominating their whole physical life. Electrons, molecules, crystals, belong to this type. They exhibit a massive and complete sameness. In the higher types, where life appears, there is greater complexity. Thus, though there is a complex, enduring pattern, it has retreated into deeper recesses of the total fact. In a sense, the self-identity of a human being is more abstract than that of a crystal. It is the life of the spirit. It relates rather to the individualization of the creative activity; so that the changing circumstances received from the environment, are differentiated from the living personality, and are thought of as forming its perceived field. In truth, the field of perception and the perceiving mind are abstractions which, in the concrete, combine into the successive bodily events. The psychological field, as restricted to sense-objects and passing emotions, is the minor permanence, barely rescued from the nonentity of mere change; and the mind is the major permanence, permeating that complete field, whose endurance is the living soul. But the soul would wither without fertilization from its transient experiences. The secret of the higher organisms lies in their two grades of permanences. By this means the freshness of the environment is absorbed into the permanence of the soul. The changing environment is no longer, by reason of its variety, an enemy to the endurance of the organism. The pattern of the higher organism has retreated into the recesses of the individualized activity. It has become a uniform way of dealing with circumstances; and this way is only strengthened by having a proper variety of circumstances to deal with.

This fertilization of the soul is the reason for the necessity of art. A static value, however serious and important, becomes unendurable by its appalling monotony of endurance. The soul cries aloud for release into change. It suffers the agonies of claustrophobia. The transitions of humour, wit, irreverence, play, sleep, and—above all—of art are necessary for it. Great

art is the arrangement of the environment so as to provide for the soul vivid, but transient, values. Human beings require something which absorbs them for a time, something out of the routine which they can stare at. But you cannot subdivide life, except in the abstract analysis of thought. Accordingly, the great art is more than a transient refreshment. It is something which adds to the permanent richness of the soul's self-attainment. It justifies itself both by its immediate enjoyment, and also by its discipline of the inmost being. Its discipline is not distinct from enjoyment, but by reason of it. It transforms the soul into the permanent realization of values extending beyond its former self. This element of transition in art is shown by the restlessness exhibited in its history. An epoch gets saturated by the masterpieces of any one style. Something new must be discovered. The human being wanders on. Yet there is a balance in things. Mere change before the attainment of adequacy of achievement, either in quality or output, is destructive of greatness. But the importance of a living art, which moves on and yet leaves its permanent mark, can hardly be exaggerated.

In regard to the æsthetic needs of civilized society the reactions of science have so far been unfortunate. Its materialistic basis has directed attention to *things*, as opposed to *values*. The antithesis is a false one, if taken in a concrete sense. But it is valid at the abstract level of ordinary thought. This misplaced emphasis coalesced with the abstractions of political economy, which are in fact the abstractions in terms of which commercial affairs are carried on. Thus all thought concerned with social organization expressed itself in terms of material things and of capital. Ultimate values were excluded. They were politely bowed to, and then handed over to the clergy to be kept for Sundays. A creed of competitive business morality was evolved, in some respects curiously high; but entirely devoid of consideration for the value of human life. The workmen were conceived as mere hands, drawn from the pool of labour. To God's question, men gave the answer of Cain—"Am I my brother's keeper?"; and they incurred Cain's guilt. This was the atmosphere in which the industrial revolution was accomplished in England, and to a large extent elsewhere. The internal history of England during the last half century has been an endeavour slowly and painfully to undo the evils wrought in the first stage of the new epoch. It may be that civilization will never recover from the bad climate which enveloped the introduction of ma-

chinery. This climate pervaded the whole commercial system of the progressive northern European races. It was partly the result of the æsthetic errors of Protestantism and partly the result of scientific materialism, and partly the result of the natural greed of mankind, and partly the result of the abstractions of political economy. An illustration of my point is to be found in Macaulay's essay criticizing Southey's *Colloquies on Society*. It was written in 1830. Now Macaulay was a very favourable example of men living at that date, or at any date. He had genius; he was kind-hearted, honourable, and a reformer. This is the extract:—"We are told, that our age has invented atrocities beyond the imagination of our fathers; that society has been brought into a state compared with which extermination would be a blessing; and all because the dwellings of cotton-spinners are naked and rectangular. Mr. Southey has found out a way he tells us, in which the effects of manufactures and agriculture may be compared. And what is this way? To stand on a hill, to look at a cottage and a factory, and to see which is the prettier."

Southey seems to have said many silly things in his book; but, so far as this extract is concerned, he could make a good case for himself if he returned to earth after the lapse of nearly a century. The evils of the early industrial system are now a common-place of knowledge. The point which I am insisting on is the stone-blind eye with which even the best men of that time regarded the importance of æsthetics in a nation's life. I do not believe that we have as yet nearly achieved the right estimate. A contributory cause, of substantial efficacy to produce this disastrous error, was the scientific creed that matter in motion is the one concrete reality in nature; so that æsthetic values form an adventitious, irrelevant addition. . . .

A. N. WHITEHEAD: *Science and the Modern World*, pp. 278-286. Copyright, 1925, by The Macmillan Company. Reprinted by permission. Title mine.

SUGGESTIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Compare Whitehead's account of æsthetic value with J. A. Smith's discussion of the æsthetic approach to Mind above, p. 154 f.
2. What function do the æsthetic values serve in education, according to Whitehead? Give your own opinion of this view.
3. What is Whitehead's criticism of Adam Smith and of modern science generally, and what do you think of this criticism?
4. How does Whitehead define art and æsthetic value?

5. Is Whitehead's theory of æsthetic value in accord with or in opposition to Perry's definition of generic value? Explain why you answer as you do.

IV. THE QUALITY OF DEITY, by *Samuel Alexander*

Analysis

Alexander argues that there have been a number of levels of reality which have emerged from an original Space-Time matrix, and that deity for us will be a new quality above mind. Time, being infinite, must ultimately produce a higher quality than we human beings embody. For there is in it a *nisus* towards such a higher quality. We have no right to regard ourselves as the highest conceivable type. We are conscious of our limitations. What the quality of deity is we can never know. Following the analogy used by Meredith in his famous "Hymn to Colour," Alexander calls deity the colour of the universe. The quality of deity is variable. At each level of emergence the next above it is deity to beings at that lower level. Deity is not spirit in our sense of the word. For deity is a new and unique quality being developed above us as a higher level of reality. However, all we can do is to represent God in human terms and the religious person is justified in speaking of God as a spirit.

Within the all-embracing stuff of Space-Time, the universe exhibits an emergence in Time of successive levels of finite existence, each with its characteristic empirical quality. The highest of these empirical qualities known to us is mind or consciousness. Deity is the next higher empirical quality to the highest we know; and, as shall presently be observed, at any level of existence there is a next higher empirical quality which stands towards the lower quality as deity stands towards mind. Let us for the moment neglect this wider implication and confine our attention to ourselves. There is an empirical quality which is to succeed the distinctive empirical quality of our level; and that new empirical quality is deity. If Time were as some have thought a mere form of sense or understanding under which the mind envisages things, this conception would be meaningless and impossible. But Time is an element in the stuff of which the universe and all its parts are made, and has no special relation to mind, which is but the last complexity of Time that is known to us in finite existence. Bare Time in our hypothesis, whose verification has been in progress through each stage of the two preceding Books and will be completed by the conception of God,—bare Time is the soul of its Space, or performs towards it the office of soul to its equivalent body or brain; and this ele-

mentary mind which is Time becomes in the course of time so complicated and refined in its internal grouping that there arise finite beings whose soul is materiality, or colour, or life, or in the end what is familiar as mind. Now since Time is the principle of growth and Time is infinite, the internal development of the world, which before was described in its simplest terms as the redistribution of moments of Time among points of Space, cannot be regarded as ceasing with the emergence of those finite configurations of Space-Time which carry the empirical quality of mind. We have to think upon the lines already traced by experience of the emergence of higher qualities, also empirical. There is a *nisus* in Space-Time which, as it has borne its creatures forward through matter and life to mind, will bear them forward to some higher level of existence. There is nothing in mind which requires us to stop and say this is the highest empirical quality which Time can produce from now throughout the infinite Time to come. It is only the last empirical quality which we who are minds happen to know. Time itself compels us to think of a later birth of Time. For this reason it was legitimate for us to follow up the series of empirical qualities and imagine finite beings which we called angels, who would enjoy their own angelic being but would contemplate minds as minds themselves cannot do, in the same way as mind contemplates life and lower levels of existence. This device was adopted half-playfully as a pictorial embodiment of the conception forced upon us by the fact that there is this series of levels of existence. It was used illustratively to point the distinction of enjoyment and contemplation. But we now can see that it is a serious conception. For the angelic quality the possession of which enables such beings to contemplate minds is this next higher empirical quality of deity and our supposed angels are finite beings with this quality. We shall have to ask how such finite deities are related to the infinite God, for they themselves are finite gods.

Deity is thus the next higher empirical quality to mind, which the universe is engaged in bringing to birth. That the universe is pregnant with such a quality we are speculatively assured. What that quality is we cannot know; for we can neither enjoy nor still less contemplate it. Our human altars still are raised to the unknown God. If we could know what deity is, how it feels to be divine, we should first have to have become as gods. What we know of it is but its relation to the other empirical qualities

which precede it in time. Its nature we cannot penetrate. We can represent it to ourselves only by analogy. It is fitly described in this analogical manner as the colour of the universe. For colour, we have seen, is a new quality which emerges in material things in attendance on motions of a certain sort. Deity in its turn is a quality which attends upon, or more strictly is equivalent to, previous or lower existences of the order of mind which itself rests on a still lower basis of qualities, and emerges when certain complexities and refinements of arrangement have been reached. Once more I am leaning for help upon Meredith, in whose "Hymn to Colour," colour takes for a moment the place of what elsewhere he calls Earth: a soul of things which is their last perfection; whose relation to our soul is that of bridegroom to bride. He figures the relation of our soul to colour under the metaphor of love; but as I read the poem, deity as the next higher empirical quality is not different from colour as he conceives it; save only that for him the spirit of the world is timeless, whereas for us deity is like all other empirical qualities a birth of Time and exists in Time, and timelessness is for us a nonentity, and merely a device for contrasting God's infinite deity with the relative imperfection of the finite things we know, a conception which shall appear in due course.

We have not yet asked what the being is which possesses deity. But before attempting to raise the question we may still linger over the quality of deity itself. In the first place it is clear that, while for us men deity is the next higher empirical quality to mind, the description of deity is perfectly general. For any level of existence, deity is the next higher empirical quality. It is therefore a variable quality, and as the world grows in time, deity changes with it. On each level a new quality looms ahead, awfully, which plays to it the part of deity. For us who live upon the level of mind deity is, we can but say, deity. To creatures upon the level of life, deity is still the quality in front, but to us who come later this quality has been revealed as mind. For creatures who possessed only the primary qualities,—mere empirical configurations of Space-Time,—deity was what afterwards appeared as materiality, and their God was matter, for I am supposing that there is no level of existence nearer to the spatio-temporal than matter. On each level of finite creatures deity is for them some "unknown" (though not "unexperienced") quality in front, the real nature of which is enjoyed by the creatures of the next level, I do not mean that a material

being would in some way think or forecast life; for there is no thinking in the proper sense till we reach mind. I do not even mean that matter forecasts deity in the sense in which it is sometimes said that to a dog his master is God. For the dog though he may not think, does feel and imagine, and his master is a finite being presented to his senses, for whom he feels attachment. I mean only that corresponding to the sense of a mysterious something which is more than we are and yet is felt in feeling and is conceived by speculation, there is some quality in the purview of material things which lies ahead of material quality. If we think ourselves back into material existence, we should feel ourselves, though matter would be the highest that we know, still swept on in the movement of Time. A merely material universe would not be exhausted by materiality and its lower empirical qualities; there would still be that restless movement of Time, which is not the mere turning of a squirrel in its cage, but the *nisus* towards a higher birth. That it is so, events show. How its being so would be "experienced" in the material "soul" may need for its description a greater capacity to strip off human privileges and sympathize with lower experience than most persons, and certainly I, possess.

Having thus realized that the relation of deity to mind is not peculiar to us but arises at each level between the next higher quality and the distinctive quality of that level, we can at once pass to another observation. We cannot tell what is the nature of deity, of our deity, but we can be certain that it is not mind, or if we use the term spirit as equivalent to mind or any quality of the order of mind, deity is not spirit, but something different from it in kind. God, the being which possesses deity, must be *also* spirit, for according to analogy, deity presupposes spirit, just as spirit or mind presupposes in its possessor life, and life physico-chemical material processes. But though God must be spiritual in the same way as he must be living and material and spatio-temporal, his deity is not spirit. To think so would be like thinking that mind is purely life, or life purely physico-chemical. The neural complexity which is equivalent to mind is not merely physiological, but a selected physiological constellation which is the bearer of mind, though it is also physiological, because it has physiological relations to what is purely physiological. That complexity and refinement of spirit which is equivalent to deity is something new, and while it is also spirit it is not merely spirit. Deity is therefore, according to the pattern of the

growth of things in time, not a mere enlargement of mind or spirit, but something which mere spirit subserves, and to which accordingly the conception of spirit as such is totally inadequate. Spirit, personality, mind, all these human or mental characters belong to God but not to his deity. They belong as we must hold not to his deity but to his "body." Yet since it is through spirit that we become aware of God, whether in the practical shape of the object of religious feeling or philosophically as the possessor of deity, since what is beyond spirit is realized through spirit, and since more particularly spirit is the highest quality whose nature we know, and we are compelled to embody our conceptions in imaginative shapes, it is not strange that we should represent God in human terms. Instead of the shadowy quality of which we can only say that it is a higher quality than mind, God is made vivid to us as a greater Spirit; and we conceal the difference in kind of the divine and the human nature under magnified representations of human attributes. These are the inevitable devices of our weakness and our pictorial craving. But, for philosophy, God's deity is not different from spirit in degree but in kind, as a novelty in the series of empirical qualities.

SAMUEL ALEXANDER: *Space, Time and Deity*, Vol. II, pp. 345-350. Reprinted by permission of Macmillan & Co., Ltd., London. Title mine.

SUGGESTIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Compare Alexander's theory of emergence with that of Lovejoy above. Which type of emergence among those distinguished by Lovejoy, would the emergence of deity be? Do you think that Alexander would recognize the types Lovejoy mentions?
2. Would deity be a value? If so, would it be an intrinsic value in Moore's sense or a relational value in Perry's sense or a value in some other sense?
3. State one reason for and one against Alexander's view from the standpoint of the religious man.
4. Does Alexander treat Time as a deity more important than the quality of deity which emerges from it? Give a reason for your answer.

PART FOUR: PRAGMATISM

CHAPTER I

A SKETCH OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRAGMATISM

I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN PRAGMATISM, by *John Dewey*

Analysis

Charles S. Peirce, the founder of Pragmatism or Experimentalism or Instrumentalism, took the term Pragmatism from Kant. Dewey explains what Peirce meant by it, emphasizing the idea that the modification of existence by applying ideas or concepts to solve the problems and change the situations presented to us in experience is the real meaning of the pragmatist's theory as expounded by Peirce. Two erroneous interpretations of the doctrine are stated and refuted. William James carried forward the work of Peirce. Dewey shows how James was more closely connected with the British philosophers, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, J. S. Mill, Bain and Hodgson, than with Kant. This caused him to change Peirce's conception by making the particular consequences of an idea the test of its truth instead of its general consequences. But in so doing he broadened the application of the theory to include all ideas, especially religious beliefs. Dewey illustrates this with James's solution of the controversy between materialism and spiritualism. James also used the pragmatic idea to define the nature of truth, thus giving a new interpretation of the old coherence and correspondence theories of truth. Dewey points out the value in this theory and indicates its relation to English empiricism. He then gives an account of *instrumentalism*, the type of pragmatism which he founded. It departed from a Neo-Kantian basis and represented a reaction against the idealistic interpretation of Bradley and Bosanquet. It is also closely related to Watson's behavioristic psychology. But two of its most important ideas it got from James's *Principles of Psychology*. These are stated and interpreted by Dewey. This is followed by a statement of James's theory of the categories or universal concepts. He then formulates the theory of pragmatism that thought is an instrument by which man adapts himself to his environment.

The purpose of this article is to define the principal theories of the philosophical movements known under the names of Pragmatism, Instrumentalism, or Experimentalism. To do this we must trace their historical development; for this method seems to present the simplest way of comprehending these movements and at the same time avoids certain current misunderstandings of their doctrines and of their aims.

The origin of Pragmatism goes back to Charles Sanders Peirce, the son of one of the most celebrated mathematicians of the United States, and himself very proficient in the science of mathematics; he is one of the founders of the modern symbolic logic of relations. Unfortunately Peirce was not at all a systematic writer and never expounded his ideas in a single system. The pragmatic method which he developed applies only to a very narrow and limited universe of discourse. After William James had extended the scope of the method, Peirce wrote an exposition of the origin of pragmatism as he had first conceived it; it is from this exposition that we take the following passages.

The term "pragmatic," contrary to the opinion of those who regard pragmatism as an exclusively American conception, was suggested to him by the study of Kant. In the *Metaphysic of Morals* Kant established a distinction between *pragmatic* and *practical*. The latter term applies to moral laws which Kant regards as *à priori*, whereas the former term applies to the rules of art and technique which are based on experience and are applicable to experience. Peirce, who was an empiricist, with the habits of mind, as he put it, of the laboratory, consequently refused to call his system "practicalism," as some of his friends suggested. As a logician he was interested in the art and technique of real thinking, and especially as far as pragmatic method is concerned in the art of making concepts clear, or of construing adequate and effective definitions in accord with the spirit of scientific method.

Following his own words, for a person "who still thought in Kantian terms most readily, '*praktisch*' and '*pragmatisch*' were as far apart as the two poles; the former belonging in a region of thought where no mind of the experimental type can ever make sure of solid ground under his feet, the latter expressing relation to some definite human purpose. Now quite the most striking feature of the new theory was its recognition of an inseparable connection between rational cognition and rational purpose."¹

In alluding to the experimental type of mind, we are brought to the exact meaning given by Peirce to the word "pragmatic." In speaking of an experimentalist as a man whose intelligence is formed in the laboratory, he said: "Whatever assertion you may make to him, he will either understand as meaning that if a given prescription for an experiment ever can be and ever is

¹ *Monist*, Vol. XV, p. 163.

carried out in act, an experience of a given description will result, else he will see no sense at all in what you say." And thus Peirce developed the theory that "the rational purport of a word or other expression, lies exclusively in its conceivable bearing upon the conduct of life; so that, since obviously nothing that might not result from experiment can have any direct bearing upon conduct, if one can define accurately all the conceivable experimental phenomena which the affirmation or denial of a concept could imply, one will have therein a complete definition of the concept."²

The essay in which Peirce developed his theory bears the title: "How to Make Our Ideas Clear."³ There is a remarkable similarity here to Kant's doctrine in the efforts which he made to interpret the universality of concepts in the domain of experience in the same way in which Kant established the law of practical reason in the domain of the *à priori*. "The rational meaning of every proposition lies in the future. . . . But of the myriads of forms into which a proposition may be translated, what is that one which is to be called its very meaning? It is, according to the pragmatist, that form in which the proposition becomes applicable to human conduct, not in these or those special circumstances, nor when one entertains this or that special design, but that form which is most directly applicable to self-control under every situation, and to every purpose."⁴ So also, "the pragmatist does not make the *summum bonum* to consist in action, but makes it to consist in that process of evolution whereby the existent comes more and more to embody generals . . ."⁵—in other words—the process whereby the existent becomes, with the aid of action, a body of rational tendencies or of habits generalized as much as possible. These statements of Peirce are quite conclusive with respect to two errors which are commonly committed in regard to the ideas of the founder of pragmatism. It is often said of pragmatism that it makes action the end of life. It is also said of pragmatism that it subordinates thought and rational activity to particular ends of interest and profit. It is true that the theory according to Peirce's conception implies essentially a certain relation to action, to human conduct. But the rôle of action is that of an intermediary. In order to be

² *Ibid.*, p. 162.

³ *Popular Science Monthly*, 1878.

⁴ *Monist*, Vol. XV, pp. 173-74.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 178.

able to attribute a meaning to concepts, one must be able to apply them to existence. Now it is by means of action that this application is made possible. And the modification of existence which results from this application constitutes the true meaning of concepts.

Pragmatism is, therefore, far from being that glorification of action for its own sake which is regarded as the peculiar characteristic of American life. It is also to be noted that there is a scale of possible applications of concepts to existence, and hence a diversity of meanings. The greater the extension of the concepts, the more they are freed from the restrictions which limit them to particular cases, the more is it possible for us to attribute the most general meaning to a term. Thus the theory of Peirce is opposed to every restriction of the meaning of a concept to the achievement of a particular end, and still more to a personal aim. It is still more strongly opposed to the idea that reason or thought should be reduced to being a servant of any interest which is pecuniary or too narrow. This theory was American in its origin in so far as it insisted on the necessity of human conduct and the fulfillment of some aim in order to clarify thought. But at the same time, it disapproves of those aspects of American life which make action an end in itself, and which conceive ends too narrowly and too practically. In considering a system of philosophy in its relation to national factors it is necessary to keep in mind not only the aspects of life which are incorporated in the system, but also the aspects against which the system is a protest. There never was a philosopher who has merited the name for the simple reason that he glorified the tendencies and characteristics of his social environment; just as it is also true that there never has been a philosopher who has not seized upon certain aspects of the life of his time and idealized them.

The work commenced by Peirce was continued by William James. In one sense James narrowed the application of Peirce's pragmatic method, but at the same time he extended it. The articles which Peirce wrote in 1878 commanded almost no attention from philosophical circles, which were then under the dominating influence of the neo-kantian idealism of Green, of Caird, and of the Oxford School, excepting those circles in which the Scottish philosophy of common sense maintained its supremacy. In 1898 James inaugurated the new pragmatic movement in an address entitled, "Philosophical Conceptions and Practical

Results," later reprinted in the volume, *Collected Essays and Reviews*. Even in this early study one can easily notice the presence of those two tendencies to restrict and at the same time to extend early pragmatism. After having quoted the psychological remark of Peirce that "beliefs are really rules for action, and the whole function of thinking is but one step in the production of habits of action," and that every idea which we frame for ourselves of an object is really an idea of the possible effects of that object, he expressed the opinion that all these principles could be expressed more broadly than Peirce expressed them. "The ultimate test for us of what a truth means is indeed the conduct it dictates or inspires. But it inspires that conduct because it first foretells some particular turn to our experience which shall call for just that conduct from us. And I should prefer to express Peirce's principle by saying that the effective meaning of any philosophic proposition can always be brought down to some particular consequence, in our future practical experience, whether active or passive; the point lying rather in the fact that the experience must be particular, than in the fact that it must be active."⁶ In an essay written in 1908 James repeats this statement and states that whenever he employs the term "the practical," he means by it, "the distinctively concrete, the individual, the particular and effective as opposed to the abstract, general and inert—'Pragmata' are things in their plurality—particular consequences can perfectly well be of a theoretic nature."^{7 8}

William James alluded to the development which he gave to Peirce's expression of the principle. In one sense one can say that he enlarged the bearing of the principle by the substitution of particular consequences for the general rule or method ap-

⁶ *Collected Essays and Reviews*, p. 412.

⁷ *The Meaning of Truth*, pp. 209-210.

⁸ In a footnote James gave an example of the errors which are committed in connection with the term "Practical," quoting M. Bourdeau who had written that "Pragmatism is an Anglo Saxon reaction against the intellectualism and rationalism of the Latin mind. . . . It is a philosophy without words, a philosophy of gestures and of facts, which abandons what is general and holds only to what is particular." In his lecture at California, James brought out the idea that his pragmatism was inspired to a considerable extent by the thought of the British philosophers, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Mill, Bain, and Shadworth Hodgson. But he contrasted this method with German transcendentalism, and particularly with that of Kant. It is especially interesting to notice this difference between Peirce and James: the former attempted to give an experimental, not an *à priori* explanation of Kant, whereas James tried to develop the point of view of the British thinkers.

plicable to future experience. But in another sense this substitution limited the application of the principle since it destroyed the importance attached by Peirce to the greatest possible application of the rule, or the habit of conduct—its extension to universality. That is to say, William James was much more of a nominalist than Peirce.

One can notice an extension of pragmatism in the above passage. James there alludes to the use of a method of determining the meaning of truth. Since truth is a term and has consequently a meaning, this extension is a legitimate application of pragmatic method. But it should be remarked that here this method serves only to make clear the meaning of the term, and has nothing to do with the truth of a particular judgment. The principal reason which led James to give a new color to pragmatic method was that he was preoccupied with applying the method to determine the meaning of philosophical problems and questions and that moreover, he chose to submit to examination philosophical notions of a theological or religious nature. He wished to establish a criterion which would enable one to determine whether a given philosophical question has an authentic and vital meaning or whether, on the contrary, it was trivial and purely verbal; and in the former case, what interests were at stake, when one accepts and affirms one or the other of two theses in dispute. Peirce was above all a logician; whereas James was an educator and wished to force the general public to realize that certain problems, certain philosophical debates have a real importance for mankind, because the beliefs which they bring into play lead to very different modes of conduct. If this important distinction is not grasped, it is impossible to understand the majority of the ambiguities and errors which belong to the later period in the pragmatic movement.

James took as an example the controversy between theism and materialism. It follows from this principle that if the course of the world is considered as completed, it is equally legitimate to assert that God or matter was its cause. Whether one way or the other, the facts are what they are, and it is they which determine whatever meaning is to be given to their cause. Consequently the name which we can give to this cause is entirely arbitrary. It is entirely different if we take the future into account. God then has the meaning of a power concerned with assuring the final triumph of ideal and spiritual values, and matter becomes a power indifferent to the triumph or defeat

of these values. And our life takes a different direction according as we adopt one or the other of these alternatives. In the lectures on pragmatism published in 1907, he applies the same criticism to the philosophical problem of the One and the Many, that is to say of Monism and Pluralism, as well as to other questions. Thus he shows that Monism is equivalent to a rigid universe where everything is fixed and immutably united to others, where indetermination, free choice, novelty, and the unforeseen in experience have no place; a universe which demands the sacrifice of the concrete and complex diversity of things to the simplicity and nobility of an architectural structure. In what concerns our beliefs, Monism demands a rationalistic temperament leading to a fixed and dogmatic attitude. Pluralism, on the other hand, leaves room for contingency, liberty, novelty, and gives complete liberty of action to the empirical method, which can be greatly extended. It accepts unity where it finds it, but it does not attempt to force the vast diversity of events and things into a single rational mold.

From the point of view of an educator or of a student or, if you will, of those who are thoroughly interested in these problems, in philosophical discussions and controversies, there is no reason for contesting the value of this application of pragmatic method, but it is no less important to determine the nature of this application. It affords a means of discovering the implications for human life of philosophical conceptions which are often treated as of no importance and of a purely dialectical nature. It furnished a criterion for determining the vital implications of beliefs which present themselves as alternatives in any theory. Thus as he himself said, "the whole function of philosophy ought to be to find the characteristic influences which you and I would undergo at a determinate moment of our lives, if one or the other formula of the universe were true." However, in saying that the whole function of philosophy has this aim, it seems that he is referring rather to the teaching than to the construction of philosophy. For such a statement implies that the world formulas have already all been made, and that the necessary work of producing them has already been finished, so that there remains only to define the consequences which are reflected in life by the acceptance of one or the other of these formulas as true.

From the point of view of Peirce, the object of philosophy would be rather to give a fixed meaning to the universe by

formulas which correspond to our attitudes or our most general habits of response to the environment; and this generality depends on the extension of the applicability of these formulas to specific future events. The meaning of concepts of "matter" and of "God" must be fixed before we can ever attempt to reach an understanding concerning the value of our belief in these terms. Materialism would signify that the world demands on our part a single kind of constant and general habits; and God would signify the demand for another type of habits; the difference between materialism and theism would be tantamount to the difference in the habits required to face all the detailed facts of the universe. The world would be one in so far as it would be possible for us to form a single habit of action which would take account of all future existences and would be applicable to them. It would be many in so far as it is necessary for us to form several habits, differing from each other and irreducible to each other, in order to be able to meet the events in the world and control them. In short, Peirce wrote as a logician and James as a humanist.

William James accomplished a new advance in Pragmatism by his theory of the will to believe, or as he himself later called it, the right to believe. The discovery of the fundamental consequences of one or another belief has without fail a certain influence on that belief itself. If a man cherished novelty, risk, opportunity and a variegated esthetic reality, he will certainly reject any belief in Monism, when he clearly perceives the import of this system. But if, from the very start, he is attracted by esthetic harmony, classic proportions, fixity even to the extent of absolute security and logical coherence, it is quite natural that he should put faith in Monism. Thus William James took into account those motives of instinctive sympathy which play a greater rôle in our choice of a philosophic system than formal reasonings; and he thought that we would be rendering a service to the cause of philosophical sincerity if we would openly recognize the motives which inspire us. He also maintained the thesis that the greater part of philosophic problems and especially those which touch on religious fields are of such a nature that they are not susceptible of decisive evidence one way or the other. Consequently he claimed the right of a man to choose his beliefs not only in the presence of proofs or conclusive facts, but also in the absence of all evidence of this nature, and above all when he is forced to choose between one meaning or another

or when by refusing to choose, his refusal is itself equivalent to a choice. The theory of the will to believe gives rise to misunderstandings and even to ridicule; and therefore it is necessary to understand clearly in what way James used it. We are always obliged to act in any case; our actions and with them their consequences actually change according to the beliefs which we have chosen. Moreover it may be that, in order to discover the proofs which will ultimately be the intellectual justification of certain beliefs—the belief in freedom, for example, or the belief in God—it is necessary to begin to act in accordance with this belief.

In his lectures on Pragmatism, and in his volume of essays bearing the title *The Meaning of Truth*, which appeared in 1909, James extended the use of the pragmatic method to the problem of the nature of truth. So far we have considered the pragmatic method as an instrument in determining the meaning of words and the vital importance of philosophic beliefs. Now and then we have made allusion to the future consequences which are implied. James showed, among other things, that in certain philosophic conceptions, the affirmation of certain beliefs could be justified by means of the nature of their consequences, or by the differences which these beliefs make in existence. But then why not push the argument to the point of maintaining that the meaning of truth in general is determined by its consequences? We must not forget here that James was an empiricist before he was a pragmatist, and repeatedly stated that pragmatism is merely empiricism pushed to its legitimate conclusions. From a general point of view, the pragmatic attitude consists in "looking away from first things, principles, 'categories,' supposed necessities; and of looking towards last things, fruits, consequences, facts." It is only one step further to apply the pragmatic method to the problem of truth. In the natural sciences there is a tendency to identify truth in any particular case with a verification. The verification of a theory, or of a concept, is carried on by the observation of particular facts. Even the most scientific and harmonious physical theory is merely an hypothesis until its implications, deduced by mathematical reasoning or by any other kind of inference, are verified by observed facts. What direction therefore, must an empirical philosopher take who wishes to arrive at a definition of truth by means of an empirical method? He must, if he wants to apply this method, and without bringing in for the present

the pragmatic formula, first find particular cases from which he then generalizes. It is therefore in submitting conceptions to the control of experience, in the process of verifying them, that one finds examples of what is called truth. Therefore the philosopher who applies this empirical method, without the least prejudice in favor of pragmatic doctrine, can be brought to conclude that truth "means" verification, or if one prefers, that verification either actual or possible, is the definition of truth.

In combining this conception of empirical method with the theory of pragmatism, we come upon other important philosophical results. The classic theories of truth in terms of the coherence or compatibility of terms, and of the correspondence of an idea with a thing, hereby receive a new interpretation. A merely mental coherence without experimental verification does not enable us to get beyond the realm of hypothesis. If a notion or a theory makes pretense of corresponding to reality or to the facts, this pretense cannot be put to the test and confirmed or refuted except by causing it to pass over into the realm of action and by noting the results which it yields in the form of the concrete observable facts to which this notion or theory leads. If, in acting upon this notion, we are brought to the fact which it implies or which it demands, then this notion is true. A theory corresponds to the facts because it leads to the facts which are its consequences, by the intermediary of experience. And from this consideration the pragmatic generalization is drawn that all knowledge is prospective in its results, except in the case where notions and theories after having been first prospective in their application, have already been tried out and verified. Theoretically, however, even such verifications or truths could not be absolute. They would be based upon practical or moral certainty, but they are always subject to being corrected by unforeseen future consequences or by observed facts which had been disregarded. Every proposition concerning truths is really in the last analysis hypothetical and provisional, although a large number of these propositions have been so frequently verified without fail that we are justified in using them as if they were absolutely true. But logically absolute truth is an ideal which cannot be realized, at least not until all the facts have been registered, or as James says "bagged," and until it is no longer possible to make other observations and other experiences.

Pragmatism, thus, presents itself as an extension of historical

empiricism with this fundamental difference, that it does not insist upon antecedent phenomena but upon consequent phenomena; not upon the precedents but upon the possibilities of action, and this change in point of view is almost revolutionary in its consequences. An empiricism which is content with repeating facts already past has no place for possibility and for liberty. It cannot find room for general conceptions or ideas, at least no more than to consider them as summaries or records. But when we take the point of view of pragmatism we see that general ideas have a very different rôle to play than that of reporting and registering past experiences. They are the bases for organizing future observations and experiences. Whereas, for empiricism, in a world already constructed and determined, reason or general thought has no other meaning than that of summing up particular cases, in a world where the future is not a mere word, where theories, general notions, rational ideas have consequences for action, reason necessarily has a constructive function. Nevertheless the conceptions of reasoning have only a secondary interest in comparison with the reality of facts, since they must be confronted with concrete observations.⁹

Pragmatism thus has a metaphysical implication. The doctrine of the value of consequences leads us to take the future into consideration. And this taking into consideration of the future takes us to the conception of a universe whose evolution is not finished, of a universe which is still, in James' term, "in the making," "in the process of becoming," of a universe up to a certain point still plastic.

Consequently reason, or thought in its more general sense, has a real, though limited function, a creative, constructive function. If we form general ideas and if we put them in action, consequences are produced which could not be produced otherwise. Under these conditions the world will be different from what it would have been if thought had not intervened. This consideration confirms the human and moral importance of thought and of its reflective operation in experience. It is therefore not true to say that James treated reason, thought

⁹ William James said in a happy metaphor, that they must be "cashed in," by producing specific consequences. This expression means that they must be able to become concrete facts. But for those who are not familiar with American idioms, James' formula was taken to mean that the consequences themselves of our rational conceptions must be narrowly limited by their pecuniary value. Thus Mr. Bertrand Russell wrote just recently that pragmatism is merely a manifestation of American commercialism.

and knowledge with contempt, or that he regarded them as mere means of gaining personal or even social profits. For him reason has a creative function, limited because specific, which helps to make the world other than it would have been without it. It makes the world really more reasonable; it gives to it an intrinsic value. One will understand the philosophy of James better if one considers it in its totality as a revision of English empiricism, a revision which replaces the value of past experience, of what is already given, by the future, by that which is mere possibility.

These considerations naturally bring us to the movement called instrumentalism. The survey which we have just made of James' philosophy shows that he regarded conceptions and theories purely as instruments which can serve to constitute future facts in a specific manner. But James devoted himself primarily to the moral aspects of this theory, to the support which it gave to "meliorism" and moral idealism, and to the consequences which followed from it concerning the sentimental value and the bearing of various philosophical systems, particularly to its destructive implications for monistic rationalism and for absolutism in all its forms. He never attempted to develop a complete theory of the forms or "structures" and of the logical operations which are founded on this conception. Instrumentalism is an attempt to constitute a precise logical theory of concepts, of judgments and inferences in their various forms, by considering primarily how thought functions in the experimental determinations of future consequences. That is to say, that it attempts to establish universally recognized distinctions and rules of logic by deriving them from the reconstructive or mediative function ascribed to reason. It aims to constitute a theory of the general forms of conception and reasoning, and not of this or that particular judgment or concept related to its own content, or to its particular implications.

As far as the historical antecedents of instrumentalism are concerned, two factors are particularly important, over and above this matter of experimental verification which we have already mentioned in connection with James. The first of these two factors is psychological, and the second is a critique of the theory of knowledge and of logic which has resulted from the theory proposed by neo-kantian idealism and expounded in the logical writings of such philosophers as Lotze, Bosanquet, and F. H. Bradley. As we have already said, neo-kantian influence

was very marked in the United States during the last decade of the nineteenth century. I myself, and those who have collaborated with me in the exposition of instrumentalism, began by being neo-kantians, in the same way that Peirce's point of departure was kantianism and that of James was the empiricism of the British School.

The psychological tendencies which have exerted an influence on instrumentalism are of a biological rather than a physiological nature. They are closely related to the important movement whose promoter in psychology has been Doctor John Watson and to which he has given the name of Behaviourism. Briefly, the point of departure of this theory is the conception of the brain as an organ for the coördination of sense stimuli (to which one should add modifications caused by habit, unconscious memory, or what are called to-day "conditioned reflexes") for the purpose of effecting appropriate motor responses. On the basis of the theory of organic evolution it is maintained that the analysis of intelligence and of its operations should be compatible with the order of known biological facts, concerning the intermediate position occupied by the central nervous system in making possible responses to the environment adequate to the needs of the living organism. It is particularly interesting to note that in the *Studies in Logical Theory* (1903), which was their first declaration, the instrumentalists recognized how much they owed to William James for having forged the instruments which they used, while at the same time, in the course of the studies, the authors constantly declared their belief in a close union of the "normative" principles of logic and the real processes of thought, in so far as these are determined by an objective or biological psychology and not by an introspective psychology of states of consciousness. But it is curious to note that the "instruments" to which allusion is made, are not the considerations which were of the greater service to James. They precede his pragmatism and it is in one of the aspects of his *Principles of Psychology* that one must look for them. This important work (1890) really developed two distinct theses.

The one is a re-interpretation of introspective psychology, in which James denies that sensations, images and ideas are discrete and in which he replaces them by a continuous stream which he calls "the stream of consciousness." This conception necessitates a consideration of relations as an immediate part of the field of consciousness, having the same status as qualities.

And throughout his *Psychology* James gives a philosophical tinge to this conception by using it in criticizing the atomism of Locke and of Hume as well as the a-priorism of the synthesis of rational principles by Kant and his successors, among whom should be mentioned in England, Thomas Hill Green, who was then at the height of his influence.

The other aspect of his *Principles of Psychology* is of a biological nature. It shows itself in its full force in the criterion which James established for discovering the existence of mind. "The pursuance of future ends and the choice of means for their attainment are thus the mark and criterion of the presence of mentality in a phenomenon."¹⁰ The force of this criterion is plainly shown in the chapter on Attention, and its relation to Interest considered as the force which controls it, and its teleological function of selection and integration; in the chapter on Discrimination and Comparison (Analysis and Abstraction), where he discusses the way in which ends to be attained and the means for attaining them evoke and control intellectual analysis; and in the chapter on Conception, where he shows that a general idea is a mode of signifying particular things and not merely an abstraction from particular cases or a super-empirical function,—that it is a teleological instrument. James then develops this idea in the chapter on Reasoning where he says that "the only meaning of essence is teleological, and that classification and conception are purely teleological weapons of mind."

One might complete this brief enumeration by mentioning also the chapter of James' book in which he discusses the Nature of Necessary Truths and the Rôle of Experience, and affirms in opposition to Herbert Spencer, that many of our most important modes of perception and conception of the world of sensible objects are not the cumulative products of particular experience, but rather original biological sports, spontaneous variations which are maintained because of their applicability to concrete experiences after once having been created. Number, space, time, resemblance and other important "categories" could have been brought into existence, he says, as a consequence of some particular cerebral instability, but they could by no means have been registered by the mind under some outside influence. Many significant and useless concepts also arise in the same manner. But the fundamental categories have been cumula-

¹⁰ *Psychology*, Vol. I, p. 8.

tively extended and reinforced because of their value when applied to concrete instances and things of experience. It is therefore not the origin of a concept, it is its application which becomes the criterion of its value; and here we have the whole of pragmatism in embryo. A phrase of James' very well summarizes its import: "the popular notion that 'Science' is forced on the mind *ab extra*, and that our interests have nothing to do with its constructions, is utterly absurd."

Given the point of view which we have just specified, and the interest attaching to a logical theory of conception and judgment, there results a theory of the following description. The adaptations made by inferior organisms, for example their effective and coördinated responses to stimuli, become teleological in man and therefore give occasion to thought. Reflection is an indirect response to the environment, and the element of indirectness can itself become great and very complicated. But it has its origin in biological adaptive behaviour and its ultimate function in its cognitive aspect is a prospective control of the conditions of its environment. The function of intelligence is therefore not that of copying the objects of the environment, but rather of taking account of the way in which more effective and more profitable relations with these objects may be established in the future. . . .

JOHN DEWEY in *Studies in the History of Ideas*, Vol. II, pp. 353-371. Edited by the Department of Philosophy of Columbia University. Published by Columbia University Press. Reprinted by permission. Note: Dewey's article was originally published in the Special American Number of the *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, Vol. XXIX, pp. 411-430, and was translated from the French for inclusion in the above-mentioned volume.

SUGGESTIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. State two important differences between Peirce's idea of pragmatism and James's idea. How does Dewey account for these differences historically?
2. What are the two errors commonly committed in interpreting Peirce and how does Dewey answer each?
3. What is your opinion of James's use of the pragmatic method to solve the controversy between spiritualism and materialism?
4. How does Dewey interpret James's "will or right to believe" principle? What is your reaction to this principle of settling the truth of vital beliefs in religion?

5. State and illustrate James's theory of truth. What do you think of it?
6. How was Dewey's instrumentalism influenced by James? How does it seem to you to differ from the pragmatism of James and of Peirce?
7. What would be the justification for calling instrumentalism a biological theory of truth? See Adams above, p. 236.

II. THE HISTORICAL ORIGIN OF PRAGMATISM, by *Morris R. Cohen*

Analysis

Cohen proves that Peirce was led to his formulation of pragmatism by Chauncey Wright. (Note here the footnote which quotes Peirce's letter to Mrs. Ladd-Franklin.) Wright came to this idea from his study of scientific method. He held that scientific laws are the actual discoverers of truth because they contain prescriptions for reaching new truths. In a footnote Peirce is quoted to show how he considered himself in relation to James, Royce and Dewey. Peirce refused to follow James. His pragmatism has a more intellectual cast. But neither did he like the application of the Darwinian analogy of natural selection to ideas, and hence he was not an instrumentalist in Dewey's sense of the word. He was closest to Royce.

In view of the general ignorance as to the sources of pragmatism which prevails in this incurious age, some remarks on the actual historical origin of pragmatism may be in order.

There can be little doubt that Peirce was led to the formulation of the principle of pragmatism through the influence of Chauncey Wright.¹¹ Wright who had first-hand acquaintance with creative scientific work in mathematics, physics, and botany was led by the study of Mill and Bain to reflect on the characteristics of scientific method. This reflection led him to draw a distinction between the use of popular scientific material, by

¹¹ The personal relations between Peirce and Wright were thus described by Peirce in a letter to Mrs. Ladd-Franklin (*Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XIII, p. 719): "It must have been about 1857 when I first made the acquaintance of Chauncey Wright, a mind about on the level of J. S. Mill. He was a thorough mathematician. He had a most penetrating intellect. . . . He and I used to have long and very lively and close disputations lasting two or three hours daily for many years. In the sixties I started a little club called 'The Metaphysical Club.' . . . Wright was the strongest member and probably I was next. . . . Then there were Frank Abbott, William James and others." "It was there that the name and the doctrine of pragmatism saw the light." It might be added that Peirce's tychism is indebted to Wright's doctrine of accidents and "cosmic weather," a doctrine which maintained against LaPlace that a mind knowing nature from moment to moment is bound to encounter genuine novelty in phenomena, which no amount of knowledge would enable us to foresee. See Wright's *Philosophical Discussions*—1876, also *Cambridge Hist. of American Literature*, Vol. III, p. 234.

men like Spencer, to construct a myth or picture of the world, and the scientific use of laws by men like Newton as means for extending our knowledge of phenomena. Gravitation as a general fact had interested metaphysicians long before Newton. What made Newton's contribution scientific was the formulation of a mathematical law which has enabled us to deduce all the then known facts of the solar system and to anticipate or predict many more facts the existence of which would not otherwise be even suspected, e.g., the existence of the planet Neptune. Wright insists, therefore, that the principles of modern mathematical and physical science are the means through which nature is discovered, that scientific laws are the finders rather than merely the summaries of factual truths. This conception of the experimental scientist as translating general propositions into prescriptions for attaining new experimental truths, is the starting point of Peirce's pragmatism. The latter is embodied in the principle that the meaning of a concept is to be found in "all the conceivable experimental phenomena which the affirmation or denial of the concept could imply."¹²

In the earlier statement of the pragmatic maxim,¹³ Peirce emphasized the consequences for conduct that follow from the acceptance or rejection of an idea; but the stoical maxim that the end of man is action did not appeal to him as much at sixty as it did at thirty.¹⁴ Naturally also Peirce could not follow the development of pragmatism by William James who, like almost all modern psychologists, was a thorough nominalist and always emphasized particular sensible experience.¹⁵ It seemed to

¹² *Monist*, Vol. XV, p. 180.

¹³ This volume (*Chance, Love and Logic*), pp. 43-45.

¹⁴ "To say that we live for the sake of action would be to say that there is no such thing as a rational purport." *Monist*, Vol. XV, p. 175.

¹⁵ The letter to Mrs. Ladd-Franklin quoted before, explains why James, though always loyal to Peirce and anxious to give him credit whenever possible, could not understand the latter's lectures on pragmatism. Peirce's incidental judgment on others is worth quoting here:

"Modern psychologists are so soaked with sensationalism that they cannot understand anything that does not mean that. How can I, to whom nothing seems so thoroughly real as generals, and who regards Truth and Justice as *literally* the most powerful powers in the world, expect to be understood by the thoroughgoing Wundtian? But the curious thing is to see absolute idealists tainted with this disease—or men who, like John Dewey, hover between Absolute Idealism and Sensationalism. Royce's opinions as developed in his *World and Individualism* are extremely near to mine. His insistence on the elements of purpose in intellectual concepts is essentially the pragmatic position."

John Dewey

Peirce that such emphasis on particular experiences endangered the principle of continuity which in the hands of men like Weierstrass had reformed modern mathematics. For this reason he began to call his own doctrine pragmatism, a sufficiently unattractive name, he thought, to save it from kidnappers and from popularity. He never, however, abandoned the principle of pragmatism, that the meaning of an idea is clarified (because constituted) by its conceivable experimental consequences. Indeed, if we want to clarify the meaning of the idea of pragmatism, let us apply the pragmatic test to it. What will be the effect of accepting it? Obviously it will be to develop certain general ideas or habits of looking at things.

Peirce's pragmatism has, therefore, a decidedly intellectual cast. The meaning of an idea or proposition is found not by an intuition of it but by working out its implications. It admits that thought does not constitute reality. Categories can have no concrete being without action or immediate feeling. But thought is none the less an essential ingredient of reality; thought is "the melody running through the succession of our sensations." Pragmatism, according to Peirce, seeks to define the rational purport, not the sensuous quality. It is interested not in the effect of our practical occupations or desires on our ideas, but in the function of ideas as guides of action. Whether a man is to pay damages in a certain lawsuit may depend, in fact, on a term in the Aristotelian logic such as proximate cause.

It is of interest to observe that though Peirce is an ardent admirer of Darwin's method, his scientific caution makes him refuse to apply the analogy of biologic natural selection to the realm of ideas, in the wholesale and uncritical manner that has lately become fashionable. Natural selection may well favor the triumph of views which directly influence biologic survival. But the pleasure of entertaining congenial illusions may overbalance the inconvenience resulting from their deceptive character. Thus rhetorical appeals may long prevail over scientific evidence.

M. R. COHEN in the Preface to Charles S. Peirce's *Chance, Love and Logic*, which Cohen edited, pp. xviii-xxii. Published by Harcourt, Brace & Company. Reprinted by permission.

SUGGESTIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Compare Cohen's account of Peirce's pragmatism with that of Dewey. What is the chief difference?
2. In its beginnings what was the relation of pragmatism to Absolute Idealism? See the quotation from Peirce in the footnote, p. 447. Compare Royce above, p. 176.

III. WILLIAM JAMES AND THE MAKING OF PRAGMATISM,
by *F. C. S. Schiller*

Analysis

Schiller insists that America is the true home of pragmatism, which is one of the nine leading discoveries in the whole history of philosophy. He enumerates and briefly characterizes the other eight. Rebuking Peirce for repudiating pragmatism, when he might have become its founder, he gives William James the title of "father of pragmatism." He gives a brief account of the reception the new philosophy received in Europe. So long as James called his philosophy psychology European thinkers accepted it, but as soon as he labelled it pragmatism they ruthlessly condemned it. John Dewey, however, based his instrumentalism on James's *Principles of Psychology*. Schiller's own relations with James began about 1897 with the review of James's book, *The Will to Believe, in Mind*. Later he met James and was greatly impressed with him. Then Dickinson Miller, one of James's ablest students, wrote an essay criticizing James's principle of the will to believe. He sent a copy to Schiller and asked him to answer it. Schiller did answer that Miller had omitted the empirical side of James's theory, and James agreed with Schiller against Miller. A little later Schiller's article in *Personal Idealism* appeared, in which he attempted to extend James's principle of the will to believe "throughout the established structures of the intellectual world." Just as Kant turned Hume's arguments against causality into a defense of causality as an instrument of human thinking, so Schiller turned Miller's arguments against the will to believe into a defense of it. To do this he used the Kantian idea of a postulate. All our human axioms are postulates of our instinctive will to believe. The critics rejected Schiller's interpretation of Kant. Thus rebuffed, he turned his attention to the problem of finding a suitable name for the new philosophy, since the name pragmatism had a number of disadvantages of which the critics were making effective use. He finally chose the term *humanism* from Miller's article but other writers had used it with a similar connotation. When Schiller asked James to adopt the term humanism, James refused on the ground that the other name was already established. Dewey's term instrumentalism proved to be too technical to take the place of pragmatism. James later admitted to Schiller that he made a mistake in taking from Peirce the term pragmatism. Schiller quotes a letter from Mrs. James to prove that James was altogether too generous in giving others credit for his own original ideas. He illustrates this tendency in James by giving an account of James's

attitude toward Bergson. Schiller finally decided to retain the name pragmatism as a generic name for the new philosophy, and to treat humanism, instrumentalism, and other recent philosophical tendencies, as special types of pragmatism. He thinks that Lovejoy was wrong in thinking that there are only thirteen types. He concludes by stressing the fact that pragmatism is social, democratic, and yet supremely individualistic.

At the recent Congress of Philosophy at Harvard I was considerably surprised to hear what very modest and apologetic estimates were put on American achievements in philosophy by some of the spokesmen of America in welcoming the representatives of foreign countries. I could not but think this modesty a sacrifice of truth to politeness, when I reflected first on the paucity of the really important discoveries which form the bright spots in the history of philosophy and, secondly, on the very great importance of one achievement which indisputably stands to the credit of America. I mean, of course, the development of Pragmatism, and as I was myself involved in it, and can testify to some aspects of it which are not generally known, and am moreover unfortunately growing old, I wish to avail myself of this opportunity in order to give reasons, before it is too late, for my conviction that the origination of Pragmatism was one of the major events in the history of thought, and to put on record certain incidents connected with the origination of Pragmatism which came within my personal knowledge.

But before I do so, let me first justify my remark about the rarity of really important novelties in the history of thought. They cannot indeed be enumerated on the fingers of one hand, but one does not need to be four-armed, like an Indian God, in order to accommodate all the conceptions which can be accounted first-class discoveries.

I find I cannot recognize more than nine of such discoveries. Of these I should credit the first, the Absolute or One of Monism, to the Hindus, although a case may perhaps be made out for Parmenides for an equal share in this discovery. Still it was in India that the ethical and logical implications of this monistic line of thought were worked out in their completest and most consistent form. The next two, Pure Spirit and Universals must both be set down to Plato. Aristotle, another Greek, is the undisputed father of Formal Logic. In Western thought, at any rate, Descartes, a Frenchman, is the first philosopher to discover the Self; though it had long been familiar to language and

long been exploited in the East, and with true philosophic modesty even been identified with the Absolute. The honor of discovering the *Critical Problem*, and the claim that the epistemological question takes precedence over the ontological, must I think be divided between England and Germany, between Locke and Kant, though neither of them succeeded in constructing a consistently critical philosophy, though not even their followers could swallow either system as it stood, and though, in some aspects, both seem to have been anticipated by the Sophists and Sceptics of antiquity. On the other hand a definite recognition of the *Problem of Value* seems to be first traceable in Germany. Its origin is obscure, but it is clearly post-Kantian and post-Hegelian; and as its significance is still largely unexplored, it may be said to be still at the beginning of its philosophic career.

Of *Darwinism* the effective birth-place is England, as that of *Pragmatism* is America: but in both these cases it was found, after the new doctrine had won its way to recognition, that anticipations of it, often of a very definite kind, could be traced all the way back to the Greeks. So far, the earliest Darwinian on record is Anaximander, and the earliest pragmatist, Protagoras: but they were both so far ahead of their times that their words fell upon deaf ears. This is due to a persistent feature in human psychology. The first hundred times or so that a new idea is ventilated, it is simply disregarded, and treated as though it had never been; the one hundred and first time, when some forceful genius gets the world by the long ears and makes it listen, the learned can always show that it was anticipated long ago. So they are satisfactorily confirmed in their conviction that there is nothing new under the sun! Nevertheless Pragmatism was as new as anything could be in the fog-laden atmosphere of philosophy.

Under these circumstances the best proof of an idea's novelty is to be found in the completeness and grotesqueness of the way in which it is misunderstood; and certainly, judged by this test, the novelty of Pragmatism ranks amazingly high. Its putative parent, Peirce, was so shocked by the fame of the doctrine fath-ered upon him, and so dismayed by the Herculean exploits which it accomplished even in its cradle, that he was actually driven to disown his paternity, and to take refuge in a "pragmaticism" which, he said, was ugly enough to be left severely alone. He has thereby provided philosophy with a superb example of the folly

of a *gran rifiuto*, though he has not yet found a Dante to damn him for it. Its real progenitor, James, could hardly restrain his nearest and dearest pupils from participating in the congenial labor of misrepresenting what they had never understood.

The whole of Continental Europe, with a perhaps pardonable ignorance of English idiom, cried out that the demand that truth must "work" and "pay" was just a piece of the banausic sordidness and vile commercialism of the American mind, endeavoring to degrade the highest and most sacred spiritual values to mere matters of dollars and cents. Even the champions of the Hegelian Absolute found it an intolerable strain upon its (theoretically infinite) elasticity to swallow the new doctrine and to absorb, transcend, transmute and transmogrify it in its all-engulfing maw. I myself can well remember what an uproar was aroused at the Heidelberg Congress of Philosophy in 1908 by my innocent remark that Pragmatism was a philosophic movement which had originated in America. The Germans took it as an intolerable piece of impertinence for a philosophic movement to originate in America, and it was no use pleading that this happened to be sheer historical fact.

Amid this hubbub no one noticed that the very doctrines which all were furiously denouncing had long been before them, and indeed had excited general and unstinted admiration under another name. So long as William James enunciated his views under the label of "psychology," what he said was accepted and applauded; but when he called the same views "philosophy," he was decried as a subverter of the pillars of the Temple of Truth. For a detailed proof of the correctness of this comment I may refer to an excellent little book which deserves to be better known in America, *The Philosophy of William James*, by H. V. Knox.¹⁶ It is largely a string of quotations, and expounds James's Pragmatism almost wholly in his own words; and the best of the joke is that he has selected his most significant quotations from the *Principles of Psychology*!

Now that was in 1914, and by that time some of us had "caught on." I myself cannot claim to have been much less obtuse than the general mass of philosophers. John Dewey alone had had the perspicacity to detect the philosophy that was contained in James's psychology and to derive his "instrumentalism" independently from that fountain head. I myself had

¹⁶ London, Archibald Constable, 1914.

been delighted with James's *Will to Believe*, and had expressed myself pretty freely in a review which appeared in *Mind* for October, 1897. This may have done something to attract the attention of English philosophers to William James, who was at that time practically unknown, at least in Oxford. Still I could not then claim any status as a disciple of James. I had only met him about twice; though five minutes after meeting him the first time I found myself talking to him as if I had known him all my life. It ought to be impressed on all American students of philosophy, from their Freshman year on, what a very great man James was. I have only met two men I should call really great, and Arthur Balfour is the other. Still, when the California Lecture on "Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results" baptized Pragmatism and flung it into the stream of philosophic controversy, I could in no wise set up as an authority on the meaning and the mind of James. I knew that he was a man after my own heart, but there were others far better qualified than I to pronounce upon his views.

Dickinson Miller was one of these, a friend and a favorite pupil of James. He was also a friend of mine, and at that time I knew him better than I knew James. In January, 1899, he wrote a subtle and impressive article in the *International Journal of Ethics*, called "The Will to Believe and the Duty to Doubt," criticizing the doctrine of the will to believe, and not long afterwards sent it to me with a request that as an admirer of James's I should write a reply to it. He had, it seems, asked James to reply, but the latter had refused.

I read the article and wrote to Miller that I was aware that he knew James much better than I did but that I could not but think that he had seriously mistaken James's meaning, giving my reasons. Miller sent my letter to James, and asked him to decide between us. To my great delight, James decided in *my* favor. Then for the first time did I realize the enormous capacity of the philosophic mind for misconstruing James. It would otherwise never have entered my own mind that the particular misconception Miller had fallen into was even possible. The point at issue between us was one which still plays a part in the attacks on Pragmatism, and for which there has never seemed to me to be the slightest justification. It concerned the question whether a pragmatist was entitled by his theory to believe whatever he liked, or in other words whether Pragmatism failed to distinguish between a truth and a truth-claim. I

pointed out to Miller that he had failed to allow for the empirical side of James's doctrine of the verification or refutation of a belief by experience of its working.¹⁷

This still seems to be one of the major difficulties its critics have with Pragmatism. For apriorism is not so much a doctrine, or even a faith, as a habit or aberration of mind. Whether or not there are *à priori* truths there are certainly *à priori* prejudices. And these are so impenetrable that they cannot even conceive the idea that experience of its working may be regarded as relevant to the truth of an idea. And so they are quite impervious to the neatness and beauty of the suggestion that the secular dispute between apriorism and empiricism might be terminated by an equitable compromise, which found a use for *both* of them, admitting that there were *à priori* truth claims galore, and in fact that nearly every one was chock full of them, but not that they were on this account self-proving and self-evident truths, and able to dispense with testing by their working in experience.

As I reflected on the situation, this voluntaristic compromise, which alone seems to assign a meaning and a function both to our anticipations of experience and to their corroboration and confirmation by experience, and which moreover could bestow logical respectability on the all-pervasive activities of our will to believe, seemed to be exactly what was required. Accordingly when I had occasion to write a contribution to the volume of Essays subsequently known as *Personal Idealism*, I chose this as my subject, and entitled it "Axioms as Postulates."

I conceived my task as that of tracing throughout the established structures of the intellectual world the manifold operations of that volitional activity whose existence and potency James had revealed, under the name of the will to believe, in a single case. And I was hopeful that by so universalizing it I could render its recognition easier and more palatable. For I had been taught as a youth that this was precisely the way in which Kant had overcome and confuted the scepticism of Hume. Hume had shown, unanswerably, that causality was not an objective fact of observation but a subjective infusion into the series of events. He had inferred that it was an illegitimate addition which vitiated our knowledge. But Kant had turned the edge of Hume's contention by accept-

¹⁷ Miller does actually quote one of the many passages in James which insist on this, but shows that he has not perceived its significance.

ing its premises and drawing a different conclusion. Subjective additions to our data were not limited to the case of causality. They were to be found in every corner of the field of knowledge. Indeed it was impossible to cultivate this field, without the use of the elaborate machinery, which Kant proceeded to describe with so much detail and obscurity that thousands of philosophy professors have lived on the *Critique of Pure Reason* ever since. This Kantian machinery of Categories, and so forth, was in a sense subjective: but it generated the only sort of objectivity which it was possible to recognize or needful to know. So the lethal weapon with which Hume had hoped to strike a deathblow at knowledge, not only became innocuous in Kant's hands, but actually essential to the only objectivity that existed or had meaning.

So why should one not, thought I, repeat this Kantian feat, and turn the will to believe, which intellectualistic system-builders had so long rejected, into the keystone of our edifice? It seemed conceivable that even Kantians might welcome such an enterprise. For, after all, Kant had not left his system so logically complete, so perfectly symmetrical and harmonious, as he had tried to make it. Even the most faithful Kantians could not but perceive that the system was traversed by a glaring incongruity. There was no logical connection between Kant's treatment of the Pure and of the Practical Reason. The latter, though psychologically rooted in Kant's idiosyncrasy, had very much the air of an afterthought, attached to the former by a transparent artifice. But, if it were taken seriously as a logical principle, it clearly embodied a thought which transcended intellectualism altogether, and could be made to yield quite a novel account of the mental activity which gave form and meaning to the data derived from experience. The process of postulation, which Kant had admitted in only a niggardly and reluctant way for the special purpose of getting himself out of a difficulty, could be construed more widely and generously. It could be given logical status, and shown to enter into the operation of all our cognitive functions. It could be universalized like the will to believe, and identified with it, or traced to a common root with it in our volitional nature. It would then be capable of generating the whole of the mind's *à priori* furniture and of accounting functionally for the whole structural *à priori*. The result would be a completely and consistently *voluntaristic* theory of knowledge such as had never yet been formulated.

So I set to work to show how all our *axioms* might be conceived as *postulates* which had suggested themselves as desirable if true, and had succeeded and survived, for transparent reasons, and could all be traced to the various activities of our will to believe. This is the genesis and history of my essay on "Axioms as Postulates."

Of course I ought to have expected that the results would be disappointing. They always are. But they ought not to have been so disappointing, if the Kantians had been more seriously concerned with the truth of Kant and the coherence of his system. They seemed to be content with tracing its history and tabulating the dates on which its various sections might be presumed to have been written, in short with leading the easy, merely parasitic, life of the industrious commentator. For the analogy which seemed so clear to me, between Kant's relation to Hume and my relation to Kant and to James, they had no eyes at all. And the historians of philosophy, those most stalwart devotees of the copy-theory of truth, continue to represent the epistemological alternatives as two, the rationalist and the empirical, both equally intellectualistic, and equally inadequate. The possibility of a synthesis, which would transcend this antithesis by taking both "reason" and "experience" in a voluntaristic way, continues to be ignored. No doubt it is felt that to recognize it would be too disturbing to traditional classifications, and would upset too many familiar "categories." But is it not one of the saddest tragedies of philosophy that it should be so much easier for a rich man's automobile to pass the portals of the Heavenly Jerusalem than for anything new to get into the histories of philosophy and for anything old that has once got into them to drop out?

But to continue my reminiscences: after having been rebuffed in my well-meant attempt to mediate in the epistemological wrangle between "rationalism" and "empiricism," I turned my attention to the excogitation of a suitable *name* for our new manner of philosophizing. For it had very soon been borne in upon me that "pragmatism" was a thoroughly bad name, and almost sufficient to damn any dog that bore it. Not only did it not explain itself, but it did not even, at a first hearing, suggest any hint of the direction in which its meaning was to be sought. All that it could suggest was indeed definitely misleading. Etymologically, it was derived from *Pragmata*, but its etymology told one nothing about what it thought about "things."

To those ignorant of Greek, it conveyed a connection with "practice" which was a dangerous half-truth; to those familiar with obsolescent English it was associated with "knavery;" to Germans it seemed to tamper wantonly with the well-established meaning of an existing term. Worst of all, it took about half an hour to explain its meaning properly, and how rarely did one have that half-hour granted one!

So considering all these things, I determined to adopt the term "humanism," which seemed significant and apt, and was not encumbered with old senses likely to interfere and to be confused with its philosophic use. It had moreover already been employed in senses very cognate to that which I wanted; sporadically indeed, but by good authorities. Thus Pringle-Pattison had used it in his *Man's Place in The Cosmos*¹⁸ and Dickinson Miller had actually applied it to James's philosophic attitude in the very article that had provoked my intervention,¹⁹

Accordingly I proposed to James that he should change the name to Humanism. But he refused, on the ground that the name Pragmatism had already been taken up and had established itself. Of course it had been taken up with joy by the adversaries of the new way of thinking; for they had realized with terror how dangerously popular its appeal might easily become, and perceived with delight what a handicap an obscure technical name like "pragmatism" would be. Their really crushing criticism which they never uttered in public but used to whisper confidentially into the ears of the elect, was that Pragmatism was "vulgar"; how fortunate then that these heretical vulgarians had been foolish enough to choose to fight under so deterrent a banner!

It was a misfortune also that John Dewey and his vigorous Chicago School had no more attractive name to offer. They did yeoman service to the cause, and *almost* forced the academic world to treat it with the respect which is always accorded to systematic technicality. For the academic pedant always thinks in his heart, and occasionally all but says, "What I can understand, I despise." Now he frequently found Dewey hard to understand, and respected him accordingly; whereas James was such easy reading that the typical professional never attended properly to what he said, and invariably misunderstood him. Also Dewey's instrumentalism never inspired fear; even apart

¹⁸ P. 61.

¹⁹ P. 176.

from its cumbrous name, it never threatened to become unduly popular. Though not so bad as "pragmatism," "instrumentalism" was a bad name too. It was too long, and ill equipped with cognate adjectives and verbs, and on the whole it is not surprising that it did not supplant "pragmatism" in philosophic use.

James, I think, realized, when it was too late, what a bad name "pragmatism" was. At any rate, so I was assured by Mrs. James in a precious letter which she wrote me, not long before her death, in response to my *Quarterly Review* article about her husband's *Letters*. This is how Mrs. James put it. On August 16, 1921, she wrote:

I have read three times over your beautiful review of the *Letters*, and cannot tell you how it touches me. You are so much nearer to William than any one else, and you speak for him as he could not for himself. . . . You are right in what you say of confessing to obligations which he never owed. It used to puzzle me in so strictly truthful a nature. Even Charles Peirce said to me "I never thought, much less taught, the views William says I did. I have very different opinions." For years poor C. S. P. had appealed to William for help until at last he acquired the habit of tugging that poor derelict through troubled waters. In one of the last quinquennial catalogues, Peirce changed his middle name from Saunders to Santiago. It was long before I understood that it was a way of calling himself St. James, but there it stands *Charles Santiago Peirce*. When William was a student in the chemical laboratory, and absorbed in philosophy, he found Charles Peirce a stimulating acquaintance; so when years after William sought to give a name to the faith he had long held, he glanced backward and said to himself, "I must have owed Pragmatism to Peirce." I protested and begged him not to handicap a cherished belief with so wanton a name. He was sorry afterwards, and preferred Humanism.

I shall never forget a confidential little lunch in my rooms at Oxford, to which I invited my friend, H. V. Knox, to meet James in order that we might both ask him what precisely he had owed to Bergson. He told us. When he had done, we both cried out, spontaneously and simultaneously, "But these are the very things which *we* have learnt from *you*!" He then admitted that it was possible that though the *Données Immédiates de la Conscience* had come out a year before the *Principles of Psychology* Bergson might have read his earlier articles in *Mind* and have assimilated their ideas, and then have developed them in an original way which James thereupon found surprising and stimulating. I am afraid, therefore, that even though he did recognize that the name "pragmatism" was a mistake, his chivalrous willingness to give his enemies any verbal advantage they

chose to claim, would always have kept him loyal to his mistaken choice!

Personally I found it quite easy to adapt myself to the situation. I could accept "pragmatism" as a generic term, of which "instrumentalism" and "humanism" could be species, as could an indefinite number of other views, more or less completely pragmatic, such as those of Poincare, Mach and Ostwald, or more extreme, like those of Nietzsche and Vaihinger. For it was evident that, theoretically at least, there might be as many pragmatisms as there were pragmatists, and that Professor A. O. Lovejoy had grossly understated their numbers in limiting them to thirteen! For it was an essential feature of "pragmatism" to be recalcitrant to the scientific fiction which depersonalizes truth. If every "truth" originates with an individual thinker facing an actual problem and choosing the best solution that presents itself to his mind, and framing the best judgment for containing it that he can conceive, and succeeding in winning the assent of others to the goodness of his judgment, it surely follows that its depersonalization is a fiction. It is obviously convenient and works pragmatically over a large field of investigation and no one would dream of denying its uses: still its legitimacy may be challenged at any point in any inquiry, should occasion to do so arise by our *agreeing* to approve each other's judgments and to sink our differences.

Nor can I see why this result should be decried as sceptical. It need not form a bar to understanding, any more than the fact that in using a common language we all have our personal, social and national peculiarities of voice, inflexion and pronunciation. It does not preclude agreement, but rather favors it. For it substitutes agreement for coercion, value for necessity, as the hall-mark of truth. And it brings out a social side to all truth-seeking, which should be a comfort to the "lone beast dwelling in his individual burrow," which James declared the philosopher to be, with so much painful truth.

This humanist truth, moreover, is not only social, but also democratic. By admitting that every center of experience should be heard from, because it may yield a contribution to the common store, it grants universal suffrage in the realm of thought, though it does *not* imply equality of value. For our individual guesses at reality and truth are inexorably judged by the value of their results. Every one has an inalienable right to his own opinion, to his personal reaction upon his world—

until he can get a better. For the right to his opinion is the correlative of his duty to improve it. James was well aware of this, and was a true democrat who loved to appeal to the people, even in the most highly oligarchic preserves and the remotest recesses of philosophy. He summed up his position in the words of his immortal carpenter: "There is very little difference between one man and another: but what little there is is very important."

Moreover, in his democratic spirit he entirely agrees with his far-off ancestor, Protagoras, who also proclaimed the universal right of every man to find his own truth, and was martyred for making man the measure of all things by the Athenian oligarchs, twelve years before the vindictive democrats in their turn forced Socrates, the anti-democratic philosopher of authority, to quaff the hemlock-bowl! It is perhaps fortunate for some of us that the connection between philosophy and politics is no longer so direct! Philosophy has become less dangerous since those times: but it is now in danger of being merely dull. If, however, American philosophy, if philosophy anywhere, will only follow the lead of William James, it will not only escape this danger, but may again resume its ancient hegemony over the human strivings to attain to fuller and nobler forms of human life!

F. C. S. SCHILLER in *The Personalist*, Vol. VIII, pp. 81-93. Reprinted by permission.

SUGGESTIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Compare what Schiller says about the significance of the discovery of pragmatism with Russell's account of the significance of the new realism above, p. 299. How do they differ?
2. What are Schiller's explanations of the cool reception pragmatism received from the philosophers?
3. What was the main point at issue between Schiller and Miller? How did James decide the issue?
4. What addition does Schiller claim to have made to pragmatism in his essay in *Personal Idealism*? How was it received?
5. What are the disadvantages in the term pragmatism, according to Schiller?
6. What does Schiller regard as the chief contribution of Dewey to pragmatism?
7. How does Schiller explain the similarity between the thought of Bergson and that of James?
8. To what extent is pragmatism social and to what extent is it individual, according to Schiller?

CHAPTER II

PRAGMATIST SOLUTIONS OF THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE AND EXISTENCE

I. THINGS, RELATIONS, AND QUANTITIES, by *Harold Chapman Brown*

Analysis

Quoting a passage from Cohen, in which a thing is said to be an essence or a complex of characteristics and to change whenever any of these characteristics change, Brown states the respects in which he is in agreement with Cohen. He points out that two interpretations of the nature of a thing are possible. There may be internal changes in the system of relations which constitute the essence or there may be changes in the external relations between a thing and other things. The former he calls the *actual* and the latter the *potential* nature of a thing. Brown argues that only the former changes with the environment whereas a change of the latter type makes a different thing out of what changes. This distinction is illustrated with the paper on which the author's words are printed, concerning which he distinguishes three different essences or things, according to the context in which paper is taken. Brown then quotes further from Cohen to emphasize a wider difference between them. In interpreting this second passage he states the characteristic pragmatist doctrine that scientific concepts are purely instrumental: "an indication of how to take hold of things and manipulate them to get forseen results." He objects to Cohen's reduction of qualities to relations, since it is better to treat relations as bridges we build across the gaps between things. In reality there is but one continuous reality out of which both qualities and relations are discriminated and made into things. Bergson is right in objecting to the separation of things from this continuous reality as the first falsification and to the building of conceptual relations across these supposed things as the second falsification we make of reality. Bergson, however, undervalues abstraction. According to Brown, quality and relation, and quantity are all abstractions. And so is every "thing." Thought, guided by the "generating problem," makes various abstractions. Reality is one continuous whole.

As I write, the way is paved for me by Professor Cohen (*Journ. of Phil., Psy., and Sci. Meth.*, Vol. XI, No. 23, Nov. 5, 1914, pp. 623-24), who outlines a theory of relations closely allied to that which I have in mind. Professor Cohen writes: "Like the distinction between primary and secondary qualities,

the distinction between qualities and relations seems to me to be a shifting one because the 'nature' of a thing changes as the thing shifts from one context to another. . . . To Professors Montague and Lovejoy the 'thing' is like an old-fashioned land-owner and the qualities are its immemorial private possessions. A thing may enter into commercial relations with others, but these relations are extrinsic. It never parts with its patrimony. To me, the 'nature' of a thing seems not to be so private or fixed. It may consist entirely of bonds, stocks, franchises, and other ways in which public credit or the right to certain transactions is represented. . . . At any rate, relations or transactions may be regarded as wider or more primary than qualities or possessions. The latter may be defined as internal relations, that is, relations *within* the system that constitutes the 'thing.' The nature of a thing contains an essence, i.e., a group of characteristics which, in any given system or context, remain invariant, so that if these are changed the things drop out of our system . . . but the same thing may present different essences in different contexts. As a thing shifts from one context to another, it acquires new relations, and drops old ones, and in all transformations there is a change or readjustment of the line between the internal relations which constitute the essence and the external relations which are outside the inner circle. . . ."

Before continuing, however, I wish to make certain interpretations of these statements for which, of course, Professor Cohen is not responsible, and with which he would not be wholly in agreement. My general attitude will be shown by the first comment. Concepts are only means of denoting fragments of experience directly or indirectly given. If we then try to speak of a "nature of a thing" two interpretations of this expression are possible. The "thing" as such is only a bit of reality which some motive, that without undue extension of the term can be called practical, has led us to treat as more or less isolable from the rest of reality. Its nature, then, may consist of either its relations to other practically isolated realities or things, its actual effective value in its environment (and hence shift with the environment as Professor Cohen points out), or may consist of its essence, the "relations within the system," considered from the point of view of the potentialities implied by these for various environments. In the first sense the nature may easily change with change in environment, but if it changes in the second sense, as Professor Cohen remarks, it "drops out of our

system." This I should interpret as meaning that we no longer have that thing, but some other thing selected from reality by a different purpose and point of view. I should not say with Professor Cohen that "the same thing may present different essences in different contexts." Every reality is more than one thing—man is an aggregate of atoms, a living being, an animal, and a thinker, and all of these are different things in essence, although having certain common characteristics. All attribution of "thingship" is abstraction, and all particular things may be said to participate in higher, i.e., more abstract, levels of thingship. Hence the effort to retain a thingship through a changing of essence seems to me but the echo of the motive that has long deduced ontological monism from the logical fact that to conceive any two things is at least to throw them into a common universe of discourse. Consequently I should part company from Professor Cohen on this one point (which is perhaps largely a matter of definition, though here not unimportant) and distinguish merely the nature of a thing as *actual* and as *potential*. Of these the former alone changes with the environment, while the latter changes only as the thing ceases to be by passing into some other thing. In other words, if the example does not do violence to Professor Cohen's thought, I can quite understand this paper as a stimulator of criticism, or as a means of kindling a fire. Professor Cohen would, I suspect, take this to mean that the same thing—this paper—must be looked upon as having two different essences in two different contexts, for "the same thing may possess two different essences in different contexts," whereas I should prefer to interpret the situation as meaning that there are before me three (and as many more as may be) different things having three different essences: first, the paper as a physical object having a considerable number of definite properties; second, written words, which are undoubtedly in one sense mere structural modifications of the physical object paper (i.e., coloring on it by ink, etc.), but whose reality for my purpose lies in the power of evoking ideas acquired by things as symbols (things, indeed, but things whose essence lies in the effects they produce upon a reader rather than in their physical character); and third, the chemical and combustion producing properties of the paper. Now it is simpler for me to consider the situation as one in which three things have a common point in thingship, i.e., an abstract element in common, than to think of "*a* thing" shifting contexts and thereby changing its essence.

But now my divergence from Professor Cohen becomes more marked. He continues with the following example (p. 622): "Our neighbor M. is tall, modest, cheerful, and we understand a banker. His tallness, modesty, cheerfulness, and the fact that he is a banker we usually regard as his qualities; the fact that he is our neighbor is a relation which he seems to bear to us. He may move his residence, cease to be our neighbor, and yet remain the same person with the same qualities. If, however, I become his tailor, his tallness becomes translated into certain relations of measurement; if I become his social companion, his modesty means that he will stand in certain social relations with me, etc." In other words, we are illustrating the doctrine that "qualities are reducible to relations" (cf. p. 623). This doctrine I cannot quite accept without modification, for I cannot tell what it means. Without any presuppositions as to subjectivity or consciousness (cf. p. 623, (a).) there are in the world as I know it certain colored objects—let the expression be taken naïvely to avoid idealistico-realistic discussion which is here irrelevant. Now it is as unintelligible to me that the red flowers and green leaves of the geraniums before my windows should be reducible to mere relations in any existential sense, as it would be to ask for the square root of their odor, though of course it is quite intelligible that the physical theory and predictions concerning green and red surfaces (or odors) should be stated in terms of atomic distances and ether vibrations of specific lengths. The scientific conception is, after all, nothing more than an indication of how to take hold of things and manipulate them to get foreseen results, and its entities are real things only in the sense that they are the practically effective keynotes of the complex reality. Accordingly, instead of reducing qualities to relations, it seems to me a much more intelligible view to consider relations as abstract ways of taking qualities in general, as qualities thought of in their function of bridging a gap or making a transition between two bits of reality that have previously been taken as separate things.¹ Indeed, it is just because things are not ontologically independent beings (but rather selections from genuinely concatenated existence) that relations become important as indications of the practical significance of qualitative continuities which have been neglected in the prior isolation of the thing. Thus, instead of an existential world

¹ It is interesting to note that in *Experience and Nature*, pp. 148 f., John Dewey accepts this theory, quoting this sentence from Brown as its source.

that is "a network of relations whose intersections are called terms" (p. 622), I find more intelligible a qualitatively heterogeneous reality that can be variously partitioned into things, and that can be abstractly replaced by systems of terms and relations that are adequate to symbolize their effective nature in particular respects. There is a tendency for certain attributes to maintain their concreteness (qualitativeness) in things, and for others to suggest the connection of things with other things, and so to emphasize a more abstract aspect of experience. Thus there arises a temporary and practical distinction that tends to be taken as opposition between qualities and relations. As spatial and temporal characteristics possess their chief practical value in the connection of things, so they, like Professor Cohen's neighbor-character, are ordinarily assumed abstractly as mere relations, while shapes, colors, etc., and Professor Cohen's "modesty, tallness, cheerfulness," may be thought of more easily without emphasis on other things and so tend to be accepted in their concreteness as qualities, but how slender is the dividing-line Professor Cohen's easy translation of these things into relations makes clear.

Taken purely intellectualistically, there would be first a fiction of separation in what is really already continuous and then another fiction to bridge the gap thus made. This would, of course, be the falsification against which Bergson inveighs. But this interpretation is to misunderstand the nature of abstraction. Abstraction does not substitute an unreal for a real, but selects from reality a genuine characteristic of it which is adequate for a particular purpose. Thus to conceive time as a succession of moments is not to falsify time, but to select from processes going on in time a characteristic of them through which predictions can be made, which may be verified and turned into an instrument for the control of life or environment. A similar misunderstanding of abstraction, coupled with a fuller appreciation than Bergson evinces of the value of its results, has led to the neo-realistic insistence on turning abstractions into existent entities of which the real world is taken to be an organized composite aggregate.

The practice of turning qualities into merely conscious entities has done much to obscure the status of scientific knowing, for it has left mere quantity as the only real character of the actual world. But once take a realistic standpoint, and quantity is no more real than quality. For primitive man, the qualitative

aspect of reality is probably the first to which he gives heed, and it is only through efforts to get along with the world in its qualitative character that its quantitative side is forced upon the attention. Then so-called "exact" science is born, but it does not follow that qualities henceforth become insignificant. They are still the basis of all relations, even of those that are most directly construed as quantitative. Quality and quantity are only different aspects of the world which the status of our practical life leads us to take separately or abstractly. "Thing" is no less an abstraction, in which we disregard certain continuities with the rest of the world because we are so constituted that the demands of living make it expedient to do so. Things once given, further abstractions become possible, among which are those leading to mathematical thinking, in which higher abstractions are made, guided always by the "generating problem" (cf. Karl Schmidt, *Jour. of Phil., Psy., and Sci. Meth.*, Vol. X, No. 3, 1913, pp. 64-75).

H. C. BROWN in *Creative Intelligence*, pp. 154-162. Published by Henry Holt & Company. Reprinted by permission.

SUGGESTIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Compare Cohen's illustration with Royce's similar illustration above, p. 178. To what extent are these thinkers in agreement in their use of this illustration?
2. Give an illustration of your own to show what you think Brown means by the distinction between the actual and the potential nature of a thing.
3. What do you think Brown means by "a qualitatively heterogeneous reality"? How is quality related to quantity in reality itself?
4. What do you think Cohen meant by the statement "qualities are reducible to relations" in the light of the illustration of his neighbor. Why do you suppose Brown says that he does not know what this means?
5. What danger is there in reducing qualities to relations, according to Brown?

II. SCIENTIFIC METHOD AND THE DATA OF SCIENCE

by *George H. Mead*

Analysis

Mead holds that the facts or data with which the scientist deals are partial meanings in between an old and a new theory or hypothesis.

He uses the theories of the spread of infectious diseases as an illustration. There follows an analogy from Zeller which is used to distinguish the point of view of the ancient scientist from that of the modern. Three results of the modern development of scientific knowledge are stated. The facts of science are open to two different interpretations. One is that of positivism which makes them instances of laws of nature. The other is that of psychology which relates them to other events in the experience of the observer. Neither positivist, nor psychologist is able to identify the nature of the fact. This is also illustrated from the case of infectious disease. Mead uses the researches of Darwin and Pasteur to refute positivism. He shows that facts are meaningless except in relation to problematic situations, and that ideas become facts and facts become ideas in every scientific investigation. Hence reality is a creative process of experiencing and the dualism between facts and ideas is completely abandoned by Mead.

Continuous advance in science has been possible only when analysis of the object of knowledge has supplied not elements of meanings as the objects have been conceived but elements abstracted from those meanings. That is, scientific advance implies a willingness to remain on terms of tolerant acceptance of the reality of what cannot be stated in the accepted doctrine of the time, but what must be stated in the form of contradiction with these accepted doctrines. The domain of what is usually connoted by the term facts or data belongs to the field lying between the old doctrine and the new. This field is not inhabited by the Aristotelian individual, for the individual is but the realization of the form or universal essence. When the new theory has displaced the old, the new individual appears in the place of its predecessor, but during the period within which the old theory is being dislodged and the new is arising, a consciously growing science finds itself occupied with what is on the one hand the débris of the old and on the other the building material of the new. Obviously, this must find its immediate *raison d'être* in something other than the meaning that is gone or the meaning that is not yet here. It is true that the barest facts do not lack meaning, though a meaning which has been theirs in the past is lost. The meaning, however, that is still theirs is confessedly inadequate, otherwise there would be no scientific problem to be solved. Thus, when older theories of the spread of infectious diseases lost their validity because of instances where these explanations could not be applied, the diagnoses and accounts which could still be given of the cases of the sickness themselves were no explanation of the spread of the infection. The facts of the spread of the infection could

be brought neither under a doctrine of contagion which was shattered by actual events nor under a doctrine of the germ theory of disease, which was as yet unborn. The logical import of the dependence of these facts upon observation, and hence upon the individual experience of the scientist, I shall have occasion to discuss later; what I am referring to here is that the conscious growth of science is accompanied by the appearance of this sort of material. . . .

Zeller has sketched a parallelism between the ideal state of Plato and the social structure of the mediæval world. The philosopher-king is represented by the Pope, below him answering to the warrior class in the Platonic state stands the warrior class of the Holy Roman Empire, who in theory enforce the dictates of the Roman curia, while at the bottom in both communities stand the mass of the people bound to obedience to the powers above. There is, however, one profound difference between the two, and that is to be found in the relative positions of the ideal worlds that dominate each. Plato's ideal world beyond the heavens gives what reality it has to this through the participation by the world of becoming in the ideas. Opinion dimly sensed the ideas in the evanescent objects about it, and though Plato's memory theory of knowledge assumed that the ideas had been seen in former existence and men could thus recognize the copies here, the ideal world was not within the mind but without. In a real sense the Kingdom of Heaven was within men in the mediæval world, as was the Holy Roman Empire. They were ideal communities that ought to exist on earth, and it was due to the depravity of men that they did not exist. From time to time men undertook in various upheavals to realize in some part these spiritual and political ideals which they carried within them. And men not only carried within them the ideas of a New Jerusalem in which the interest of one was the interest of all and of an earthly state ordered by a divine decree to fulfil this Christian ideal, but the determining causes of the present condition and the future realization depended also upon the inner attitudes and experiences of the individuals themselves.

Without carrying the analogy here too far, this relation between the experience of the individual and the world which may arise through the realization of his ideas is the basis of the most profound distinction between the ancient world and the modern. Before the logic of this attitude could appear in science a long

period of intellectual and social growth was necessary. The most essential part of this growth was the slow but steady development of psychological doctrine which placed the objective world in the experience of the individual. It is not of interest here to bring out the modern epistemological problem that grew out of this, or to present this in the world of Leibnitzian monads that had no windows or in the Berkeleian subjective idealism. What is of interest is to point out that this attitude established a functional relationship between even the subjective experience of the individual and the object of knowledge. A skepticism based upon subjectivism might thereafter question the justification of the reference of experience beyond itself; it could not question knowledge and its immediate object. . . .

The world is still too much with us. We recognize here three striking results of the development of reflective consciousness in the modern world:—first, it is assumed that the objective world of knowledge can be placed within the experience of the individual without losing thereby its nature as an object, that all characters of that object can be presented as belonging to that experience, whether adequately or not is another question; and second, it is assumed that the contradictions in its nature which are associated with its inclusion in individual experience, its references beyond itself when so included, may themselves be the starting-point of a reconstruction which at least carries that object beyond the experience within which these contradictions arose; and third, it is assumed that this growth takes place in a world of reality within which the incomplete experience of the individual is an essential part of the process, in which it is not a mere fiction, destroying reality by its representation, but is a growing-point in that reality itself.

These characters of philosophic interpretation, the inclusion of the object of knowledge in the individual experience and the turning of the conflicts in that experience into the occasion for the creation of new objects transcending these contradictions, are the characters in the conscious method, of modern science, which most profoundly distinguish it from the method of ancient science. This, of course, is tantamount to saying that they are those which mark the experimental method in science.

. . . Whenever we reduce the objects of scientific investigation to facts and undertake to record them as such, they become events, happenings, whose hard factual character lies in the circumstance that they have taken place, and this quite inde-

pendently of any explanation of their taking place. When they are explained they have ceased to be facts and have become instances of a law, that is, Aristotelian individuals, embodied theories, and their actuality as events is lost in the necessity of their occurrence as expressions of the law; with this change their particularity as events or happenings disappears. They are but the specific values of the equation when constants are substituted for variables. Before the equation is known or the law discovered they have no such ground of existence. Up to this point they find their ground for existence in their mere occurrence, to which the law which is to explain them must accommodate itself.

There are here suggested two points of view from which these facts may be regarded. Considered with reference to a uniformity or law by which they will be ordered and explained they are the phenomena with which the positivist deals; as existences to be identified and localized before they are placed within such a uniformity they fall within the domain of the psychological philosopher who can at least place them in their relation to the other events in the experience of the individual who observes them. Considered as having a residual meaning apart from the law to which they have become exceptions, they can become the subject matter of the rationalist. It is important that we recognize that neither the positivist nor the rationalist is able to identify the nature of the fact or datum to which they refer. I refer to such stubborn facts as those of the sporadic appearance of infectious diseases before the germ theory of the disease was discovered. Here was a fact which contradicted the doctrine of the spread of the infection by contact. It appeared not as an instance of a law, but as an exception to a law. As such, its nature is found in its having happened at a given place and time. If the case had appeared in the midst of an epidemic, its nature as a case of the infectious disease would have been cared for in the accepted doctrine, and for its acceptance as an object of knowledge its location in space and time as an event would not have been required. Its geographical and historical traits would have followed from the theory of the infection, as we identify by our calculations the happy fulfilment of Thales' prophecy. The happening of an instance of a law is accounted for by the law. Its happening may and in most instances does escape observation, while as an exception to an accepted law it captures attention. Its nature as an event is, then, found in

its appearance in the experience of some individual, whose observation is controlled and recorded as his experience. Without its reference to this individual's experience it could not appear as a fact for further scientific consideration.

Now the attitude of the positivist toward this fact is that induced by its relation to the law which is *subsequently* discovered. It has then fallen into place in a series, and his doctrine is that all laws are but uniformities of such events. He treats the fact when it is an exception to law as an instance of the new law and assumes that the exception to the old law and the instance of the new are identical. And this is a great mistake,—the mistake made also by the neo-realist when he assumes that the object of knowledge is the same within and without the mind, that nothing happens to what is to be known when it by chance strays into the realm of conscious cognition. Any as yet unexplained exception to an old theory can happen only in the experience of an individual, and that which has its existence as an event in some one's biography is a different thing from the future instance which is not beholden to any one for its existence. Yet there are, as I indicated earlier, meanings in this exceptional event which, at least for the time, are unaffected by the exceptional character of the occurrence. For example, certain clinical symptoms by which an infectious disease is identified have remained unchanged in diagnosis since the days of Hippocrates. These characters remain as characters of the instance of the law of germ origin when this law has been discovered. This may lead us to say that the exception which appears for the time being as a unique incident in a biography is identical with the instance of a germ-induced disease. Indeed, we are likely to go further and, in the assurance of the new doctrine, state that former exceptions can (or with adequate acquaintance with the facts could) be proved to be necessarily an instance of a disease carried by a germ. The positivist is therefore confident that the field of scientific knowledge is made up of events which are instances of uniform series, although under conditions of inadequate information some of them appear as exceptions to the statements of uniformities, in truth the latter being no uniformities at all.

That this is not a true statement of the nature of the exception and of the instance, it is not difficult to show if we are willing to accept the accounts which the scientists themselves give of their own observation, the changing forms which the hypothesis

assumes during the effort to reach a solution and the ultimate reconstruction which attends the final tested solution. Whenever we are fortunate enough, as in the biographies of men such as Darwin and Pasteur, to follow a number of the steps by which they recognized problems and worked out tenable hypotheses for their solution, we find that the direction which is given to attention in the early stage of scientific investigation is toward conflicts between current theories and observed phenomena, and that since the form which these observations take is determined by the opposition, it is determined by a statement which itself is later abandoned. We find that the scope and character of the observations change at once when the investigator sets about gathering as much of the material as he can secure, and changes constantly as he formulates tentative hypotheses for the solution of the problem, which, moreover, generally changes its form during the investigation. I am aware that this change in the form of the data will be brushed aside by many as belonging only to the attitude of mind of the investigator, while it is assumed that the "facts" themselves, however selected and organized in his observation and thought, remain identical in their nature throughout. Indeed, the scientist himself carries with him in the whole procedure the confidence that the fact-structure of reality is unchanged, however varied are the forms of the observations which refer to the same entities.²

The analysis of the fact-structure of reality shows in the first place that the scientist undertakes to form such an hypothesis that all the data of observation will find their place in the objective world, and in the second place to bring them into such a structure that future experience will lead to anticipated

² An analysis which has been many times carried out has made it clear that scientific data never do more than approximate the laws and entities upon which our science rests. It is equally evident that the forms of these laws and entities themselves shift in the reconstructions of incessant research, or where they seem most secure could consistently be changed, or at least could be fundamentally different were our psychological structure or even our conventions of thought different. I need only refer to the *Science et Hypothèse* of Poincaré and the *Problems of Science* of Enriques. The positivist who undertakes to carry the structure of the world back to the data of observation, and the uniformities appearing in the accepted hypotheses of growing sciences cannot maintain that we ever succeed in isolating data which must remain the same in the kaleidoscope of our research science; nor are we better served if we retreat to the ultimate elements of points and instants which our pure mathematics assumes and implicitly defines, and in connection with which it has worked out the modern theory of the number and continuous series, its statements of continuity and infinity.

results. He does not undertake to preserve facts in the form in which they existed in experience before the problem arose nor to construct a world independent of experience or that will not be subject itself to future reconstructions in experience. He merely insists that future reconstructions will take into account the old in re-adjusting it to the new. In such a process it is evident that the change of the form in the data is not due to a subjective attitude of the investigator which can be abstracted from the facts. When Darwin, for instance, found that the marl dressings which farmers spread over their soil did not sink through the soil by the force of gravity as was supposed, but that the earthworm castings were thrown up above these dressings at nearly the same rate at which they disappeared, he did not correct a subjective attitude of mind. He created in experience a humus which took the place of a former soil, and justified itself by fitting it into the whole process of disintegration of the earth's surface. It would be impossible to separate in the earlier experiences certain facts and certain attitudes of mind entertained by men with references to these facts. Certain objects have replaced other objects. It is only after the process of analysis, which arose out of the conflicting observations, has broken up the old object that what was a part of the object, heavier-things-pushing-their-way-through-soil-of-lighter-texture, can become a mere idea. Earlier it was an object. Until it could be tested the earthworm as the cause of the disappearance of the dressings was also Darwin's idea. It became fact. For science at least it is quite impossible to distinguish between what in an object must be fact and what may be idea. The distinction when it is made is dependent upon the form of the problem and is functional to its solution, not metaphysical. So little can a consistent line of cleavage between facts and ideas be indicated, that we can never tell where in our world of observation the problem of science will arise, or what will be regarded as structure of reality or what erroneous idea.

G. H. MEAD in *Creative Intelligence*, pp. 178-204 (with omissions). Published by Henry Holt & Company. Reprinted by permission. Title modified.

SUGGESTIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Describe the type of material with which Mead thinks science is concerned, namely, that lying between the new and the old.

Work this out from the illustrations of infectious disease, and of Darwin's study of earthworms.

2. Does Mead's view that reality is a single process alternating between ideas and facts seem to you to be identical with Brown's view? Justify your answer.
3. State in your own words the chief differences between ancient and modern science, as Mead sees them.
4. Discuss and criticise Mead's analogy adopted from Zeller.

CHAPTER III

PRAGMATIST SOLUTIONS OF THE PROBLEM OF TRUTH AND ERROR

I. THE PROBLEM OF TRUTH AND ERROR, by *D. L. Murray*

Analysis

Rejecting absolute truth, self-evidence and intuition, Murray holds that the real problem is to distinguish between the true and the false among relative truths. These relative truths differ in practical value and yield practical truth, even though there be no absolute truth. Thinking does not start from certainty but is conditioned always by doubt. Every judgment is a *truth-claim* which is merely formal. Afterwards it may get validated. Then it becomes relatively true. If the *truth-claim* is not validated by later experience the judgment is erroneous. The process of validating judgments is endless, as is proven by the history of science in which all truth-claims are subject to continuous correction. All other theories of truth have broken down. The correspondence theory fails because we are unable to get outside the truth-claim to see whether the supposed correspondence between a judgment and what it asserts holds. Really correspondence is only a truth-claim, namely, that an idea or judgment corresponds with reality. Whether it does can only be verified by the consequences of the belief that it does. Murray admits that correspondence is not altogether wrong when applied to judgments of perception. He dismisses the "consistence" or coherence theory, holding that an idea's being consistent with the rest of our knowledge is a good test of truth just because it is a part of its working. But the fact that dreams and delusions may be coherent, proves that coherence among our ideas does not constitute truth. If we mean by coherence a coherence among the ideas of an absolute Mind, we have the correspondence theory all over again, for we cannot tell whether our ideas correspond with those in the absolute Mind whose experience we can never share. Intuitive or feeling theories of truth also fail, for we often feel that judgments are true which later turn out to be erroneous. Hence the feeling theory has no way of solving the problem of error. Thus, by a process of elimination Murray proves that the pragmatist theory is the only acceptable theory of truth. All inquiries arise from the obstacles to the carrying out of human purposes. They engender truth-claims. The consequences which follow from each truth-claim constitute its truth. Truth is *value*. To the objection that this would make all ideas which we like true, Murray answers that useless ideas are not true. Only objectively useful ideas are true. Although the complete verification of an idea is impossible and we can never attain absolute cer-

tainty, we can attain practical certainty. "The pragmatic test is practically adequate, and is the only one available."

It has been shown in the last chapter how urgent has become the problem of discriminating between the true and false among relative "truths." For absolute truth has become a chimera, self-evidence an illusion, and intuition untrustworthy. All three are psychologically very real to those who believe in them, but logically they succumb to the assaults of a scepticism which infers from the fact that no "truths" are absolute that all may reasonably be overthrown.

The only obstacle to its triumph lies in the existence of "relative" truths which are *not* absolute, and do not claim to be, and in the unexamined possibility that in a relativist interpretation of all truth a meaning may be found for the distinction between "true" and "false." Now, not even a sceptic could deny that the size of an object is better measured by a yard-measure than by the eye, even though it may be meaningless to ask what its size may be absolutely; or that it is probable that bread will be found more nourishing than stone, even though it may not be a perfect elixir of life. Even if he denied this, the sceptic's *acts* would convict his *words* of insincerity, and *practically*, at any rate, no one has been or can be a sceptic, whatever the extent of his *theoretic* doubts.

This fact is construed by the pragmatist as a significant indication of the way out of the epistemological *impasse*. The "relative" truths, which Intellectualism passed by with contempt, may differ in *practical value* and lead to the conceptions of *practical truth* and certainty which may be better adapted to the requirements of human life than the elusive and discredited ideals of absolute truth and certainty, and may enable us to justify the distinctions we make between the "true" and the "false." At any rate, this suggestion seems worth following up.

To begin with, we must radically disabuse our minds of the idea that thinking *starts from certainty*. Even the self-evident and self-confident "intuitions" that impress the uncritical so much with their claim to infallibility are really the results of antecedent doubts and ponderings, and would never be enunciated unless there were thought to be a dispute about them. In real life thought starts from perplexities, from situations in which, as Professor Dewey says, beliefs have to be "reconstructed," and it aims at setting doubts at rest. It is psychologi-

cally impossible for a rational mind to assert what it knows to be true, and supposes every one else to admit the truth of. This is why even a philosopher's conversation does not consist of a rehearsal of all the unchallenged truisms that he can remember.

Being thus conditioned by a doubt, every judgment is a challenge. It claims truth, and backs its claims by the authority of its maker; but it would be folly to imagine that it thereby becomes *ipso facto* true, or is meant to be universally accepted without testing. Its maker must know this as well as any one, unless his dogmatism has quite blotted out his common sense. Indeed, he may himself have given preference to the judgment he made over the alternatives that occurred to him only after much debate and hesitation, and may propound it only as a basis for further discussion and testing.

Initially, then, every judgment is a *truth-claim* and this claim is merely *formal*. It does not *mean* that the claim is absolutely true, and that it is impious to question it. On the contrary, it has still to be validated by others, and may work in such a way that its own maker withdraws it, and corrects it by a better. The intellectualist accounts of truth have all failed to make this vital distinction between "truth-claim" and validated truth. They rest on a *confusion of formal with absolute truth*, and it is on this account that they cannot distinguish between "truth" and error. For false judgments also formally claim "truth." No judgment alleges that it is false.¹

On the other hand, if the distinction between truth-claims and validated truths is made, there ceases to be any *theoretic* difficulty about the conception and correction of errors, however difficult it may be to detect them in practice. "Truths" will be "claims" which have worked well and maintained themselves; "errors," such as have been superseded by better ones. All "truths" must be *tested* by something more objective than their own self-assertiveness, and this testing by their working and the consequences to which they lead may go on indefinitely. In other words, however much a "truth" has been validated, it is always possible to test it further. I.e., it is never theoretically "absolute," however well it may practically be assured. For a confirmation of this doctrine Pragmatism appeals to the history of scientific truth, which has shown a continuous correction

¹Not even "I lie," which is meaningless as it stands. Cf. Dr. Schiller's *Formal Logic*, p. 373.

of "truths," which were re-valued as "errors," as better statements for them became available.

It may also be confirmed negatively by the break-down of the current definitions of truth, which all seem in the end to mean nothing.

The oldest and commonest definition of a "truth" which is given is that it is "the correspondence of a thought to reality." But Intellectualism never perceived the difficulties lurking in it. At first sight this seems a brave attempt to get outside the circle of thought in order to test its value and to control its vagaries. Unluckily, this theory can only assert, and neither explains nor proves, the connection between the thought and the reality it desiderates. For, granting that it is the intent of every thought to correspond with reality, we must yet inquire how the alleged correspondence is to be made out. Made out it must be; for as the criterion is quite formal and holds of all assertions, the claim to "correspond" may be false. To prove the correspondence, then, the "reality" would have somehow to be known apart from the truth-claim of the thought, in order that the two might be compared and found to agree. But if the reality were already known directly, what would be the need of asserting an idea of it and claiming "truth" for this? How, moreover, could the claim be tested, if, as is admitted, the reality is not directly known? To assert the "correspondence" must become a groundless postulate about something which is defined to transcend all knowledge. The correspondence theory, then, does not *test* the truth-claim of the assertion; it only gives a fresh definition of it. A "true" thought, it says, is one which *claims to correspond* with a "reality." *But so does a false,* and hence the theory leaves us as we were, puzzled to distinguish them.²

Yet the theory is not wholly wrong. Many of our thoughts do claim to correspond with reality in ways that can be verified. If the judgment "There is a green carpet in my hall" is taken to mean "If I enter my hall, I shall *see* a green carpet, per-

²This same difficulty reappears in various forms, as e.g., in a recent theory which makes the truth of a judgment lie in its asserting a relation between different objects, and not in the existence of those objects themselves. This formula also applies as evidently to false judgments as to true. It, too, brings no independent evidence of the existence of the objects referred to, and might fall into error through asserting a relation between objects which did not exist. It is, moreover, incapable of showing that a relation corresponding to the idea we have of it really exists when we judge that it does.

ception tests whether the judgment "corresponds" with the reality perceived, and so goes to validate or disprove the claim. But the limits within which this correspondence works are very strait. It applies only to such judgments as are anticipations of perception,³ and will test a truth-claim only where there is willingness to act on it. It implies an experiment, and is not a wholly intellectual process.

The superiority of the "correspondence" theory over the belief in "intuitions" lies in its insistence that thought is not to audit its own accounts. Its success or failure depends upon factors external to it, which establish the truth or falsehood of its claims. No such guarantee is offered by the next theory, which is known as the "consistence" or "coherence" theory. In order to avoid the difficulty which wrecked the "correspondence" theory, that of making the truth of an assertion reside in an inexperienceable relation to an unattainable reality, this view maintains that an idea is true if it is consistent with the rest of our thoughts, and so can be fitted with them into a coherent system. No doubt a coherence among our ideas is a convenience and a part of their "working," but it is hardly a test of their objective truth. For a harmonious system of thoughts is conceivable which would either not apply to reality at all, or if applied, would completely fail. On this theory systematic delusions, fictions, and dreams, might properly lay claim to truth. True, they might not be quite consistent: but neither are the systems of our sciences. If, then, this *absolute* coherence be insisted on, this test condemns our whole knowledge; if not, it remains formal, and fails to recognize any distinctions of value in the claims which can be systematized.

To avoid this *reductio ad absurdum*, it has been suggested that it is not the coherence of the idea in human, finite, minds which constitutes "truth," but the perfect consistency of the experience of an Absolute Mind. The test, then, of our limited coherency will lie in its relation to this Absolute System. But here we have the correspondence doctrine once again in a fresh disguise; our human systems are now "true" if they correspond with the Absolute's. But as there is no way for us of sharing the Absolute Experience, our test is again illusory, and productive of a depressing scepticism; and, again, we have only

³ Each perception, however, contains much that is supplied by the mind, not "given" to it.

asserted that truth is what *claims* to be part of the Absolute System.

A word may be devoted to the simple refusal of intuitionists to give an account of Truth on the ground that it is "indefinable." Truth is taken to be an ultimate unanalyzable quality of certain propositions, intuitively felt, and incapable of description. Error, by the same token, should be equally indefinable and as immediately apprehended. How, then, can there be differences of opinion, and mistakes as to what is true and what false? How is it that a proposition which is felt to be "true" so often turns out to be erroneous? If all errors are felt to be true by those they deceive, is it not clear that immediate feeling is not a good enough test of a validated truth? Thus, once again, we find that an account to truth-claim is being foisted on us in place of a description of truth-testing.

The intellectualist, then, being in every case unable to justify the vital distinction commonly made between the true and the false, we return to the pragmatist. He starts with no preconceptions as to what truth must mean, whether it exists or not; he is content to watch how *de facto* claims to truth get themselves validated in experience. He observes that every question is intimately related to some scheme of human purposes. For it has to be *put*, in order to come into being. Hence every inquiry arises, and every question is asked, because of obstacles and problems which arise in the carrying out of human purposes. So soon as uncertainty arises in the course of fulfilling a purpose, an idea or belief is formulated *and acted on*, to fill the gap where immediate certitude has broken down. This engenders the truth-claim, which is necessarily a "good" in its maker's eyes, because it has been selected by him and judged *preferable* to any alternative that occurred to him.

How, then, is it tested? Simply by the consequences which follow from adopting it and using it as an assumption upon which to work. If these consequences are satisfactory, if they promote the purpose in hand, instead of thwarting it, and thus have a valuable effect upon life, then the truth-claim maintains its "truth," and is so far validated. This is the universal method of testing assertions alike in the formation of mathematical laws, physical hypotheses, religious beliefs, and ethical postulates. Hence such pragmatic aphorisms as "truth is useful" or "truth is a matter of practical consequences" mean essentially that all assertions must be *tested by being applied*

to a real problem of knowing. What is signified by such statements is that no "truth" must be accepted merely on account of the insistence of its claim, but that every idea must be tested by the consequences of its working. Its truth will then depend upon those consequences being fruitful for life in general, and in particular for the purpose behind the particular inquiry in which it arose. Truth is a *value* and a satisfaction; but "intellectual satisfaction" is not a morbid delight in dialectical and verbal juggling: it is the satisfaction which rewards the hard labour of rationalizing experience and rendering it more conformable with human desires.

It should be clear, though it is often misunderstood, that there is nothing arbitrary or "subjective" in this method of testing beliefs. It does not mean that we are free to assert the truth of every idea which seems to us pretty or pleasant. The very term "useful" was chosen by pragmatists as a protest against the common philosophic licence of alleging "truths" which could never be applied or tested, and were supposed to be none the worse for being "useless." It is clear both that such "truths" must be a monopoly of Intellectualism and also that they do not allow every man to believe whatever he wishes, provided only that he boldly claims "self-evidence" for his idiosyncrasy. In this purely subjective sense, into which Intellectualism is driven, it is, however, clear that there can be no useless ideas. For any idea any one decided to adopt, because it pleased or amused him, would be *ipso facto* true. Pragmatism, therefore, by refuting "useless" knowledge, shows that it does *not* admit such merely subjective "uses." It insists that ideas must be more objectively useful—viz., by showing ability to cope with the situation they were devised to meet. If they fail to harmonize with the situation they are untrue, however attractive they may be. For ideas do not function in a void; they have to work in a world of fact, and to adapt themselves to all facts, though they may succeed in transforming them in the end.

Nor has an idea to reckon only with facts: it has also to cohere with other ideas. It must be congruous with the mass of other beliefs held for good reasons by the thinker who accepts it. For no one can afford to have a stock of beliefs which conflict too violently with those of his fellows. If his "intuitions" contrast too seriously with those of others, and he acts on them, he will be shut up as a lunatic. If, then, the "useful" idea has to

approve itself both to its maker and his fellows without developing limitations in its use, it is clear that a pragmatic truth is really far less arbitrary and subjective than the "truths" accepted as absolute, on the bare ground that they seem "self-evident" to a few intellectualists.

If, however, it be urged that pragmatic truths never grow absolutely true at all, and that the most prolonged pragmatic tests do not exclude the possibility of an ultimate error in the idea, there is no difficulty about admitting this. The pragmatic test yields *practical*, and not "absolute," certainty. The existence of absolute certainty is denied, and the demand for it, in a world which contains only the practical sort, merely plays into the hands of scepticism. The uncertainty of all our verificatory processes, however, is not the creation of the pragmatist, nor is he a god to abolish it. Abstractly, there is always a doubt about what transcends our immediate experience, and this is why it is so healthy to have to repudiate so many theoretic doubts in every act we do. For beliefs have to be acted on, and the results of the action rightly react on the beliefs. The pragmatic test is practically adequate, and is the only one available. That it brings out the risk of action only brings out its superiority to a theory which cannot get started at all until it is supplied with absolute certainty, and meantime can only idly rail at all existing human truths. . . .

D. L. MURRAY: *Pragmatism*, pp. 40-52. Published by Constable & Co., Ltd.. London. Reprinted by permission.

SUGGESTIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Is there any more reason for referring to beliefs as relative truths than as relative falsehoods, in view of the fact that some of them are false? How do you think this question would have to be decided if the number of false in proportion to the number of true beliefs were the deciding principle? What principle do you think operated in the case of Murray that might explain his calling beliefs relative truths instead of relative falsehoods?
2. What is the difference between the truth-claim of a judgment and its truth? Illustrate. Why does Murray call the former merely formal?
3. Would Murray's criticism of the correspondence theory be valid against Rogers's statement of that theory above, pp. 364 f.?
4. What is the chief value of the correspondence theory? Why does this reduce it to the pragmatist theory?
5. Explain why the coherence theory turns into a correspondence

theory. What is the chief value of the coherence theory and why does this reduce it to the pragmatist theory?

6. Discuss Murray's identification of truth with value or objective utility. Do you think that he satisfactorily answers the objection that on this view whatever has utility would be true?
7. Do you think that practical certainty is all that the mind needs in its quest for truth? If so, how would you reconcile this with the desire people have to know the worst?

II. TRUTH-VALUE, by *Addison Webster Moore*

Analysis

Moore regards truth and error as values. But the real problem is: What is the place of judging in experience as a whole? On this point the absolutists and the realists take one view and the instrumentalists another. According to the former, as is shown by quotations from Bradley and a footnote referring to McGilvary, judging is only one instinct or aspect of human nature among others. Holding such a view Moore argues that such thinkers are committed to some sort of an absolute to save unity and continuity. Only the pragmatist, like James, can do justice to the variety in the world and be a pluralist. But another difficulty is connected with the definition of truth as that which satisfies a purpose to judge truly. For such a definition begs the question and contains a vicious circle. What is the material which satisfies the instinct of thought, if it really is an instinct? If we say that it is some special material, then thought loses its universality. To save universality one might turn to formal logic, but this is just what the absolutists refuse to do. They have themselves pointed out that purely formal truth, as set forth in Traditional Formal Logic, is (i) indifferent to concrete factual material, (ii) has no place for error, and (iii) makes thinking consist wholly in a subjective consistency. Suppose, then, that we try the hypothesis that thought gets its material from other instincts, but is, nevertheless, independent as a process. This view leads to the incurable contradictions which the absolutists never tire of pointing out (see Carr above, pp. 203 ff.). Suppose, then, that we hold that thinking creates its own material. Both Bradley and Royce have defended this thesis and Moore mentions Royce's two famous illustrations of material created by thinking. He proceeds to point out two defects in this view.

So we are led by a process of elimination to a statement of the pragmatist theory, which insists upon the continuity between the process and the content of thought, but makes thinking the whole process of experience, instead of an aspect of experience. When a conflict arises among instincts seeking satisfaction, thought analyzes the situation and tries to solve it. If it succeeds truth results, but if it fails error is the outcome. Thus thinking is the entire process, extending from the beginning of the conflict, through the effort to remove it and culminating either in success or in failure, truth or error. Truth-value, then, is the satisfaction of a mind which comes from quelling the dissatisfaction due to a conflict among other instincts. Reversing

Bradley and Royce, the instrumentalist allows the concrete situation to generate thinking. This situation, which is conflicting instincts, really produces both the process and the content of thinking. There is no thinking, preëxistent as a specter, to which the instinctive material is to be given.

In the sense defined, thinking has always existed. Each present act of thinking is modified by previous thinking. Thinking has an immediate value of its own, namely, "the entire experience of conflicting instinctive values undergoing mediation and revaluation." Such ends or purposes as there are are born of the conflicting instincts and are not given in advance. Moore restates briefly his definition of truth-value, and admits that there are many important questions he has left unanswered, several of which he states. He concludes by stating and answering five possible objections to his theory.

If we begin with the most general and formal phase of the subject, the usual statement is that truth and error are values belonging to the experience of judging. But such a statement is obviously verbal until we go on to state *what* the value of this judging experience is. And this brings upon us at once the entire problem of the place and function of judging in the whole process of experience, and with it the issue between logical-absolutism and certain forms of realism, on the one hand, and "instrumentalism" on the other.

The contention of the logical-absolutist is that truth and error values are the satisfaction and the dissatisfaction of a special and independent "want" or "side" or "aspect"—using Mr. Bradley's phrases—of our nature. In his article on "Truth and Practise" (*Mind*, 1904), Mr. Bradley says: "Reality is the satisfaction of all the wants of our nature, and theoretical truth is those perceptions and ideas which directly satisfy *one* of those wants." Thinking, then, appears to be the operation of a specialized instinctive want coördinate with the other instincts, as eating, drinking, reproduction, etc. Indeed Mr. Bradley comes near to saying this in so many words, albeit somewhat facetiously, when he says: "Metaphysics is a finding of bad reasons for what we believe on instinct—but to find these reasons is no less an instinct."⁴

With truth-value thus based on a special and independent instinctive need, an uninitiated observer might at first sight wonder that the supporters of this view are so shocked at Professor James's metaphysical pluralism, for this conception

⁴In his paper which followed this at the symposium, Professor McGilvary frankly states and defends the special-instinct view of thought, using eating and drinking as analogues.

surely appears pluralistic enough. But a second look dispels the wonder. For with so much logical and psychological pluralism as this instinct-view of thought involves, nothing short of an omnipotent metaphysical absolute can save unity and continuity. On the other hand, Professor James can revel freely in his metaphysical pluralism just because he has so fortified his logical and psychological continuity in human experience that he can rest assured that no pluralistic metaphysical horde, however great, can ever destroy it. In general it appears that what we neglect in our psychology and logic we try to make up in our metaphysics. Metaphysics seems to be a sort of clearing-house for the accounts between our logic and unreflective experience.

And while we are about it another paradox or two in the situation may be worth a glance. Behold the immediate-empiricist, Dewey, insisting upon the mediate instrumental character of thought, while the absolutists are contending for its independent immediacy. Again, the logical-absolutist not only professes to accept the instrumentalist's doctrine of the relativity of truth and error to need, want, and purpose, but characterizes it as a "truism." In the article above cited, Mr. Bradley says: "To me it seems obvious that if some function belongs to our nature there will be a need and a desire which correspond to that function. Hence if the free use of the intellect is really one aspect of our being, we shall in consequence have a need and a desire for that use." Likewise we find the absolutists, Royce and Taylor, and the realist, Perry, all agreeing that *true* judging is the satisfaction of a want—a purpose—namely, the purpose to judge *truly*!

The instrumentalist's reply is that *this* is indeed not only a truism, but an unblushing *petitio* of a real issue, and that to him the truly pathetic thing is his critics' complacent satisfaction with it. Suppose we say: "Truth is what satisfies the cognitive need." "How trifling!" Locke would say, until we go on to show *what* the cognitive need is, *how* it differs from other needs, and *how* it goes about satisfying itself. In such questions as these the real issue between the absolutist's and the instrumentalist's logic is defined.

If truth be the satisfaction of a special instinct coördinate with the other instincts, obviously we must at once ask: What is this instinct's peculiar satisfying material or object? And here we seem halted; for there appears to be no special object analo-

gous to those of the other instincts. The content of any thought always turns out to be the material of some other instinct. Besides, if thought has its own special material, what becomes of its universality?

"Universality"! That word gives us a new cue and suggests that we may have been on the wrong scent for the object of the cognitive instinct. For does not universality belong to such things as major, minor, and middle terms? Here, then, perhaps, is to be found thought's satisfying portion. The cognitive need is a hungering for universals and particulars, a thirsting after subjects and predicates, a yearning for syllogisms and episyllogisms; while negatively it is a congenital horror of such things as illicit majors and minors and undistributed middles.

This gentle mockery, I am sure, cannot give offense, for nothing could surpass the contempt with which absolutists themselves have rejected formal logic—for instance, the hilarious scorn which Mr. Bradley heaps upon the devoted head of the syllogism. The reasons for this repudiation are familiar. I need mention only a few of them. First, if the formal processes were the satisfying content of thought, the material ought to be perfectly indifferent. The length of the Devil's tail or the color of Eve's eyes should be as satisfying material as anything else. Again, if the material be indifferent and thought goes on according to its own independent and immutable laws, where is there any place for error, for dissatisfaction? Once more, if dissatisfaction does *somehow* arise, what is to determine when truth is reached again? If we answer: "Simply the sense of *consistency* peculiar to the cognitive instinct," what saves thought from the subjectivism alleged to characterize the other instincts, as hunger, thirst, etc.?

The situation at this point is, then, that, if the formal processes are rejected, thought, though a special and independent instinctive need coördinate with the other instincts, has yet no corresponding peculiar satisfying material. What is to be done? What *has* been done so far in the history of logic is to compromise by admitting the dependence of thought for its *material* upon the other instincts, but still cling to its independence as a *process*. The consequence of this compromise has been the train of incurable "contradictions" and "antinomies" which have harassed the entire history of logic, and which end in the confession that so long as the cognitive instinct must be depend-

ent on the other instincts for its materials no "perfect" satisfaction, no genuine truth-value is possible. The indispensable condition of reaching such a state, says Mr. Bradley, in effect, is that thought should be independent, not only as a process, but in its material as well. That it should, in short, produce its own material.⁵

We all know how, at this point, Professor Royce came valiantly to the rescue with his famous map of England and the self-representative number-series as illustrations of how thought could produce its own material. But many think: (1) that even in the self-representative number-series the contributions of the other instincts are discoverable; and (2) that, as an illustration of what thought can do in the way of producing its own differences when the other instincts are shut out as far as possible, the result is not very promising in the way of variety.

At about this stage of affairs the "instrumentalist," "pragmatist," or "evolutionist" (whatever you will) came into the discussion. He began by agreeing with Bradley and Royce that the one thing needful is continuity between the process and the content of thought. But the attempt to secure this by having thought produce its own material had, in his opinion, failed. Falling back, then, upon Bradley's position that thought draws its materials from the other instincts, and groping about for a new clue, he kept putting such questions as these: What determines *when* thought draws upon the other instincts for material? And what determines *what* materials it selects and just *what* it is to do with them? Observations in response to these inquiries seemed to show: (1) that the materials selected are always those of instincts which have come into conflict in the process of satisfying or "expressing" themselves; (2) that it seems to be the work of thought to deal with this conflict; (3) that it sets about this through analysis and synthesis; (4) that success or failure in effecting the resolution of the conflict marks the limits of this process of analysis and synthesis, i.e., determines specifically truth and error. Concerning truth-value he could say, so far, at least this much: that thought's satisfaction is not independent of the satisfaction of the other instincts. Rather does it seem to find its satisfaction precisely in quelling the dissatisfaction due to the conflict of the other instincts. Their extremity is thought's opportunity.

⁵ *Appearance and Reality*, 2nd ed., Appendix, p. 562 ff.

Still the breach between the process and the material of thought remained. But, said the instrumentalist, there is yet an alternative, namely, the reverse of Royce's experiment. That is, instead of attempting to meet Bradley's demand for continuity by having thought produce its own material, why not have *the material produce its own thought*? The term "produce," however, leaves the connection still too loose. Rather, why not regard these instincts in conflict *as developing into both the process and the content of thinking*? Just as the contents of the conflicting instincts are not left behind when thought begins, but go on over *into* the thinking as *its* content, so, on the other hand, there is no thought machine or faculty already there *in advance* waiting to receive the material of these instincts. The process of thought is just the process of this conflict of instincts working itself out through interaction with other and *for the present purpose* more stable values. Here no specter of the "given" need haunt our logic. For this ghost pursues only that logic which assumes a *pre-existent*, purely cognitive faculty, or machine, or agent, or entity of some sort, to which this instinctive material is to be "given."

It should be understood that we are not speaking here, as so many have supposed, of an absolute origin of thought in the universe. The instrumentalist may readily agree that as this conflict of instinctive values has always existed, so thought has always existed. And that as this previous thinking results in reconstructed instincts, so any present conflict is, in this sense and to this extent, an outcome of previous thinking. But he insists that this previous thinking, as the present, was not performed by a purely cognitive agent, or faculty, or instinct, *upon* a material "given" to it by the other instincts.

Also this view does not mean, from the standpoint of value, that this readjusting, revaluing stage into which the contents of the conflicting instincts pass has not its own peculiar value; nor that it may not be regarded as an "immediate" value, as all value, in a sense, must be. But it insists that we must keep in mind that the *content* of this "immediate" value is just this entire experience of conflicting instinctive values undergoing *mediation* and revaluation. It is the value of experience as undergoing control in contrast with experience in chaotic conflict; but not control *by* a special faculty or instinct of control. Control is a "stage" of experience, not a "part," or "side," or "phase" of it.

There is, to be sure, always in this revaluation or control stage some value (or values) that serves as the end or purpose. But the control is not *all* lodged in the purpose. The end is only one pole of the whole process of gaining control. In this sense the *end* is a *means* of control. But, again, the main point here is that the end is not furnished by an outside, independent faculty or instinct which operates as a special "end-factory," whose business it is to keep a supply ahead or, failing this, to make one "while you wait." This end is born of the conflicting instincts. It is bone of their bone and flesh of their flesh.

The implication is, then, that truth-value is not the satisfaction of a special instinct coördinate with the other instincts, but that it is the value of the entire experience of readjusting conflicting values through the process of redistribution of values effected by interaction with a wider and more permanent range of relevant values.⁶

I am painfully aware of the extremely general character of all this; that it gives no details of this revaluating stage; that it leaves unnoticed the different elements in the constitution of truth-value out of which spring the ambiguities of the term "truth," in which it is identified now with the subject, now with the predicate, of the judgment; now with what we *have* attained, again with what we are *seeking*. I am mindful that we have not touched that old, but ever-perplexing, tangle of relationships between truth-value on the one side, and ethical, æsthetic, and economic values on the other. We say in one breath that truth is a value belonging to judgment as such, and in the next we speak of ethical, æsthetic, and economic "judgments." Does truth, then, belong only to one kind of judgments? Or are ethical, æsthetic, and economic judgments special forms of truth? Or are they all coördinate values belonging to every judgment? Or are they stages through which every judgment passes? And if so, what determines these stages? But in the time allowed for the paper much must be sacrificed, and I wish in the minute or two left to anticipate two or three general objections.

The first is likely to be the usual challenge of this whole conflict-mediational view of thought and its value. "How," it will

⁶ One of the best papers I know of on the relations of thought and value is Professor H. W. Stuart's paper on "Valuation as a Logical Process" in *Studies in Logical Theory*, 227 ff.

be asked, "can it apply at the level of perceptual judgments?" e.g., "This is paper," or "This paper is white." Where is the conflict here? "Well," the instrumentalist will answer, "there may not be any conflict. But *if* there is not, then there is no judgment." And he will declare that here, as so often in philosophy, language bewrayeth us. We assume that, because we repeat the words that *have* expressed, or *might* express a judgment, they do now. And he will suggest that a simple but effective way to test the presence of a real "live" judgment, to use Dr. Thompson's term, is to preface the alleged judgment with the term "I think," or "I judge," or "I have an idea." If the statement "This is paper" means "I think," or "I judge," or "I have an idea" that it is paper, then it is a real judgment. If it does not mean this, it is merely a direct articulatory response to the visual and tactual stimulations, and is no more a judgment than tearing it, or poking it, or setting a match to it. Once more, judging means *inquiry*; inquiry means *doubt*; and doubt means *conflicting impulses*.

Again, it may be said even if conflict in immediate experience does lead to thinking, it is no less obvious that thinking leads to conflict. What experience more common, alas! than to find that the more we think the worse the tangle becomes. But this is only the familiar paradox of "fighting for peace" or a "painful cure of a pain." Obviously, as the conflict develops into the thinking stage it may prove to be much more far-reaching and deep-seated than it was immediately *felt* to be. Fortunately, on the other hand, it often, if not so often, turns out the other way.

Admitting once more the conflict character of knowledge, it will be said, as it has been said, that this problem is not experienced as a conflict of *instinctive* values, but is experienced from the very start *as* a cognitive problem, as a problem of knowledge. The answer is: Of course it is. For when the conflict in immediate values has gone beyond the blind pull-and-haul, thrashing-about stage, and has developed into the problem form, it is already in the cognitive stage, and is, of course, so experienced.

As for the objection that this view of thought value "subordinates" the intellectual "side" or value to the other "sides" or values, I confess I am unable to see how the conception of thought as the experience in which already constituted values are reconstituted, revalued, makes it subordinate to these values.

The converse would be as true—and as false. As true and as false as to say: “Speaking is subordinate to words or painting to colors.”

Finally, it may be said that this “instrumental” view of thought destroys the character of immediacy which is fundamental in value. This assumes that the value of an instrument must itself be instrumental. But this is akin to the psychologizing that regards a perception of a heap as a heap of perceptions. The mediating character of thought no more conflicts with the immediacy of its value than the movements of a horse conflict with its color.

A. W. MOORE: *Pragmatism and Its Critics*, pp. 111-127.
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SUGGESTIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Make a list of the different forms of the instinct theory of thought discussed by Moore in the first part of his argument, and briefly define each.
2. What are the two paradoxes in the instinct theory, taken generally?
3. What are the chief defects in a formal theory of truth?
4. Why does Moore reject the compromise theory which makes thought independent as a process but derives its content from other instincts?
5. Why does Moore reject the Bradley-Royce theory that thought can create its own material? State his two criticisms in your own words.
6. Define and give an illustration of an act of thinking as it is interpreted by Moore.
7. Would you agree with Moore's implication that the material of thinking is always instinctive material (conflicts among instincts)? Why or why not?
8. Make a list of all the objections to the instrumental theory which Moore takes up after stating his theory. Try to add at least one additional objection of your own, giving an example to make it clear.
9. What is Moore's theory of error? Does it seem to you to be the same as that of Murray in the preceding selection?
10. Compare Murray's doctrine of the truth-claim and the process of validating a truth-claim with Moore's definition of a truth-value. Are the two views essentially alike, or do you see any important differences?

CHAPTER IV

PRAGMATIST SOLUTIONS OF THE BODY-MIND PROBLEM

I. MIND AND MATTER, by *Joseph K. Hart*

Analysis

Hart argues that all that we know, all the objects of knowledge whatsoever, must be inside of experience. He uses the Constitution of the United States to illustrate the proposition that reality is not in documents or static things, but only in "*the actual run of events in experience.*" This run of events in its entirety is the whole of nature as we know it and it is the whole of experience. Experience contains two aspects, one of sequence or order and this is matter; the other is the logical connection between events or the meanings of events, and this is mind. These two aspects are mutually necessary and supplementary, and both are present in every event. We must always emphasize the whole of which these two are aspects, if we would solve the body-mind problem. Hart goes on to define matter more closely, holding that it is not a cause but a *condition* of the appearance of mind in nature. When mind first appears in history it is a "system of meanings" of the primitive social group. Hart here briefly classifies events into natural events and those due to intention (human?) or choice. Among the former some are subject to *control* and all conceivably might be. It is this idea of control which is the clue to the relation between mind and matter. Every event in nature has an order and we control it by learning what its order is. Mind is "the emergence of order in events which carry forward to a desired end." When such mind becomes habit it relapses to the level of matter. Only when mind rises to the level of controlling what happens and becomes "the instrument of directed changes in nature" does it attain to the position of a new aspect of reality. But there is still a higher level than this *general* mind, and that is mind as it is embodied in individual centers of mind. These are extremely rare for they require complete freedom from the customs and the grooves of general mind, and such freedom is extremely difficult to attain. It is in such individualized centers of mind that science emerges. Another way of stating this is that nature or experience as a whole is creative and in individualized minds it becomes conscious of its creativeness. But in the moment of creativity the physical and the mental are not separate, but revert to the undifferentiated and preanalytic stage of pure *experiencing*. This fact is illustrated from the history of physical theories. Hart explains why we think matter is more real than mind. It is partly due to the fact that the "mind becomes its own executioner." Centuries of domi-

nation by the doctrine that the truth is some fact of sense experience makes us think that mind is unreal, for it is admittedly not a fact of sense experience. Then, too, we are mentally lazy and this makes us seek a conception of mind which is free from the strenuous life of a creative mind. So we imagine an eternal mind or soul, cut loose from matter, and like a Platonic idea or form. Hart concludes with a brief summary of his theory that there are two levels of mind—general and individual.

What the world is, or may be, "outside of and beyond our knowledge," no one will ever know, as must be obvious, although there is much at any particular time *in* experience that is *not in knowledge*. Hence, when we seek for "something real" outside of relationships in our experience, we seek an impossible abstraction; and if we should ever be able to find, as some seekers have professed to do, such an "ultimate reality," we should find something so idealized, so attenuated, so remote from the world in which we actually live, as to be not merely irrelevant, but to be perverting in its effects upon our living—as is the case with the findings of many esoteric religious sects. This does not mean, let the reader be assured, that there is no *existence* outside our knowledge. It merely means that "objects of knowledge" are *inside*, not outside our experience; that we cannot *know* anything save as it comes inside the areas of knowledge.

What is "reality"? What is the Constitution of the United States? Some would reply: "A certain document written in 1787, put into operation in 1789, to which have been added some nineteen several amendments." But such an answer would be legalistic, metaphysical, mythical. The real constitution of the United States—as was abundantly demonstrated in recent war-time—is certain basic social relationships in our national, group and individual living, upon which, often by the narrowest margins, the decisions of the Supreme Court turn. The Fourteenth amendment has come to mean whatever the Supreme Court needs to have it mean at any specific time. The Fifteenth amendment means nothing at all—in many parts of the country. The First amendment means very little. The Eighteenth may go the same way. Political "reality" is not in documents; "reality" is not in things: *reality* is in the *actual run of events in experience*.

This "run of events," taken by and large, past and present, severally and inclusively, makes up the "order of nature," as we *know* it. Within this "order of nature" we find two aspects, two characters that may be tentatively differentiated, namely:

first, that of the sequence, the regularity or irregularity of these events, their order or lack of order; and second, that of logical connection of events—their relationships, interdependences, meanings. Both these characters are present in our experience, and both are *real*. At least neither is *more* real than the other. These two characters of events in experience appear, when they emerge into critical examination, as Matter and Mind: the *sequence* of events in experience and nature is what we mean by “matter”; the *meanings* of events in experience and nature is what we mean by “mind.” When our experiences “hold together” in certain ways, we say that we used “iron” in our constructions. When we want our experiences to operate in certain ways, we use “gold,” or “wood,” as the case may require. That is to say, *matter* is the means by which we determine the order and direction of our experiences.

Now, “mind” and “matter” are not strangers to each other: they are not set over against each other in nature, as they often are in our theories. They need each other: they are implied in each other; they are pertinent to each other; and the long efforts of philosophers to isolate them from each other, to set up invidious comparisons between them, to make one of them “noble” and the other “base,” or to deny the meanings of the one or the other, have not only been socially and morally disastrous, but they have been futile in logic, because they have set up more problems than they have solved. Doubtless, “matter” and “mind” are not to be confused; but, on the other hand, they are not to be so separated as to make the question as to how “mind” can operate in a “body” impossible of intelligent consideration.

To be sure, in any logical analysis, factors that are distinguishable must be set apart for purposes of intellectual clarification and mental grasping; but *the whole*—of anything—has an integrity that is always destroyed (as well as realized) in any process of analysis; and that original wholeness—enriched by new content of details—must be brought back into experience as quickly as possible when the analysis has been completed. *Reality* does not reside in details: a flower is not “made up” of its “parts.” The details are *refuse* left over from analysis, good for nothing but to be swept out upon the “dump.” “Matter” by itself is refuse; “mind” by itself is refuse: *reality* is a wholeness in which both appear.

So, for better or for worse, these two characters in experience and in nature must be studied in relationship to each other,

not in separation or divorce from each other. . . . For though we must seek the significance of each of these characters of experience in our most critical moods, the original wholeness of experience must not be ignored, or denied. We shall follow these two characters further into experience and nature.

Matter is not an "independent existence": present-day physics completely exhibits this fact. Nor is it merely a passing "event." It is a property of events; it is a general character of events. Nothing "material" is "eternal": certainly an atom is not. Scientists are now telling us that the atom is but a temporary equilibrium of stresses within the whirling forces of the universe. Matter is the promise and premise of orderliness in events, the predictability of events. Matter is not the "cause" of mind; it is no more than a *condition* of the manifestation and appreciation of mind. In short we may say that matter is that character of events by means of which, as our knowledge grows, we can more and more nearly determine the sequence and order of those events.

When we first come upon "mind," in history, it is a *system of meanings*—the "folkways" and "mores" of the primitive social group: inside this system of meanings, the primitive group's "run of events," or current of living, is embedded. Everything happens inside this system of meanings: these folkways and mores continuously give meaning to any specific event. Hence, from the first, *meaning* is as much a part of an event as its sequence, or place. A thundercloud *means* rain, quite as truly as it *gives* rain: its reality is quite as much in its meaning as in its giving. Mind is just as real as matter—if that question has any relevance.

Events vary both in their sequences and in their meanings. Some events are purely "natural": they just occur, without intention or choice—like a cyclone. Some are more orderly, occurring in some definite sequence, directed to results—like the growing of a tree. Not all "natural" events are, at present, subject to "control"; but it seems likely that they might all be, eventually, related into sequences, in such ways as to make a control possible if it were worth while to do so. This concept of "control" brings "sequence" and "meaning" into a single clue.

Even in what may look like the most chaotic of natural on-goings, something of sequence can be found. Even the cyclone has a "natural history." Events follow each other; they exist

alongside each other: day follows night; growth comes with the coming of the sun; the day and the sun always travel together. The world is full of sequences and co-existences in events.

These orders of sequences and co-existences can be disentangled from the mere masses of events, and made useful for the purposes of forecast and direction. The farmer can find out the best time to plant his corn, or his cabbages, or his cucumbers. He discovers sequences of events that are important; and in finding out those sequences, he develops and demonstrates his "intelligence," his mind. So mind appears: mind is, in its earlier forms, the emergence of orderliness in events which carry forward to a desired end.

Such mind may be merely habit—the repetition of events—and as such it may degenerate into mere sequence, become physical in character, and end as *matter*. Mind easily becomes set in physical ways, and becomes *finished*!

But mind can be more than this mere repetition of events, world without end. Mind may become direction of events, organization of new sequences, controlling events to selected, reconstructed, or deferred and distant aims, requiring nice calculations and minute adjustments. Hence, mind, escaping from habit and the folkways, may become the instrument of directed changes in nature. In this sense, mind as meaning and control tends everywhere to put its impress upon matter, so that it is not an idle dream to suppose that "nature" may some day cease to be as much mere "brute fact" as it is now, and may become, more and more, controlled and enjoyable experience.

But mind, even in this general sense, is much limited in its ability to escape from the fascinations of the regular and the orderly: it falls into and enjoys—in spite of all sorts of concomitant evils—the grooves of habit and custom which have been set in matter, like ruts in a highway. These ruts obstruct when life seeks to change direction, when the high-way is to be made over. This is seen when a new invention comes along: when, for example, the old wagon fails and the steam engine has come in. At such times all the rigidities of matter come to the defence of the old tool; and all the old mind—of habit and custom—argues for the old against the new. For the new will not and cannot run in the old grooves. The steam engine changes the speed of living; it changes the character of tasks; and the relationships of groups and individuals will have to be made over: institutions will feel the impact of this new invention—

church and state and politics and the home, as well as industry. The new invention introduces new sequences of events into experience; it calls for new adjustments of all old sequences to each other and to the new; it calls for a more or less complete recasting of meanings, relationships, logical connections: that is to say, it calls for new mind in the race.

The new situation needs more flexible, more sensitively organized and concentrated, more tirelessly persistent mind. Such characteristics are not usually found in *general mind*, folkway mind, mob mind: such mind is frequently less flexible than the demands made by the new situation call for; it is more loosely organized, more diffused, and though momentarily explosive, it is easily exhausted. Flexibility of mind, sensitivity of attention and persistence of concentration are usually to be found, not in this general mind, but in individual centres of mind, in individual minds.

But, individual minds are rare. Individuality in mind connotes freedom from the grooves of general mind; the initiation of observation of nature and experience from some independent standpoint; the presentation of these observations to critical examination; and the elaboration of novel opinions upon the basis of these critical examinations. Such individual minds are just as "natural" as are the more conventional types: they are simply more rare—like most precious things in nature. In such minds, traditions, the folkways, customs tend to disintegrate: new sequences, new meanings appear—and "science" may emerge!

In such a mind, the Ptolemaic universe, for example, passes away and the Copernican takes its place—the new universe being properly named for the mind in which it germinated. In such a mind the world that was made in six days passes away and a universe without beginning and without end takes its place—though the fact that such a universe takes its place in the mind, say, of Herbert Spencer does not mean that it will take its place in the "general mind." In the "general mind" old worlds and old fragments of old worlds are piled about in amazing confusion, like articles in an ancient attic. But in individual minds, here and there, now and then, old systems dissolve and new orders offering greater freedom to more individual minds, emerge. Now and again, in some individual mind, such as Jefferson or Lincoln, appears the germ of a social order in which all individuals will be, and will be accepted as, candidates for

eventual freedom, individuality; but no such germ has yet been able to mature. The general human climate is still too rigorous for any plant so tender.

It is no accident that most great scientific discoveries bear the name of some great man: "Newton's Law of Gravitation" is a "law of gravitation" such as could grow up in a certain individualized centre of mind at a certain time in the seventeenth century. Since the coming of Einstein, the fact that it was, in truth, *Newton's* law has become more unmistakable.

So nature is *creative*; and *mind* is the aspect of nature in which this creative element comes to awareness of itself. But every such creative moment involves "matter" as well as "mind." However, in any creative moment—for example, in the absorbing research experiences of the scientist in his laboratory—the *physical* and the *mental*, matter and mind, revert to nature, to an undifferentiated *experiencing*, which is neither physical nor mental, neither matter nor mind, but just intense experiencing: something prehistoric, pre-analytic. For example, when the physicist is studying the problem of the nature of the atom, he finds certain discrepancies in its movements: he finds it exhibiting qualities that do not comport with current assumptions as to its structure. He finds contradictions between old theories and his own observations; he finds contradictions among various aspects of his own observations. He sees these contradictions tearing the old arguments, the old assumptions, the old atom, all to pieces. He becomes absorbed in this dissolving of the established world: new creation is taking place in his experience, as in the experience of Copernicus or of Newton.

New elements come into view: the atom, as a solid bit of identical "matter" passes out of the picture; in its place comes a sort of solar system, in which certain "bodies" move with velocities approaching that of light, and in which the arrangement of these "bodies" determines chemical quality. Are these elements under observation "mental" or "physical"? The scientist does not stop to ask; such a question would not only be irrelevant, it would be ruinous: for it would miss the problem and undo the work of hours, or days, or a lifetime. He calls the new "body" in his observations an "electron." Its place in the atom is hypothetical, problematical. An hypothesis begins as "mental," a guess, more or less plausible. An hypothesis may explain the conditions or it may not. The observer's opinion, integrating his attention to various phases of

his research is fluid: it flows back and forth. In the long run, as certainty grows, the hypothesis, i.e., the electron, will organize itself into the physical and become solid part of the structure of the atom; or it will return into the mental and be rejected: if it fits it becomes physical; if it does not fit, it remains mental. The scientist will not be able to decide which it will be until the whole investigation is over and the world of physical things begin to recompose.

Why then do we classify—in our ordinary estimates—"matter" as "dead" but "eternal" and "mind" as "living" but "temporary"? Partly because we are still dominated by primitive fears which distort all our immediate experiences, making the things of *sense* loom big in our eyes, and which dominate our critical experiences, making "mind" its own executioner. The "mental" is more precarious than the "material" but it is no less *real*. It is in fact far more real to most of us most of the time.

Moreover, we have been subjected for several centuries now to the doctrine that "truth" is "fact" and that "fact" is always accepted on the evidence of the senses. And, since we cannot see or taste or hear or feel or smell "mind," nor grasp the creaking of its joints, we have accepted the doctrine that it has no "reality"—defining "reality" as that which can be "sensed." So, excluding by definition the thing that we seek for, we turn around and exhibit great surprise at not finding it within the terms of our definition!

But also, we have been brought up, since primitive times, to be mentally lazy: we are not after a "mind" that is natural, related to nature, intimate in natural processes, effective in achieving changes in nature; we want a "mind" that is distinct from gross "matter," above nature, framed in Platonic splendor and carrying its own writ of eternal assurance. It wearies us to face the real tasks of mind: to give meaning and direction to events; to select desirable sequences of events, and by long investigation, learn how to combine those sequences in such ways as to produce stability, affirmative quality, beauty and peace upon the earth; to understand the mind's own nature; to choose its own destiny; to work out its own salvation, in the midst of spaces and times; and by the uses of physical relationships, to organize a world that shall be more enduringly enriching and satisfying. We want "minds" that will do these things or will have done these things while we go fishing. Not

finding such "minds" we surrender to some primitive fear and we erect that fear into a materialistic metaphysic.

But, in spite of the absolutisms of our younger psychologists and critics, knowledge began before 1910, even before 1907. Socrates was a not unimportant figure in the world's life; Plato and Aristotle are still worth knowing. "Mind" is, first, a general system of meanings—inclusive of all existent meanings; and it is promise of more meanings now vaguely hidden in the fringes of experience. "Mind" may never be anything else; for millions it *is* never anything else. They share the folkway meanings of their families and groups and are content.

But also mind may become individualized, escaping from the grooves of custom, striking out on its own lines, and so giving new patterns to the world, and new character to the events of an age. Mind may grow, elaborate, change, emerge into new areas, as realistically as does the physical aspect of experience. Such natural mind may, perhaps, never achieve the glory of a Platonic heaven; but it can and does, like Plato himself and all other individualized centres of mind, help to clear away some of the mists from the face of nature; some of the dust from the objects of experience; and enriching the ranges of life's meanings and controls, it redeems experience from a few more of its primitive fears, and gives to life a luminosity and a courage that have imperishable quality.

JOSEPH K. HART: *Inside Experience*, pp. 117-130. Copyright, 1927, by Longmans, Green & Co. Reprinted by permission.

SUGGESTIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. How can you reconcile Hart's saying that matter is no more ignoble than mind with his theory that mind is a higher level of nature than habit, which is a relapse back into matter?
2. What do you think of Hart's principle that reality resides only in the whole and not in the parts or details?
3. Does calling matter a *condition* rather than a cause of mind enable Hart to avoid the difficulty of making mind a late product in the evolution of what is not essentially mind?
4. Does Hart's implication that mind begins in history with primitive social groups exclude the possibility of animals having minds? Or do you think that Hart would say that animals have what he calls *general* mind?
5. Does Hart have two or three levels of mind in his theory? That is to say, do you think that the first emergence of mind, before its relapse into habit, is a level of mind prior to general mind,

or is it identical with general mind? Does he think the first emergence was in an individualized center or was it social?

6. Compare Hart's account of the creativity of mind in physical science with Mead's theory of scientific method above, p. 469.
7. What type of theory do you think Hart's theory of the relation of the body and mind is? See the chart from Pratt above, p. 393. Classify Hart's theory according to the various types of theory listed on the chart, or, if you think it different from any mentioned by Pratt, give it a name and place it with reference to the theory listed on the chart which seems to you to be most like Hart's theory.

II. A CO-ORDINATION THEORY, by *Boyd H. Bode*

Analysis

Bode begins by stating the ordinary view which emphasizes the similarities between reflex action and conscious behavior. No doubt the two are continuous but Bode thinks that conscious behavior has a distinctive feature about it which is not present in reflexes. This feature is that the various movements in a conscious act are started simultaneously, whereas in a reflex action they are successive. This means that conscious behavior rises to a new level above that of reflex action by virtue of the fact that it involves a certain process of organization. The units in the organization are "systems of neural discharge" due "either to the inherited or the acquired structure of the nervous system." Yet this is not purely mechanical. The reorganization of these systems is continuous and varied. Conscious activity constructs its pattern as the act proceeds, whereas a reflex act presupposes a set pattern in the nervous system. Conscious acts are purposively directed, as is illustrated by every act of attention. There is always a certain selectiveness of response in conscious behavior and this is its most important trait. The miracle of consciousness is the conversion of future results into present stimuli. To be conscious is to be guided in present action by a future possible result. This is illustrated by the behavior of a base-ball player. Bode then gives a more precise account of the way our submerged activities turn into perceptions, using the perception of the sharpness of a razor's edge as an example. In all perception a contingent result becomes operative as a present fact. "Consciousness is a name for the control of conduct by future results or consequences." Consciousness begins when such stimuli are acquired by any organism. Situations of uncertainty and perplexity are different only in degree from perceptual experiences, as is shown by an interpretation of the experience of uttering a sentence. New coördinations between the sensory stimulus and the neural organization of the response are made at each successive step in a conscious act. This is a unique and distinctively new mode of operation, which Bode calls intelligence or consciousness. He criticizes parallelism. This solution of the body-mind problem treats consciousness as simply a more complicated form of reflex action to which intelligence adds nothing. Warren's statement of parallelism is quoted to prove this statement.

The interactionist, on the other hand, makes the mental a link in the causal series, but treats the mental as a different kind of a cause from the physical. There are difficulties in such a dualism, which Bode has no space to consider, but he points out that such behavior as embodies foresight, the sense of obligation, and logical reasoning is absolutely inexplicable on the basis of an interaction theory. The various difficulties in parallelism and interactionism are held to be due to a prejudice against accepting a view such as Bode defends, and which he briefly restates and summarizes at the end of his concluding paragraph.

It is evident that the attempt to ascertain the nature of consciousness and of psychology from the standpoint of behavior is committed to the assumption that the behavior in question is of a distinctive kind. The justification of this assumption will enable us to formulate the definitions which we seek. Discussions of conscious behavior ordinarily emphasize the similarity between conscious and reflex behavior rather than the difference. An attitude of expectancy, for example, is usually conceived as a sort of temporary reflex. Certain nervous connections are organized for the occasion, so that, when a given stimulus arrives, it will induce its appropriate response. This situation is best exemplified, perhaps, in simple reaction-experiments, in which the subject makes a certain predetermined response upon presentation of the stimulus. The process is supposed to be of the reflex type throughout, the only difference being that ordinary reflexes are relatively permanent and unvarying, whereas a prearranged response to a stimulus has to do with a reflex that is made to order so as to meet the exigencies of the moment.

For certain purposes such a description of conscious behavior is no doubt sufficiently accurate. Our present concern, however, is with the differences between these temporary organizations and ordinary reflexes. In order to bring out these differences, let us introduce a slight complication into our reaction-experiment and suppose that the subject is to make one of two alternative responses, according to the nature of the stimulus. His state of expectancy is accompanied by a certain bodily "set" or preparedness for the coming event, although the precise nature of the event is a matter of uncertainty. His nervous system is in readiness to respond this way or that, or rather, it has already started to act in both of the alternative ways. If the subject is to respond with the right hand to one stimulus and with the left hand to the other, both hands are in a state of activity before the stimulus appears. The organization of the temporary reflex through the agency of the cerebral cortex

could not be achieved were it not for the fact that all the movements entering into the organization are nascently aroused before the spring is touched which permits the act to unroll itself in orderly sequence.

The various successive movements, then, which make up our temporary reflex achieve their relationship to one another from the fact that they are started simultaneously, and this peculiarity constitutes a distinctive feature. Apparently this feature is absent from true reflexes. An act of swallowing, performed unconsciously, may start the complicated processes of digestion, but it is merely the first act of a series. There is no evidence that the movements of the stomach and of the other organs concerned in digestion must be presupposed before the act of swallowing can take place. The swallowing may start the other processes, but we cannot say that these other processes react back upon the first act and make it one of swallowing rather than something else. Yet this "back stroke" is precisely what is necessary in our reaction-experiment, for it is by virtue of this fact that the organization of the temporary reflex becomes a possibility. The first response cannot take place until the last is provided for. Thus the immediate act of looking has embodied in it the activity that is to follow later. The looking is not simply with the eye, but with the hands that are to complete the response. The optical response is a response which, in the language of Bergson, prefigures or sketches out the act of a later moment. The nervous system is enabled to act as a unit, because the movements that are to occur at a later time are represented in the first stage of the complete act. The first stage, accordingly, does not occur independently, but *as* a preliminary to the second. With an imperfect organization of the entire response, it may happen that the subsequent movements are not suppressed until their proper moment arrives, but appear in advance of their scheduled time. In writing, for example, we frequently omit words or add to a word the final letter of some word that belongs to a subsequent part of the sentence. An error of this sort could hardly occur so readily in the course of an act that belongs to the type of the true reflex. . . .

It seems clear, then, that conscious behavior involves a certain *process* of organization which constitutes a differential. The units entering into this process are "definitely organized systems of neural discharge," the antecedent organization of these

several systems being due either to the inherited or to the acquired structure of the nervous system. Given a certain amount of plasticity, the nervous system builds up specific forms of response for certain objects or situations, and these forms of response subsequently become the material from which new organizations or new modes of response are constructed. The achievements of the past, accordingly, become stepping-stones to new achievement. The new organization, moreover, is not determined by a mechanism antecedently provided, but has a peculiar flexibility, so as to meet the demands of a new situation. That is, a new mode of procedure is adopted. Instead of being a purely mechanical reaction, the response that results from the situation is tentative or experimental in character, and "by a process of trial and error, perhaps, the elements necessary to effect the adaptive response may be assembled and the problem solved."

We may add at once that the reorganization which is required to constitute conscious behavior varies a great deal in extent. In an act that is more or less habitual, a comparatively slight modification of the corresponding organized system of neural discharge will suffice to harmonize the conflicting elements, whereas on other occasions a more extensive modification is required. But in any case it appears that there is a certain impropriety in describing conscious behavior in terms of a temporary reflex, since the study of this behavior is concerned with the organization of the discordant elements, not as a result, but primarily as a process. In a reflex act we may suppose that the stimulus which evokes the first stage in the response is like the first in a row of upstanding bricks, which in falling knocks down another. That is, the reflex arc is built up by agencies that are quite independent of the subsequent act. The arc is all set up and ready for use by the time the reflex act appears upon the scene. In the case of conscious activity, on the other hand, we find a very different state of affairs. The arc is not first constructed and then used, but is constructed as the act proceeds; and this progressive organization is, in the end, what is meant by conscious behavior. If the course of a reflex act may be compared with traveling in a railroad train, the progress of a conscious act is more like that of a band of explorers, who hew their path and build their bridges as they go along. The direction of the act is not determined from without but from within; the end is internal to the process.

This process of organization and purposive direction is exemplified in every act of attention. Is that noise, for example, a horse in the street, or is it the rain on the roof? What we find in such a situation is not a paralysis of activity, but a redirection. The incompatibility of responses is purely relative. There is indeed a mutual inhibition of the responses for hoof beats and rain respectively, in the sense that neither has undisputed possession of the field; but this very inhibition sets free the process of attention, in which the various responses participate and coöperate. There is no static balancing of forces, but rather a process in which the conflict is simply a condition for an activity of a different kind. If I am near a window facing the street, my eye turns thither for a clue; if the appeal to vision be eliminated, the eye becomes unseeing and coöperates with the ear by excluding all that is irrelevant to the matter in hand. In this process the nervous system functions as a unit, with reference to the task of determining the source and character of the sound. This task or problem dominates the situation. A voice in an adjoining room may break in, but only as something to be ignored and shut out; whereas a voice in the street may become all-absorbing as possibly indicating the driver of the hypothetical horse. That is, the reason why the conflict of responses does not end in a deadlock, but in a redirection, is that a certain selectiveness of response comes into play. Out of the mass of more or less inchoate activities a certain response is selected as a rallying-point for the rest, and this selection is of a purposive character. The selection is determined by reference to the task in hand, which is to restore a certain harmony of response. Accordingly, that response is selected which gives promise of forwarding the business of the moment. By virtue of this selective character, one of the constituents of the total activity becomes exalted among its fellows and is entrusted with the function of determining further behavior.

The purpose of the discussion, up to this point, is to put forward this selective or teleological character as the fundamental and differentiating trait of conscious behaviour; and our task, accordingly, is to give an account of the nature and *modus operandi* of this purposive control. This control, it is evident, consists in giving direction to behavior with reference to results that are still in the future. The basis for this anticipation of the future is furnished by the nascent responses which foreshadow further activity, even while they are still under the

thralldom of the inhibitions which hold them back. These suppressed activities furnish a sort of diagram or sketch of further possible behavior, and the problem of consciousness is the problem of making the result or outcome of these incipient responses effective in the control of behavior. Future results or consequences must be converted into present stimuli; and the accomplishment of this conversion is the miracle of consciousness. To be conscious is to have a future possible result of present behavior embodied as a present existence functioning as a stimulus to further behavior. Thus the qualities of a perceptual experience may be interpreted, without exception, as anticipations of the results of activities which are as yet in an embryonic stage. The results of the activity that is as yet partly suppressed are already expressed or anticipated in the perception. The present experience may, as James says, "shoot its perspective far before it, irradiating in advance the regions in which lie the thoughts as yet unborn."¹ A baseball player, for example, who is all "set" to field a ball as a preliminary to a further play, sees the ball, not simply as an approaching object, but as ball-to-be-caught-and-then-thrown-to-first-base. Moreover, the ball, while still on the way, is a ball-that-may-bound-to-the-right-or-to-the-left. The corresponding movements of the player to the right or left, and the act of throwing, although present only as inhibited or incipient acts, are nevertheless embodied in the visual experience. Similarly my couch looks soft and inviting, because the optical stimulation suggests or prompts, not only the act of lying down, but also the kind of relaxation that is made possible by a comfortable bed. So likewise the tiger's jaws and claws look cruel and horrible, because in that perception are reflected the incipient movements of defense and recoil which are going on in the body of the observer. Perception, like our air castles, or like dreams in the Freudian theory, presents what is at best but a suggestion or program in the guise of accomplished fact.

The projection, however, of our submerged activities into our perceptions requires a more precise statement. According to the foregoing contention, the appearance, for example, of a razor's edge as sharp is the sensory correlate of an incipient response which, if it were to attain full-blown perfection, would be the reaction to a cut. By hypothesis, however, the response is inhibited, and it is this inhibition which calls forth the perception of the object. If the response encountered no obstruction, adap-

¹ *Psychology*, Vol. I, p. 256.

tation would be complete and perception would not occur. Since there is a blocking of the response, nature resorts to a special device in order to overcome the difficulty, and this device consists in furnishing the organism with a new type of stimulus. The razor as perceived does not actually cut just now, but bodies forth the quality "will cut," i.e., the perceived attribute derives its character from what the object will, or may, do at a future time. That is, a perceived object is a stimulus which controls or directs the organism by results which have not yet occurred, but which will, or may, occur in the future. The uniqueness of such a stimulus lies in the fact that a contingent result somehow becomes operative as a present fact; the future is transferred into the present so as to become effective in the guidance of behavior.

This control by a future that is made present is what constitutes consciousness. A living body may respond to an actual cut by a knife on purely mechanical or reflex principles; but to respond to a cut by anticipation, i.e., to behave with reference to a merely possible or future injury, is manifestly an exhibition of intelligence. Not that there need be any conscious reference to the future as future in the act. Merely to see the object as "sharp" is sufficient to give direction to conduct. But "sharp" is equivalent to "will cut"; the quality of sharpness is a translation of future possibility into terms of present fact, and as thus translated the future possibility becomes a factor in the control of behavior. Perception, therefore, is a point where present and future coincide. What the object *will* do is, in itself, just a contingency, an abstract possibility, but in perception this possibility clothes itself in the garments of present, concrete fact and thus provides the organism with a different environment. The environment provides a new stimulus by undergoing a certain kind of change, i.e., by exercising a peculiar function of control. This control is seeing, and the whole mystery of consciousness is just this rendering of future stimulations or results into terms of present existence. Consciousness, accordingly, is a name for a certain change that takes place in the stimulus; or, more specifically, it is a name for the control of conduct by future results or consequences.

To acquire such a stimulus and to become conscious are one and the same thing. As was indicated previously, the conscious stimulus is correlated with the various inherited and acquired motor tendencies which have been set off and which are strug-

gling for expression, and the uniqueness of the stimulus lies in the fact that the adaptive value of these nascent motor tendencies becomes operative as the determining principle in the organization of the response. The response, for example, to "sharp" or "will cut" is reminiscent of an earlier reaction in which the organism engaged in certain defensive movements as the result of an actual injury. That is, the response to "sharp" is a nascent or incipient form of a response which at the time of its first occurrence was the expression of a maladaptation. The response that is induced when an object is seen as sharp would be biologically bad, if it were completed, and the fact that the object is seen as sharp means that this result is foreshadowed and operates as a stimulus to prevent such maladaptation. Similarly the couch which meets my weary eye becomes a stimulus to repose because the nascent activity which is aroused would be biologically good if completed. In any case the character of the stimulus is determined by the adaptive value which the incipient activity would have if it were carried out. Consciousness, accordingly, is just a future adaptation that has been set to work so as to bring about its own realization. The future thus becomes operative in the present, in much the same way as the prospects for next year's crop may be converted by the farmer into ready money with which to secure the tools for its production. . . .

Situations of uncertainty and expectancy, as exemplified by the familiar child-candle incident, are of interest because they emphasize both the anticipatory character of experience and the peculiar reconstruction of the stimulus. These situations, however, differ merely in degree, not in kind, from other experiences; their merit is that in them the distinctive character of conscious life is writ large. To say that they are conscious situations is to say that they are so constituted that the possibilities of a subsequent moment are embodied in them as a positive quality. In them the present moment embodies a future that is contingent. And similarly the response has neither the predetermined organization of the reflex nor the aimless character of a response that issues in a set of random movements. It is, so to speak, of a generalized character, like the paleontological specimens that foreshadow in their structure the advent of both fish and reptile. This form of organization, however, while exemplified most strikingly in situations of uncertainty, pertains to all conscious behavior. In uttering a sentence, for example, we know in advance what we are going to say, yet the

sentence shapes itself into definite form only as we proceed; or perhaps we get "stuck," and by hemming and hawing bear witness that a struggle for a certain kind of organization is going on. The same word in different contexts is a different word in each instance, by virtue of the coloring that it takes on from what is to follow after. And this is equally true of our most casual experiences. The auditory or visual object that we happen to notice and immediately afterwards ignore is apprehended with reference to the possibility of warranting further attention, or else it presents itself as an intruder that is to be excluded in order that we may go on with the concern of the moment. All experience is a kind of intelligence, a control of present behavior with reference to future adjustment. To be in experience at all is to have the future operate in the present.

This reference to the future may be in the nature of an end or goal that controls a series of activities or it may be of a momentary and casual kind. In any case the character of the stimulus changes with the progress of the act. The book on the table must become successively book-to-be-reached-for, book-to-be-picked-up, and book-to-be-opened, unless the process is to drop back to the type of reflex. This development of the stimulus gives genuine continuity, since every moment in the process comes as a fulfilment of its predecessor and as a transition-point to its successor. In a purely mechanical act response follows stimulus like the successive strokes of a clock. It is a touch-and-go affair; the stimulus presses the button and then subsides, while the neural organization does the rest. In conscious behavior, on the other hand, stimulus and response keep step with each other. A mere succession of stimuli would reduce conscious behavior to a series of explosive jerks, on the principle of the gasoline engine. To be conscious at all is to duplicate in principle the agility of the tight-rope performer, who continuously establishes new coördinations according to the exigencies of the moment and with constant reference to the controlling consideration of keeping right side up. The sensory stimulus provides continuously for its own rehabilitation or appropriate transformation, and in a similar way the neural organization is never a finished thing, but is in constant process of readjustment to meet the demands of an adaptation that still lies in the future.

It is this relationship of present response to the response of the next moment that constitutes the distinctive trait of conscious behavior. The relatively unorganized responses of the

present moment, in becoming reflected in the experienced object, reveal their outcome or meaning before they have become overt, and thus provide the conditions of intelligent action. In other words, future consequences become transformed into a stimulus for further behavior. We are confronted here with a distinctive mode of operation, which must be properly recognized, if we are to give a consistent and intelligent account of conscious behavior. On the other hand, if we refuse to recognize the advent here of a new category, intelligence becomes an anomaly and mystery deepens into contradiction. Since intelligence or consciousness must be provided for somehow, we are forced back upon either interactionism or else epiphenomenalism, more or less disguised under a euphonious name, such as psycho-physical parallelism or the double-aspect theory. That is, the relation of stimulus and response is either reduced to plain cause and effect or else is rejected altogether and supplanted by a bare concomitance of the physical and mental series. In either case conscious behavior is reduced to the type of reflex action, the only issue between the two doctrines being the question whether or not it is necessary or permissible to interpolate mental links in the causal chain.

According to the doctrine of parallelism, conscious behavior is nothing more than a complicated form of reflex, which goes on without any interference on the part of mind or intelligence. Intelligence adds nothing to the situation except itself; it carries no implications or new significance with regard to conduct. The psychic correlate is permitted to tag along, but the explanations of response remain the same in kind as they were before they reached the level of consciousness. "Mere complexity should not becloud the issue. Every brain process, like every reflex activity, is presumably the result of physico-chemical processes. The assumption of a mysterious intuition or 'psychic force' adds nothing to the mechanistic explanation, even when the latter is most fragmentary. The interactionists go out of their way unnecessarily in assuming a special activity of consciousness to account for the dislocation of reactions from sensations. The nervous organization suffices to explain it. Distant-stimuli and central stimuli coöperate to bring about anticipatory reactions; foresight is but the conscious side of this process. The phenomenon is *both* physical and mental."²

² H. C. Warren, *Psychological Review*, Vol. XXI, p. 93. See below, p. 568 f.

The passage just quoted is fairly typical. Since the mental is an aspect or concomitant of the physical it is clearly entitled to an occasional honorable mention, but the fact remains that the explanation of behavior is to be given wholly in terms of neural organization. The mental is quite literally an "also ran." To say that a physico-chemical process is also mental is of no particular significance as long as it is implied that the end or goal of the process plays no part in shaping the course of events. The mental simply gives dignity to the occasion, like the sedan chair with no bottom, in which the Irishman's admirers, according to James's story, ran him along to the place of banquet and which prompted the hero to remark: "Faith, if it wasn't for the honor of the thing, I might as well have come on foot."

It is this empty show of respect which the interactionists seek to avoid when they make the mental a distinct link in the causal sequence. The physical first causes the mental, and the mental in turn brings about a change in the physical. In this way a certain importance is indeed secured to mental facts, but it appears that, so far as purposive action is concerned, we are no better off than we were before. The mental is simply another kind of cause; it has as little option regarding its physical effect as the physical cause has with regard to its mental effect. Non-mechanical behavior is again ruled out, or else a vain attempt is made to secure a place for it through the introduction of an independent psychic agency.

It is true, indeed, that we are under no antecedent obligation to maintain the existence of an activity that is not entirely reducible to the type of everyday cause and effect. But neither does scientific zeal and incorruptibility require us to do violence to the facts in order to secure this uniformity of type. Not to speak at all of the difficulties inherent in this dualism, it seems undeniable that some facts persistently refuse to conform to the type of mechanism, unless they are previously clubbed into submission. Foresight and the sense of obligation, for example, must learn to regard themselves as nothing more than an interesting indication of the way in which the neural machinery is operating before they will fit into the scheme. And similarly the progress of an argument is no way controlled or directed by the end in view, or by considerations of logical coherence, but by the impact of causation. Ideas lose their power to guide conduct by prevision of the future, and truth and error conse-

quently lose their significance, save perhaps as manifestations of cerebral operations. Since reasoning involves association, it must be reducible to bare association; the sequence of the process is just sequence and nothing more. A description of this kind is on a par with the celebrated opinion that violin music is just a case of scraping horse-hair on catgut. Everything that is distinctive in the facts is left out of account, and we are forced to the conclusion that no conclusion has any logical significance or value.

In the end these difficulties, and in fact most of our philosophic ills, may be traced back to the prejudice that experience or knowing is a process in which the objects concerned do not participate and have no share. This assumption commits us at once to various corollaries and thus breeds a set of abstractions that pass themselves off as entities and add themselves to the world of our experience as demonstrable facts. In philosophy, as in the financial world, there is a constant temptation to do business on a basis of fictitious capitalization. Our abstract physico-chemical processes, with their correlates, such as passive, independent objects, souls, minds, or absolutes, do not represent actual working capital, but watered stock, and their inevitable tendency is to convert the legitimate business of philosophy into a campaign of exploitation, which is none the less exploitation because it is frequently done in the interests of what are supposed to be the spiritual values of man. A careful inventory of our assets brings to light no such entities as those which have been placed to our credit. We do not find body and object *and* consciousness, but only body and object. We do not find objects that remain indifferent to the experiential process, but rather objects that exhibit a flexibility and mobility which defy all description. We do not find a self-sufficient environment or absolute *to* which intelligence must needs adjust itself, but an environment that is at odds with itself and struggling in the throes of a reconstruction. The process of intelligence is something that goes on, not in our minds, but in things; it is not photographic, but creative. From the simplest perception to the most ideal aspiration or the wildest hallucination, our human experience is reality engaged in the guidance or control of behavior. Things undergo a change in becoming experienced, but the change consists in a doing, in the assumption of a certain task or duty. The experiential object hence varies with the re-

sponse; the situation and the motor activity fit together like the sections of a broken bowl. . . .

B. H. BODE in *Creative Intelligence*, pp. 232-234, 237-244, 248-255. Published by Henry Holt & Company.
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SUGGESTIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Compare Bode's coördination theory with the unrestricted correlation theory of Lloyd Morgan above, p. 403 ff. Indicate the chief similarities and differences.
2. Use illustrations of your own to bring out what Bode regards as the essential differences between a reflex and a conscious act.
3. How does Bode interpret the razor illustration to show the presence of *nascent activities* in perceptual knowledge? Would you agree with his interpretation? Do you think that it would apply equally well to all perceptions, or only to those objects which are associated with human activities?
4. What is Bode's chief objection to a parallelism such as that defended by Warren?
5. What is Bode's chief objection to any form of interaction theory?
6. Why is Bode's own view definable as a coördination theory? Where would you place it in the Pratt diagram above, p. 393?
7. Compare Bode's account of intelligence with that of Brown (p. 461 ff.), and Mead (p. 466 ff.), and Moore (p. 488 ff.), above.

CHAPTER V

PRAGMATIST SOLUTIONS OF THE PROBLEM OF VALUE

I. TYPES OF VALUE, by *James H. Tufts*

Analysis

Tufts begins by giving a brief analysis of the problem into its constituent elements and states two positions he aims to defend. Taking up the first of these, namely, that value is objective in a sense peculiar to itself, he states the theory of the realists as represented by G. E. Moore, and the theory of the idealists as represented by Croce. He then points out the ways in which he agrees with these thinkers. But he argues that value is to be taken *as value*, and not as an independent essence or being, whether static or otherwise. Value as value presupposes a living process of valuing. Turning to the second position he would defend, namely, that a social factor in value is an aid in distinguishing moral from other types of value, Tufts asks what social factors are present in valuing over and above "the life process with its selective activity and attending emotions." Two general sorts of stimuli give rise to two different types of behavior. The first sort of stimuli are the ordinary things which satisfy desire. Such things determine a type of value which is relative to our human wants. These Tufts calls economic values. But the more complex type of stimuli are bi-focal, that is to say, they are such that "our attention shifts alternately to their behavior and to our response, or, conversely, from our act to their response." This type of stimuli leads to a revision of wants or to a change in the self which wants. Through such situations as embody these stimuli and which are social in character, moral values arise. Illustrations of moral judgments are given and analyzed to show the presence in them of the social factor. A purely personal ideal, Tufts argues, always exhibits a social character. Between economic and moral values are the æsthetic values. The varying objectivity of values, or the fact that some of these forms of value have greater objectivity than others, cannot be wholly explained, but seems to be correlated with the degree to which the situation is social. Economic, personal, æsthetic and moral values are discussed successively to bring out this fact. The social is thus shown to be the root of all values.

If we are dissatisfied with custom and habit and seek to take philosophy for the guide of life we have two possibilities: (1) we may look for the good, and treat right and duty as subordinate concepts which indicate the way to the good, that is, con-

sider them as good as a means, or (2) we may seek first to do right irrespective of consequences, in the belief that in willing to do right we are already in possession of the highest good. In either case we may consider our standards and values either as in some sense fixed or as in the making.¹ We may suppose that good is objective and absolute, that right is discovered by a rational faculty, or we may consider that in regarding good as objective we have not made it independent of the valuing process and that in treating right as a standard we have not thereby made it a fixed concept to be discovered by the pure intellect. The position of this paper will be (1) that good while objective is yet objective as a value and not as an essence or physical fact; (2) that a social factor in value throws light upon the relation between moral and other values. . . .

(1) We begin with the question of the synthetic and objective character of the good. With G. E. Moore as with the utilitarians the good is the ultimate concept. Right and duty are means to the good. Moore and Rashdall also follow Sidgwick in regarding good as unique, that is, as "synthetic." Sidgwick emphasized in this especially the point that moral value cannot be decided by physical existence or the course of evolution, nor can the good be regarded as meaning the pleasant. Moore and Russell reinforce this. However true it may be that pleasure is one among other good things or that life is one among other good things, good does not mean either pleasure or survival. Good means just "good."

A similar thought underlies Croce's division of the Practical into the two spheres of the Economic and the Ethical. "The economic activity is that which wills and effects only what corresponds to the conditions of fact in which a man finds himself; the ethical activity is that which, although it corresponds to these conditions, also refers to something that transcends them. To the first correspond what are called individual ends, to the second universal ends; the one gives rise to the judgment concerning the greater or less coherence of the action taken in itself, the other to that concerning its greater or less coherence in respect to the universal end, which transcends the individual."² Utilitarianism is according to Croce an attempt to reduce the Ethical to the Economic form, although the utilitarians as men attempt in various ways to make a place for that distinction

¹ Cf. A. W. Moore, *Pragmatism and Its Critics*, 257-78.

² Croce, *Philosophy of the Practical*, pp. 312 f.

which as philosophers they would suppress. "Man is not a consumer of pleasures. He is a creator of life." With this claim of the distinctive, synthetic, character of the moral consciousness and of the impossibility of testing the worth of ideals by cosmic laws, or by gratification of particular wants as measured by pleasure, I have no issue. The analysis of the moral judgment made above points out just how it is that good is synthetic. It is synthetic in that it represents a measuring and valuing of ends—instinctive and imagined, individual and social—against each other and as part of a whole to which a growing self corresponds. It is synthetic in that it represents not merely a process of evaluating ends which match actually defined desires, but also a process in which the growing self, dissatisfied with any ends already in view, gropes for some new definition of ends that shall better respond to its living, creative capacity, its active synthetic character. Good is the concept for just this valuing process as carried on by a conscious being that is not content to take its desire as ready made by its present construction, but is reaching out for ends that shall respond to a growing, expanding, inclusive, social, self. It expresses value *as* value.

Value *as value* not as being; nor as independent essence; nor as anything static and fixed. For a synthetic self, a living personality, could find no supreme value in the complete absence of valuing, in the cessation of life, in the negation of that very activity of projection, adventure, construction, and synthesis in which it has struck out the concept good. A theory of ethics which upholds the synthetic character of the good may be criticized as being not synthetic enough if it fails to see that on the basis of the mutual determination of percepts and concepts, of self and objects, the synthetic character of the process must be reflected in the ultimate meaning of the category which symbolizes and incorporates the process.

(2) We may find some light upon the question how moral value gets its distinctive and unique character, and how it comes to be more "objective" than economic value if we consider some of the social factors in the moral judgment. For although the concept good is rooted in the life process with its selective activity and attending emotions it involves a subtle social element, as well as the more commonly recognized factors of intelligence.

Within the fundamental selective process two types of behavior tend to differentiate in response to two general sorts of

stimulation. One sort is simpler, more monotonous, more easily analyzable. Response to such stimulation, or treatment of objects which may be described under these terms of simple, analyzable, etc., is easily organized into a habit. It calls for no great shifts in attention, no sudden readjustments. There is nothing mysterious about it. As satisfying various wants it has a certain kind of value. It, however, evokes no consciousness of self. Toward the more variable, complex sort of stimuli, greater attention, constant adjustment and readjustment, are necessary.

Objects of the first sort are treated as things, in the sense that they do not call out any respect from us or have any intrinsic value. We understand them through and through, manipulate them, consume them, throw them away. We regard them as valuable only with reference to our wants. On the other hand, objects of the second sort take their place in a bi-focal situation. Our attention shifts alternately to their behavior and to our response, or, conversely, from our act to their response. This back and forth movement of attention in the case of certain of these objects is reinforced by the fact that certain stimuli from them or from the organism, find peculiar responses already prepared in social instincts; gesture and language play their part. Such a bi-focal situation as this, when completely developed, involves persons. In its earlier stages it is the quasi-personal attitude which is found in certain savage religious attitudes, in certain æsthetic attitudes, and in the emotional attitudes which we all have toward many of the objects of daily life.

Economic values arise in connection with attitudes toward things. We buy things, we sell them. They have value just in that they gratify our wants, but they do not compel any revision or change in wants or in the self which wants. They represent a partial interest—or if they become the total interest we regard them as now in the moral sphere. Values of personal affection arise as we find a constant rapport in thought, feeling, purpose, between the two members of our social consciousness. The attitude is that of going along with another and thereby extending and enriching our experiences. We enter into his ideas, range with his imagination, kindle at his enthusiasms, sympathize with his joys or sorrows. We may disagree with our friend's opinions, but we do not maintain a critical attitude toward *him*, that is, toward his fundamental convictions and attitudes. If "home is the place where, when you have to go there,

they have to take you in," as Frost puts it, a friend is one who, when you go to him, has to accept you.

Moral values also arise in a social or personal relation—not in relation to things. This is on the surface in the form of judgment: "He is a good man," "That is a good act." If it is less obvious in the practical judgment, "This is the better course of action," i.e., the course which leads to the greater good, or to the good, this is because we fail to discern that the good in these cases is a something with which I can identify myself, not a something which I merely possess and keep separate from my personality. It is something I shall be rather than have. Or if I speak of a share or participation it is a sharing in the sense of entering into a kindred life. It is an ideal, and an ideal for a conscious personal being can hardly be other than conscious. It may be objected that however personal the ideal it is not on this account necessarily social. It embodies what I would be, but does not necessarily imply response to any other personality. This, however, would be to overlook the analyses which recent psychology has made of the personal. The ideal does not develop in a vacuum. It implies for one thing individuality which is conceivable only as other individuals are distinguished. It implies the definition of purposes, and such definition is scarcely if ever attempted except as a possible world of purposes is envisaged.

Æsthetic valuation is in certain respects intermediate between the valuation of things on the one hand and the moral evaluation of acts of persons or conscious states on the other. Æsthetic objects are in many cases seemingly things and yet even as things they are quasi-personal; they are viewed with a certain sympathy quite different from that which we feel for a purely economic object. If it is a work of art the artist has embodied his thought and feeling and the observer finds it there. The experience is that of *Einfühlung* (intuition or empathy). Yet we do not expect the kind of response which we look for in friendship, nor do we take the object as merely a factor for the guidance or control of our own action as in the practical judgment of morality. The æsthetic becomes the object of contemplation, not of response; of embodied meaning, not of individuality. It is so far personal that no one of æsthetic sensibility likes to see a thing of beauty destroyed or mistreated. The situation in which we recognize in an object meaning and embodied feeling, or at least find sources of stimulation which

appeal to our emotions, develops an æsthetic enhancement of conscious experience. The æsthetic value predicate is the outcome of this peculiar enhancement.

It seems that the social nature of the judgment plays a part also in the varying objectivity of values. It is undoubtedly true that some values are treated as belonging to objects. If we cannot explain this fully we may get some light upon the situation by noticing the degree to which this is true in the cases of the kinds of values already described.

Economic values are dubiously objective. We use both forms of expression. We say on the one hand, "I want wheat," "There is a demand for wheat," or, on the other, "Wheat is worth one dollar a bushel." Conversely, "There is no demand for the old-fashioned high-framed bicycle" or "It is worthless." The Middle Ages regarded economic value as completely objective. A thing had a *real value*. The retailer could not add to it. The mediæval economist believed in the externality of relations; he prosecuted for the offenses of forestalling and regrating the man who would make a profit by merely changing things in place. He condemned usury. We have definitely abandoned this theory. We recognize that it is the want which makes the value. To make exchange possible and socialize to some degree the scale of prices we depend upon a public market or a stock exchange.

In values of personal affection we may begin with a purely individual attitude, "I love or esteem my friend." If I put it more objectively I may say, "He is an honored and valued friend." Perhaps still more objectively, we—especially if we are feminine—may say, "Is not X dear?" We may then go on to seek a social standard. We perhaps look for reinforcement in a small group of like-minded. We are a little perplexed and, it may be, aggrieved if other members of the circle do not love the one whom we love. In such a group judgment of a common friend there is doubtless greater objectivity than in the economic judgment. The value of a friend does not depend upon his adjustment to our wants. As Aristotle pointed out, true friendship is for its own sake. Its value is "disinterested." If a man does not care for an economic good it does not reflect upon him. He may be careless of futures, neglectful of corn, indifferent to steel. It lessens the demand, lowers the values of these goods, an infinitesimal, but does not write him down an inferior person. To fail to prize a possible friend is a reflec-

tion upon us. However the fact that in the very nature of the case one can scarcely be a personal friend to a large, not to say a universal group, operates to limit the objectivity.

In the æsthetic and moral attitudes we incorporate value in the object decisively. We do not like to think that beauty can be changed with shifting fashions or to affirm that the firmament was ever anything but sublime. It seems to belong to the very essence of right that it is something to which the self can commit itself in absolute loyalty and finality. And, as for good, we may say with Moore in judgments of intrinsic value, at least, "We judge concerning a particular state of things that it would be worth while—would be a good thing—that that state of things should exist, even if nothing else were to exist besides."

With regard to this problem of objectivity it is significant in the first place that the kind of situation out of which this object value is affirmed in æsthetic and moral judgments is a social situation. It contrasts in this respect with the economic situation. The economic is indeed social in so far as it sets exchange values, but the object valued is not a social object. The æsthetic and moral object is such an object. Not only is there no contradiction in giving to the symbolic form or the moral act intrinsic value: there is entire plausibility in doing so. For in so far as the situation is really personal, *either member is fundamentally equal to the other and may be treated as embodying all the value of the situation*. The value which rises to consciousness in the situation is made more complete by eliminating from consideration the originating factors, the plural agents of admiration or approval, and incorporating the whole product abstractly in the object. In thus calling attention to the social or personal character of the æsthetic or moral object it is not intended to minimize that factor in the judgment which we properly speak of as the universalizing activity of thought, much less to overlook the importance of the judgmental process itself. The intention is to point out some of the reasons why in one case the thinking process does universalize while in the other it does not, why in one case the judgment is completely objective while in the other it is not. In both æsthetic and moral judgments social art, social action, social judgments, through collective decisions prepare the way for the general non-personal, objective form. It is probable that man would not say, "This is right," using the word as an adjective, if he had not first said, as member of a judicially acting group, "This is right," using the word as a

noun. And finally whatever we may claim as to the "cognitive" nature of the æsthetic and moral judgment, the only test for the beauty of an object is that persons of taste discover it. The only test for the rightness of an act is that persons of good character approve it. The only test for goodness is that good persons on reflection approve and choose it—just as the test for good persons is that they choose and do the good.

JAMES H. TUFTS in *Creative Intelligence*, pp. 372-382.

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SUGGESTIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. State as clearly as you can the respect in which Tufts agrees with Moore and Croce, and the respect in which he differs from them.
2. If value is relative to a life process would it be restricted to life on earth, or does Tufts mean to make such a restriction? Justify your answer in some way.
3. If value of the second type is related to a self and is social, would the satisfaction of animal wants be a value of this type? Do you think that this restricts value of the second type to human beings during their earthly life? Would you favor such a restriction or do you regard value as in some sense super-earthly?
4. Discuss Tufts's explanation of the "varying objectivity of values," telling whether you agree or disagree with him and why.
5. Compare Tufts's account of value with Perry's definition of value above, p. 414 f. What seems to you to be the chief difference between these thinkers? What is one point of similarity?
6. Compare Tufts's account with A. W. Moore's treatment of truth-value. Do you think that Tufts would treat this type of value as a fourth type, alongside of economic, moral and æsthetic values? If so, where do you think he would place it in his implied scale of varying objectivities of value? For example, would he say it is more or less objective than economic or æsthetic value? Or would truth-value, as defined by Moore, belong in such a scale at all?

II. NATURAL LAWS AND HUMAN HOPES, by *M. C. Otto*

Analysis

It has long been recognized by thinkers that there is a whole of things which is not subject to man's wishes, but is regulated by natural laws. It is difficult to resist thinking of ourselves as at the mercy of the power of nature. Slosson is quoted to show how prone men are to look upon nature as evil, bent on destruction. We may admit much of what Slosson says, but we cannot treat nature as a destructive and

malicious force. Such a view would be a vicious anthropomorphism. On the other hand, nature is not man's friend. Clarence Darrow is quoted as a defender of this view, but it is equally anthropomorphic. "We have no evidence whatsoever of the existence in the material world of any regard for human affairs." Otto denies, however, that nature determines itself and all its parts. No such mechanistic unity as this has ever been discovered. It is even doubtful whether such a view is intelligible. The unity of nature is not a whole which pre-exists. It is rather a unity which occurs, and, therefore, men can determine to some extent its character. Otto argues that we should start with the experienced fact that man's hopes, fears, and efforts do change the world, instead of starting with the assumption that they cannot change it. Yet natural laws represent insight into reality. However, they are really only descriptions of observed sequences, and, as such, they are the instruments which men may use to further their desires. Even though human life may eventually perish from the earth, it will last long enough for the "decrease of suffering and the increase of happiness." And, after all, this is the important thing.

We must now knit the argument a little closer. The burden of the discussion so far has been that natural laws are opportunities which men may employ to realize his hopes. Does this take us to the bottom of the question? Not quite to the bottom. For one thing, we cannot altogether avoid leaving the common-sense level. We must take at least a glance at the claim that natural laws are, so to speak, the dynamic habits of the universe by means of which the whole of things moves on in its undeviating way despite man's wishes or desires. That there is such a whole of things, thus moving on, is one of those immortal conceptions which finds reincarnation in every new outlook on the world, and so remains alive though successive bodies of knowledge die. The sturdy old Roman, Lucretius, was repeating an ancient tale when he sang that things

". . . arise and fall and fall
From flowers to stars—the great things and the small;
Whilst the great Sum of all things rests the same,
The all-creating, all-devouring All."

An ancient tale, but ever new. Men are prone to believe to-day as they did yesterday and of old that there is much more "in the minds of the events" (to use the recent words of Viscount Grey) "than in the minds of the chief actors." And we have already observed how thinkers otherwise at odds have united in the attempt to reduce the experienced plurality and diversity of things to one dominating type of existence.

A heron, not being a thinker, nor aspiring to be one, may go about his business in a matter of fact way, realizing his simple, dimly-perceived ends oblivious of the great world and its ways. A primitive or primitive-minded man may do the same. But one who has been made aware of his place in a vast universe, ruled, as he has been taught, by law which is the model of universality and inevitableness, can scarcely resist thinking of himself as at the mercy of the power that "launched the rolling planets into space." He will tend to attribute everything that happens to a something called Nature, and to regard all incidents or episodes in the history of events as the inevitable temporal explication of this eternal potency. He will incline to the opinion of Herman Melville: "It's too late to make any improvement now. The universe is finished; the copestone is on, and the chips were carted off a million years ago." This creates an issue we cannot entirely avoid.

The ease with which we are imposed upon by language makes it desirable, first of all, that we keep in mind the perfect neutrality of any whole of things towards the drama enacted on the earth. "Love Nature?" cries Edwin E. Slosson in one of the most widely distributed of contemporary books. "Never!" And why not? Because "she is our treacherous and unsleeping foe, ever to be feared and watched and circumvented, for at any moment and in spite of all our vigilance she may wipe out the human race by famine, pestilence or earthquake and within a few centuries obliterate every trace of his achievement." But Mr. Slosson is writing as a journalist, not as a scientist, when he pictures Nature, bent on destruction, sneaking up, as it were, on unsuspecting humanity. Let us grant what he maintains—that the human race not only may, but ultimately will, be wiped out, together with all human achievements. Let us say with him: "The wild beasts that man has kept at bay for a few centuries will in the end invade his palaces; the moss will envelop his walls and the lichen disrupt them. The clam may survive man by as many millennia as it preceded him. In the ultimate devolution of the world animal life will disappear before vegetable, the higher plants will be killed off before the lower, and finally the three kingdoms will be reduced to one, the mineral." And let us agree to believe that "chaos is the 'natural' state of the universe," "anarchy the natural state of the human race," and that both tend naturally to sink back into the chaos out of which they arose. Still we have no ground

for calling Nature "our treacherous and unsleeping foe." To do so is to think of Nature after the analogy of a human being who, if he were to be responsible for such destruction, would testify to the maliciousness and cruelty of his nature. The metaphor (so long as we recognize it to be a metaphor) may well symbolize those inescapable facts of life which add a touch of somberness to the minds of those who think; but no fact or sum of facts, however devastating to human hopes, is evidence of malice in Nature.

If the course of Nature may not be accused, in any proper sense, of being man's enemy, neither may it be credited, in any proper sense, with being man's friend. Clarence Darrow has for the moment turned poet when he writes in this vein: "For after all, men and animals are much alike, and nature loves them both and loves them all, and sends them forth to drive the loneliness from off the earth, and takes them back into her loving breast to sleep." To be sure, material forces are put to a multitude of profitable uses by man. And human desires, from the most physical to the most spiritual (using familiar terms) are dependent upon natural processes. Even Mr. Slosson's project of circumventing Nature must rely upon the Nature it would circumvent. Nevertheless to ascribe kindliness to the world order is a figure of speech. Nature, in many aspects, may be of support and benefit to man without giving him the slightest reason for attributing the bounties received to an interested intention. Speaking with a sense of responsibility for the meaning of words, we are forced to admit that we have no evidence whatsoever of the existence in the material world of any regard for human affairs.

Now assuming it to be a fact that the world at large is not intent either upon advancing or thwarting human desires, it still remains an open question whether there is a tendency in things as a whole which determines the destiny of the whole and every part of it. If such be the case, then the whole of things does after all move on, though blindly, in its undeviating way despite man's wishes or desires. And is this not exactly the purport of science as commonly understood? A vast, interlocked, mechanical whole, impelled by irresistible mechanical forces that act with undeviating uniformity, to which every creature and every event, every process and every particle are absolutely subject—does not the world, as viewed by exact science, come to just that? Since it comes to just that, and since

exact science is taken to be supreme in the world of knowledge, how fatuous the notion that natural laws are opportunities which man may use to realize his hopes—as if natural laws were subject to man, rather than he to them!

There are two or three ideas relevant to this question which may at least be alluded to in this brief study. We may ask, Who knows that what we call Nature is the sort of Whole generally supposed, a Whole which is something other than the active togetherness of elements, something superior to the totality of its parts and their relations? No such unity has been *demonstrated* to characterize the world as a whole, if indeed it has been made comprehensible. And the unities we are acquainted with—illustrated in nations, cities, clubs, organic and inorganic bodies—are of a type in which the individual elements have an identity, a function, and a radius of effective influence truly their own, while in their mutual interdependence and interaction they *constitute* the whole without which they could not exist. May not a unity of the same nature be assigned to the universe, a unity which *occurs* because its components constantly come into relation and interaction with each other, rather than a unity which *pre-exists* and produces the relations and interactions? Such a whole of things it would be an error to picture as forging ahead over men's hopes and fears, not to be deviated at any point by anything men can do. In such a universe human hopes and fears are as real as anything else and may logically be conceived to be instrumental in determining to some extent the character of the whole; for they may be effective in deciding what some of the relations and interactions of life shall be, and so, to some extent, what kind of a world men shall live in. Or to put it in another way: instead of accepting, as a veritable picture of ultimate reality, the mechanical whole of things arrived at by physical science through its method of abstraction, and then denying or blinking the significance of man's hopes and fears and efforts—instead of proceeding in this way, we may take as something undeniably real the observable effectiveness of these hopes and fears and efforts, and attempt to read the character of the whole of things with due regard to this experienced fact.

This does not, it is true, entirely meet the difficulty. Natural laws remain to control events if a determining Whole of things does not. For in spite of much instruction to the contrary, and some striking developments in science which should have made

us sceptical, we still think of these laws as compelling forces whose manner of operation scientists have been clever enough to trace and record, but against whose ceaseless activity men are powerless. We may perhaps have advanced beyond H. T. Buckle, who argued that in a given state of society a certain number of people must commit suicide because of a "large social law," the power of which "is so irresistible that neither the love of life nor the fear of another world, can avail anything towards even checking its operation." In the case of social laws we have learned that the "law" is *descriptive*, not *proscriptive*; that a change in social conditions will result in changed social laws. Yet in principle we are in agreement with Mr. Buckle, and have still to appreciate the conception of natural laws according to which they are not forces compelling things to behave in specific ways, but interpretations of the way specific things behave, arrived at by ingeniously relating particular occurrences to other occurrences not obviously of the same type. It would be foolish and cheap to attempt to belittle their significance, either as human accomplishments or aspects of experienced existence. They are the glory of thinking and they represent insight into reality. But it does not follow that we regard them as we would decrees of fate "that men must needs abide." It rather follows that we respect them for what they are; generalizations of observed regularities in natural phenomena which make possible predictions of what will happen under set conditions. Which is another way of saying that they are instrumentalities enabling men to further their desires.

It may still be contended that man's range of influence is very limited and that changes are constantly taking place on earth and beyond it which may sooner or later frustrate all his efforts. This must be conceded. When we remember the animal dynasties that have gone to their doom, or consider the destiny of suns and moons and stars, we cannot engage upon the so-called "mastery of nature" with the confidence and buoyancy of those who were younger in knowledge. There is much disclosed by science which "shadows forth," as some one has said, "the heartless voids and immensities of the universe, and thus stabs us from behind with the thought of annihilation." Still, whether the run of the human drama is to be long or short, it promises to be long enough before the curtain falls, if fall it must, for the decrease of suffering and the increase of happiness; long enough

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to win great numbers of men from acquisitive scheming to creative endeavor, and to make beauty far more pervasive of life than it is. And that is what matters.

M. C. OTTO: *Natural Laws and Human Hopes*, pp. 71-82.

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SUGGESTIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. On the basis of this selection, give one reason for regarding Otto as a pessimist and one reason for regarding him as an optimist. State the sense in which you are using the word optimism and pessimism.
2. Do you think that Otto has the idealistic doctrine of the Absolute in mind when he rejects the doctrine of a preëxistent unity? Why or why not?
3. Why do you think Otto objects to an anthropomorphic view of nature? Do you think he wholly avoids it when he makes man able to manipulate nature to his own advantage, he being himself a product of nature? In other words, do you regard the theory that the highest evolution of nature, namely, humanity, is able to formulate natural laws and use them as instruments to satisfy his desires as in any sense an anthropomorphic interpretation of nature?
4. State Otto's theory of natural laws. How does it express the characteristic pragmatist doctrine of instrumentalism? Does Otto seem to you to hold the same view as Mead and Moore on this point?

III. BUILDING THE COMMUNAL MIND, by H. A. Overstreet

Analysis

Overstreet quotes a passage from Larsen's *The Philosopher's Stone* to show the power of understanding and of an interpenetration of minds. With this passage as a background he argues that most of our problems in modern life are due to an exaggerated emphasis on individuals, plus a protective shell of self-sufficiency. Our experiences of space and time accentuate the idea that we are external to each other. We need to learn from Kant that space and time are "organic with our organisms." The illusion that we are separate is similar to the distortion of the real by a camera. In reality the human being is imprisoned in his own peculiar sense forms and he knows very little about himself. Yet out of such hemmed-in creatures the communal mind must be formed. The mystics are cited as a proof that men can escape from their prison houses and rise to a "cosmic individuality" which is far higher than their isolated individuality. But the mystics are geniuses and only rare minds are capable of their insights. We must find a way out of the prison house for the average man. Knowledge is one way out. Two types of knowledge-getting are differentiated

—the type which merely acquires and appropriates items of information, and the type in which one so identifies himself with what is known that his knowledge can be used effectively in solving the problems of modern life. Overstreet defends the intuitive type of knowledge-getting as one of the ways out of the prison of isolated individuality, relating a boyhood experience to support his argument. The same distinction exists in other experiences, such as æsthetic appreciation, erotic love, and the enjoyment of nature. He lists the types of attitude which are uprooted by this "identification-with" idea, such as self-sufficiency, self-pride, jealousy, cruelty, self-absorption and intolerance. The communal mind is defined as that social reality which is created when people adopt the "identification with" idea in their relations with each other. The major human problem is to find a way to cross the "dead line that separates me from you."

This paper is an attempt to call attention to some of the less-noticed puzzles that confront us as we make our rather mild efforts to build up communal-minded creatures out of our passionately self-interested selves.

May I begin by quoting an incident from a modern novel, *The Philosopher's Stone*, by the Danish writer, Anker Larsen?

"Every time Jens was alone with Lillebror, he slipped of his own accord into that silent, most primitive part of his ego which was entirely himself. He was in the happy world of the language of heaven, and the feeling that they both knew all the things about each other which could not be put into words, did not fade.

"One summer morning they came out early, while the dew still lay on the grass and twinkled at them.

"Jens happened to look at the road and found that he was fond of it. He was fond of it in the same way that he was fond of Lillebror and he thought he could see in the road that it liked him too.

"He could feel this right into the soles of his feet, which tickled with the desire to touch the road. He pulled off his shoes and stockings.

"Lillebror, who always did the same as Jens, pulled off his too and ran on ahead across the playground.

"Jens followed him, looking at the soft prints of little naked feet; the tracks seemed to him so alive that he could not only see them but *hear* and *feel* them.

"The playground was smiling.

"Under the elder-tree by the churchyard wall stood Lillebror lost in wonder.

"Jens went over to see what there was to amuse him.

"There was nothing, but Lillebror's eyes were fathomless. Jens looked into them and saw that Lillebror *stood open*. Jens could see at the same time *what he was, and how he was aware that he was so*. The language of heaven was a bigger thing than he had known. He understood how God could be all-knowing.

"When he turned to the elder-tree, he saw that it stood open like Lillebror, and he knew that that was what the child was wondering at. He could see what the elder was, and how it was aware that it was so.

"It was as though the elder-tree breathed into him, and when the breath of the elder was in him he felt a great joy, which he knew; the joy of the language of heaven. The elder also spoke the language of heaven in its inmost being.

"There was something in him which insisted on his sitting down under it; Lillebror was already seating himself comfortably. So he knew that the elder was inviting them in.

"There were the three together, happy in that which we have no words to say. There they would sit a little while.

"They did so, and time stood still in their hearts a little while.

"But in their stomachs, which must have belonged to the closed world, time continued to move on, and by lunch time it had left distinct traces: they were very hungry.

"They got up. 'The time must have passed without our knowing it,' said Jens.

"They went across the playground, but over by Jakob Hansen's gate they were stopped by a barking and loud cries of a woman's voice.

"The yard dog had got loose and was rushing towards them. The servant girl saw it, ran into the house screaming, and called out that Hector was killing the children.

"Jakob Hansen and his men left their lunch, but dared not tackle the dog unarmed. One got a gun, another a spade, another a fork. All the time the girl was shrieking that the children must be bitten to death already; she had seen the dog rush at them, but dared not go to their help, for Hector was savage as a wolf.

"It made a dash for the boys just as they had left the elder. In spite of their hunger they had not quite come back to the closed world, where we reflect and understand what danger is.

"When Jens saw the dog come rushing at them with bristling coat and bared teeth, it did not occur to him that it meant him any harm. He simply saw that the dog *stood open*. He saw

what Hector was, and how he was aware that he was so. 'You're a good watch dog,' he said. 'Nobody can get past you when you are loose in the yard.'

"And he put out his hand and patted him.

"When Jakob Hansen and his men arrived with their weapons, the dog was quietly allowing himself to be patted by both the boys. Jakob wiped the sweat from his forehead before he recovered himself sufficiently to go and take Hector by the collar.

" 'I can't make it out,' he said; 'it's a miracle he didn't bite them to pieces.'

"But the girl, who had come up in the rear of them, understood. Now she had seen what a power there was in innocence, she said, and she was converted from that hour.

"She wanted conversion too, for it was a long time since she had been innocent."

All this, of course, sounds like sentimental nonsense to our ordinary robust scholars' minds—and perhaps it is. But then, if Jens is right, we ourselves, in our everyday life, perhaps even in our proudly intellectual life, are living in a considerably "closed world." Things and creatures do not "stand open" to us. We speak a slow word-by-word language to each other, laboring through time to express what is really instantaneous; we clumsily walk our one-step-after-the-other, laboring through space to reach what is already there; we stand outside each other, regarding each other as "other" individuals.

Few, even of the keenest among us, are accustomed to think of such habits of mind as these as defects in ourselves. We take it for granted that this way of speaking and walking and "being individuals" is the real thing, and that anything else is inconceivable and, therefore, if suggested, a good deal crazy.

It may be that most of our problems of mind and personality are unsolvable by us because we discuss them in terms of what is really our closed world. Apparently we are doing what a two-dimensional creature would be doing, if, passing around the base of a cylinder and unable to raise its vision into a third dimension, it should confidently attempt to describe the nature of the cylinder. It would, of course, describe the cylinder as a circle, or perhaps not even as a circle, and would be highly incensed if told that its mind was only doddering on the lower edges of reality. This two-dimensional creature lives in a world closed to the third dimension. Do we ourselves inhabit a world

closed to other dimensions? If we do,—which is not altogether unlikely,—then the normal inadequacies of our mind—our isolations, petty independencies, intolerances, prides, and cruelties—and our anti-social nature in general, may be due simply to our inability to function in a more adequate system of dimensions.

Spinoza, as we remember, suggested that we know only two of an infinite number of attributes of infinite substance. With our eight or nine meager senses, in other words, we walk in the midst of an abysmal ignorance. We are, however, guarded against the appallingness of our ignorance by a kind of protective shell of self-sufficiency. The average mind *thinks* it knows, in kind at least, pretty much all that needs to be known. It *thinks* the spaces about it are quite as empty as they seem. It keeps its sanity and its complacence because it unhesitatingly takes the appearance to be the reality.

Kant, as we know, took us a step beyond Spinoza. Not only are we limited, but, with complete unconsciousness, we create our own limitations. Space and time are not a kind of independent outside-of-ourselves space and time, but are organic with our organisms. This is the hardest thing of all for the average mind to get hold of. I doubt whether most of us philosophers get it as more than an interesting theory—really feel it, I mean, and build up a new type of experience upon it. For if once the idea—or the feeling—gripped us fully, I suspect that most human relationships would get transformed. For example, what we call human individuality is largely a three-dimensional space affair. Thomas Jones is a person “out there”; I am a person “here.” If I wish to have contact with Thomas Jones, I must cover a space that lies in between. Even if I wish only to have mental contact, I must throw something—words or signs of some sort—across an intervening space. What I am constantly aware of, in short, is the mutual outside-ness of Thomas Jones and myself, and of all other individuals and myself.

Our space experience, therefore, conditions us to a sense of personal outsideness. It lays stress—perhaps a quite illusory stress—on what we call our individuality. If we group ourselves together, as in the family or the community, we are nevertheless like peas rattling in a pod. We bump ourselves together; we make agreements not to bump; or we deliberately plan prodigious bumps that will rattle each other out of existence. We look at each other from the exterior; and we are actually con-

vinced that thus we see each other aright. "To thine own self be true," we solemnly intone, and believe that it *is* true.

All of which may be quite false if Kant is right. For if this space of ours is not independent outside space, but only a space issuing forth from our organic constitution; or even if, though real, it is only a partial space, like the two-dimensionality of the creature we have mentioned, then all this three-dimensional out-sidedness out of which we carve our individualities may be something of an illusion.

The camera, as Bergson long ago showed, commits just such a distortion of the real. Here is a moving thing. The camera snaps it into an everlasting fixation. That fixated thing which we call a photograph is, of course, laughably inadequate to represent the living thing.

If the camera were alive, we should say that it had a "dot-dot-dot"—a discrete—form of experience and no experience whatever of "flow." Have we something of the camera nature in us? Do we, in like manner, fixate the flow of life into spaced-off individuals? And then, because we have spaced them off, do we begin to glare at each other and proceed to wipe each other off our spaces?

A harder thing than this is to believe that time has no fixed outside existence. We like to think that "Cæsar dead and turned to clay" belonged to quite another day. And so we proceed to lose interest in Cæsar and center interest in ourselves. Again a kind of fixation—this time in the "present"—*our* present. But suppose that yesterday and to-day are only yesterday and to-day from our organic point of view, that from the point of view of differently placed organism, yesterday is to-day and to-day does not exist. Our finely sequential world of past, present, and future looks a little tipsy. Christ still lives and we ourselves are not yet born.

Or suppose that we could speed up the organic tempo of our lives. In one revolution of the earth we might live a whole lifetime. Apparently the more quickly moving creatures do it, being born in the morning and dying at night. Poor things, we say, not realizing that their time is not our time, that time is relative to organic movement, and that our twenty-four hours are no more the measure of real time (if such exists) than we are the measure of the entire universe.

Human beings, then, in truth, are special creatures under special circumstances who know themselves only from special

points of view. It would seem to be quite erroneous, then, to take the normal experience of a human individual as the measure of what is fundamentally real about him. It is far more plausible to believe that the human being lives a curiously imprisoned life—imprisoned within his own peculiar space, time, and sense forms;—and that he knows almost as little about himself and his world as does the caterpillar or the fly.

And yet it is out of these curiously imprisoned creatures that we must build our communal life. It is small wonder, then, that our chief problem is with those qualities which are the outcome and expression of our imprisoned point of view—self-absorption, intolerance, ignorance, fixed mindedness, misunderstanding, cruelty, pride-of-self. Can we find a clue to the building in ourselves of a less imprisoned life?

A few spiritual geniuses—the mystics—seem to have found their way out. They seem actually to have broken through the hard walls of our ordinary psychical life, and to have emerged into another kind of psychical life, one in which their egoistic individuality has disappeared, to reappear as an intensified cosmic individuality.

Doubtless in such mystic experience, we are at the upper limits of our human possibilities. Doubtless, too, in such experience, we have a pointing of the direction in which the evolution of the human mind and spirit will proceed. But at present that direction is no doubt reserved for the spiritual geniuses of the race. Our problem at the present moment is with the ordinary run of mankind. Can we move our average personalities even a short step in a direction which leads to a kind of breaking through the walls of our ordinary limitations?

The clue, one suspects, may be found in those experiences which tend, so to speak, to *open us out*.

Obviously, the most usual opening-out experience is that in which the mind reaches out to further knowledge. But not all such reaching-out is of equal significance. There are apparently two kinds of reaching-out to knowledge, first, the reaching-out which is appropriative; second, the reaching-out which identifies itself with that to which it reaches out. The first, which is the usual form of knowledge-getting, is really not an opening out of oneself, but rather a taking in to oneself. The knowledge is brought in, to be appropriated and used. The movement starts from the individual and returns to the individual with captured booty.

Ordinarily we make no distinction between these two kinds of knowledge-getting. All knowledge-getting is supposed to be good. But there can be misers in knowledge, one suspects, as well as misers in gold; and the resulting personality may be equally unlovely. Hence the importance of stressing the second kind of knowledge-getting, where the attempt is made *to identify oneself with what one comes to know*. I have in mind the self-surrender of a scientist like Fabre, who literally sinks himself into the creatures he studies; and I compare him with the usual biologist or entomologist whose approach to his living subject-matter is wholly from the outside.

I know that I am risking all my logical reputation—if I have any—in what I am here implying, but I ask myself how well we could understand a child if we did not seek in some measure to surrender our well endowed adulthood and identify ourselves with the child's own interest in life? It is a sad commentary upon the biological sciences, and latterly upon a certain type of psychology that they refuse to do this. They refuse to sink themselves in the object, to find and live in the interior of the object. Which means, of course, that such sciences, despite all of value which they contribute, remain closed to the more real aspects of what they study.

And so I come to what seems fairly central. If a person is to press beyond his limits, it apparently must be through the kind of knowledge-getting in which he actually *surrenders himself to, identifies himself with*, the object which he studies. Schools rarely train to this kind of knowledge-getting. They train chiefly the ability to accumulate facts. For this reason they may be said to accentuate the normal self-centered appropriativeness of individuals and to prevent their breaking through to a condition of real communal mindedness.

The second kind of knowledge-getting presupposes a kind of love-of-the-object. That, of course, sounds like the completest kind of nonsense. When we enter a schoolroom or a laboratory, we are supposed, upon pain of inflicting our personal equation upon a suffering world, to leave our emotional, our love-nature behind. But this may mean that our schools and laboratories admit only our part-selves—perhaps even less than that. And part-selves can hardly be expected to attain whole views.

I remember a boyhood experience. I recount it not because it was extraordinary, but because it might occur to any quite ordinary person like myself, and it suggests a point of view. I

had started out to draw a tree. As I tried to set down the way the branches grew out of the trunk, and the way the leaves hung fluttering on the branches, a curious feeling began to come over me. The tree, at first, had been just something "out there," an indifferent object, not myself. But now, as I worked away with my pencil, I began curiously to *feel* the tree. It was as if I could sense the interior life of it, could feel it living and growing, could actually talk with it in a language without words. The tree suddenly was a life *in its own right*. It stood open.

The experience was strongly emotional. I can remember to this day the tides of feeling that surged in me as I walked home. I seemed to have broken into another order of life. I had not simply seen an external thing with my eyes, taken note of its contours with my pencil. I had felt and loved a life other than my own.

Despite the apparent idiocy of all that, there, perhaps, may be the clue. Knowledge that is also *love of the thing known* is really a different kind of knowledge. It is on another level. It is the kind that most learned persons do not possess, for which reason they are so often closed personalities, unsympathetic, intolerant, self-centered, even anti-social.

No doubt it is this swinging ourselves into the interiors of other existence which must serve chiefly to expand our limited selves. Human individuals have, apparently, to learn the almost completely unknown art of "*identifying themselves with.*"

We need, therefore, propose no high mystical adventure for the ordinary person. We have here a relatively simple clue. We have distinguished two kinds of knowledge-getting; the appropriate kind and the kind in which one "*identifies-oneself-with.*" We can make the same distinction in other regions of experience. In the viewing of pictures, for example, or the hearing of music, how much of the experience is purely appropriative, a kind of passive taking in of enjoyment; how much of it is an actual effort to identify ourselves with what the picture portrays or the music tells? Again, in erotic love, how much of it is a mere enjoyment of the act of loving,—a being in love with love; how much of it is an identification of ourselves with the very interior life of the other person? We have made such a god out of love that we fail to note that erotic love, even in its highly respectable forms, is for the most part grossly egoistic. Instead of opening us out, it closes us in—which accounts perfectly for the fact that erotic love, of itself, even though it forms families and induces high

respectabilities, does not tend to develop the broadly communal mind.

And so we might ask the question about our so-called "love of Nature." Is that just an enjoyment, an awakening in ourselves of a pleasant feeling, a holding of these feelings deliciously to ourselves; or is it an actual *identification-of-ourselves-with* a living something far more comprehensive than ourselves?

Once this idea of "identification-with" is grasped, it tends to become central. It serves as the test by which we are enabled to distinguish experience that keeps us within our limits and experience that really opens us out. And, of course, it is obvious how the "identification-with" idea places its instant condemnation upon such an attitude as intolerance—which is never an identifying-with, but always a holding-to-oneself as sufficient; or self-pride, which separates-itself-from and holds-itself-above; or jealousy and cruelty, which seek to hurt or to obliterate the other; or self-absorption, which simply forgets that the other exists.

The communal mind cannot be built out of non-communal attitudes. Aggregating people together may simply make them rattle the more viciously against each other. Much of our so-called civilization is just an organized preying of men upon each other; or at least, at its worst, an organized way of helping each other to get self-satisfaction. The communal mind—if it is ever to be developed—is the mind that lives widely and intensely, in and through the minds that surround it. It is the mind that is constantly opening out, surrounding itself, and yet winning a more powerful selfhood through *identification-with* other life. This seems to be the central idea. It is not unlikely that it may be made the animating idea in our education and in the rest of our significant experience.

At present, education, and all the rest of our experience, accentuate the fact that "I-am-I" and "You-are-you." At best I can shake hands with you, talk with you, study with you. I can even marry you. But not even this last fatality drags me really out of myself across the dead line that separates the me from you. But might I not learn to cross that dead line? That, I think, is our major human problem. As yet that problem remains in the limbo of mystical nonsense.

H. A. OVERSTREET: *Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy*, pp. 146-154. Edited by E. S. Brightman. Published by Longmans, Green & Co. Reprinted by permission.

SUGGESTIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. What idea in the quotation from Larsen does Overstreet especially stress? What name does Larsen give to this idea and what does Overstreet call it when he distinguishes two types of knowledge?
2. Would Overstreet's theory logically imply pan-psychism, the theory that everything is psychical in nature? Explain your answer.
3. Compare Overstreet's second type of knowledge with Bergson's theory of intuition above, p. 170 ff., and with Royce's theory of interpretation above, p. 178 ff. Which of these thinkers does he seem to you to be nearer and why?
4. Does Overstreet's use of the experience of the mystics mean that he believes in an over-individual reality which is identical with the religious object with which the mystics seek union? Or is it the human communal mind which he regards as the highest reality.
5. Compare Overstreet with Otto. Do you think that they hold the same view as to the destiny of man? Explain your answer.

IV. RELIGIOUS VALUES AND THE PRACTICAL ABSOLUTE,
by *Edward Scribner Ames*

Analysis

Ames points out that there has been a shift in recent studies of religion from the "faculty theory" of the nature of religion to the two-fold problem: (i) to tell what religious values are, and (ii) to determine the source of their validity. Taking up the first problem, Ames expresses the belief that the religious values are not distinct from, but are rather identical with other kinds of value. This means that religious values must be located in the stream of actual, concrete human experience. Moreover, there is a different scale of religious values for every social order. Each scale of values is correlated with a definite interest-pattern of the social group which recognizes these values. Illustrations from primitive religions are given to show how the scale of values among such social orders is predominantly determined by custom. There are wide differences among the interest-patterns of varying groups, but each group's scale of values is correlated with its peculiar interest-pattern. When tensions and struggles arise the values are organized more definitely, and the highest values of the group become the basis for ceremonials which help to conserve them. Hence "religion is the conservation of the highest social values." Certain apparent exceptions to this formula are explained. Ames then proceeds to explain the "hierarchy of social values" which results in a somewhat complicated type of social order, due to the influence of the social and physical environment confronting the members of the group. When men began to question customs an important difference appeared. Illustrations of this are given from the Greek, Hebrew, and far Eastern people. Such reflective criticism produces the wider modern outlook, and a new scale of values arises which is in conflict with the customary

tribal value systems. William James is quoted to illustrate the type of values recognized in a highly civilized society. These are predominantly social values. A brief sketch of the modern development is given, indicating a gradual shift in the direction of a new scale of values more compatible with the interest-pattern of our age.

Ames then turns to his second problem. He points out that primitive man's conduct was validated by repetition and familiarity. But an additional sanction is necessary for modern man's reflective values. Ames defines this additional sanction as the *practical absolute*. The fact that men have to act causes an idea present in the mind at the time of action to take on a character of absoluteness. Even among primitive men this sanction was operative, as Durkheim has shown, and it was the deeper reason for primitive man's conduct. This same deeper reason is especially operative in religion, which is predominantly a life of action. Hence religion has always exalted to a high place its practical absolutes, representing them in pictorial form with vivid imagery. Ames uses this idea of the practical absolute to solve the problem of the conflict between science and religion. In conclusion he suggests that religion will make an important contribution to the development of a new social order through its use of the practical absolute.

One of the striking facts in the studies of the psychology of religion which have appeared since the beginning of this century is the measure of agreement as to the nature of religion. It is commonly supposed that religion is the subject about which there is the greatest divergence of opinion and that these differences emerge most violently when the attempt is made to formulate exact definitions. It may therefore be taken as an evidence of the substantial contribution which the science of psychology has made that we are now in possession of a working definition of religion. This definition centers upon the concept of values. In Höffding's phrase it is the conservation of values. For Coe it is the determination and the effort to realize the highest social values. In the recent *Philosophy of Religion* by W. K. Wright it is "the endeavor to secure the conservation of socially recognized values through specific actions." All of these definitions show the marked tendency of psychology away from the old faculty theories and away from the standpoints of intellectualism stressing belief, and of feeling which made religion primarily a matter of emotion. The agreement lies in the application of the functional or behavioristic point of view. Religion is thus regarded as an active striving toward the realization of desired ends or felt values. That these ends are ideal and social in character may also be included in the agreement. Religion is therefore conceived as a practical interest as contrasted with

science and philosophy which are reflective. This paper undertakes to deal with these values of religion in respect to two questions: First, specifically, what are they? Second, why are they accompanied by such a sense of validity in the active effort to realize them?

In stating what are the values of religion, it may be said at the outset that religion has no values of its own. The values of religion are also other kinds of values at the same time,—economic, political, social or æsthetic. This, of course, is not peculiar to religious values. Moral values are not exclusively matters of ethics. All moral problems are at the same moment problems of business, of political science, of eugenics or art. It is needless to say here, though the neglect of the fact constantly leads to difficulty, that the phenomena with which any specific science deals are also, from other points of view, the legitimate material of various scientific and practical interests. Religion, then, should be understood to find the values which it cherishes, in the stream of actual, concrete experience.

It may be assumed also, though less casually, that these values of religion imply an order of values of differing degrees of importance in all human societies where religion is found. James observed that the individual's consciousness is, in normal experience, "figurate." So accustomed is the mind to working with patterns and meanings that it is restless and irritated when confronted with materials which do not fall into some appreciable order. When attention is directed to them it is disconcerting if the objects along the roadside at dusk do not take their places readily in the familiar classification as trees, or men or animals. If a teacher puts random lines and figures on the blackboard before a class of students they will seek for a meaning, an intelligible arrangement. Even in dreams some semblance of the form and structure of waking mental life appears. Not only does man respond to the environment with this organizing, systematizing activity of apperception but he also displays characteristic emotional reactions in reference to the objects and situations with which he has vital experience. In the hunting stage, when the savage is driven by meat hunger, it is not difficult to appreciate the fact that the sight of the bear or deer should elicit intense emotional excitement; or that the cry of an enemy warrior should stir him with fear and rage; or that the call of his mate in distress should rouse him to frantic effort.

The studies of many tribes in relatively low stages of cultured development disclose interest-patterns and scales of values of a very definite character. Among the natives of Central Australia the food interest is dominant. Generosity in sharing food is a prime virtue. Infanticide is common but is apparently due to the difficulty of nourishing the infant and an unweaned older child at the same time. Marriage relations also hold a very important place and within their complex system the marriage relation is strictly observed. Their sense of obligation and their fortitude under suffering appear conspicuously in the observance of their food and initiation ceremonials. The regard shown for the sacred places and the *Churinga*, or sacred objects of these ceremonials, further indicates the most important concerns of their interest. For the head-hunters of Borneo, life reaches the apex of its ecstasy and meaning in capturing heads from neighboring tribes. It is said that "they find therein the complete expression of their ideals of life, of their highest conceptions of value." It is not difficult to realize how a code of approved conduct and a scale of manly qualities could develop out of that supreme and dangerous interest. For the Todas, life organizes around the care of the buffaloes and the habits involved in that occupation determine the relative importance of personal qualities and conduct. The Shinto religion exalts two characteristics of the Japanese, cleanliness and joyousness. "In Shinto," King observes, "actual personal dirt is worse than moral guilt. To be dirty is to be disrespectful to the gods." The festivals of Shinto are very merry and, so to speak, seriously promote light-heartedness. For example, in one of the festivals, when the offerings are brought in procession before the shrine, the village chief calls out in a loud voice, "According to our annual custom, let us laugh."

While, then, the interest-patterns of various peoples differ very widely the important thing is that where there is any tension or struggle whatever, there comes to be an organization of ends, of conduct and of values. The highest of these values are the foci of the ceremonials and they are determining factors in moulding the conceptions of the gods. To say then that religion is the "consciousness of the highest social values" is to employ a formula which is applicable to all organized societies, however they may differ from one another in the particular values they cherish or however their values may change by addition or loss, by enlargement or deterioration. The only quali-

fication of this formulation of religion in terms of the highest social values which seems to be required is in the case of religions extended beyond the culture in which they were indigenous, or in the case of religions which have become static and unresponsive to the growing life and the new social values of an expanding civilization. The zeal of missionary propaganda has shown instances of the artificial imposition of the ideals of one religious tradition upon the mores of another people, and the rapid expansion of Greek reflective thought made it impossible for the religion of an earlier age to assimilate the new conceptions and the new evaluations of life. But where the customs and institutions of a people unfold under the influence of a settled habitat, through the processes of normal development there emerges a scale of values, often modified from age to age but presenting in the upper ranges those values which are the chief concerns of religion. This was impressively true of the Egyptian people who through a vast historic existence and many different dynasties held in the foreground a dominating interest in the future life.

The existence of a hierarchy of social values in the earlier stages of human life is, from the instances cited, sufficiently illustrated for the present purpose. With all the diversity noted, a general principle of explanation commends itself. This principle is the influence of the environment, physical and social. The values have been those which evolved in the process of securing a living from such animals, fruits and products of the soil as were available; in the accidental fixation of attention upon accompanying phenomena of the chase or warfare or social relations or natural events; and in the influence of conspicuous persons, such as chiefs, kings and medicine men. These earlier stages are under the sway of custom and the value scales which develop are relatively unconscious and wholly uncriticized.

A radical difference appears when the rule of custom begins to be felt to be inadequate and the questioning intelligence is called forth. This critical process in its beginnings was most acute and most complete among the Greeks. Plato's Dialogues are the glowing record of that achievement. The same process in different terms and with a different emphasis occurred among the Hebrews, and the writings of the great prophets Amos and Hosea, Isaiah and Jeremiah preserve that history. Confucius and Buddha performed a similar task for the cultures of their inheritance. In all of these there is a common work performed.

It is the deliverance of the human spirit from the bondage of blind custom and the assertion of a conscious, selective determination of values in the interest of a more rational and a nobler human existence. That birth of reason did not at once abolish all superstition, magic, and abject obedience to custom. But it did open a new conception of the world and of human institutions. From that day to this it has offered to educated men a world view, and has stimulated increasing numbers of people to pursue larger ideals and to devote themselves to the realization of more clearly conceived values. Not the least important of the results has been a critical survey of the traditional cultures of all tribes and peoples. It is now possible to see how naïvely and how unconsciously those cultures grew up out of the conditions and accidental circumstances of tribal existence. It is also possible to make new estimates of these customs in terms of the new standpoint of more critical reflection. . . .

What I am concerned to point out is that a new scale of values came with this reflective life, a scale of values which is characteristic of the reflective life wherever it is developed, and which stands in sharp contrast to all customary-tribal value systems. It is true that tribal customs still survive in modern life but in so far as they have not stood the test of reflective assessment, they are just survivals and belong to the primitive world. It seems therefore that those who have been so diligent in setting forth the variations of primitive customs might have been more instructive and less confusing if they had remarked the difference between the custom-ruled life of our remote ancestors, including our "contemporary ancestors," and the life of those whose culture comprises, however dimly, the philosophical and scientific inheritance.

As a statement of the scale of values of civilized society I quote a passage from James' well-known description of the hierarchy of the selves. He says, "A tolerably unanimous opinion ranges the various selves which men may seek in an hierarchical scale according to their worth. A certain amount of bodily selfishness is required as a basis for all the other selves. But too much sensuality is despised, or at best condoned on account of the other qualities of the individual. The wider material selves are regarded as higher than the immediate body. He is esteemed a poor creature who is unable to forego a little meat and drink and warmth and sleep for the sake of getting on in the world. The social self as a whole, again, ranks higher than

the material self as a whole. We must care more for our honor, our friends, our human ties, than for a sound skin or wealth. And the spiritual self is so supremely precious that, rather than lose it, a man ought to be willing to give up friends and good fame, and property, and life itself."³ In other passages he identifies this spiritual self with the widest possible ideal social self. The counterpart of that conception is a social order in which the individuals seek mutually to build up that type of character. Hence social sympathy, mutual aid, coöperation for the attainment of the common good is the great ideal of the modern world and becomes the central aim of religion.

Christianity, from the first, centered attention upon the value of the human soul but it could not regard the natural order of society as consistent with, or conducive to, a spiritual existence. It therefore learned to endure this present temporary, physical state and to prepare the soul for a heavenly realm of pure and changeless bliss. Very slowly did the humanism of the Renaissance affect this view of the individual. For a long time the changes wrought by science and industry and social reorganization were thought to pertain only to outward, material conditions, and consequently to create only stronger earthly bonds about the soul. But gradually the antagonism of body and soul relaxed under the genial influence of the new learning and the physical came to be regarded as at least a condition of mental and spiritual vitality. Medicine and hygiene at last won a decisive victory. Religion generously founded hospitals and clinics not merely under the claim of "good works" but also as a means to health of soul. In every direction as science and secular life yielded practical advantages religion more and more freely supported their claims. Religion has become the champion of better government, better education and better art. Instead of being complacently obedient to the powers that be, she has often helped to turn them out of office and put in others. Instead of despising the wisdom of this world she has endowed it in numerous colleges and universities. New appreciation of the fine arts, of poetry and the drama, of music and the dance, of play and recreation has developed. Nor are these tendencies due to mere unconscious drifting away from old habits. They are cultivated on principle, with the conviction that the full rounded development of all the natural powers of human life is the supreme good. No longer does this development relate to

³ *Psychology*, Vol. I, p. 314.

some hidden essence, or latent force, or occult power of personality. It does not proceed by mysterious rites but rather by cultivating a sane and responsive life in the midst of vital social relations. Religion has learned to direct attention to the ideal of democracy, recognizing that this ideal fundamentally involves the qualities of neighborliness and genuine respect and love of fellowman. Just what these attitudes demand in any age and especially in an industrial and urban society like ours is not easy to determine. To find out what these claims of understanding sympathy are, becomes as urgent a need of religion as of social settlements and bureaus of charity.

Therefore along with this social idealism of democracy there is demanded the scientific spirit of inquiry and experimentation. It is in this connection that religion is undergoing the greatest readjustment. Having been accustomed, like politics and family life, to respect the authority of established routine, it is difficult to accept the spirit of free inquiry, to undertake novel, social experiments. But this method is gaining favor everywhere by the results it shows. Religious people are told that they should test prophets by their fruits and that wisdom is justified of her children. That encourages the use of experiment. Through it man comes to rely more upon himself and gains in power and responsibility. That makes for growth in character. Religious leaders are beginning to appreciate these new values of the social-scientific spirit. They see that all external authority, whether of custom, or of institutions, or of a revelation from heaven, hinders the creative spirit and the development of a responsible will in man. It is in the interest of this intelligent, responsible freedom for all the members of society that religion attaches positive value to the fact that it has no infallibility left, —no infallible Bible, no infallible Pope or Council, no infallible creed or conscience or reason or person. Strangely enough the attainment of that conclusion has already become the starting point of new and vital movements in religion, movements which sincerely and reverently make the values of a democratic-scientific social order the genuine and dominant values of a new religious faith and hope. Neither Catholic nor Protestant Christianity has ever consistently accepted the implications of a real democratic-scientific social order. It is highly improbable that either will ever be able to do so. Therefore Christianity faces a new epoch, an epoch which requires that she identify herself completely in spirit and purpose with the highest values

of modern democracy and science. What that involves cannot be known in advance. One cannot know beforehand what love to one's neighbor will entail. He can only find out as the days unfold their experiences. Therefore democracy is always a venturesome and interesting experiment. Freeing slaves and giving votes to women are no more the end of certain processes than they are the beginning of others. Neither does the scientific inventor know what the effect of his invention will be. Certainly that was true for the inventors of the gas engine which made possible the automobile and the airplane, with astonishing effects upon social and industrial life.

The second question of this discussion is, Why are the values of religion accompanied by such a sense of validity in the active effort to realize them? This question is peculiarly pertinent in reference to such values as have just been discussed. The explanation of the seeming validity of established customary values is that it arises from familiarity and long repetition. Such values, through long use, have accumulated sanctions and authority. But is this the whole story? Is there not something else in the nature of practical conduct which is even more important in accounting for the sense of the validity of religious values?

The point referred to is the nature of the practical judgment at the moment of action. The definition of religion as a practical endeavor to realize values implies that it is primarily a matter of action, an affair of overt deeds. In this respect it is sharply contrasted with the reflective attitude of philosophy. Now it is characteristic of overt action that it requires the definite selection of an end or plan. Since only one plan can be followed at one time, the one chosen must be carried out as if it were the only possible one and as having, at least at the moment of action, absolute worth and validity. If a person cannot bring himself to choose one line of action with such definiteness and exclusiveness then he either does not act at all or acts without force and effectiveness. He wobbles and hesitates and vacillates. He does not make the clear-cutting, forward thrust of successful action. The man of affairs, the captain of industry, becomes habituated to quick decisions and to prompt and vigorous action. He is said to have a firm will, to be a man of strength, and force of character. His manner takes on the attitude of settled conviction. His words are few and terse but fateful. He tends to be an absolutist. At the other extreme is the man of reflective habits. His tendency is to analyze, to

deliberate, to balance contrasting views, to see the other side of every question. He develops a Hamlet-like hesitation. In every situation he is given to questioning whether it is better to be or not to be, to act or not to act. So long as he refrains from action he may enjoy the contemplation of the alternatives, of the numerous possibilities which play through his thought. The approach of the moment when he must act is repellent because in order to launch himself into the objective deed he must abandon all but one of his cherished potentialities. This line of inquiry has led me to the conception of the *practical absolute*, the absolute of the moment of action and the absolute of predominantly practical modes of life. While looking through the writings of the logicians with this conception in mind I came upon the following passage in an article by Dewey treating of different stages of logical thought. He says: "The nearer we get to the needs of action the greater absoluteness must attach to ideas. The necessities of action do not wait our convenience. Emergencies continually present themselves where the fixity required for successful activity cannot be attained through the medium of investigation. The only alternative to vacillation, confusion, and futility of action is ascription to the ideas of a positive and secured character, not in strict logic belonging to them."⁴ Bosanquet also remarks that "the only really categorical, concrete, moral judgment is that which determines what the course of action is, by adopting which we can be equal to the occasion; and the predicate of this judgment is a course of action."⁵

These observations may throw light upon the fixed character of the religious values of early society and may also furnish a suggestion as to the way in which new elements in the development of modern culture, especially the method of modern science, achieve the sense of absolute value. As is now well known the life of primitive man was one of action more than of reflection. Such reflection as he experienced was rather of the nature of reverie, of day-dreaming and fancy. This flow of imagery was largely bound down to the patterns and events of the more strenuous and thrilling moments of action, as in the chase or battle. Hence the mental life, either in times of leisure or stress, had little opportunity to become released from the absoluteness

⁴ Dewey: "Some Stages of Logical Thought"; *Philosophical Review*, Volume IX, Number 5, September, 1900.

⁵ Bosanquet: *The Psychology of the Moral Self*, p. 113.

and fixity of action. Durkheim has undertaken to show how the unconscious "collective representations" of primitive man became the rigid framework of the conceptual life, the categories of space, time, causality and the rest, and that these categories were the counterpart of the habits of action, binding customs, generated by the necessities of man's struggle for existence. This suggests a deeper reason for the authority of religious attitudes than those explanations which refer its absoluteness to its natural conservatism or to the fact that it is a product of custom or of revelation.

This deeper reason lies in the nature of religion as a life of action. It has always been marked by the struggle to meet emergencies, to make safe the food supply, or the marriage relation and childbirth, to ward off evils in times of crises, in illness and death and war. Religion reflects the desperate conflict man has had to adjust himself to his world,—the world of physical nature and even more to the world of his troubled imaginings. He has had to battle demons and ghosts, devils and sprites and relentless furies in a thousand shapes. Or the struggle may be represented from the other side of the shield as the urgent effort to attain relief, to enjoy happiness, to gain paradise, to found a city which has foundations, to build an eternal kingdom. Religion is ever waging a warfare, conducting a campaign, striving for fuller life. Even its contemplative life has followed this pattern. It has dreamed of victory after battle and of those who have come up through great tribulation into triumph and peace. It has therefore lived constantly by the use of the absolutes of action. And these absolutes have been of the most absolute kind because the values for which the actions were precipitated were felt to be of the profoundest importance.

From this point of view it may be possible to gain a better understanding of the conflict between science and religion in our modern world. Science has invaded the precincts of religion, too often in its narrower conception of itself merely as a critic, a detached reflective investigator, instead of coming in its larger function of helping to find and to realize whatever practical and vital ends man's nature craves. In its narrower rôle it has been irritating and confusing to the practical spirit of religion. In its larger function it is felt by all enlightened religionists to be a friendly and most useful ally. This is not to minimize the chastening effects of the application of science to religion. In its friendliest mood science is a strenuous physician and surgeon

producing a powerful catharsis and amputating limbs and removing organs decadent and useless, or infected by superstition. Not a few have thought the patient never could survive the treatment. Because religion has been so bound up and permeated by the magic and tribal custom to which it was born it has been the conviction of many who knew its beginnings best that the coming of science would be its death. But events do not justify that prediction.

It is, however, a vital question as to how religion is to adjust itself to science. The other distinguishing characteristic of our time, the democratic ideal, seems to lie much closer to religion as we know it, for democracy is a practical endeavor, and it seeks to realize the development of the individual which is already enshrined as the highest value of religion. One approach for the hospitable reception of science by religion is through the practical advantages which science already offers for carrying out the democratic and practical religious program of good will and social amelioration. Medical science has been appropriated in that way. Educational sciences have also found their place in religious schools. Technical and applied sciences of many kinds have been used freely. The difficulties have arisen at those points where the method of science has led to general conceptions which conflict fundamentally with the prevailing religious philosophies. Notable examples are found in geology and its effect on biblical cosmology, in biology, and its theory of evolution, and in historical criticism and its implications for the doctrine of revelation. But a difficulty, deeper than all these, lies in the method itself, for science cannot be content simply to help in fulfilling the ends which religion sets up. It will insist in passing criticism on the ends themselves. This means that if religion is to be thorough in appropriating and furthering, as its own values, the highest values of society, it must accept unreservedly the value of science both in its method and in its results. Applying this principle to the ideal of democracy it means that religion cannot satisfy the demands of the situation by imposing a preconceived type of society as the final goal for which we are to strive. Democracy is a genuine adventure of faith and we cannot know where we are going until we arrive. Science helps to survey the situation before the experiment is made. It presents, on the basis of past experience, and by the prognostications of trained imagination, the various possible lines of action and their probable outcome. But it is compelled to yield all of

its possibilities but one at the moment the experiment is put into action. And it must allow that one to be acted upon with all the wholeness of heart and sense of absoluteness which efficient action requires. After the plan has been tried, or as its successive steps occur, science may make new observations and prepare for further specific action and so on in a continuous process of growing experience.

In this way science has won over various fields of experience in recent years. One knows the physician is not infallible but trusts him nevertheless. Oil and mining investments are known to lack perfect security yet the man who invests in them parts with his money at the moment of purchase with as much finality as perfect knowledge could warrant. Manufacturers put out their latest product as the "acme" or the "perfecto" or the "ideal" and when they discover some means of improvement they advertise a new model and without embarrassment proclaim it as perfection. The extent to which this use of a practical absolute may be carried is illustrated by a well known type of oil stove for cooking purposes which bravely bears in conspicuous letters across its front this legend: "New Perfection, Number 62."

There are indications that religion may eventually reach such an attitude where the practical absolute of action will be accompanied by a process of reflective reconstruction in the direction of an expansive social ideal. In the past, religion has often accepted, though grudgingly, modifications of its values in response to the growing life of society. But the modifications have been ascribed to other influences than reflective thought. Thereby men have excused themselves from the responsibility of the situation. They have at times held to the doctrine of progressive revelation but too often have conceived the process of revelation as ending at some point in the past, and providing no method of dealing with new conditions in the living present. In those religious systems which have announced new revelations from heaven in times of crisis, there has been no reliable means of understanding the revelation nor of determining whether it was applicable to the case in hand. And there were often conflicting revelations for the same perplexity. The scientific method of meeting human problems is radically different. It claims no infallibility, but does actually take hold of the concrete difficulty and endeavors to find a working solution in the light of all the facts. In our society this method is already yielding

results so encouraging and so full of promise that the projects of expert social engineers are beginning to be thought of as guides to new social values which are genuinely religious. When facing the emergencies of the vast, insistent demands of some great social problem, like the war, or the famine in Russia, a plan of action matured in the light of all available experience and human sympathy, approves itself to all right minded men as absolutely the thing to do. It is the practical absolute. It proclaims the sure way of salvation and discloses beyond doubt what must be taken as the categorical imperative of the divine will.

E. S. AMES: *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. XXXII, pp. 347-352 and 356-365. Reprinted by permission of the University of Chicago Press.

SUGGESTIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. How does religion differ from science and philosophy, according to Ames?
2. State clearly what Ames means by an interest-pattern, and explain the use he makes of this idea in his theory of varying scales of values. Illustrate.
3. What is the significance of conflict and tension in the development of a scale of values?
4. What is Ames's general explanation of the differentiation of values in primitive societies? Why do different types of values come to be distinguished?
5. What important change is made in the scale of values when reflective criticism begins? Illustrate this from some one of the great civilizations.
6. State the essential characteristics of the modern hierarchy of values as brought out in the quotation from James and Ames's interpretation of it.
7. Define and illustrate Ames's concept of the practical absolute. How does he use it to explain the fixed character of religious values among primitive people and the new sense of absolute value in modern culture?
8. Would Ames's idea of the practical absolute imply a certain relativity in values? Explain your answer.
9. How does Ames explain the conflict between religion and science? Are the values won for man by scientists religious values, according to Ames? Would you agree with him on this point?

PART FIVE: OTHER TYPES OF PHILOSOPHY^{*}

CHAPTER I

VITALISM VERSUS MECHANISM

The body-mind problem in philosophy is closely connected with the wider problem of vitalism (or teleology) versus mechanism; a problem the solution of which is crucial in dealing with the freedom of the human will in ethics and the philosophy of religion. Vitalists are believers in an unpredictable purpose in evolution, but mechanists regard every event that happens as predictable from preceding conditions. Consequently mechanism is the present-day form of materialism in philosophy. The controversy between the vitalists and the mechanists has been one of the most significant movements in the philosophy of the twentieth century, drawing philosophers of all schools into its vortex.

I. EMERGENT EVOLUTION, by *Hans Driesch*

Analysis

Driesch first states the theory of Lloyd Morgan, who originated the technical term *emergent evolution*, although he took the word emergent from Lewes. According to Morgan, inorganic nature exhibits the character of emergence in the series: atom, molecule, crystal; and this continues into organic nature in the series: life, mind, reflective thought. Each step in the series is unpredictable and yet it is due wholly to natural forces, save only that it originated from God. Emergent evolution is opposed to all mechanistic interpretations of nature. Morgan's two uses of the word mind are mentioned (see above, p. 402 ff.) and his "philosophic creed" that God is the real source of the emergence is stated. Driesch distinguishes two meanings of the word evolution: (i) "the unfolding of something already enfolded" and (ii) the outspringing of something wholly new. Morgan uses the word only in the second sense. So much for the vitalism of Morgan.

Driesch follows this exposition with a statement of his own vitalism, which denies any emergence in the inorganic world. That world is entirely uniform and operates according to strictly causal-mechanical laws. There every event is predictable, at least, theoretically. Hence Driesch restricts his vitalism to the phenomena of life and mind. Two types of development are here involved, namely, embryological and phylogenetic development. He deals briefly with the former, which is determined by "the constellation of matter and by the essence of entelechy." Entelechy is Driesch's technical term for the vital force

to which the processes of life are due. He holds that a super-mind which knew both the constellation of matter and the essence of entelechy could predict just what any embryological development would be, but no human mind can because the essence of entelechy in an organism is beyond our comprehension. Hence embryological development is not emergent in Morgan's sense.

Is phylogenetic development emergent? Here we are concerned with the entire evolution of life from species to species. The question of whether it is emergent depends upon whether it is regarded as a free, super-personal evolution due to a Super-entelechy—a word Driesch regards as more philosophical than Morgan's term God. Hence the problem really reduces to the problem of whether there is a real cosmic freedom, as Morgan recognized. To solve this problem Driesch distinguishes between a fact of the first and of the second order. Phylogeny is a second order fact, that is to say, it is a generality from a concrete occurrence. But all second order facts have a hypothetical character, and this is especially true of phylogeny, which is absolutely unique. There is but one racial evolution, its end or goal is unknown, and we do not know whether it has yet reached its end. There may be many ends, the totality of which is the end proper. When we try to explain such a unique second order fact, we have to admit that there are two equally good explanations. Driesch states these and argues that we cannot choose between them on the basis of reason. Our choice is an act of faith.

Emergent evolution has been made a technical term by C. Lloyd Morgan, the word "emergent" having been used already by G. H. Lewes as contrasted with "resultant." Morgan refers to J. S. Mill's concept of heteropathic laws as the ultimate root of the concept in question.

The new thing in Morgan's book, then, is the concept of an *evolution* which is emergent: evolution, in the broadest sense, meaning "the comprehensive plan of sequence in all natural events." An evolution is emergent as far as the "incoming of the new" is in question; and this according to Lloyd Morgan is the case in the inorganic world as well as in the organic. If we look upon empirical reality as one Unity we find the series: atom, molecule, crystal, life, mind, reflective thought. Each subsequent phenomenon is newly incoming with regard to its antecedents.

Emergent evolution, thus, is the contrary of a mere "regrouping of preëxisting elements." But it must be conceived "without invoking any extra-natural power," such as entelechy, *élan vital*, etc.,—with the only exception of God.

That all subsequent phases in an emergent evolution are "unpredictable" from the antecedents is its main characteristic ac-

cording to our author; and this holds in particular with regard to life. Thus it happens that of all "isms" vitalism seems to be the most legitimate one.

Emergent evolution stands in contrast with all sorts of "mechanistic interpretation," that means, with all interpretations "in terms of resultant effects only" or of "summation."

The "New" that appears in emergent evolution is in the main a new sort of "relatedness"; and in particular, of "effective relatedness," appearing under the aspect of causation; effective relatedness standing in opposition to non-effective, that means mere reflective relatedness, such as "similar," "near to," etc. The emergent appearance of mind, e.g., belongs here. But it must not be forgotten that the word "mind" has a double meaning; for Morgan is a disciple of Spinoza. Mind, therefore, means, first, the "parallel" to every event in nature, and, secondly, the specific conscious mind in the narrow sense.

"What, then, makes emergents emerge?" The answer is: God as the ultimate all pervading activity. This, at least, is Morgan's "philosophic creed."

There have been two aspects of evolution in the history of science and philosophy. Evolution has been regarded either "as the unfolding of that which is enfolded," "the rendering explicit of that which is hitherto implicit," or it has been considered as "the outspringing of something that has hitherto not been in being" in the truly "epigenetic" sense. Only the second kind of evolution is emergent: the subsequent phases have "no being at all at the preceding stages of the evolutionary process"—except always God as "an acknowledged directive, immanent Activity" "omnipresent throughout," as "Causality," not as "causation." "All evolutionary process depends" on Him, as its "ultimate source."

Emergent evolution, then, does neither "interpret the higher in terms of the lower" nor vice versa.—

So much about Lloyd Morgan's principal statements.

We now proceed along our own route, and shall say in the first place, that we do not believe that there is any sort of "evolution" in the inorganic world, neither emergent nor non-emergent. For, according to modern physics and chemistry, there is nothing but "resultant" effects in this field of empirical reality. Electrons, or electric fields or ether, as you like, are the ultimate elements here, and all future events are "predictable," if only you know the position and velocity of these

elements at a given time and the fundamental causal law of acting. All particulars, in fact, are nothing but "resultants" in consequence of "regrouping." We may call this the doctrine of the Uniformity of the inorganic world. If only we knew the very details, we, in fact, *should* be able to predict the peculiarities of water from those of hydrogen and of oxygen, and even a newly appearing "color" might be predicted, supposing we knew also the fundamental laws of psychophysics. Morgan makes a very fine distinction here between "quality" and "property," the former being a peculiarity in itself, the latter being of the form of a relation; color, then, is a "property." But also properties are certainly "predictable."

Morgan tells us that "a molecule would not foretell the relations which it will obtain in liquids or in solids." But this, in my opinion, is not the point in question. The point in question is, whether an extra-molecule mind, that knows everything *about* all molecules at a given moment could predict—and it certainly can in principle, though not, of course, in reality—whenever mere inorganic events are in question.

From all we have said it comes out that we may restrict our further discussion to the study of life and mind. Here now we quite certainly have evolution before us and this in a double sense: embryological and phylogenetic.

With regard to the former, I may be quite short, as Morgan's theory does not refer to it. I, therefore, should only like to say, that my own vitalism has been founded upon the analysis of embryology, both experimental and logical, and that embryology, in my opinion, is a sort of evolution which, though non-mechanistic, is yet not "emergent" in the last resort. For it is determined both by the constellation of matter and by the essence of entelechy. And it would be "predictable" if you knew both. That you cannot predict practically, because you cannot know entelechy before its manifestation, is an all-too-human restriction, but nothing more. A Supermind might predict. This, at least, is a postulate of my vitalism. Now embryology is part of phylogeny, and, for this reason, my embryological vitalism is not the last word on the problem of life as a whole. But as embryological vitalism, as resting upon itself, my vitalism does not know true "emerging"; in any case it looks upon the morphogenetic events *as if* they were determined in a universal way.

We turn to phylogeny, i.e., to the theory of descent in the

broadest sense, including mental phylogeny, and thus we approach Morgan's principal problem in a critical way.

Is phylogeny "emergent evolution"? That is the question.

And with regard to this very problem it now seems to me as if there were a gap in the conception of the problem on the part of Lloyd Morgan, a gap that relates to the most important point. No doubt "new" things and relations emerge in phylogeny with regard to one who is himself one of its members, namely, man. But is this "emerging" really "emerging"; i.e., is it emerging for one who stands *outside* the process?

We now see the main point, as I believe. God is the ultimate active source of all; so Morgan tells us. Let us introduce a truly philosophical term for the theological one, let us speak of a *superpersonal phylogenetic entelechy*. The fundamental question, then, is the following: Does this Superentelechy possess an essence, an *essentia*, a suchness, from which the phylogenetic process is the determined necessary consequence, in such a way that this *essentia* is merely transformed from the intensive into the extensive state? Or, is there no such *essentia* or suchness; in other words, is the Superentelechy's *essentia* making itself during the phylogenetic process?

We thus are facing the problem of Bergson's *élan vital* or, what is the same thing, the problem of freedom in its cosmological form. And it seems to me that only a free superpersonal evolution would deserve the predicate of being emergent in the ultimate meaning of the word.

We, of course, take the word "free" and "freedom" in their strict meaning as denoting indeterminism and not in the sense in which Spinoza and Kant have used them, i.e., not in the sense of a determination by the mere essence of the something in question exclusively.¹

Phylogeny is regarded by us as *one* coherent process, as it is also in Morgan's discussion. Superentelechy or God, to use Morgan's term, is its ultimate source. Is, then, this Superentelechy free in its acting or not? Only in the second case is phylogeny really an emergent evolution; in the first case it is such a sort of evolution only with regard to us.

Morgan, as I have said, does not formulate the problem of determinism quite strictly, though he has seen it, in particular at the end of his work. Is there an "orderly and progressive

¹In my German works I have called *Wesensgemässheit* what Spinoza and Kant have called freedom.

development"? so he asks; is perhaps emergent evolution taken as a whole a "law of nature"? Is its unpredictableness perhaps nothing but a consequence of "our necessary ignorance of what the further development of a plan will be," every single effect being strictly determinate in accordance "with it"?

Statements like these seem to indicate that Morgan has seen the problem of freedom in an implicit way and it seems to me, though it does not come out quite clearly, that he is inclined to decide in favor of determinism. In this case emergent evolution would be only "emergent" with regard to us who are its parts.

Let us, then, study the problem of cosmological freedom in our own way.

In all empirical questions facts come first. Now there exist two sorts of "facts," which may be said to be of the first and second degree. A fact of the first degree or an immediate fact consists in the statement that a *such* is *now here*. This sort of facts is the primordial source of all our knowledge about empirical reality. Facts of the second degree are generalities induced from facts of the first degree; here belong all so-called laws of nature, may they relate to things or to events, and here belongs also phylogeny. All facts of the second degree have, more or less, an hypothetical accent, as was first seen by Hume. So has the fact of phylogeny; but the accent of probability is very strong here, at least with regard to the existence of a phylogeny in general.

Phylogeny as a fact of the second degree, now, has three characteristics: It is unique, that means that there is but one phylogeny, very hypothetic, of course, in its details. It is, most probably, of the kind of an evolution, and not of a mere summative cumulation, but of an evolution with an unknown end. It is, finally, an evolution of which we are unable to say, whether it has already reached its end or not.

Phylogeny is unique; for there is only one phenomenon of life, the single living individuals standing in material continuity by means of propagation—*omne vivum e vivo*.

Phylogeny is evolution with an unknown end: for it would be very unwise and anthropomorphic to say that man is its end. There may be many "ends," the totality of which is the "end" proper.

Phylogeny as an evolution may be not yet finished; for who could affirm the contrary?

This then, is phylogeny: a unique evolution with an unknown end and probably unfinished. And this "fact"—of the second degree, as we know—now wants an explanation. We ask: What is at the bottom of it, what is its essential cause?

You will understand without difficulty the general logical aspect of our problem. What we have, i.e., what we know, is a fact in the form of an event, phylogeny; this is regarded as being the consequence of something, and we are in search of the *reason* of this *consequence*. Intentionally I have chosen these rather indifferent purely logical terms. For even if in our case the consequence is an "effect" and the reason a "cause," the primordial relation between consequence and reason is preserved, effect being, so to speak, a "function" of *consequence*, and cause a "function" of *reason*.

Now it is one of the most fundamental principles of the general theory of reasoning, that there is never a universal way from the consequence to the reason, though there exists such a way going from the reason to the consequence or from the negation of the consequence to the negation of the reason. And this principle will prove to be of great importance for us; and not only in a general way, but with particular reference to the problem of cosmological freedom.

Notice well what the "consequence" is, from which we must start, as it alone is given to us: it is phylogeny in the empirical aspect, i.e., unique, with an unknown end, probably still in progression. This "consequence" now might have two very different "reasons":

First, there might be at its bottom a superentelechy which possesses a fixed essence and does nothing but copy its essence once more into matter, and realize phylogeny in this way. For what would be the consequence of such a process? Exactly what we observe: unique phylogeny with an unknown end and probably unfinished.

But, secondly, there also might be at the bottom of phylogeny a superentelechy without a fixed essence, i.e., with an essence which is making itself during the phylogenetic process. For in this case also the "consequence" would be what we observe, namely: unique phylogeny with an unknown end and probably unfinished.

Two reasons, then, might have as their consequence that which we observe, which we possess: empirical phylogeny as it is. *And we possess no means whatever to decide.*

But this means nothing less than that the problem of cosmological freedom, or if now we like to introduce again Lloyd Morgan's term of *emergent evolution*, in the true sense *cannot be solved*.

We, in fact, have settled our problem by *proving* its insolubleness, just as the problem of squaring the circle has been "settled," though, of course, on quite a different field of our knowledge.

We may believe in emergent evolution in the proper sense, in Bergson's *élan vital*, in his *dieu qui se fait*, i.e., in cosmological indeterminism.

But we may also believe in determinism, i.e., in Spinoza's *substantia* or *natura naturans ex qua sequitur natura naturata*.

Our decision rests upon a belief and will rest upon a belief forever, irrespective of the number of facts still to be discovered. And this depressing conclusion ultimately rests upon the uniqueness of phylogeny: we cannot make experiments with "the phylogeny" as we can with the egg of a frog or a sea urchin. For phylogeny is a "class with but one case," to put it in terms of strict logic; and we cannot stand outside it, for we form parts of it ourselves.

Let me once more come back to embryology. My vitalism has conceived embryology as a determined process, though not as one that is predictable from the material conditions alone. This statement was, however, of the form of a postulate. If, now, we remember that phylogeny is composed of the sum total of all embryologies, we at once discover that our postulate may not be in accord with the truth. On the field of pure embryology we say that the egg produced by an A produces an A. Well, this is true as long as there is no phylogenetic step. But there may be such a step and then the egg produced by an A will produce a B. And this step may be conceived under the aspect of determinism or of freedom. . . .

HANS DRIESCH: *Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy*, pp. 1-7. Edited by E. S. Brightman. Published by Longmans, Green & Co. Reprinted by permission.

SUGGESTIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Define the term emergent evolution as used by Lloyd Morgan.
2. Compare Morgan's theory with the selection from Lovejoy above, p. 349 ff.

3. What is Driesch's reason for rejecting emergent evolution so far as inorganic nature is concerned?
4. Why does Driesch argue that embryological vitalism need not hold to emergent evolution in Morgan's sense of the word?
5. What is Driesch's attitude toward phylogeny? Does he regard it as emergent in Morgan's sense?
6. Why does Driesch regard phylogeny as unique? Why does this uniqueness reduce the problem of whether phylogeny is emergent in Morgan's sense to a form that is insoluble?
7. State clearly what you think Driesch means by cosmic freedom, and the distinction between this and the doctrine of freedom of Spinoza.

II. MECHANISM VERSUS VITALISM IN THE DOMAIN OF PSYCHOLOGY, by *Howard C. Warren*

Analysis

Warren gives a clear definition of mechanism and illustrates it. He then analyzes the doctrine of vitalism into three different theories, namely, those propounding vital indeterminism, vital force, and non-mechanistic relationship. Each of these types of vitalism is defined and quotations are given from the writings of representatives of each type. Warren next takes up the case against mechanism, listing four lines of argument used by vitalists against it. The argument that it is inconceivable is answered briefly. Warren regards it as pseudological or dogmatic and insists that the problem has to be solved on the basis of the evidence of experience. The argument from organization, which has been most fully developed by Driesch, has been refuted at length in the writings of Loeb, who has succeeded in explaining vital phenomena without recourse to Driesch's *entelechy*. Warren points out three weaknesses in Driesch's argument. The argument from voluntary selection is discussed at greater length. Warren analyzes it into the *neurology of deliberation* and the *temporal fallacy*. He first gives the physiological and mechanistic explanation of deliberation. There follow three objections which vitalists make to this neurological explanation, each of which is briefly answered. Warren admits that there are complexities and that all the details have not been accounted for and probably cannot be by human minds, but he holds that the determination is there even though we cannot fully comprehend what it is. Freedom of will is an illusion due to a faulty observation of our experience of time. The temporal fallacy is in supposing that when two alternatives are before the mind they are "presented in all their strength at once." Warren turns to the fourth argument against mechanism, which he calls the argument from teleological activity (purposive behavior). Vitalists believe that future events determine present conduct (see Bode above, p. 504 ff.). Warren meets this by pointing out that the causal conditions have to be extended beyond the present in both directions—into the past as well as into the future. Spatial factors are also involved. He proposes that the word teleology should be used to mean the "temporal and spatial extension of the

conditions in certain organic phenomena." But this does not mean indeterminism. Warren examines these conditions under the headings: (i) distant-reception, (ii) memory, and (iii) purpose, and shows that each of these phenomena can be explained mechanistically. However, he admits that purposive activity is a "special type of causation." In conclusion Warren discusses the pattern concept of teleology, and holds that Bosanquet's statement of it is unintelligible.

I. DEFINITIONS

It is well, at the outset, to understand clearly what is meant by vitalism and mechanism. Both terms imply activity or change; they refer to processes in nature, not merely to static configurations. The two terms represent more or less contrasted types of process. The point at issue is whether both types actually occur in nature, or whether the changes and activities which take place in the universe may not all be reduced to a single type—the mechanistic.

Mechanism.—The distinctive characteristic of mechanistic processes is that the course of events in the sequence is rigidly *determined*. Given a certain set of antecedents, one and the same series of consequents will follow every time. If the total conditions of the situation at a given instant are known (or in so far as they are known), the results can be predicted unequivocally. If the conditions are not known to us, we nevertheless believe that the course of events in a mechanistic system is fixed, certain, unambiguous, determinate, unequivocal.

According to this definition of mechanism, which seems to be the prevailing conception of the term, and is my interpretation of its use . . . , a mechanistic process may be represented graphically as a unilinear series. An indeterminate process is one in which the outcome is not wholly unequivocal. Such a series may be pictured graphically by a line which forks or branches at certain points representing alternative courses of events beyond these points.²

Physical and chemical phenomena, as understood to-day, are typical cases of determinate activity. The course of events in these domains is generally believed to be unequivocal. These sciences furnish the practical basis upon which our notion of mechanism is founded. When we speak of mechanistic processes we have usually in mind activities of the physicochemical type. But the two notions are not identical. So far as present

² See diagram in Bergson, *Time and Free Will*, Pogsan trans., p. 176.

knowledge goes, certain processes in nature, such as the growth of organisms and voluntary acts of human beings, though strictly determinate, *may* involve activities (or forces) of a "higher type" than the physicochemical. Mechanism represents a generic type; physicochemical mechanism is a specific type which may or may not exhaust the genus.

Vitalism.—While the definition of mechanism given above is generally accepted, there is no agreement as to the connotation of vitalism. The name is applied by different writers to several mutually incompatible views which seek to explain vital phenomena in other terms than those of physicochemical activity. In the literature we find three distinct types of theory which take issue with physicochemical mechanism as a general explanation of natural processes. They may be classed together, though the third type is not, strictly speaking, a form of vitalism.

1. *Vital Indeterminism.*—Vital phenomena are held by some to be not entirely "unilinear"; at certain points two or more alternative courses are (supposed to be) possible, the actual outcome in any given instance being unpredictable. In earlier days this notion was extended to inorganic nature; the actual results in certain cases were ascribed to "chance" or "caprice." So far as I know, this view has no adherents among contemporary scientific thinkers. Equivocal causation is limited to-day to organic phenomena; the selection or choice is attributed either (a) to autonomy, i.e., self-determination of the creature, or (b) to the operation of some non-physical agent working upon the material substance of the organism. These qualifications of indeterminism virtually place the interpretation in the next class.³

2. *Vital Force.*—Professor William E. Ritter defines vitalism as the view that "something absolutely new and novel came into the world when living beings came, and that this came as a special force, or principle, or factor . . . not material."⁴ While this force or factor has not always been conceived as determinate in its activity, it is to-day generally regarded as *subject*

³ As a philosophical theory only—not for purposes of scientific investigation. Driesch, e.g., holds that "two systems absolutely identical in every physicochemical respect may behave differently under absolutely identical conditions, in case that the systems are living systems." (Quoted by Jennings in *Science*, 1912, Vol. XXXVI, p. 435.) Driesch regards this view as "experimental indeterminism," but not as "absolute indeterminism." Cf. Bergson's illustration cited above.

⁴ "Controversy between Materialism and Vitalism," *Science*, 1911, Vol. XXXIII, p. 438.

to certain laws. Its workings are held to exhibit certain uniformities, though these are not of the physicochemical type. The vital force is variously designated as *élan vital* (Bergson), entelechy (Driesch), or soul (W. McDougall).

The activity of the "vital force" is generally characterized as *teleological*. This term is variously defined. Usually it signifies that the choice is determined with reference to something "yet to come"—that the outcome is not merely the resultant of past conditions.

3. *Non-mechanistic Relationship*.—Certain writers who reject the notion of a specific vital force, nevertheless believe that the activities of organisms are not wholly explicable in physicochemical terms. According to Kant: "Some products of material nature cannot be judged to be possible according to merely mechanical laws. (To judge them requires quite a different law of causality, namely that of final causes.)"⁵ Hobhouse regards a living being as a system of "forces in which mechanical relations are qualified by teleological relations:"⁶ and Professor Henderson somewhat similarly defines biological organization as consisting in "a teleological and non-mechanical *relationship* between mechanical things and processes."⁷

Professor Lovejoy describes this type of vitalism as the general doctrine that "the action of living bodies is not strictly a function of the number and spatial configuration of the particles composing them at any instant."⁸ Professor Jennings points out, however, that the same may be said of non-living systems also;⁹ so that this view, while it is anti-mechanistic, need not take a vitalistic form. Both Hobhouse's and Henderson's conceptions of non-mechanistic relations might be similarly extended to the inorganic realm. Henderson seems to imply this broader notion of teleology in his discussion of the "order of nature."

II. THE CASE AGAINST MECHANISM

The opposition to mechanism as a complete explanation of the processes which occur in nature is thus seen to be of different degrees. The three anti-mechanistic attitudes may be summed up as follows: (1) Certain processes in nature are not

⁵ *Kritik of Judgment*, trans. by Bernard, p. 294.

⁶ *Development and Purpose*, p. 329, note. (Quoted by Henderson.)

⁷ "Teleology of Inorganic Nature," *Philos. Rev.*, 1916, Vol. XXV, p. 278.

⁸ "The Meaning of Vitalism," *Science*, 1911, Vol. XXXIII, p. 612.

⁹ "Doctrines Held as Vitalism," *Amer. Natural*, 1913, Vol. XLVII, p. 394.

determinate. (2) Certain activities of organisms are determined in part by a force or agent which is not physicochemical in character. (3) Physicochemical mechanism prevails universally, but it does not afford a *complete* explanation of certain natural processes; the mechanistic explanation needs to be supplemented by a teleological explanation, which takes account of relations belonging to a different order or dimension from the mechanistic.

The mechanist, on the other hand, believes that the weight of scientific evidence favors an explanation of natural processes stated wholly in physicochemical terms. According to the mechanistic interpretation, not only inorganic phenomena, but all phenomena of organic life, including those in which human consciousness is concerned, are strictly determinate and belong to the physicochemical type.

The case against mechanism is based chiefly upon four lines of argument. (1) *Inconceivability*: A thorough-going mechanistic interpretation of nature is inconceivable and impossible. (2) *Organization*: Mechanism does not explain certain observed characteristics of growth and regulation in organisms. (3) *Voluntary Selection*: Conscious introspection demonstrates that voluntary choice in human beings is not mechanistically determined. (4) *Teleology*: The adaptive character of behavior is not fully describable in mechanistic terms.

These arguments are used alike by all classes of opponents to the mechanistic standpoint. We shall examine them in turn in the remainder of this paper.

The Argument from Inconceivability.—The difficulties which meet us when we endeavor to reach a clear conception of mechanism are not to be ignored. They are such as occur when any new scientific principles are formulated which appear to be at variance with familiar but more limited generalizations. When the theory of the earth's spherical shape was first propounded it was difficult to imagine how men could live at the antipodes without "dropping off."

That many such inconceivabilities and absurdities have been rendered conceivable and have eventually been adopted diminishes the weight of this argument. Yet the opponents of mechanism to-day lay considerable emphasis on the difficulty. Not merely do they point out the need of greater explicitness in defining and describing mechanism; but they assert that the theory at certain points is inconceivable, impossible, or absurd. Such an argument may be characterized as pseudological.

The Kantian logic bristles with this type of reasoning. The passage quoted above is an instance in point. "Cannot be judged" is one shearing-blade of its antinomy; the opposite blade with its "must be judged" is equally sharp. If we smooth down the "cannot" and the "must," the antinomy no longer cuts.

The contemporary neo-Kantians follow in the Master's footsteps. Hobhouse asserts that "the actions of living beings are not explicable in mechanical terms, and we are compelled by the evidence to admit a teleological factor."¹⁰ He may be justified in arguing that these actions *have not yet been fully explained*; but to characterize them as inexplicable is to spar with brass knuckles.

Driesch, for all his scientific training, uses this type of argument profusely: "A theory like Weismann's is impossible."¹¹ "It would be nonsense to apply the concept of 'quantity' and 'measure' to something which has only to do with the *arrangement* of a manifoldness."¹² "How could a 'machine' be divided and divided and always remain the same?"¹³ As a call for "more light" such arguments deserve respectful attention. As a *reductio ad absurdum* they are not impressive.

W. McDougall's arguments in certain places indicate the same mental attitude: "The behavior of animals . . . is everywhere characterized by certain features which seem to present insuperable difficulties to all attempts at purely mechanical explanation."¹⁴ "Mental chemistry is an inadmissible notion;" it is "strictly absurd."¹⁵ "The difficulties of phenomenalist parallelism are then very great, indeed insuperable."¹⁶ "Such a state of things (as correlation of pain with beneficial reactions and of pleasure with detrimental reactions) would seem to us profoundly irrational and absurd."¹⁷

With the argument from inconceivability may be joined its converse, the argument from *a priori necessity*, so familiar to readers of Kant. Both arguments strike the scientist as pseudo-

¹⁰ *Development and Purpose*, p. 329, note.

¹¹ *Problem of Individuality*, p. 13.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 35.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 22. Cf. *Science and Philosophy of the Organism*, Vol. I, pp. 138-149; note the weakness of his argument if the assertion of necessity be eliminated.

¹⁴ *Body and Mind*, p. 258.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 283.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 160.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 324-325.

logical. Such voluntaristic terms as *necessary* and *impossible* exert an undue logical pressure which even the out-and-out determinist resents.

The solution of the problem before us, as of any other scientific problem, depends upon *empirical* evidence. The function of logic is merely to imitate in thought the formal relations which prevail throughout the universe. The data of knowledge are drawn from the world about us; our rôle as rational beings is to arrange these data into orderly systems which *tally with the formal relations found in nature*. Pseudological devices carry us away from such correspondence between thought and nature.¹⁸

The Argument from Organization.—The second indictment against mechanism rests upon the phenomena of growth and other vital processes observed in organisms. According to the vitalists these processes are inconsistent with a strictly mechanistic theory. This line of argument has been developed most systematically by Driesch. Certain crucial experiments demonstrate, in his opinion, that each cell in the organism is “equi-potential”; that is, it is capable of building up an entire organism. But, as a matter of fact, he points out, most cells develop only into some specific part of the organism, and the development of each cell harmonizes with that of the other cells in the organism. This would indicate, in his judgment, that the course of development is not wholly physicochemical, but is in some way controlled or directed by a non-physical agent—an entelechy.

The evidence for mechanism on this count has been exhaustively presented by Jacques Loeb in a recent work, *The Organism as a Whole*, to which the reader is referred. According to this array of evidence the phenomena of organic life *do* admit of interpretation in strictly physicochemical terms, so far as scientific research has examined them. The hypothesis of a guiding entelechy appears to be quite as redundant as the hypothesis of an agency directing the movements of the planets in their orbits.

In addition to this direct empirical evidence for the mechanistic character of vital processes, we may notice certain weaknesses in Driesch's argument. (1) His statement of equipotentiality is broader than the facts warrant. The germ

¹⁸ In fairness we should note an equally illegitimate tendency on the part of mechanists to characterize the vitalistic position as a phase of mysticism or magic.

cells and certain of the cells which arise in *early* development do indeed appear to be capable of producing an entire organism. But many of the cells which arise in *later* stages of growth are more specialized. They appear capable of producing only certain specific organs or certain kinds of tissue. In the frog a certain type of cell, however situated, develops only into a leg. In man the nerve cells, blood cells, etc., produce only tissues of one type. Such cells are not equipotential.

(2) Driesch's conception of "mechanism" is too narrow. The machines devised by man are of two distinct sorts—*constructing* machines and *operating* machines. The organism is at once a building mechanism and a working mechanism. The individual cells build up the organism and the organism as a whole performs certain operations of reaction upon the environment. Driesch does not seem to recognize that a mechanism may combine both features.

(3) The structural form which arises in organisms by growth may be due to the interaction of cells upon one another. The development of any given cell is inhibited or modified by the action of the whole organism upon it. This would explain the "harmonious" development of the entire system as readily as Driesch's *entelechy*.

The two remaining lines of attack upon mechanism (volition and teleology) touch upon the sphere of psychology and will be examined in greater detail.

III. THE ARGUMENT FROM VOLUNTARY SELECTION

The supposed autonomy of consciousness in determining action is used to support the view that vital phenomena are likewise autonomous or self-determined in certain respects. If volition proves to be physicochemically determined, this presumption disappears.

The Neurology of Deliberation.—It is now generally admitted that the thoughts which precede voluntary muscular activity depend in some way upon cerebral activity. There are three alternative interpretations of this relation: (1) Thought and neural processes are regarded by some as two *distinct* but *interacting* series of phenomena. (2) They are believed by others to constitute two *independent, parallel* series. (3) They are held to constitute *one series*, which may be observed subjectively as conscious experience and objectively as neural activity. The

third view appears to accord with the observed facts, and seems preferable under the rule of parsimony.¹⁹

The subjective experience of thought consists in a succession of mental states whose causal relation is not directly observed. If the series of events is mechanistically related, the causal description should be expressible in terms of the neural processes which are identical with the conscious experiences. As yet these neural processes have not been measured. That nerve impulses exist we know, and we have considerable knowledge of their pathways.

While an objective description of the process of "voluntary selection" is still more or less hypothetical, it may be stated in mechanistic terms as readily as in terms of an animistic agency. During the period of deliberation which precedes volition neural impulses travel now along one path (or set of paths), now along another among the cortical centers. When a neural impulse reaches a motor synapse of low resistance, discharge takes place and certain muscles are contracted. According to the mechanistic view both the central course of the impulse (deliberation) and the motor discharge (volition) follow the line of least resistance.

At least three objections are raised to this as a complete explanation²⁰ of the occurrence. (1) The succession of thoughts is determined in part by our attitude and conscious endeavors. (2) The actual initiation of the act is a matter of conscious control. (3) We are conscious at the time, or later, that we might have acted otherwise.

Attitude lends itself, however, to description in neural terms. The course of the nerve impulse is determined not merely by the sum-total of present stimuli; it depends quite as much upon past experience. The resistance at each synapse is modified by the impulses which have traversed it in the past, and the sum-total of these modifications constitute the general *set* of the nervous system. This neural set, in subjective terms, is our *attitude*. Laboratory investigations have demonstrated that associations of various types are formed according to certain regular principles. So far as can be judged, each association follows a line of least resistance, which is determined by habit (neural set) and present stimulation.

¹⁹ Cf. Bode's quotation from Warren above, p. 510.

²⁰ As here given the "explanation" is schematic and incomplete. To work out the neural details would carry us beyond the space allotted to this discussion.

Conscious endeavor to deliberate is one phase of attitude. In neural terms it is a *set* in some direction. It means that certain central synapses have been made permeable, so that the impulse passes from center to center instead of finding at once the motor outlet.

If we observe intently the actual initiation of a voluntary act (the so-called *fiat*), we find it characterized by extremely vivid consciousness. *Unless* it is intently observed the action takes place of itself. In ordinary cases, then, the neural activity of volition means simply the passage of the impulse into a motor pathway through a permeable synapse. In certain specific cases this passage is preceded by an *intensive summation* of nerve impulses, and this is the neural equivalent of the *fiat*.

In attempting to describe these phenomena the real difficulty seems due to the complexity of the occurrences, not to their peculiar character. We are dealing with a vast plexus of impulses and resistances. To account for them all is practically beyond our power. Like the problem of three bodies in physics, the outcome is practically unsolvable, but it is nevertheless rigidly determinate.

The Temporal Fallacy.—The notion of “freedom”—of the indeterminateness of volition—appears to rest upon a faulty observation of the time relations of conscious experience. Choice implies that two or more alternative courses of action are presented in consciousness, of which one is selected by the individual. The fallacy consists in assuming that these alternatives are presented in all their strength at once.

When I debate whether to spend my vacation in the mountains or at the seashore, the reasons for and against each course are reviewed successively, not simultaneously. If there are strong motives for each, these motives are considered in turn. When the decision is actually reached it is due to the motives which are strongest at that time. I may afterwards feel that I might have chosen the other course quite as readily. But this is because the motives as *now presented* are different in strength from what they were at the time of decision. The problem of expense may weigh more heavily than it did when a salary check was just deposited; the wishes or welfare of some member of the family may now appear in a stronger light. I read back the present situation into the earlier; I appear to have chosen a line of greater resistance, because this line offers greater re-

sistance at present. Hence the belief that the choice is guided by "my will" rather than determined by the total situation. . . .

IV. THE ARGUMENT FROM TELEOLOGICAL ACTIVITY

The vitalistic hypothesis claims support in the fact that organic phenomena bear reference not merely to their antecedents in the past but to future conditions and situations. This is true not only of conscious behavior but of growth and other vital phenomena. I plan and execute my actions with reference to the coming vacation. The development of the embryo yields organs which are devoid of present utility but which later will serve to nourish and protect it. Our description of behavior and growth is incomplete if we merely trace the causal sequence as we do in inorganic processes. The scientific treatment of vital phenomena involves taking into account the future outcome as well as the antecedents.

This is only part of the story, however. In the case of behavior the conditions are extended in *both* temporal directions. The creative activity often has reference to the more or less remote past as well as to the future. A bird becomes gun-shy as a result of some experience. Thereafter when she sees a gun her reactions are conditioned not merely by present stimuli, but by the residual effects of the earlier situation. The mnemonic factors enter into our explanation of behavior in some form or other—either as neural set or as memory image.

There is also an extension of the *spatial* factors in behavior, though this is not so obvious. An organism reacts to distant stimuli, or rather to distant situations. We converge the two eyes with reference to a certain "depth." When the conductor shouts "All aboard," we run faster if we are further away from the train. We reach to right or left according to the direction of the object and put forth greater or lesser effort according to its degree of remoteness from us.

The word *teleology* may be used to denote this temporal and spatial extension of the conditions in certain organic phenomena.²¹ The recognition of teleology by science does not *ipso facto* imply acceptance of indeterminism. Neither does it involve the admission of exceptions to the general principles

²¹ The two terms, *teleology* and *purpose*, are usually employed interchangeably. But *purpose* connotes temporal extension only. On etymological grounds the meaning of teleology may be broadened to include spatial extension of the conditions as well.

of physicochemical action. Teleological activity may be described in terms which harmonize completely with our notions of physical causation. The conception of mechanism is broadened somewhat, but we find no discontinuity-point separating the physicochemical sphere from phenomena of a "higher order."

Distant-reception.—The principal distant senses of animals are sight, smell, and hearing. In each of these the stimuli come from objects or sources more or less remote from the creature. The stimuli travel toward the animal and affect the appropriate receptor. The stimuli as such are not distant, but the source remains distant and *continues to send out waves or emanations* toward the receptor. The situation is analogous to telegraphy, where a transmitting operator manipulates the key and a receiving operator, perhaps a thousand miles away, receives the message. The transmitter remains at a distance during the entire operation, but his activity and the activities of his instrument play an essential rôle in the process. A complete scientific description of telegraphy involves reference to the source of transmission.

Similarly, distant reception and the resulting reactions are not completely described in terms of the *impinging* stimulus. The distant source is an essential factor to be considered. In explaining telegraphy the recognition of the distant source implies no modification of the laws of causation. It merely indicates a certain complication of the causal processes in such types of activity. The same appears true in distant-reception.

Memory.—The mnemonic factors in the antecedents of behavior are not present stimuli, but dispositions of some sort in the cortical tracts. When I recite "Mandalay" or steer a sailboat around a buoy, the immediate stimuli are not the sole causal factors. Past experiences have altered in some way the central synapses if not the neural substance itself. These "prepared" central conditions are essential factors in the process; a scientific description of my activity involves taking them into account. This may be expressed in various ways. It may be said (1) that my present cortical set is a factor in my activity; or (2) that my memory of the poem or of the art of sailing enters into the process; or (3) that my past experiences in memorizing the poem or learning to sail are one of the antecedents of the present action. These are all abbreviated descriptions of the temporal extension.

The third form of statement is the most satisfactory, since it emphasizes the earlier occurrences which produced the cortical set and built up the memory. To describe the mnemonic factor merely in terms of present neural dispositions is to miss an essential point. Memory is conditioned by the *original experiences* which produce the set, in the same way that perception is conditioned by the *distant objects* which generate the stimuli.

To say that my reading of "Mandalay" years ago is one of the "essential" antecedents of my present memory experience does not imply that time is syncopated—that the "past" is "present." The causal sequence holds in full mechanistic form. But in describing memory phenomena the statement is abbreviated for convenience. Just as we say $9 \times 6 = 54$, instead of adding 6 to 6 again and again, so we speak of the original sensory experience as a direct antecedent of the present recall.

Purpose.—When we act with reference to a future situation the causal relation is more complex. In a former paper this type of activity was examined at some length.²² Briefly, purposive actions depend upon distant-reception and memory. When a ball is coming toward me I *prepare* to catch it. Part of the future situation is already given through *distant-reception*: I see the ball coming before it reaches my hands. Part of the future situation is also given by the *memory* factor: I represent the coming situation in terms of similar past experiences.

In the article referred to, purpose was defined as an "inversion of the temporal order." This is merely another shorthand formulation. In ordinary causal series the order would be (1) sight of the object, (2) contact, (3) reaction of some sort, such as grasping the ball, eating food, etc. In purposive action part of the reaction (3) precedes the contact (2). Professor Perry²³ points out that in the case of a dog chasing a rabbit the digestive process actually begins before the dog catches his prey. Here the reaction is started before the significant part of the stimulus occurs. Such an inversion of order is characteristic of purpose; it is an *anticipatory* reaction, but the process is mechanistically performed.

Purposive activity is thus seen to be a special type of causation, not a mode of change opposed to the causal type. The

²² "A Study of Purpose," *J. of Phil., Psychol.*, etc., 1916, Vol. XIII, Nos. 1, 2, 3.

²³ "Docility and Purposiveness," *Psychol. Rev.*, 1918, Vol. XXV, p. 16.

same was found true in the case of memory and distant-reception. Teleology in general, then, is a specialized form of causal process, which arises through certain extensions of the spatial and temporal range of the antecedents. Only the complexity, it appears, hinders us from describing the process completely in terms of physicochemical mechanism.

The Pattern Concept of Teleology.—Driesch offers as one of his arguments for vitalism the fact that organisms present certain peculiar patterns or forms. Professor Henderson, while denying the truth of vitalism, also emphasizes the pattern or order of certain phenomena in the universe.

These and the more or less similar views of Bosanquet, Hobhouse, and others indicate a sense of dissatisfaction with the postulates of physicochemical mechanism. With the exception of Driesch the authors mentioned admit the universality of mechanistic causation. They believe that the causal process is supplemented in some way by another factor which belongs to a different order.

Bosanquet conceives this factor to be the principle of Value, and makes Teleology a subform of this principle. If teleology "is to retain a meaning, . . . it must fall back on the characteristics of value which, apart from sequence in time and from selected purposes, attach to the nature of a totality which is perfection."²⁴ Psychophysics points the way to a scientific definition of "value," but "a totality which is perfection" conveys no more meaning to the present writer than "a thirteen which is redness." . . .

H. C. WARREN in the *Philosophical Review*, Vol. XXVII, pp. 597-606 and 608-612. Reprinted by permission.

SUGGESTIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Write a one thousand word paper on the controversy between mechanism and vitalism, summarizing Warren's arguments, and giving your own attitude at the end of the paper.
2. To what extent does Warren admit that there are gaps in the mechanistic explanation which make it incomplete in the present stage of our knowledge? Is this favorable to mechanism or to teleology? Why?
3. Why does Warren reject Driesch's explanation of organic processes in terms of entelechy?
4. Could a vitalist accept Warren's neurological explanation of deliberation and still be a vitalist? Give a reason for your answer.

²⁴ *Individuality and Value*, p. 126.

5. State clearly the temporal fallacy. Is it committed by the vitalists or by the mechanists?
6. Could vitalists accept Warren's proposed definition of teleology? Give a reason for your answer. Is the "pattern concept of teleology" identical with or different from Warren's proposed use of the word?

CHAPTER II

AGNOSTICISM, SCEPTICISM AND POSITIVISM

I. THE UNKNOWABLE OF HERBERT SPENCER, by *George Santayana*

Analysis

Santayana regards Spencer's belief in substance, which operates mysteriously and is more real than any of its modes, as the central truth of philosophy, but he thinks that it is unfortunate that Spencer named this pervasive substance the Unknowable. He explains this misnomer as being partly due to the influence of the neo-Kantian philosophy which was in vogue in England in Spencer's day. Santayana points out that substance can be known and that Spencer himself did not take the epithet "unknowable" strictly. However, the emotion which the term unknowable suggests and tends to call forth is legitimate, since we are surrounded by veritable mysteries all through our lives. The agnosticism prevalent in Spencer's day throughout English culture is briefly described. The calling of substance unknowable is really a mere play on words for the fact that we have to take things for granted that we cannot understand fully. Another reason why Spencer called substance unknowable was his desire to reconcile religion and science, by having the former deal with the unknowable and the latter with the knowable parts of reality. Santayana gives his own idea of religion in connection with his discussion of Spencer, holding that true religion demands a belief in a substance more real than anything man can create. He points out that the confusion of intuition with knowledge is largely responsible for Spencer's notion that substance is unknowable. We have knowledge of many facts that are intuitively undiscoverable, and the fact that we cannot know them intuitively does not mean that we cannot know them at all and that they are unknowable. In conclusion he illustrates Spencer's theory with the attitude ladies take toward jewels.

. . . It is not, however, as a philosopher of evolution or as a political prophet that I wish to consider Herbert Spencer. I should like to confine myself, if it were possible, to one point in his system, not especially characteristic of his age nor of ours, a point in which he seems to me to have been a true philosopher such as any age might produce; for if nature has made a man observant, intelligent, and speculative, the times cannot prevent him from being so. I refer to his belief in a substance which by its secret operation, in infinite modes, kindles experience, so

that all phenomena as they appear and all minds observing these appearances are secondary facts and not, as is often alleged, the fundamental or only realities. On the contrary, any experience is incidental to animal life and animal passions, which in turn are incidental to the general flux of substance in the world. Appearances and feelings and consciousness itself are in their nature desultory and unsubstantial, yet not groundless nor altogether mad, because substance creates and sustains them by its steady rhythms, so that they are truly expressive and, when intelligence arises, may become terms and symbols in true knowledge.

This is of course no new doctrine, but as old as the hills. It is an opinion which any man, if not otherwise prejudiced or indoctrinated, might well come to by himself. It was embraced by Spencer as a matter of course, and held perhaps all the more resolutely because he was not too respectful of academic tradition. Had he been expert in metaphysics and educated at a university, he might have missed the obvious.

Unfortunately, in wishing to pick out from Spencer's system this one ancient and familiar belief, and to defend it, I am arrested at once by an untoward circumstance. Herbert Spencer called this substance beneath all appearances the Unknowable. This negative appellation is evidently drawn from a critical and subjective philosophy, such as Spencer's was not. It belongs to the vocabulary of disappointment; it is a romantic word. It transports us far from the region of eager inquiry, experiment, statistics, miscellaneous information, and scientific enlightenment in which Spencer's other theories had bloomed. Why this anomaly? Why any metaphysical preface at all to a work of straightforward natural philosophy?

I think the reason was that Spencer, not being by nature a logician, bowed in logic to casual authorities, and relied too much, in this subject too, on the fashion of the hour. He supposed, as some do to-day, that the latest logic was the last. Dean Mansel, Sir William Hamilton, and Kant would never be superseded. He hardly considered the atmosphere, the implications, or the contradictions of the doctrines he quoted from those worthies; he appealed to them on one point, in order to discredit all their other arguments. Metaphysics should be proved, out of the mouths of the metaphysicians themselves, to be incompetent to revise his scientific speculations, or to refute his conclusions. He hardly cared, therefore, if the language of

his metaphysical preface was that of his natural enemies, and perverse essentially: that fact seemed almost an advantage since it locked the gates against those enemies with their own bolts.

Yet words are weapons, and it is dangerous in speculation, as in politics, to borrow them from the arsenal of the enemy. In consenting to call substance unknowable, Spencer exposed himself to the derisive question how, if substance was unknowable, he ever came to know of its existence. Indeed, if the epithet were taken strictly, it would positively contradict and abolish belief in that tremendous reality on which he bestowed it, partly perhaps in reverence, and partly in haste to be done with reverence and to come to business. But Spencer did not take the epithet strictly, since he spoke of *modes* of the unknowable and regarded phenomena everywhere as its manifestations; and if we take the word knowledge in its natural sense (of which I shall speak presently) it is hard to see how anything could be better revealed than by being manifested everywhere. The fact is that relative and oblique designations, such as the unknowable or the unconscious, cannot be taken strictly: they cannot be intended to describe anything in its proper nature, but only in its accidental relation to something else—to a would-be knower who is unable to know it, or to an ulterior sensibility which as yet has not arisen. Nothing can be intrinsically unknowable; for if any one was tempted to imagine a substance such that it should antecedently defy description, inasmuch as that substance had no assignable character, he would be attributing existence to a nonentity. It would evidently make no difference in the universe whether a thing without any character were added to it or were taken away. If substance is to exist, it must have a character distinguishing it from nothing, and also from everything else. In saying this I do not mean to ignore those renowned philosophers who have maintained that the entire essence of substance is pure Being: I can easily conceive that in some other world pure Being should be all in all. Pure Being is itself a particular essence, the simplest essence of all, clearly distinguishable, both in definition and in experience, from every other essence, and loudly contrary to nothing, with which Hegel would identify it, not (I think) honestly: and if pure Being by chance were the essence of substance, substance would be so far from unknowable that it would be thoroughly well known, and we should always carry with us, as Spinoza observes, an adequate idea of it. That the substance of this world has a

far more elaborate nature I believe can be easily proved; but I cannot enter here into that argument. It is easy to conceive, however, that the intrinsic nature of substance may be very recondite and very rich, so that the human mind has no occasion and no capacity to describe it adequately—and this perhaps comes nearer to Spencer's intention in calling it unknowable. In this sense not only God but the remoter parts of space and time, and probably the depths of matter, would be unknowable to man. Even then, however, the intrinsic nature of substance could offer no resistance to being discovered, if any one had the means and the wit to do so; and if substance remains largely unknown to mankind, the reason will not be any recalcitrancy on its part, but rather a casual coincidence in ourselves of curiosity with blindness, so that we earnestly desire to search the depths of substance, but cannot.

In this measure the emotion suggested by the term unknowable is a legitimate emotion. It expresses an integral part of the tragedy involved in being finite and mortal—perhaps in being a mind or spirit at all. Poets and philosophers sometimes talk as if life were an entertainment, a feast of ordered sensations; but the poets, if not the philosophers, know too well in their hearts that life is no such thing: it is a predicament. We are caught in it; it is something compulsory, urgent, dangerous, and tempting. We are surrounded by enormous, mysterious, only half-friendly forces. This is our experience in the dilemmas of conduct, in religion, in science, and in the arts; so that the usual sequel to agnosticism, when impatient people deny that the unknown exists, far from being a rational simplification, is a piece of arrant folly: one of those false exits in the comedy of thought which, though dramatic, are ignominious, because the mind must revert from them to the beginning of the scene, and play it over again on some other principle. All the reasons that originally suggested the belief in substance remain unimpaired, and suggest the same belief again and again. We are not less dependent than our forefathers on food, on circumstances, on our own bodies; the incubus of the not-ourselves is not lifted from us; or if in some respects we have acquired a greater dominion over nature, this only adds positive knowledge of substance to the dumb sense we had before of its environing presence. How far this understanding of substance shall go depends on the endowment of the proposed knower, and on the distance, scale, and connexions of the things he is attempting to

describe. How far knowledge is possible, therefore, can never be determined without first knowing the circumstances; and the very notion of knowledge—by which I do not mean mere feeling or consciousness, but the cognizance which one existence can take of another—is a notion that never could be framed without confident experience of sundry objects known and of persons able to know them.

In saying this I am not merely expressing my own view of the matter; I am thinking of the agnosticism prevalent in Spencer's generation. It was no general scepticism; it did not, even in Kant, challenge the possibility of knowledge on account of the audacious claim which all transitive or informing knowledge puts forth in professing to report and describe something absent. On the contrary, such transitive and informing knowledge was still assumed to exist; the essential miracle of it was not denied, because it was not noticed. Everybody was assumed to know his own past, not merely to imagine it; everybody was assumed to know, not merely to imagine, the conscious existence of others, and the laws and phenomena of nature *ad infinitum*. But all these known facts, however remote and unobservable, were phenomena that had appeared, or might have appeared, to some human mind. What was condemned never to be known was only the environment of this experience, which experience had always supposed it possessed and observed, and which had been called matter, God, or the natural world. Yet the existence of these objects was not denied: had there really been no God, no matter, and no natural world, I do not see how incapacity to discover them could have been called agnosticism. The agnostic was haunted by ghosts of substance, filling his whole experience with a sense of discomfort, ignorance, and defeat. Those substances were real but elusive; and though he never saw them, the agnostic remembered only too well the tales once told concerning them, and secretly desired to have assurance of their truth; only he thought such assurance was eternally denied him by his psychological constitution. As speech has been called a means of concealing thought, so knowledge was a screen cutting off reality. Evidently this agnosticism, besides assuming true knowledge of much absent experience, presupposed accurate knowledge of the human mind and its categories, conceived to be unalterable; and it also presupposed a definition of that veiled reality definite enough to assure us that no definition of it would ever be given.

So much sure knowledge at home had a tendency to console the agnostic for his ignorance abroad. If metaphysics had closed its doors upon him, science was inviting him to a feast. Science was then believed to be so clear and unquestionable, and practically so beneficent, that human life would presently be filled to the brim with busy knowledge, busy wealth, and busy happiness. Mankind being thus happily occupied, like the busy bee, would have no reason to regret its ignorance of what did not concern it. Yet this contentment in agnosticism, so wise in its humility and so natural in an age of material progress, is fatal sooner or later to agnosticism itself. If you are not a wistful and distressed agnostic, you will forget ere long that you are an agnostic at all. Why should you believe in those ghosts of substance, if you never see them? There were once, or there seemed to be, substantial and formidable realities which everybody was sure of—God, matter, the natural world; but after literary psychology had proved that you could know nothing but your own ideas, and you found that, in spite of your incredulity, these ideas continued to flow as pleasantly as ever, what reason could you have to imagine the existence of anything else? Thus the agnostic who has lost his sense of bereavement will readily revert to dogmatism. He will relapse into innocent habit of mind which regards what we see as existing substantially, and what we do not see as nothing. . . .

Calling substance unknowable, then, is like calling a drum inaudible, for the shrewd reason that what you hear is the sound and not the drum. It is a play on words, and little better than a pun. In the sense in which what is heard is the sound, hearing is intuition: in the sense in which what is heard is the drum, hearing is an instance of animal faith, of that sort of perception which includes understanding and readiness to assume much that is not perceived, and to act on that assumption. Certainly if nature had confined our cognitive powers to intuition of absolute data, and we were incorrigibly æsthetic idiots, substance would be unknowable to us; but in that case we should not be agnostics about substance, since we should have not the least inkling that such a thing might exist, nor the least notion of its nature. But mankind has always had ideas of matter, of God or the gods, and of a natural world, full of hidden processes and powers; these objects, just because they existed, were necessarily removed from intuition; but everybody knew the quarter in which they lay and the circle of experiences in which

each of them was manifested. Everybody knew what he meant by believing in them, and what sort of things they would be if it was really on them, and not on something quite different, that his action was directed. For instance, at this moment, not being able to discard the rude logic of my animal ancestors, I think I find indications before me of the four walls of this room and of you sitting within them, both you and the walls being possessed of a substantial existence, that is, having existed prior to my arrival in Oxford and existing apart, even now, from my summary intuitions of you, vague symbols to me of your being and of your presence. Nor does the equal substantiality which I attribute to you and to the walls at all imply an identity of nature between the two. On the contrary, I should be utterly lacking in sanity, as well as in civility, if I now turned my back upon you and addressed the wall; yet on the hypothesis that my perceptions do not convey knowledge of substance, but are intuitions of pure ideas, it would be equally vain to address myself to you or to the wall, since in either case I should be haranguing my own sensations. The fact that substantial, and substantially different, realities must be posited beyond myself and my data, one sort amenable to persuasion and the other deaf, is something I assume because the enterprise of life in me at this moment demands that I should do so. I am pledged by my instant adventure and by the general art of living (which has a groundless ascendancy over all animals) to take for granted that you are sitting there, admirable in your patience and inscrutable in your thoughts; and that just as in speaking to you I posit your substantial existence, so you in your turn are kindly positing mine, over and above the volatile sounds which you actually hear: and I am sure you are intelligently recognizing me and my thoughts very much for what we really are.

Thus the Spencerian Unknowable is unknowable only to idealists, who identify knowledge with intuition, and, if they are consistent, deny the capacity of thought to indicate anything external, whether an event, a substance, or another actual thought. But these objects withdrawn from intuition are the objects of daily knowledge and of science: and Spencer believed he knew them very well. The scruples that made him substitute the word unknowable for the word force or the word force for the word matter, were the scruples of an idealist, such as he did not intend to be. They sprang from the habit of reducing things to their adventitious relation to our selves, the

habit of egotism; as if the difficulty we may have in approaching them could constitute their intrinsic being.

There was, however, a motive of quite another sort leading Spencer to disguise the substance of things under the name of the Unknowable. He wished to reconcile science with religion. It is easy to deride this pretension in one who had so little sympathy with religious institutions and with religious experience. Religion in the mass of mankind has never been a mere sense of mystery. It has been a positive belief, and an experimental effort, directed on the means of salvation. A prophet, conscious of some promise or warning conveyed to him miraculously, cannot substitute for this specific faith an official assurance that science will never quite succeed in dissipating the mystery of things: it is not what he will never know that interests him, but what he thinks he has discovered. Genuine religion professes to have positive knowledge and to bring positive benefits: it is an art; and to ask it to be satisfied with knowing that no knowledge can penetrate to the heart of things is sheer mockery: the opposite is what religion instinctively asserts. Like science, religion is solid only in so far as by faith and art—the two wings of true knowledge—it can really survey human destiny and reveal the divine decrees on which human destiny depends. And yet I think that Herbert Spencer, in throwing somewhat contemptuously that sop to religion, was in fact silently reconciling religion with science behind his back and without suspecting it. The substance envisaged in science and that envisaged in religion have always been the same. The paths of discovery are different, but, if they convey true knowledge, they must ultimately converge upon the same facts, on the same ground of necessity in things. In the recognition of a universal substance far removed from the imagination and the will of men, yet creating this will and imagination at the appropriate places, and giving them their natural scope, there lies a quite positive religion, and by no means a new one. Substance, if we admit it at all, is by definition the source of our life and the dispenser to us of good and evil. Respect for it, then, is the beginning of wisdom, and harmony with it is the sign of salvation. I do not mean to suggest that *all* religion is addressed to such a real and formidable object. There are strains in religion of quite another quality. There is, for instance, a rapturous strain, the impulse to praise, to sing, to mythologize, to escape from all the limitations and cares of mortality into an ecstatic

happiness. But I ask myself this question: What would ecstasy be but madness if it were not the voice of substantial harmony with the substance of things and with its movement? Though substance may be forgotten, and only light and music may seem to remain, it is the massive harmonies in substance that justify those mystic feelings, if anything justifies them at all. If the spheres did not revolve according to law, the morning stars would not sing together; and the God of Aristotle would not think his eternal thoughts. Even enthusiasm, therefore, when not vapid, expresses respect for substance and happy union with its motion. Those prosaic terms of Spencer's—adaptation and equilibrium—really express admirably the basis of the most ecstatic emotions, when they are healthy and deserving of a place in human economy. It would be a sad compliment to pay to religion to identify it with fatuous and ephemeral heats, divorced from all perception of substance and of its true fertility. Religion of the sober, practical, manly sort, Roman piety, is emphatically reverence for the nature of things, for the ways of substance. How far such manly piety may have been misled by superstition, or by hasty and sentimental science, so as to distort the laws of the world and found a *false* religion, is a question of fact for soberer science to examine. If a traditional deity proves to be a living power, if it is the whole or a part of the substance actually confronting us, then serious piety will revere that deity and meditate on its ways. If on the contrary the only substance that controls our destiny or can reward our obedience is a natural substance, manifested in all nature and plastic to common arts, then a serious piety will study the ways and sing the praises of this natural substance. Piety is on the side of belief in substance: the existence of substance is the basis of piety. To set up in the place of substance any spontaneous ideas or pert exigences of our own is contrary to religion: a mind that professes to create matter, to create truth, and to create itself is a satanic mind. At least Lucifer and the ancient sceptics were disinterested, and disdained a world in which they did not believe; but modern rebels, religious or political, are without asceticism; like Doctor Faustus they are crammed with pretentious learning, they trust in magic and in their own will, covet all experience, and hanker for the promised land; but they will never see it except in a mirage if, in contempt of substance, they merely command it to appear. . . .

My conclusion accordingly is this: Belief in substance, besides

being inevitable in daily life (which I think is the right place for philosophy), is vindicated by the adequacy and harmony of the view it gives us of existence; and the notion that substance is unknowable is reduced to a misunderstanding—intelligible but unfortunate—due to a confusion of knowledge with intuition. If by knowledge we understood an intuition containing no element of faith, but simply inspecting the obvious, then indeed all substance would be unknowable; but this necessary ignorance would then extend to every subsisting fact assumed in science and in daily life: not only would matter and God disappear from the scene, but the whole past and future would be denied, together with all that flux of experience which social intercourse, psychology, and history presuppose. Nothing would then be knowable save the feeling or image present at the moment to the mind; and even this would not be known for a fact or event in the world, but all that would be known in it, or through it, would be its own specious nature, the idea presented or the sensation felt. To limit knowledge to intuition of such obvious essences is to deny knowledge: it is to revoke the whole transitive intention or significance of ideas. The knowledge that mankind claims and rejoices in is of quite another sort; it consists in information about removed facts, intuitively undiscoverable. To a mortal creature, hounded by fate, and not merely engaged in seraphic contemplation, absent things are the things important to know; it is they that have created us, and can now feed or entice us; it is they that our moral nature hangs upon and looks to with respect.

I have sometimes wondered at the value ladies set upon jewels: as centres of light, jewels seem rather trivial and monotonous. And yet there is an unmistakable spell about these pebbles; they can be taken up and turned over; they can be kept; they are faithful possessions; the sparkle of them, shifting from moment to moment, is constant from age to age. They are substances. The same aspects of light and colour, if they were homeless in space, or could be spied only once and irrecoverably, like fireworks, would have a less comfortable charm. In jewels there is the security, the mystery, the inexhaustible fixity proper to substance. After all, perhaps I can understand the fascination they exercise over the ladies; it is the same that the eternal feminine exercises over us. Our contact with them is unmistakable, our contemplation of them gladly renewed, and pleasantly prolonged; yet in one sense they are unknowable;

we cannot fathom the secret of their constancy, of their hardness, of that perpetual but uncertain brilliancy by which they dazzle us and hide themselves. These qualities of the jewel and of the eternal feminine are also the qualities of substance and of the world. The existence of this world—unless we lapse for a moment into an untenable scepticism—is certain, or at least it is unquestioningly to be assumed. Experience may explore it adventurously, and science may describe it with precision; but after you have wandered up and down in it for many years, and have gathered all you could of its ways by report, this same world, because it exists substantially and is not invented, remains a foreign thing and a marvel to the spirit: unknowable as a drop of water is unknowable, or unknowable like a person loved.

GEORGE SANTAYANA: *The Unknowable*, pp. 6-13, 16-21 and 27-29. The Herbert Spencer lecture for 1923. Published by the Clarendon Press.

SUGGESTIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. What is Santayana's interpretation of Spencer's theory of the Unknowable? Define what he says Spencer meant by the entity he called unknowable.
2. Explain why Spencer used the term unknowable to designate this object.
3. What danger was there in his using this term? Would you agree that the term is open to the criticism which the critics made of it?
4. Characterize the agnosticism prevalent in English culture in Spencer's day.
5. How did Spencer reconcile religion and science with his doctrine of the unknowable? Compare his reconciliation with that of Ames above, p. 547 f. Does Ames seem to you to be under the influence of Spencer?
6. Compare Santayana's account of the nature of religion with the view of Ames. Are they in substantial agreement or are their views of religion opposite views? Justify your answer.
7. Contrast intuition with knowledge to bring out the difference Santayana thinks exist between them.
8. State Santayana's interpretation of his illustration of the attitude of ladies towards jewels. Can you suggest any criticism of his interpretation or any other possible interpretation?

II. FICTIONALISM, by *Hans Vaihinger*

Analysis

Vaihinger explains why he gave his book the title *The Philosophy of "As if."* In the first place he was interested in the use of fictions as

a method of human reasoning. But in the second place he wanted to defend an idealistic positivism or fictionalism as a philosophy. He gives a brief account of the development of idealistic positivism in Germany. There follows a discussion in which fictionalism is differentiated from scepticism, containing an explanation of the confusion between the two theories. Likewise Vaihinger distinguishes fictionalism from an agnosticism, like that of Spencer. The charge that fictionalism contains two antithetical ideas of reality is answered by Vaihinger by the retort that all philosophers have to recognize both mind and matter. This dualism is an insoluble riddle for any philosophy, but in practical life it is solved by the necessity of action. A set of fifteen principles follows as a summary of the teachings of fictionalism.

In the *Preface to the English Edition*, which follows, Vaihinger gives a brief account of the use of the concept of fiction in philosophy prior to the appearance of his own book. He also differentiates fictionalism from the closely related philosophy of pragmatism (see Schiller above, p. 459).

I called this work *The Philosophy of "As if"* because it seemed to me to express more convincingly than any other possible title what I wanted to say, namely that "As if," i.e., appearance, the consciously-false, plays an enormous part in science, in world-philosophies and in life. I wanted to give a complete enumeration of all the methods in which we operate intentionally with consciously false ideas, or rather judgments. I wanted to reveal the secret life of these extraordinary methods. I wanted to give a complete theory, an anatomy and physiology so to speak, or rather a biology of "As if." For the method of fiction which is found in a greater or lesser degree in all the sciences can best be expressed by this complex conjunction "As if." Thus I had to give a survey of all the branches of science from this point of view.

But it was not only a methodological investigation that I was attempting. The study of fictional thought in all branches of science had led me gradually to extend these investigations to philosophy itself, particularly to epistemology, ethics and the philosophy of religion. Just as my investigations into the function of "As if" had arisen out of a definite view of the world so again this developed independently into a universal system of philosophy—I gave it the name of "Positivist Idealism" or "Idealistic Positivism." As I have already mentioned, Ernst Laas had published between 1884 and 1886 a three-volume work on Idealism and Positivism, in which he attacked Idealism and championed Positivism. The positivist attitude was also represented in Germany by Mach, Avenarius and to a certain extent by Schuppe, and it found particular favour with the scientifically

inclined (but the name Positivism was never placed in the forefront of any programme). The chief currents of German philosophy, however, were certainly idealistic, though in different ways. Between these one-sided views¹ it seemed to me that a compromise was necessary, all the more so because attempts of this kind had met with success in other countries. I considered that the time had come to announce the union of Idealism and Positivism. The result has proved that the right word was spoken at the right moment.

The term "Scepticism" has occasionally been applied to the Philosophy of "As if" and its systematic doctrines; but this is not correct, for scepticism implies a theory which raises doubt or questioning to the dignity of a principle. The Philosophy of "As if," however, has never had a trace of this attitude. In a simple and straightforward investigation it proves that consciously false conceptions and judgments are applied in all sciences; and it shows that these scientific Fictions are to be distinguished from Hypotheses. The latter are assumptions which are probable, assumptions the truth of which can be proved by further experience. They are therefore verifiable. Fictions are never verifiable, for they are hypotheses which are known to be false, but which are employed because of their utility. When a series of hypotheses in mathematics, mechanics, physics, chemistry, ethics or the philosophy of religion are shown in this way to be useful fictions and so justify themselves, surely this does not imply scepticism. The reality of these hypotheses is not doubted; it is denied on the basis of the positive facts of experience. The expression of "Relativism" would be more applicable to the Philosophy of "As if," in so far as it denies all absolute points (in mathematics just as in metaphysics) and shows a natural affinity with the theory of relativity both of the past and the present.

The use of the term "Scepticism" as applied to the Philosophy of "As if," has no doubt been partly due to the doubt with which this philosophy regards metaphysical realities, particularly God and immortality. But the above consideration applies

¹ The growing tendency of the "idealistic" philosophers and the neo-Kantians to return to Fichte and Hegel seemed to me to be becoming more and more dangerous. I was always convinced that this one-sided idealistic tendency, which was partly foreign and partly hostile to reality, was the more dangerous to the whole of German civilization in that it led our youth to underestimate foreign philosophy, and therewith the whole civilization of neighbouring peoples, their capacity and, in general, their mental and moral power.

in this case also. In the Philosophy of "As if" I have never attempted to hide the fact that I regard these conceptions as Fictions of ethical value. My conviction in this respect is clear, simple and decided.

Many people of course confuse the technical expression involved here and think that they can discover in the Philosophy of "As if" not exactly "Scepticism," but "Agnosticism." This latter system teaches that human knowledge is confined within more or less narrow limits and speaks of the Unintelligible, the Unknowable, according to Spencer's definition. Naturally the Philosophy of "As if" also holds that knowledge has certain limits, but not in the sense that these limits bound only human knowledge, while they are non-existent for a superhuman knowledge. This is the theory of Kant and Spencer. It is the old complaint that the human mind is confined by narrow boundaries, which do not limit the higher forms of mind. My opinion is that these boundaries of knowledge are not implicit in the specific nature of man as compared with other possible minds of a higher order, but that such limitations are part of the nature of thought itself; that is to say, if they are higher forms of mind, these limitations will affect them and even the highest Mind of all. For thought originally only serves the Will to Life as a means to an end, and in this direction also it fulfils its function. But when thought has broken loose from its original aim, according to the Law of the Preponderance of the Means over the End, and has become an end in itself, it sets itself problems to which it is not equal because it has not developed for this purpose; and finally the emancipated thought sets itself problems which in themselves are senseless, for instance, questions as to the origin of the world, the formation of what we call matter, the beginning of motion, the meaning of the world and the purpose of life. If thought is regarded as a biological function, it is obvious that these are impossible problems for thought to solve, and quite beyond the natural boundaries which limit thought as such. From this point of view, we have no inclination to fall back on the favourite old grievance about the limitations of human knowledge. At most we may complain that the Law of the Preponderance of the Means over the End has led us to ask questions which are as unanswerable as the problem of $\sqrt{-1}$. A moment of reflection will show that all knowledge is a reduction of the unknown to the known, that is to say a comparison. This proves therefore

that this comparison or reduction will somewhere stop automatically. In no sense, therefore, can the Philosophy of "As if" be called scepticism or agnosticism.

In the same way we can dispose of another objection which is raised against the Philosophy of "As if," namely that the concept of reality implied in it is not uniform: on the one hand all reality is reduced to sensations, or sensational contents (in the sense of Mill's theory of "Sensations and possibilities of sensation"); on the other hand the concept of reality in the natural sciences, which reduce everything to the movement of matter and the smallest constituents of matter, is constantly being employed, sometimes tacitly, sometimes expressly. And with this is bound up the question, how to unify these two concepts of reality represented by the Philosophy of "As if."

One might admire the perspicacity of this discovery of a two-fold concept of reality in the Philosophy of "As if," if one were not surprised at the short-sightedness of the subsequent question. I am going to ask a question in return. Has any philosophical system of ancient, modern or present times ever succeeded in bringing these two spheres into a logical, rational relation? These two hemispheres of reality, expressed briefly on the one hand as the world of motion and on the other hand as the world of consciousness, have never been brought into a logically satisfactory relation by any philosopher. They will never be brought into a definitely unified association by any rational formula. We stand here at a point where an impossible problem confronts our reason. This question is just as impossible of solution by rational methods as the question of the purpose of existence. Although we, who ask this question, permanently unite in our nature these two halves of reality, or rather just because the divergence, or the obvious contradiction, between motion and consciousness runs all through our own being, our mind is not in a position to answer satisfactorily this fundamental question or this so-called world-riddle.

Therefore he who would criticize any system of philosophy, or the philosophy of "As if" in particular, for not answering this question, is in the same intellectual position as a man who would reproach a mathematician for not solving the problem of the squaring of the circle in his text-book of geometry, or a technical engineer for not dealing with the construction of the *perpetuum mobile* in his text-book of engineering.

In discussing ultimate world-problems, one is always coming

up against this rationally insoluble antithesis between motions of matter and particles of matter on the one hand and on the other hand sensations, or rather contents of consciousness. For the philosopher who deals with the analysis of our contents of consciousness, this analysis ends everywhere with our sensations on the psychological plane and with our sensational contents on the epistemological plane. The world is to him an endless accumulation of sensational contents which, however, are not given to us and to him without plan, but in which certain regularities of co-existence and succession can be found. These sensational data—what Windelband calls “*Gegebenheiten*” and Ziehen “*Gignomene*”—these events crowd upon us more or less irresistibly; indeed they even cast a lasting fear over us, for we have to rule our lives according to them, in constant expectation of their appearance. This world of sensational contents is the material with which alone the philosopher as such can deal. But on the other hand, the philosopher must recognize for good or ill that the scientist constructs quite a different sphere of reality, the world of motion, the mobile world. To construct a rational relation between these two worlds is an impossible desire of our understanding, which fundamentally is not fitted for the theoretical solution of world problems, but only for the practical service of the will to live.

Naturally the human mind is tormented by this insoluble contradiction between the world of motion and the world of consciousness, and this torment can eventually become very oppressive. One would be well advised to remember how Kant has already pointed out that there are problems which mock us perpetually, but which we cannot get rid of. But there is one solution of this and similar torturing questions; for in intuition and in experience all this contradiction and distress fades into nothingness. Experience and intuition are higher than all human reason. When I see a deer feeding in the forest, when I see a child at play, when I see a man at work or sport, but above all when I myself am working or playing, where are the problems with which my mind has been torturing itself unnecessarily? We do not understand the world when we are pondering over its problems, but when we are doing the world's work. Here too the practical reigns supreme.

I will end by summarizing all the conclusions which are expressed in the Philosophy of “*As if*,” or which form its basis or arise out of it, as follows:

(1) Philosophical analysis leads eventually, from an epistemological standpoint, to sensational contents, and from a psychological to sensations, feelings and strivings or actions. Scientific analysis leads to another concept of reality, to matter and the smallest constituents and motions of matter. Naturally it is impossible for the mind as such to bring these two spheres of reality into a rational relation, although in intuition and experience they form a harmonious unity.

(2) The strivings which probably exist in the most elementary physical processes develop in organic beings into impulses. In man, who has sprung from the animal (and to a certain extent in all the higher animals) these impulses have evolved into will and action, which is expressed in movements and caused by stimuli or by the sensations arising from stimuli.

(3) Ideas, judgments and conclusions, that is to say thought, act as a means in the service of the Will to Live and dominate. Thought is originally only a means in the struggle for existence and to this extent only a biological function.

(4) It is a universal phenomenon of nature that means which serve a purpose often undergo a more complete development than is necessary for the attainment of their purpose. In this case, the means, according to the completeness of its self-development, can emancipate itself partly or wholly and become established as an end in itself (Law of the Preponderance of the Means over the End).

(5) This Preponderance of the Means over the End has also taken place in thought, which in the course of time has gradually lost sight of its original practical purpose and is finally practised for its own sake as theoretical thought.

(6) As a result, this thought which appears to be independent and theoretical in its origins, sets itself problems which are impossible, not only to human thought, but to every form of thought; for instance, the problems of the origin and meaning of the universe. To this category belongs also the question of the relation between sensation and motion, popularly known as mind and matter.

(7) These endless, and, strictly speaking, senseless questions cannot be answered by looking forwards but only by looking backwards, by showing how they arose psychologically within us. Many of these questions are just as meaningless, as for instance the problem of $\sqrt{-1}$.

(8) If intellectualism or rationalism be identified with the

assumption of an original theoretical reason as an inherent human faculty with certain problems to be determined by it, then my exposition must be termed anti-rationalism or even irrationalism, in the same sense in which histories of modern philosophy, for instance that of Windelband, speak of "idealistic irrationalism."

(9) From this standpoint all thought-processes and thought-constructs appear *à priori* to be not essentially rationalistic, but biological phenomena.

(10) In this light many thought-processes and thought-constructs appear to be consciously false assumptions, which either contradict reality or are even contradictory in themselves, but which are intentionally thus formed in order to overcome difficulties of thought by this artificial deviation and reach the goal of thought by roundabout ways and by-paths. These artificial thought-constructs are called Scientific Fictions, and distinguished as conscious creations by their "As if" character.

(11) The "As if" world, which is formed in this manner, the world of the "unreal" is just as important as the world of the so-called real or actual (in the ordinary sense of the word); indeed it is far more important for ethics and æsthetics. This æsthetic and ethical world of "As if," the world of the unreal becomes finally for us a world of values which, particularly in the form of religion, must be sharply distinguished in our mind from the world of becoming.

(12) What we usually term reality consists of our sensational contents which press forcibly upon us with greater or lesser irresistibility and as "given" can generally not be avoided.

(13) In these given sensational contents (which include what we call our body) there is an abundance of regularity in co-existence and succession, investigation of which forms the content of science. By means of the sensational contents which we call our body, we can exercise greater or lesser influence on the rich world of the other sensational contents.

(14) In this world we find on the one hand a very great number of relations of fitness, on the other hand much that is not fitting. We have to take this as we find it, for there is little that we can alter. It is a satisfying Fiction for many to regard the world as if a more perfect Higher Spirit had created or at least regulated it. But this implies the supplementary Fiction of regarding a world of this sort as if the order created by the Higher Divine Spirit had been destroyed by some hostile force.

(15) It is senseless to question the meaning of the universe, and this is the idea expressed in Schiller's words: "Know this, a mind sublime puts greatness into life, yet seeks it not therein" (*Huldigung der Künste* 1805). This is positivist idealism. . . .

The publication of this work in an English translation gives me very great pleasure. From early youth I have studied English literature, and later English philosophy. During the period when my philosophical views were taking shape, and especially in the years 1874-1876, it was David Hume and still more J. S. Mill whose influence on my thought was paramount. Thus I was early attracted by English philosophy, and I formed the project of writing a History of English Thought. But, like many similar hopes, this plan was destined to remain unrealized. I soon found that the importance of Fictions had already been partly recognized by English philosophers. English Nominalism of the Middle Ages showed traces of such a recognition. With John Duns Scotus, who died in 1308 in Cologne, when only in his thirty-fourth year, there began a sceptical movement which tended in the same direction. But it was in William of Occam, who took refuge with Ludwig of Bavaria, and died in Munich in 1347 at the age of 77, that we find for the first time a clear and definite treatment of the fictional nature of general ideas, developed in a manner which is still a model for to-day. He fully understood that *ficta*, as they were called in the writings of the Middle Ages, although their theoretical non-existence might be admitted, are practically necessary and must be recognized in this sense. On the other hand this was not realized by Bacon or even by Hume, though in Berkeley there are at least indications of an understanding of Fictions. But in Hobbes we find a considerable knowledge both of Fictions themselves and of the theory of their use. Empty space, the idea of a *bellum omnium contra omnes*, and of an "original contract" are for Hobbes conscious Fictions. A special study of Hobbes' theory of Fictions had been contemplated by my late colleague Professor Frischeisen-Köhler who was well versed in English philosophy and hoped to write a history of its development; but owing to his early death neither project was realized. Fictions, part of England's heritage from the Romans, have played a large part in English jurisprudence and political philosophy, both in practice and theory; more so than in other countries. There is room for a special monograph on this subject, covering the use of Fictions both in Adam Smith's political economy and in

Jeremy Bentham's political philosophy. In the present work the methods of Adam Smith and Bentham have been treated in some detail, but they would appear in quite another light, if brought into relation with the whole history of English thought. Thus particularly in England conditions point to a favourable reception for the theory of Fictions as developed in *The Philosophy of "As if."* "Pragmatism," too, so widespread throughout the English-speaking world, has done something to prepare the ground for Fictionalism, in spite of their fundamental difference. Fictionalism does not admit the principle of Pragmatism which runs: "An idea which is found to be useful in practice proves thereby that it is also true in theory, and the fruitful is thus always true." The principle of Fictionalism, on the other hand, or rather the outcome of Fictionalism, is as follows: "An idea whose theoretical untruth or incorrectness, and therewith its falsity, is admitted, is not for that reason practically valueless and useless; for such an idea, in spite of its theoretical nullity, may have great practical importance." But though Fictionalism and Pragmatism are diametrically opposed in principle, in practice they may find much in common. Thus both acknowledge the value of metaphysical ideas, though for very different reasons and with very different consequences.

It can be shown, and has been demonstrated at length in the present volume, that the theory of Fictions was more or less clearly stated by Kant, who was proud of his Scottish descent. Nearly 100 pages of the work are devoted to this question and it is there proved in detail that for Kant a large number of ideas, not only in metaphysics but also in mathematics, physics and jurisprudence, were Fictions. The metaphysical ideas were somewhat confused by Kant himself in his *Critique of Pure Reason* (Theory of Method), but were definitely called "heuristic Fictions." This was overlooked and not understood in Kant's own day and for a long time after; and Kant was quite right when he said of himself, "I am a century too early with my works; it will be a hundred years before they are properly understood." That was in 1797. The hundred years of incubation which Kant prophesied for his theories have now gone by, and the times are ripe for this his profoundest contribution, which I may mention has now been given due value by Professor Norman Kemp Smith of Edinburgh in his admirable commentary on the *Critique* (recently published in a second Edition).

The whole civilized world celebrated Kant's 200th Anniversary on April 22nd of this year, and the English Translation of the *Philosophie des Als Ob* may thus be regarded as a tribute to the occasion by Englishmen and Germans alike.

HANS VAIHINGER: *The Philosophy of "As if,"* pp. xli-xlvii, and vii-ix. Translated by C. K. Ogden. Published by Harcourt, Brace & Co. Reprinted by permission.

SUGGESTIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. On the basis of Vaihinger's discussion make brief definitions of each of the following: fictionalism, scepticism, agnosticism and pragmatism. Try to distinguish the last three from each other and from fictionalism.
2. Study carefully the fifteen principles stated as the essence of fictionalism by Vaihinger and try to restate each briefly, combining any you think can be combined, so as to make a shorter set of principles than he gives.
3. Distinguish methodological from metaphysical fictionalism.
4. Make a list of the philosophers who have contributed to the development of fictionalism, indicating very briefly what each contributed.

CHAPTER III

NIETZSCHE AND SPENGLER

I. THE TRAGIC PHILOSOPHY, by *Charles M. Bakewell*

Analysis

Bakewell tells about Dr. Levy's English edition of Nietzsche's writings, recently completed (The Macmillan Company, 1925). He refers to the fact that Nietzsche has been very much misunderstood both by his friends and by his foes. To appreciate him one needs to know something of his tragic life. Bakewell gives a brief biographical sketch in which he discusses Nietzsche's relations with Schopenhauer and with Wagner and tells how his life ended in insanity. Bakewell then lists a number of ultra-modern ideas which were anticipated by Nietzsche, holding that he is the forerunner of all contemporary irrationalism. However, this is merely a by-product of Nietzsche's real philosophy. He sings the praises of the will to power. The evolutionary principle of life is not a principle of adaptation to a given environment but it is a conquering of the environment. This is symbolized in the superman idea. The idea of an eternal recurrence of all things expresses a similar thought. Bakewell looks upon the famous doctrine of a transvaluation of all values as the practical application of the will to power philosophy. It explains his hostility to Christianity and to democracy. Nietzsche is at his worst when he turns iconoclastic and attacks institutions, for he shows an absolute inability to comprehend the positive values of the institutions which he attacks. His writings abound in contradictions but these are really irrelevant because his attitude is primarily æsthetic. Indeed, Bakewell argues that the only justification for Nietzsche is æsthetic.

The Nietzscheans, who preach Nietzsche's philosophy but do not have the strength of will to practice it, are scorned by Bakewell. There is a deep contradiction in the very idea of a Nietzsche cult. Yet Bakewell thinks that a voyage to Nietzsche land would be a good thing for everybody, and especially for all kinds of reformers. He concludes by offering suggestions as to the order in which Nietzsche's books should be read.

After twenty years, and after many rebuffs which would have discouraged any but the most ardent of disciples, Dr. Levy has at last succeeded in bringing the authorized English translation of Nietzsche's works to completion with the publication of the eighteenth or index volume. He has good cause for rejoicing, not only over the long deferred accomplishment of his purpose, but also over the manner in which it has been done. I refer not to

the book making, which is in every way excellent, but to the translations. He has been fortunate in finding collaborators as devoted and faithful as himself, and skilful enough in the use both of German and of English to give their translations the vitality, the charm, the spirit, the *tempo* (to use one of Nietzsche's favorite words) of the original text—a difficult task, for Nietzsche was a rare master in the artistry of speech.

Few men have, I think, been more universally misunderstood and misrepresented both by friend and by foe. This was perhaps inevitable in the case of a writer who gives no systematic presentation of his philosophy, but contents himself with throwing it out in dazzling fragments—in songs, in brilliant epigrams, and in pregnant aphorisms. One can find isolated statements to support almost any interpretation. Nietzsche's temperament was that of the poet rather than that of the thinker. Perhaps it would be fairer to say that for him the thinker is always the poet, the creator of values.

One cannot get at the proper angle of vision for interpreting Nietzsche's philosophy without taking into consideration certain facts in his history. He was born in 1844 and was descended from a long line of preachers on both sides of the house. His father died when he was five years old and he was brought up by his mother, as his sister tells us, with Spartan severity and simplicity. He received his early training in the famous Pforta school, distinguished both for the severity of its discipline and for the fame of the scholars it has produced. He was a great lover of out-door exercise, seems to have had an excellent physique, and to have been capable of prodigious mental and physical exertion.

At the age of twenty he entered the University of Bonn with high ambition and threw himself into his work with that energy and devotion to the task in hand that was characteristic of his every undertaking. He worked always at high pressure, and early and late, devouring everything he could find that could in any way help him in his chosen field, which was classical philology—philology, however, interpreted in a very broad way, as the door that led to the understanding of classical culture and civilization, and as being at once science, philosophy, and art. He was soon disillusioned in what passed for scholarship in the university, petty, wooden, and uninspiring—"culture philistinism," he later called it—and was thoroughly disgusted with his fellow students whom he found a superficial, frivolous,

swash-buckling, beer-guzzling crowd. At the end of the year he followed his teacher, Ritschl, to Leipzig. Here he found conditions no better than at Bonn, but he made his escape through the timely discovery of Schopenhauer and Wagner, the two titanic figures in the Germany of that day. Of the former he wrote, after reading his *The World as Will and Idea*: "Here I saw a mirror in which I espied the world life, and my own nature depicted with frightful grandeur." He was introduced to Wagner. It was the beginning of a friendship that ripened into intimacy in the years that followed, the brightest page in Nietzsche's troubled career.

Himself a musician of great talent, he was already the enthusiastic admirer of the composer of "Tristan" before he made his acquaintance. Wagner at once became his hero, the one man destined to inaugurate a new and higher culture, a yea-saying culture, noble, proud, and free, and pagan-cheerfulness triumphing through pessimism, as in Æschylean tragedy. Before many years had passed, however, he repudiated Schopenhauer as a man who had set all things awry. He found that he had simply read himself into the writings of that philosopher; Schopenhauer had been a mere cipher for Nietzsche. And, alas, the same proved true of Wagner. The disillusionment came with the "Götterdämmerung," and most of all with "Parsifal"—Wagner turned pious, Wagner become Christian! And so he broke with his best, almost his only friend, in pain and anguish it is true, but brutally. Honesty, sincerity, what he called "intellectual cleanliness," was his dominant trait, and he must be true to himself, be himself, no matter what the cost; there could be no compromise; and the cost was, Nietzsche left all alone—Nietzsche *contra mundum*, Nietzsche *contra* Christendom.

At the unusually early age of twenty-four he was called to a professorship at the University of Basel, where we find him writing works on philology as "thrilling as a Parisian novel," as his former teacher Ritschl is said to have characterized them. But he chafed under the limitations of academic life, and before long sickness, the after effects of an illness contracted in the Franco-Prussian War, brought the desired release. He was forced to resign, and in 1879, at the age of thirty-five, he became a pensioner, and for the next ten years was a wanderer, going from place to place in search of health, spending most of his time in Italy and in the upper Engadine, and leading a life of great frugality on an income that was never more than a thousand

dollars a year. His suffering was intense and prolonged, as much as two hundred days in one year, we are told, of pure pain. And toward the end he was almost blind. But his energy, both physical and mental, was unabated.

This was the most prolific part of his career. Volume followed volume. The words poured from his pen; he wrote as one inspired. And in all these volumes there is not one word of complaining or of self pity. The publications of this period include such titles as *The Joyful Wisdom*, *The Dawn of Day*, *The Will to Power*, and the triumphant *Zarathustra*. The story is told of the stoic slave Epictetus that one day his cruel master was torturing him, twisting his leg, and that Epictetus calmly said to him, "If you go any further you will break my leg." And when his master did go further, and the leg was broken, he looked up at him and smiled as he said, "I told you you would." Nietzsche's stoicism is of a purer water. He suffered much from the "bludgeonings of fate," but his head however bloody was always "unbowed." In fact, like his own hero, he never appears "more proud, more martial, more happy, than when the storm is brewing." He fairly welcomes pain.

"Suffering is inevitable to the higher life; everything worth while is born in travail. Pain is man's best self-preservative; it protects him from smug ease, and fills him with disgust for that kind of happiness. The hidden masterful something, that tyrant in us that holds us to our task, creative activity, the ideal of supermen, brings the cheerfulness that is necessary to overcome despair."

"How little," he explains, "How little you know of the happiness of man, you comfortable good-natured ones." Nietzsche was indeed singularly able to detach himself from his own feelings, and to view his own suffering objectively, as part of the game of life, part of the cosmic tragedy which the strong man could always look down upon with laughter in his voice and a song on his lips.

It is surprising in how many ways Nietzsche has anticipated views generally regarded as ultra-modern. The fundamental conflict between the morality of sympathy and the ruthless ways of nature, which Huxley emphasized in his famous Romanes lecture, may be said to supply one of the basic tenets of his philosophy. He is, largely because of the recognition of this conflict, an ardent advocate of eugenics, with perhaps a clearer vision of what this implies than most of its modern defenders. He has given an excellent exposition of the pragmatic theory of

truth. But while maintaining that what is useful in the way of belief is what passes and must pass for truth, he thinks that the word "true" as applied to such beliefs is merely an adjective of approval that our vanity supplies,—which is perhaps no more than our American pragmatist meant by saying that there is no such thing as Truth with a capital T; there are only "truths." He is in many ways a Freudian before Freud, recognizing the importance of sex, the menace of repression, and the significance and the possibilities of sublimation. He has anticipated the behaviorist too, contradictions and all, as any number of passages attest. Stimulus and response, the conditioned reflex—all is here save the lingo. The soul is body; body and physiology are our starting point; the soul, as other than the body, consciousness, will, etc., does not exist—although he, like the modern behaviorist, finds it necessary often to speak as if it did. "Elementary, my dear Watson," elementary and obvious are the simple conclusions that you so elaborately establish by the torturing of dogs. Here in these pages speaks your master, who has given behaviorism a cosmic sweep. In short, it may be said without exaggeration that nearly every form of contemporary irrationalism is anticipated in the writings of Nietzsche.

But these things are largely by-products. His central and dominating thought may be thus briefly summarized. This is a wild world in which we live, game-flavored, and beset with danger. It is not a rational, still less a divine order. There is no abiding reality hidden behind the appearances in which one can take refuge from the storm. The appearances *are* the reality. Things are as they appear. All things are in ceaseless flux. It is a world of becoming, not of being. Science, like art, merely creates fictions which enable us to lay hold upon this ever-changing world and steer our bark through the rapids. All living things, and most of all human beings, are urged forward in the course of evolution not by the struggle for existence (mere existence is cheap and easily secured and therefore contemptible) but by the will to power, to master, to creative activity. The determining factor in evolution, for man at least, is therefore not adaptation to environment—that implies yielding and surrender—but rather the conquering of environment and the preparing of the way for him that shall surpass man.

The will to power, the vital force, rich and inexhaustible, Nietzsche links with the conception of the Greek god Dionysus, appropriately symbolized in the satyr—"half goat, half god,"

the latter because the will to power is boundless in its demands, the former because it is held down to earth, housed in the beast. And so life greatly lived is always tragedy. Schopenhauer had taught that the restless will is ever seeking a goal which it can never find, and is therefore doomed to perpetual discontent; that every satisfaction proves to be but a momentary resting place on the weary journey; that life is void of worth and meaning because it is the manifestation of a will ever tormented by illusion, and that the aim should be renunciation of the will to live, annihilation, Nirvana. But after Schopenhauer came Darwin, and reading both of these men through the eyes of Æschylus, Nietzsche discovers the cheerfulness that triumphs in and through pessimism. Æschylus did not view the tragedies which were his themes as problems requiring or admitting of solution. His heroes were caught in the toils of fate, of *moira*, but grandly they suffered. He shows us how to face the questionable, the terrible, without flinching, and to rejoice in our power to do so.

So, for Nietzsche, we are caught in the toils of destiny, the restless will to power is never satisfied, life for the individual is tragedy. But evolution has taught us to view life as the story of growth, of power more and more concentrated in the individual. Life becomes itself the goal of life just because the restless will is never satisfied and because it can view every achievement as a stepping stone to a higher level of power. One can, therefore, enter with zest into the game of life, knowing that nothing is dispensable, learning to view the necessary as the beautiful, and to laugh at all tragedies whether on the stage or in real life. Let one look forward rather than backward, live for the children-land rather than the fatherland, and then he can cheerfully say with Nietzsche, "Myself I sacrifice to my love"—that is to superman, to the greater man that is to be—"and my neighbor as myself." One should desire to live, not safely and comfortably, but dangerously. The world was not made for man, so, of course, life is tragic. The test of a man's strength is his ability to face the facts as they are, in all their ruthlessness and cruelty, and still say, "Yea, I would not have it otherwise. It is a great tragedy; let us have it over again." And we shall have it over again in all its detail, for "eternal recurrence" is the law of destiny.

Superman is not a fixed and determinate goal of evolution, but rather an expression for the fact that no such goal is neces-

sary. He is simply the next step in the development beyond that which humanity has already achieved. Nietzsche has painted his own conception of superman in the character of Zarathustra, and has himself sat for the portrait. It is, for all its grandeur, a terrifying picture, this proud, lonely, loveless being whose only companions are the eagle and the serpent, and whose very laughter makes you want to weep.

The practical application of this philosophy, the so-called transvaluation of values, is found in the exaltation of all that makes for strength and power, for the ascending scale of life. Healthy instincts are here a safer guide than reason. Nietzsche's "immoralism" is a return to the pagan virtues, what he calls hero-morality,—the glorification of the strong, the proud, the masterful—and the abandonment of the Christian virtues of humility, sympathy, altruism. These latter the weak have made into virtues for their own protection in their weakness. In modern phrasing they are the defense reaction of the weak and have their origin in an inferiority complex.

The hero-virtues, are, to be sure, for the elect, the few, the favored, the aristocrats. The doctrine of human equality came in with Christianity and must go out with it. Nietzsche would emphasize the interval between men. Democracy is anathema. The weak must be content to be used up in the interest of the strong. "Ancient civilization perished because it rested on slavery," he writes, "our own will perish because it does not." The many, the weak, will, of course, still cling to their Christian virtues, and it is well for the elect that they should; otherwise they would arise in their combined strength and rend them—a view which one of his admirers strangely enough refers to as evidence of Nietzsche's tolerant attitude toward Christianity! Machiavellian would be a more accurate term, for this view is strikingly reminiscent of that wily Florentine's advice to his "Prince." No less strange and fantastic is the suggestion of the editor of these volumes that Nietzsche represents the triumph of the spirit of Judaism over that of Christianity. (He actually welcomes Nietzsche as the Christian prodigal son returned at last to the Jewish fold.)

Nietzsche is at his worst when he goes "philosophizing with a hammer," as he expresses it. He loses all sense of proportion with his wholesale and sweeping condemnation of persons, nations, institutions, and systems. How he hates the Germans, and how he struggles to discover, or invent, a Polish ancestry

for himself along the paternal line in order to blot out the German taint; and how unfair he is in his criticisms! How he hates the English, and the Americans too! But most of all does he hate democracy and Christianity. It is perhaps hardly necessary to add that he gives a mere travesty of Christianity. There is, in fact, a whole realm of values to which he was totally blind and they are the distinctive human values, which have indeed been stressed in Christian civilization even if they did not have their origin wholly in Christianity. These are positive values too, values that make for strength and power, but a kind of strength and power of which he never knew the meaning, never could know the meaning because of the abnormal life that he led—a man without a country, without family, without children, almost without a friend.

It were a waste of time to call attention to the contradictions in Nietzsche's teachings which are many and manifest, or to demand logical proofs of one who has but scorn for the mere "logicizing intellect." Nietzsche *scent*s error, illusion, and corruption; he *hears* the doctrine he proclaims; taste is his guide. "The only justification of the universe," he writes, "is æsthetic;" and, we may add, the only justification of Nietzsche is æsthetic. It is from this point of view that his work must be judged. He is above all an artist, a poet, a pagan poet, perhaps the greatest pagan poet of Christendom, greatest because most completely and most honestly pagan. Reading Nietzsche is like visiting a strange land, a land as strange and remote from the home-land as could well be conceived. It is as if one should take a voyage to Mars and discover a Martian civilization and culture that sets our own on end.

It is a stimulating and enlightening experience, and one that plays havoc with our complacencies. But to suppose that he has solved our problems, that in the words of the publisher's somewhat flamboyant advertisement "he stands alone as the necessary teacher, the indispensable signpost, the requisite beacon in this hour of need," is little short of ridiculous. I delight in reading Nietzsche, but I cannot stand the Nietzscheans. In them one finds the bad manners, the blasphemies, the impudences, the egotism, without the creative genius to support them. There is, indeed, a contradiction in the very idea of Nietzscheans. Certainly they are not Nietzscheans who merely echo Nietzsche's views, or who look up to him as a savior who has discovered a new gospel for the salvation of mankind,—this man who would

“rather be a satyr than a saint,” and who had but contempt for *mankind*. If you think you are a Nietzschean, here are some of the tests that you must meet and vanquish with approval. Have you abjured luxury, comfort, ease; do you live austere; are you hard to others, and most of all to yourself; are you inured to the severest discipline; can you find cheerfulness in the face of life’s tragedies even when you are yourself the victim of fate; are you, moreover, a creator of values? If you cannot meet these tests you are a sham and an impostor, merely one of “Zarathustra’s apes,” as Nietzsche has scornfully dubbed you. The truth is Nietzsche was born to stand alone. Nature broke the mould. Napoleon and Voltaire might perhaps pass as his first cousins; and Machiavelli, Cæsar Borgia, and Bernard Shaw as cousins once removed.

A voyage to Nietzsche-land is good for every one who is venturesome and has the stomach for it, and is mature enough and wise enough to visit this land without catching either Nietzschephobia or Nietzschemania. First of all, I would recommend this voyage to the preachers. I have been told that Nietzsche’s best readers in Germany to-day are the Lutheran ministers. That is as it should be. I would send the liberal ones, knowing that they would come back more alert to the ruts and pitfalls in their path, and prepared to preach a more virile and muscular and courageous gospel; and I would send the fundamentalists, who shudder at the thought of evolution, in order that they might discover what a real shock is. Then I would send our younger writers who have lately been taking up the cudgels for the discontented and aspiring souls who feel crushed by their environment; they would discover that the real source of this discontent is a Dionysian urge that sends the victim forward chafing at every restraint on his freedom and independence; they would learn that Main Street dominates every city, and that New York or Paris is just a Gopher Prairie on a larger scale, more complex, more confusing, and more noisy, but just as banal, just as much terrorized by stupidities and driven by the herd instincts,—only there are many herds in the large city, and they differ in the color of their pelts and the fashion of their horns. I would suggest that one of these authors write a novel in which he takes his hero from the small town through the disillusionment of the great city and finally up onto the heights where, his independence finally achieved, he sits on Zarathustra’s throne. Let him sing, and laugh, and dance, let

him suffer and rejoice as he looks down upon the tragedies of mankind. Then trace his subsequent fate. And I would send the editor of the dollar soothsayer series which is so rapidly growing, wherein sundry wise men undertake to tell the fortune of mankind, the air of mystery that is supposed to vouchsafe the gift of prophecy being secured, not by Turkish dress or gypsy garb and the use of broken English, but by title names taken from ancient story and the use of the jargon of the schools. He could readily cull from the writings of Nietzsche a volume with the title "Dionysus," or "The Future of Culture," which would be the most startling of his series and "as thrilling as a Parisian novel." For my part, however, I must confess that I prefer the prophet who follows in the footsteps of Jules Verne, or even of Bellamy, or Wells.

A word as to the order in which Nietzsche's works should be read. Begin with *The Birth of Tragedy*, his first published book. The kernel of his thought is here, though encased in wrappings borrowed from philosophies which he later repudiated. Then turn to the *Future of Our Educational Institutions*—these for the soberer Nietzsche of the earlier days. Then read *The Dawn of Day*, *The Joyful Wisdom* (especially Book IV), *The Genealogy of Morals*, *Beyond Good and Evil*, and as much of *The Will to Power* as you can—the book of Nietzsche that I find hard to read. It is hopelessly prolix and in long stretches positively dull. It is only fair to add, however, that this work was left unfinished. With this preparation, the *Zarathustra* will be intelligible. Put off to the last the *Ecce Homo*, his amazing autobiography—a biography wholly interior, the story of the life of a mind. It was written with incredible rapidity just before the veil descended on his reason, dooming him for his remaining years to the death in life of insanity. His entire past mental life seems to have rushed before his vision in his last days of sanity, with great clarity and distinctness; as a drowning man is said just before death to take in at a glance his whole past life. Nietzsche once wrote: "The thinker does not need applause or the clapping of hands, provided he be sure of the clapping of his own hands. The latter, however, he cannot do without." In this book he very audibly claps his hands. If you read this book first, you will simply be repelled by the egotism, even by the titles of his chapters—"Why I am so Clever," "Why I write such excellent books." And yet it does not require much of a stretch of the imagination

to suppose Bernard Shaw writing of himself under just those captions. Shaw has the genius to get away with it, and so had Nietzsche.

CHARLES M. BAKEWELL in the *Saturday Review of Literature*, Vol. II, pp. 733-735 and p. 742. Reprinted by permission.

SUGGESTIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Why do you suppose Bakewell called Nietzsche's philosophy "The Tragic Philosophy"? What teaching of Nietzsche might justify this title? What facts in his life would justify it?
2. What modern ideas does Bakewell say Nietzsche anticipated? Make a list and give a brief characterization of each, naming a leading advocate of the idea.
3. State clearly Nietzsche's interpretation of evolution, bringing out what he meant by the will to power, the eternal recurrence and the superman ideas.
4. Why does Bakewell dislike the modern Nietzsche cult? Do you think that he is right in implying that a Nietzsche cult is in contradiction with what Nietzsche taught?
5. List the different types of people whom Bakewell would like to send on a journey to Nietzsche land, and tell why he would send each type, or what lessons he thinks each type needs to learn from Nietzsche.

II. NIETZSCHE'S RELIGION, by George Wobbermin

Analysis

In spite of Nietzsche's avowed hostility to Christianity, Wobbermin argues that he had a religion which was not radically different from Christianity. In support of this contention he quotes and explains Nietzsche's famous *Midnight Song*, bringing out the three basic religious ideas implicit in it. In the first place, there is the idea that a profound and eternal meaning is to be found by those who go beyond the outward appearances and bore into the world's inner reality. Secondly, there is the idea that pain is beneficial to man and points to something beyond its bare existence as a fact. Thirdly, there is the idea that all pain will ultimately disappear in a final joy which comes from participating in eternity. Wobbermin shows that each of these ideas is a fundamental truth of Christianity, and is really not in conflict with Nietzsche's general philosophical doctrines. Yet the fact that he gave expression to these ideas shows that he was greatly influenced by the Christian philosophy of life.

Upon close examination it will be found that motives of a religious nature are by no means lacking in Nietzsche's own thinking. But these genuine religious motives are, as a rule,

either subsequently violently and artificially distorted, or else they lose their proper meaning. For example I need only to refer to the well-known verse in the famous "Midnight Song," which friends and admirers have had chiseled upon the memorial stone on the shore of Lake Silser, in the Upper Engadine:

O man! Take heed!
 What saith deep midnight's voice indeed?
 'I slept my sleep—
 From deepest dream I've woke and plead:—
 The world is deep,
 And deeper than the day could read.
 Deep is its woe—
 Joy—deeper still than grief can be:
 Woe saith: Hence! Go!
 But joys all want eternity—
 Want deep profound eternity!' ¹

Any one having anything like a fine appreciation of the religious life will at once recognize the point of relation between the feeling expressed in this verse and belief in God. Nor is it merely a relation of remote analogy, indeed it is exactly the most significant psychological fundamental motives and fountain heads of religion which are involved.

The world is deep,
 And deeper than the day could read.

This implies that the meaning and import of the world which surrounds us, and in which we live, is not to be fathomed by superficial reflection. And that means, in the first place, that the world has a meaning. It is not meaningless, purposeless and aimless. Consequently, realizing or at least divining this, we may neither look upon nor conduct our life aimlessly and as though it were meaningless. And, in the second place, it means that only he who bores into the depths will be able to compre-

¹ I have taken this from the English translation of the works of Nietzsche, Vol. II, p. 279. Here is the original (WW. VI, p. 332):

O Mensch! Gib acht!
 Was spricht die tiefe Mitternacht?
 'Ich schlief, ich schlief—
 Aus tiefem Traum bin ich erwacht:—
 Die Welt ist tief,
 Und tiefer als der Tag gedacht.
 Tief ist ihr Weh—,
 Lust—tiefer noch als Herzeleid:
 Weh spricht: Vergeh,
 Doch alle Lust will Ewigkeit!
 Will tiefe, tiefe Ewigkeit!' Tr.

hend this meaning, for, as a matter of fact, it does not lie in that which presents itself immediately and passively to the senses. It is upon this conviction that religion bases its faith in a world or sphere of life of the "beyond," a world which is designated or conceived as "beyond," first, because, as is asserted, in its nature and import it extends beyond the whole world of sense and phenomena (because it is deeper, or, to use a word which expresses the same thing under a different figure, higher than this); and second, because the phenomenal world receives meaning only by being brought into relation to the world of the "beyond."

And again:

Joy—deeper still than grief can be:
Woe saith: Hence! Go!
But joys all want eternity—
Want deep profound eternity!

Such an ardent longing for eternity, for the values and realities of eternity over against the transitoriness of all manifestations and achievements of the world of sense is another fundamental motive of religion. And this is in closest accord with the discussion above. The same thought is expressed in the hymn:

O Ewigkeit, du schone,
Mein Herz an dich gewohne,
Mein Heim ist nicht in dieser Zeit. (Tersteegen.)²

From this the desire is born in religion to subordinate everything of "this world" to the "world beyond." To use the language of Schleiermacher, it is the desire "to become one with the infinite while still in the finite and eternal at once." Of course the meaning of the words eternal and eternity in religious usage, especially in that of the Christian religion, is altogether different from that ordinarily connected with the words. Indeed, the quotation just given from the Christian author shows that very clearly. As interpreted by the Christian belief in God eternity does not mean simply the endlessness of time, and not, therefore, the passing of time. Indeed, if we seek an understanding of the word eternity from the psychological approach, it stands in contrast with the temporal as such and means the surmounting of everything temporal and ephemeral—of all changing finite existence. And Nietzsche's "Midnight Song"

² O Eternity, Thou beautiful, my heart lives in thee, my home is not in time.

shows that he comprehended, at least in a measure, this turn and interpretation of the word. His more specific characterizations of eternity testify to this—"deep, profound eternity," for it must be noted that the word deep here is manifestly intended to connect with and to recall the thought expressed in the preceding sentence—"the world is deep." But it is precisely this connection which is significant and conclusive for the religious consciousness. For eternity, in the sense in which the word is used in the Christian religion, signifies precisely the eternal and profound substance of cosmic and of human history—its eternal foundation in God and its eternal relationship to God.

Finally, therefore, these lines of Nietzsche lead to genuine religious optimism: not a powerless optimism which dreams itself away unaffected by the tribulations and contradictions of life, but a higher, courageous, strong-willed optimism which abides in spite of all adversity and suffering in its "nevertheless,"

Joy—deeper still than grief can be.

For the ultimate and deepest meaning of the world does not lie in sorrow but only in joy; not in the depreciation and negation of life, but in its affirmation, enrichment and elevation. Imbued with such optimism the Apostle Paul said: "For our light affliction which is for the moment, worketh for us more and more exceedingly an eternal weight of glory, while we look not at the things which are seen, but at the things which are not seen; for the things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal." II Cor. 4, 17 f.

All of these thoughts, which spring from the depths of the human spirit, and which are from their very conception intrinsically related with one another, are in the Christian belief in God consistently welded in the conviction that the phenomenal world, presenting itself to us to begin with, and our own life in it, are not ultimate, not an end and goal in themselves, but rather, that they have the ground and purpose for their existence in a deeper or higher world—the world of God; and that it is only through reference to his eternal being and to the eternal essence of his Kingdom that God gives meaning and purpose to this phenomenal world of ours, supporting and actively permeating it. Thus the destiny and goal of human life is to grow beyond itself, and into fellowship with God.

When once these feeling and thought motives so strongly

attested by Nietzsche are recognized as valid and as pointing in the right direction, they can be united with the Christian belief in God and its ideal of fellowship with God. For this would be incomparably more natural and satisfactory than the interpretation of these motives of Nietzsche to favor the theories of the superman and the eternal recurrence of all things. For critically considered these theories contradict and annul one another. For when the doctrine of the eternal and inevitable recurrence of all things (*alles Werdens und Geschehens*) is taken seriously there can be no final goal. Moreover, strictly speaking, the superman cannot be the goal of evolution, for even the very idea of a development toward an end must be unconditionally rejected. Indeed Nietzsche himself occasionally demanded this.³ Yet this idea is the real motive of the whole doctrine of the superman.

GEORGE WOBBERMIN: *Christian Belief in God*, pp. 8-12.
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SUGGESTIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. What do you think of Wobbermin's interpretation of Nietzsche's "Midnight Song"? Do you think Nietzsche's ideas here are Christian?
2. What contradictions does Wobbermin point out in Nietzsche's philosophy?

III. A PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY, by *Oswald Spengler*

Analysis

Spengler distinguishes a *Culture* from a *Civilization*, the latter being the last stage only of the former. A civilization is external and artificial. It is culture in decay. The Romans were the civilization-stage of Greek Culture. European civilization began in the nineteenth century as the decay of West European Culture. A civilization is always characterized by the growth of the city, which saps the life from the surrounding country. Examples of this process are given.

Spengler summarizes his theory in four propositions. (i) The evolution of the historical life of peoples is not linear so that there is just one straight line of evolution always tending higher, but there have been many distinct cultures and each has passed through definite stages and, consequently, we may discover the stage in another culture, for example, Greek Culture, which is identical with the stage we are now passing through. (ii) The nineteenth and twentieth centuries represent the stage of decadence for West European Culture. (iii) Another

³ WW. XII, pp. 51 ff.

stage lies ahead which will represent a further decay. (iv) The next stage of West European Culture will be the last and it is predetermined by the forms of decay which are now at work. In the light of these four principles it is easy to interpret history. Spengler calls his interpretation a Copernican theory of history to differentiate it from the linear theory, which he calls the Ptolemaic interpretation of history (see the passage given in a footnote, p. 615). Hope about the future must now give way to the actual facts. Spengler meets the charge that this would make people give up in despair, with the argument that it should only cause young people to choose a career adapted to the stage of evolution they are in. Instead of devoting themselves to art, let them give their attention to technical pursuits; instead of trying to be philosophers, let them become politicians. These are the fields which offer the largest opportunity in a decaying civilization.

Spengler gives his own idea of philosophy, holding that the philosophy of any age is the expression of the life force operating in the stage of culture which that age is in. Philosophy is never a system of dry-as-dust ideas. He contrasts the great philosophers of the past with the thinkers of to-day. Modern philosophers are entirely out of touch with the affairs of the world. All they do is speculate. They do not participate in making their culture. All the great thinkers of the past were men of action. To-day "we confuse philosophy with preaching, with agitation, with novel-writing, with lecture-room jargon." Spengler argues that the only type of philosophy possible for a decadent civilization, like ours, is one similar to *Classical Scepticism*. He explains what scepticism is. Other types of philosophy belong to a stage of culture through which we have already passed. An unphilosophical philosophy, a sceptical philosophy of history, is the last philosophy that West European Culture will be able to produce. Absolute truth is out of the question. Only the truth relative to a particular mankind can be stated. The philosophy of our age must be such a relative philosophy.

The *Decline of the West* comprises nothing less than the problem of *Civilization*. We have before us one of the fundamental questions of all higher history. What is Civilization, understood as the organic-logical sequel, fulfilment and finale of a culture?

For every Culture has *its own* Civilization. In this work, for the first time the two words, hitherto used to express an indefinite, more or less ethical, distinction, are used in a *periodic* sense, to express a strict and necessary *organic succession*. The Civilization is the inevitable *destiny* of the Culture, and in this principle we obtain the viewpoint from which the deepest and gravest problems of historical morphology become capable of solution. Civilizations are the most external and artificial states of which a species of developed humanity is capable. They are a conclusion, the thing-become succeeding the thing-becoming,

death following life, rigidity following expansion, intellectual age and the stone-built petrifying world-city following mother-earth and the spiritual childhood of Doric and Gothic. They are an end, irrevocable, yet by inward necessity reached again and again.

So, for the first time, we are enabled to understand the Romans as the *successors* of the Greeks, and light is projected into the deepest secrets of the late-Classical period. What, but this, can be the meaning of the fact—which can only be disputed by vain phrases—that the Romans were barbarians who did not *precede* but *closed* a great development? Unspiritual, unphilosophical, devoid of art, clannish to the point of brutality, aiming relentlessly at tangible successes, they stand between the Hellenic Culture and nothingness. An imagination directed purely to practical objects—they had religious laws governing godward relations as they had other laws governing human relations, but there was no specifically Roman saga of gods—was something which is not found at all in Athens. In a word, Greek *soul*—Roman *intellect*; and this antithesis is the differentia between Culture and Civilization. Nor is it only to the Classical that it applies. Again and again there appears this type of strong-minded, completely non-metaphysical man, and in the hands of this type lies the intellectual and material destiny of each and every “late” period. Such are the men who carried through the Babylonian, the Egyptian, the Indian, the Chinese, the Roman Civilizations, and in such periods do Buddhism, Stoicism, Socialism ripen into definitive world-conceptions which enable a moribund humanity to be attacked and re-formed in its intimate structure. *Pure Civilization*, as a historical process, consists in a progressive *taking-down* of forms that have become inorganic or dead.

The transition from Culture to Civilization was accomplished for the Classical world in the fourth, for the Western in the nineteenth century. From these periods onward the great intellectual decisions take place, not as in the days of the Orpheus-movement of the Reformation in the “whole world” where not a hamlet is too small to be unimportant, but in three or four world-cities that have absorbed into themselves the whole content of History, while the old wide landscape of the Culture, become merely provincial, serves only to feed the cities with what remains of its higher mankind.

World-city and province ⁴—the two basic ideas of every civilization—bring up a wholly new form-problem of History, the very problem that we are living through to-day with hardly the remotest conception of its immensity. In place of a world, there is a *city, a point*, in which the whole life of broad regions is collecting while the rest dries up. In place of a type-true people, born of and grown on the soil, there is a new sort of nomad, cohering unstably in fluid masses, the parasitical city dweller, traditionless, utterly matter-of-fact, religionless, clever, unfruitful, deeply contemptuous of the countryman and especially that highest form of countryman, the country gentleman. This is a very great stride towards the inorganic, towards the end—what does it signify? France and England have already taken the step and Germany is beginning to do so. After Syracuse, Athens, and Alexandria comes Rome. After Madrid, Paris, London come Berlin and New York. It is the destiny of whole regions that lie outside the radiation-circle of one of these cities—of old Crete and Macedon and to-day the Scandinavian North ⁵—to become “provinces.” . . .

Let it be realized, then:

That the secret of historical form does not lie on the surface, that it cannot be grasped by means of similarities of costume and setting, and that in the history of men as in that of animals and plants there occur phenomena showing deceptive similarity but inwardly without any connexion—e.g., Charlemagne and Haroun-al-Raschid, Alexander and Cæsar, the German wars upon Rome and the Mongol onslaughts upon West Europe—and other phenomena of extreme outward dissimilarity but of identical import—e.g., Trajan and Rameses II, the Bourbons and the Attic Demos, Mohammed and Pythagoras.

That the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, hitherto looked on as the highest point of an ascending straight line of world-history, are in reality a stage of life which may be observed in every Culture that has ripened to its limit—a stage of life characterized not by Socialists, Impressionists, electric railways, torpedoes and differential equations (for these are only body-

⁴ See Vol. II, p. 117 *et seq.*

⁵ One cannot fail to notice this in the development of Strindberg and especially in that of Ibsen, who was never quite at home in the civilized atmosphere of his problems. The motives of “Brand” and “Rosmersholm” are a wonderful mixture of innate provincialism and a theoretically-acquired megalopolitan outlook. Nora is the very type of the provincial derailed by reading.

constituents of the time), but by a civilized spirituality which possesses not only these but also quite other creative possibilities.

That, as our own time represents a transitional phase which occurs with certainty under particular conditions, there are perfectly well-defined states (such as have occurred more than once in the history of the past) *later* than the present-day state of West Europe, and therefore that

The future of the West is not a limitless tending upwards and onwards for all time towards our present ideals, but a single phenomenon of history, strictly limited and defined as to form and duration, which covers a few centuries and can be viewed and, in essentials, calculated from available precedents.

This high plane of contemplation once attained, the rest is easy. To this *single* idea one can refer, and by it one can solve, without straining or forcing, all those separate problems of religion, art-history, epistemology, ethics, politics, economics with which the modern intellect has so passionately—and so vainly—busied itself for decades.

This idea is one of those truths that have only to be expressed with full clarity to become indisputable. It is one of the inward necessities of the Western Culture and of its world-feeling. It is capable of entirely transforming the world-outlook of one who fully understands it, i.e., makes it intimately his own. It immensely deepens the world-picture natural and necessary to us in that, already trained to regard world-historical evolution as an organic unit seen backwards from our standpoint in the present, we are enabled by its aid to follow the broad lines into the future—a privilege of dream-calculation till now permitted only to the physicist. It is, I repeat, in effect the substitution of a Copernican for a Ptolemaic aspect of history, that is, an immeasurable widening of horizon.⁶

Up to now every one has been at liberty to hope what he pleased about the future. Where there are no facts, sentiment

⁶ In the following passage Spengler explains what he means by this distinction: "The most appropriate designation for this current West-European scheme of history, in which the great Cultures are made to follow orbits round *us* as the presumed centre of all world-happenings, is the *Ptolemaic system* of history. The system that is put forward in this work in place of it I regard as the *Copernican discovery* in the historical sphere, in that it admits no sort of privileged position to the Classical or the Western Culture as against the Cultures of India, Babylon, China, Egypt, the Arabs, Mexico—separate worlds of dynamic being which in point of mass count for just as much in the general picture of history as the Classical, while frequently surpassing it in point of spiritual greatness and soaring power" (p. 18).

rules. But henceforward it will be every man's business to inform himself of what *can* happen and therefore of what with the unalterable necessity of destiny and irrespective of personal ideals, hopes or desires, *will* happen. When we use the risky word "freedom" we shall mean freedom to do, not this or that, but the necessary or nothing. The feeling that this is "just as it should be" is the hall-mark of the man of fact. To lament it and blame it is not to alter it. To birth belongs death, to youth age, to life generally its form and its allotted span. The present is a civilized, emphatically not a cultured time, and *ipso facto* a great number of life-capacities fall out as impossible. This may be deplorable, and may be and will be deplored in pessimist philosophy and poetry, but it is not in our power to make otherwise. It will not be—already it is not—permissible to defy clear historical experience and to expect, merely because we hope, that this will spring or that will flourish.

It will no doubt be objected that such a world-outlook, which in giving this certainty as to the outlines and tendency of the future cuts off all far-reaching hopes, would be unhealthy for all and fatal for many, once it ceased to be a mere theory and was adopted as a practical scheme of life by the group of personalities effectively moulding the future.

Such is not my opinion. We are civilized, not Gothic or Rococo, people; we have to reckon with the hard cold facts of a *late* life, to which the parallel is to be found not in Pericles's Athens but in Cæsar's Rome. Of great painting or of great music there can no longer be, for Western people, any question. Their architectural possibilities have been exhausted these hundred years. Only *extensive* possibilities are left to them. Yet, for a sound and vigorous generation that is filled with unlimited hopes, I fail to see that it is any disadvantage to discover betimes that some of these hopes must come to nothing. And if the hopes thus doomed should be those most dear, well, a man who is worth anything will not be dismayed. It is true that the issue may be a tragic one for some individuals who in their decisive years are overpowered by the conviction that in the spheres of architecture, drama, painting, there is nothing left for *them* to conquer. What matter if they do go under! It has been the convention hitherto to admit no limits of any sort in these matters, and to believe that each period had its own task to do in each sphere. Tasks therefore were found by hook or by crook, leaving it to be settled posthumously whether or not

the artist's faith was justified and his life-work necessary. Now, nobody but a pure romantic would take this way out. Such a pride is not the pride of a Roman. What are we to think of the individual who, standing before an exhausted quarry, would rather be told that a new vein will be struck to-morrow—the bait offered by the radically false and mannerized art of the moment—than be shown a rich and virgin clay-bed near by? The lesson, I think, would be of benefit to the coming generations, as showing them what is possible—and therefore necessary—and what is excluded from the inward potentialities of their time. Hitherto an incredible total of intellect and power has been squandered in false directions. The West-European, however historically he may think and feel, is at a certain stage of life invariably uncertain of his own direction; he gropes and feels his way and, if unlucky in environment, he loses it. But now at last the work of centuries enables him to view the disposition of his own life in relation to the general culture-scheme and to test his own powers and purposes. And I can only hope that men of the new generation may be moved by this book to devote themselves to technics instead of lyrics, the sea instead of the paint-brush, and politics instead of epistemology. Better they could not do.

It still remains to consider the relation of a morphology of world-history to Philosophy. All genuine historical work is philosophy, unless it is mere ant-industry. But the operations of the systematic philosopher are subject to constant and serious error through his assuming the permanence of his results. He overlooks the fact that every thought lives in a historical world and is therefore involved in the common destiny of mortality. He supposes that higher thought possesses an everlasting and unalterable objectiveness (*Gegenstand*), that the great questions of all epochs are identical, and that therefore they are capable in the last analysis of unique answers.

But question and answer are here one, and the great questions are made great by the very fact that unequivocal answers to them are so passionately demanded, so that it is as life-symbols only that they possess significance. There are no eternal truths. Every philosophy is the expression of its own and only its own time, and—if by philosophy we mean effective philosophy and not academic triflings about judgment-forms, sense-categories and the like—no two ages possess the same philosophic intentions. The difference is not between perishable

and imperishable doctrines but between doctrines which live their day and doctrines which never live at all. The immortality of thoughts-become is an illusion—the essential is, what kind of man comes to expression in them. The greater the man, the truer the philosophy, with the inward truth that in a great work of art transcends all proof of its several elements or even of their compatibility with one another. At highest, the philosophy may absorb the entire content of an epoch, realize it within itself and then, embodying it in some grand form or personality, pass it on to be developed further and further. The scientific dress or the mark of learning adopted by a philosophy is here unimportant. Nothing is simpler than to make good poverty of ideas by founding a system, and even a good idea has little value when enunciated by a solemn ass. Only its necessity to life decides the eminence of a doctrine.

For me, therefore, the test of value to be applied to a thinker is his eye for the great facts of his own time. Only this can settle whether he is merely a clever architect of systems and principles, versed in definitions and analyses, or whether it is the very soul of his time that speaks in his works and his intuitions. A philosopher who cannot grasp and command actuality as well will never be of the first rank. The Pre-Socratics were merchants and politicians *en grand*. The desire to put his political ideas into practice in Syracuse nearly cost Plato his life, and it was the same Plato who discovered the set of geometrical theorems that enable Euclid to build up the Classical system of mathematics. Pascal—whom Nietzsche knows only as the “broken Christian”—Descartes, Leibniz were the first mathematicians and technicians of their time.

The great “Pre-Socratics” of China from Kwan-tsi (about 670 B.C.) to Confucius (550-478 B.C.) were statesmen, regents, lawgivers like Pythagoras and Parmenides, like Hobbes and Leibniz. With Lao-tsze—the opponent of all state authority and high politics and the enthusiast of small peaceful communities—unworldliness and deed-shyness first appear, heralds of lecture-room and study philosophy. But Lao-tsze was in his time, the *ancien régime* of China, an exception in the midst of sturdy philosophers for whom epistemology meant the knowledge of the important relations of actual life.

And herein, I think, all the philosophers of the newest age are open to a serious criticism. What they do not possess is real standing in actual life. Not one of them has intervened effec-

tively, either in higher politics, in the development of modern technics, in matters of communication, in economics, or in any other *big* actuality, with a single act or a single compelling idea. Not one of them counts in mathematics, in physics, in the science of government, even to the extent that Kant counted. Let us glance at other times. Confucius was several times a minister. Pythagoras was the organizer of an important political movement ⁷ akin to the Cromwellian, the significance of which is even now far underestimated by Classical researchers. Goethe, besides being a model executive minister—though lacking, alas! the operative sphere of a great state—was interested in the Suez and Panama canals (the dates of which he foresaw with accuracy) and their effects on the economy of the world, and he busied himself again and again with the question of American economic life and its reactions on the Old World, and with that of the dawning era of machine-industry. Hobbes was one of the originators of the great plan of winning South America for England, and although in execution the plan went no further than the occupation of Jamaica, he has the glory of being one of the founders of the British Colonial Empire. Leibniz, without doubt the greatest intellect in Western philosophy, the founder of the differential calculus and the *analysis situs*, conceived or coöperated in a number of major political schemes, one of which was to relieve Germany by drawing the attention of Louis XIV to the importance of Egypt as a factor in French world-policy. The ideas of the memorandum on this subject that he drew up for the Grand Monarch were so far in advance of their time (1672) that it has been thought that Napoleon made use of them for his Eastern venture. Even thus early, Leibniz laid down the principle that Napoleon grasped more and more clearly after Wagram, viz., that acquisitions on the Rhine and in Belgium would not permanently better the position of France and that the neck of Suez would one day be the key of world-dominance. Doubtless the King was not equal to these deep political and strategic conceptions of the Philosopher.

Turning from men of this mould to the "philosophers" of to-day, one is dismayed and shamed. How poor their personalities, how commonplace their political and practical outlook! Why is it that the mere idea of calling upon one of them to prove his intellectual eminence in government, diplomacy, large-scale organization, or direction of any big colonial, commercial

⁷ See Vol. II, 373 ff.

or transport concern is enough to evoke our pity? And this insufficiency indicates, not that they possess inwardness, but simply that they lack weight. I look round in vain for an instance in which a modern "philosopher" has made a name by even one deep or far-seeing pronouncement on an important question of the day. I see nothing but provincial opinions of the same kind as any one else's. Whenever I take up a work by a modern thinker, I find myself asking: has he any idea whatever of the actualities of world-politics, world-city problems, capitalism, the future of the state, the relation of technics to the course of civilization, Russia, Science? Goethe would have understood all this and revelled in it, but there is not one living philosopher capable of taking it in. This sense of actualities is of course not the same thing as the content of a philosophy but, I repeat, it is an infallible symptom of its inward necessity, its fruitfulness and its symbolic importance.

We must allow ourselves no illusions as to the gravity of this negative result. It is palpable that we have lost sight of the final significance of effective philosophy. We confuse philosophy with preaching, with agitation, with novel-writing, with lecture-room jargon. We have descended from the perspective of the bird to that of the frog. It has come to this, that the very *possibility* of a real philosophy of to-day and to-morrow is in question. If not, it were far better to become a colonist or an engineer, to do something, no matter what, that is true and real, than to chew over once more the old dried-up themes under cover of an alleged "new wave of philosophic thought"—far better to construct an aero-engine than a new theory of apperception that is not wanted. Truly it is a poor life's work to restate once more, in slightly different terms, views of a hundred predecessors on the Will or on psycho-physical parallelism. This may be a profession, but a philosophy it emphatically is not. A doctrine that does not attack and affect the life of the period in its inmost depths is no doctrine and had better not be taught. And what was possible even yesterday is, to-day, at least not indispensable.

To me, the depths and refinement of mathematical and physical theories are a joy; by comparison, the æsthete and the physiologist are fumblers. I would sooner have the fine mind-begotten forms of a fast steamer, a steel structure, a precision-lathe, the subtlety and elegance of many chemical and optical processes, than all the pickings and stealings of present-day

“arts and crafts,” architecture and painting included. I prefer one Roman aqueduct to all Roman temples and statues. I love the Colosseum and the giant vault of the Palatine, for they display for me to-day in the brown massiveness of their brick construction the *real* Rome and the grand practical sense of her engineers, but it is a matter of indifference to me whether the empty and pretentious marblery of the Cæsars—their rows of statuary, their friezes, their overloaded architraves—is preserved or not. Glance at some reconstruction of the Imperial Fora—do we not find them the true counterpart of a modern International Exhibition, obtrusive, bulky, empty, a boasting in materials and dimensions wholly alien to Periclean Greece and the Rococo alike, but exactly paralleled in the Egyptian modernism that is displayed in the ruins of Rameses II (1300 B.C.) at Luxor and Karnak? It was not for nothing that the genuine Roman despised the *Græculus histrio*, the kind of “artist” and the kind of “philosopher” to be found on the soil of Roman Civilization. The time for art and philosophy had passed; they were exhausted, used up, superfluous, and his instinct for the realities of life told him so. *One* Roman law weighed more than all the lyrics and school-metaphysics of the time together. And I maintain that to-day many an inventor, many a diplomat, many a financier is a sounder philosopher than all those who practise the dull craft of experimental psychology. This is a situation which regularly repeats itself at a certain historical level. It would have been absurd in a Roman of intellectual eminence, who might as Consul or Prætor lead armies, organize provinces, build cities and roads, or even be the Princeps in Rome, to want to hatch out some new variant of post-Platonic school philosophy at Athens or Rhodes. Consequently no one did so. It was not in harmony with the tendency of the age, and therefore it only attracted third-class men of the kind that always advances as far as the *Zeitgeist* of the day before yesterday. It is a very grave question whether this stage has or has not set in for us already.

A century of purely extensive effectiveness, excluding big artistic and metaphysical production—let us say frankly an irreligious time which coincides exactly with the idea of the world-city—is a time of decline. True. But we have not *chosen* this time. We cannot help it if we are born as men of the early winter of full Civilization, instead of on the golden summit of a ripe Culture, in a Phidias or a Mozart time. Every-

thing depends on our seeing our own position, our *destiny*, clearly, on our realizing that though we may lie to ourselves about it we cannot evade it. He who does not acknowledge this in his heart, ceases to be counted among the men of his generation, and remains either a simpleton, a charlatan, or a pedant.

Therefore, in approaching a problem of the present, one must begin by asking one's self—a question answered in advance by instinct in the case of the genuine adept—what to-day is possible and what he must forbid himself. Only a very few of the problems of metaphysics are, so to say, allocated for solution to any epoch of thought. Even thus soon, a whole world separates Nietzsche's time, in which a last trace of romanticism was still operative, from our own, which has shed every vestige of it.

Systematic philosophy closes with the end of the eighteenth century. Kant put its utmost possibilities in forms both grand in themselves and—as a rule—final for the Western soul. He is followed, as Plato and Aristotle were followed, by specifically megalopolitan philosophy that was not speculative but practical, irreligious, social-ethical. This philosophy—paralleled in the Chinese civilization by the schools of the "Epicurean" Yang-chu, the "Socialist" Mo-ti, the "Pessimist" Chuang-tsü, the "Positivist" Mencius, and in the Classical by the Cynics, the Cyrenaics, the Stoics and the Epicureans—begins in the West with Schopenhauer, who is the first to make the *Will to life* ("creative life-force") the centre of gravity of his thought, although the deeper tendency of his doctrine is obscured by his having, under the influence of a great tradition, maintained the obsolete distinctions of phenomena and things-in-themselves and suchlike. It is the same creative will-to-life that was Schopenhauer-wise denied in "Tristan" and Darwin-wise asserted in "Siegfried"; that was brilliantly and theatrically formulated by Nietzsche in "Zarathustra"; that led the Hegelian Marx to an economic and the Malthusian Darwin to a biological hypothesis which together have subtly transformed the world-outlook of the Western megalopolis; and that produced a homogeneous series of tragedy-conceptions extending from Hebbel's "Judith" to Ibsen's "Epilogue." It has embraced, therefore, all the possibilities of a true philosophy—and at the same time it has exhausted them.

Systematic philosophy, then, lies immensely far behind us, and ethical has been wound up. *But a third possibility, corresponding to the Classical Scepticism, still remains to the soul-*

world of the present-day West, and it can be brought to light by the hitherto unknown methods of historical morphology. That which is a possibility is a necessity. The Classical scepticism is ahistoric, it doubts by denying outright. But that of the West, if it is an inward necessity, a symbol of the autumn of our spirituality, is obliged to be historical through and through. Its solutions are got by treating everything as relative, as a historical phenomenon, and its procedure is psychological. Whereas the Sceptic philosophy arose within Hellenism as the negation of philosophy—declaring philosophy to be purposeless—we, on the contrary, regard the *history of philosophy* as, in the last resort, philosophy's gravest theme. This is "skepsis," in the true sense, for whereas the Greek is led to renounce absolute standpoints by contempt for the intellectual past, we are led to do so by comprehension of that past as an organism.

In this work it will be our task to sketch out this unphilosophical philosophy—the last that West Europe will know. Scepticism is the expression of a pure Civilization; and it dissipates the world-picture of the Culture that has gone before. For us, its success will lie in resolving all the older problems into one, the genetic. The conviction that what *is* also *has become*, that the natural and cognizable is rooted in the historic, that the World as the actual is founded on an Ego as the potential actualized, that the "when" and the "how long" hold as deep a secret as the "what," leads directly to the fact that everything, whatever else it may be, must at any rate be *the expression of something living*. Cognitions and judgments too are acts of living men. The thinkers of the past conceived external actuality as produced by cognition and motivating ethical judgments, but to the thought of the future they are above all *expressions and symbols*. *The Morphology of world-history becomes inevitably a universal symbolism.*

With that, the claim of higher thought to possess general and eternal truths falls to the ground. Truths are truths only in relation to a particular mankind. Thus, my own philosophy is able to express and reflect *only* the Western (as distinct from the Classical, Indian, or other) soul, and that soul *only* in its present civilized phase by which its conception of the world, its practical range and its sphere of effect are specified.

OSWALD SPENGLER: *The Decline of the West*, pp. 31-33 and 38-46. Translated by C. F. Atkinson. Copyright, 1926, by Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. Reprinted by permission. Title mine.

SUGGESTIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. What is Spengler's distinction between a Culture and a Civilization? What does he regard as the chief characteristic of the latter?
2. Study the footnote on p. 615 and explain carefully the difference between the Ptolemaic and Copernican interpretations of history.
3. Would one be justified in referring to Spengler's view as *cultural pluralism* and to the theory he opposes as *cultural monism*? Justify your answer.
4. State Spengler's idea of what philosophy should be and explain why he thinks that scepticism is the only possible philosophy for our age.
5. Contrast what Spengler says about a philosophy being necessarily a reflection of an age, with what Santayana said about a philosophy which only expresses the tendencies of a definite time (above, p. 576). Which of these opposite ideas of philosophy do you think is correct and why?
6. Write a one thousand word paper giving your own reaction to Spengler, either criticizing or defending him.

CHAPTER IV

THE NEW SCHOLASTICISM AND ITS CONTRIBUTIONS TO MODERN THOUGHT, by *James H. Ryan*

Analysis

Ryan quotes the editor of the *Times Literary Supplement* on the revival of interest in Mediæval Philosophy in general and in the philosophy of Saint Thomas Aquinas in particular. This is really a new thought tendency and not just an old philosophy decked out in new clothes. Ryan calls this new philosophy the *New Scholasticism* but it is also sometimes called the *New Thomism*. He traces its history from the Encyclical *Æterni Patris*, issued in 1850, by Pope Leo XIII. The scholastics realize that it will be difficult for their philosophy to gain recognition, partly because it is rooted in the philosophy of the Middle Ages and partly because it is officially connected with the Roman Catholic Church. The *odium theologicum* is upon it. Most modern philosophers are simply ignorant of the teachings of the New Scholasticism. This was even true of William James. The monistic premises upon which so much of modern philosophy rests is one reason for this lack of understanding of scholastic philosophy, which is partly dualistic. It is a mistake to think that the New Scholasticism is tied up with mediæval science, although mediæval science was much more important than the critics suppose. As a matter of fact the New Scholasticism is friendly to modern scientific research. This is proven first by a statement from Pope Leo XIII and secondly by the contributions to modern science which have been made by Catholic scientists. Ryan admits that the New Scholasticism is anti-materialistic and anti-mechanistic but he denies that it is anti-scientific. However, philosophy can never be identified with science. In this respect Hoernlé is right as against Dewey and Russell, and the views of the latter are already giving way. The New Scholasticism cannot accept either extreme experimentalism or extreme deductionism, just because it must be true to both types of thought. Ryan deals with the objection that the theistic position of the scholastics is in conflict with evolution, holding that they have no quarrel with evolutionism as a science but only with evolutionism as a philosophy. He points out that there is a revolt in philosophy against biology and quotes Professor Urban to prove this.

This leads Ryan to a statement of the positive contributions of the New Scholasticism to present-day philosophy, especially with reference to the solutions of the problem of knowledge and the body-mind problem. The scholastics are partly dualistic on the former problem, holding to a correspondence theory of truth. He states the relation of the New Scholasticism to pragmatism, idealism and realism. Its dualistic realism is a higher synthesis of pragmatism and idealism.

Ryan insists that the distinction between intellect and will must be maintained, and that primacy must be given to the intellect, this being the position of St. Thomas Aquinas. On the body-mind problem the scholastics hold an interaction theory. Ryan criticizes parallelism and defends the Mind-Substance Theory against the functional theory of mind which has prevailed since Hume. In conclusion he states briefly the contributions of the New Scholasticism to a philosophy of nature and to ethics, especially to the field of applied ethics.

“The Scholastic tradition reigned undisputed for nearly three centuries, and it did not die with the Middle Ages. Not only did it survive in England as we have seen. . . . In the system of Hegel, and even, though in a less degree, in that of Kant, Aquinas’s influence is apparent. Hegel indeed had first studied from Thomistic manuals, and he owed more to them than he owed to Heraclitus. In our own times we have seen a more obvious revival of Thomism. After considering the systems of Gioberti and Rosmini, the Vatican gradually decided to make Thomism its official philosophy. The result has been far-reaching. In Italy, where, as ever, Dante is studied, Scholasticism accompanies the neo-Hegelianism of Croce and Gentile. Cardinal Mercier was the leader of the revival in Northern Europe. He founded the school of Louvain, and he re-wrote his lectures in a considerable volume. Scholasticism regains its hold on Germany, and we gather from the fourth and fifth books in our list that it is beginning to arouse respect also in Great Britain.”

Thus writes the editor of the *Times Literary Supplement* (London, November 5, 1925) apropos of a lengthy review of a series of new books on Scholastics and Scholasticism written by such well-known scholars as Étienne Gilson, Francesco Olgiati, Jacques Maritain, and Henri Ghéon. The revival of interest in England in the thought of the Scholastics is being paralleled in the United States by a similarly awakened interest in things mediæval, and especially in mediæval philosophy. The creation of the Mediæval Academy of America, and the announcement of a new review, *Speculum, A Journal of Mediæval Studies*, are signs which point in only one direction.

The realistic trend of American philosophy owes more than it suspects to the classical thought of the thirteenth century. While it would be an exaggeration to maintain that the New Realists arrived at their theory of knowledge because of an appreciation of the principles of Dualistic Realism, since few, if any, of them betray even a nodding acquaintance with the philosophy of Saint Thomas, nevertheless it can be contended

honestly that they have been affected to no small extent by Thomistic thinking, from whatever source originally they gained a knowledge of it. Nor is this renewed interest in Thomistic thinking to be looked upon as momentary, superficial, and likely to be overthrown at the appearance of some new fad in philosophy. If the interest were purely archæological, it might be waved away as one of the passing fashions of the day, and we could hope from it nothing more consequential than an increase of appreciation of the truly stupendous literary and artistic creations of the Middle Ages. But Scholasticism, in its twentieth century dress, that is, as the New Scholasticism, is not presenting itself to modern thought as something very old, decked out in up-to-date clothes; a corpse brought to life by a magic process of artificial intellectual respiration. Quite the contrary. The New Scholasticism maintains that it is a vital current of present-day thinking, that it has a message for the modern philosophical world, that in the practical affairs of life it can point a way out of the various difficulties which seem to have swamped many thinkers and left them helpless before the tide of scepticism and unbelief threatening the future and even the present.

In the dark night of the intellectual anarchy which has followed upon the war, the Neo-Scholastic holds out for acceptance a systematic thought which, like a great light, penetrates the obscurities of the dungeon in which much of our thinking seems to be confined, and indicates the road to safety, sanity, and salvation. We know that the light which will penetrate this darkness is not an illusion. The eager search for it proves that mankind, too, realizes both its existence and its need. That men shall see and accept and be guided by its blessed rays depends on the energy we manifest and the skill we use in making known our belief to an age whose eyes have become unaccustomed to the strong white light of truth.

We have alluded to the vitality of Scholastic thought. Its reappearance as a contender in the arena of warring systems of philosophy cannot but appear to many observers as little short of a resurrection from the dead. For Scholasticism had been interred, and without the honors of war, by such renowned thinkers as Descartes, Locke, Hume, and Kant. So accustomed had philosophy become to the idea that nothing was to be expected from the thought of the Middle Ages that it passed over in amused silence the strenuous efforts which were being made to rekindle the spark of life in its supposedly dry bones.

The renaissance of Scholastic thought began in Italy as early as 1850. Its rebirth, like the birth of any great man or movement, passed unnoticed. Its early appearance to the modern world, in the form of commentaries and compendia written in Latin, served to confirm the widespread belief that as a philosophy it was hopeless. The first real impetus given to Scholastic philosophy came from the Encyclical "*Æterni Patris*" of that great Pope, Leo XIII. The world, well aware of the modernity and soundness of Pope Leo's thinking on other subjects, could not but give ear to his fervent plea for a revival of philosophical studies. It saw, too, that the Pope was in earnest when he stated his conviction of the need of a sound philosophy, and from that day forward Scholasticism became an element in thinking that had to be reckoned with. The influence of Cardinal Mercier and the University of Louvain in spreading the ideals of Leo was determining. The twentieth century opened with the army of the New Scholasticism drawn up in fighting array, prepared to battle for the great principles that had shown such vitality in Ancient Greece and Imperial Rome, and had helped to mould the Middle Ages from a barbarous incoherency into a logical and highly efficient culture.

The New Scholasticism has a long and difficult road to travel before it can hope for anything approaching the recognition given in intellectual circles to certain modern systems of philosophy. No one is more acutely aware of this fact than the Neo-Scholastics themselves. The difficulties involved are of many kinds, not the least being the patronizing attitude generally assumed towards a system of thought which is so deeply rooted in the past. Again, modern thought has become strangely and, we feel, unreasonably suspicious of any intellectual position which seems to imply the acceptance of defined dogmas of religion. The whole trend of our thinking has been in the direction of secularism, of the divorcing of science and philosophy from the tenets of religious faith, be it Christian or non-Christian. It is true that religion has come to be accepted by many people as a dignified and useful sort of sentimental experience. But its intellectual influence is either denied outright or passed over in mild contempt. The result of such an attitude has been to discount beforehand every system of thought tinctured by or associated with religious dogma. In modern times, the *odium theologicum* has thus acquired a new and startling meaning.

The aforementioned difficulties must sooner or later yield to

a sound and clear presentation of the Scholastic position, if we are prepared to make it known in a way and under circumstances which will appeal to thinkers. What I mean is that, considering the actual situation, the medium of presentation is often of as much importance as the arguments advanced to sustain one's position. Interest in a philosophical or scientific movement soon wanes if its leaders are not anxious to make themselves understood in a language which the modern man can comprehend. The mode of presentation, therefore, as well as the language used, are tremendously important elements to be considered when one is committed to the difficult task of making his thought known and acceptable to others. It is quite generally conceded that any failure of the New Scholasticism to attain the commanding position in modern thought which it deserves because of the clarity and sanity of its thought constructions, is due primarily to the weakness it has exhibited in the methods used to bring such principles before the public. On occasions when this thought has been well and logically expressed, it has been received with an appreciation and even enthusiasm that is as surprising as it is gratifying. All of which suggests the idea that it is not Scholasticism *in se* which is repellent to modern thinkers. Prejudiced as many are, and indifferent as many more are, to our system of philosophy, the great majority of its opponents will be found among those who are almost entirely ignorant of Scholastic principles. This may be due either to an unwillingness or an incapability of approaching this thought in the severe dress in which it is often presented. A good example of this latter handicap is seen in the late Professor James. Few philosophers exhibited a more genial broadmindedness than the great leader of American Pragmatism. In many of his best ideas James was closer to the philosophy of the Schools than he ever suspected. In spite of all this, he betrayed again and again an obscurantist attitude toward Scholastic philosophy which is in startling contrast to his ordinarily impartial treatment of points of view opposite to his own. The only plausible explanation of this strange treatment of Scholasticism on the part of James seems to be that he did not know what the Scholastics taught, but formed his ideas of their teachings from the tradition current in idealistic circles, or that he did not feel himself quite equal to consulting the sources from which alone a fair and scientific view of that position can be obtained.

By all this I do not mean to assert that opposition to Schol-

asticism is due solely either to ignorance of its teachings or to our own ineffective methods of presentation. Many modern thinkers, and the number is on the increase, understand only too well what these fundamental positions are. However, because of their acceptance of a radically opposite starting-point which, generally speaking, is monistic, they confess themselves incapable of harmonizing Scholastic conclusions with their own accepted premises. Their position, of course, is quite logical, conceding the truth of the monistic philosophy. These thinkers, therefore, oppose the New Scholasticism, conscious of the fact that as a system it is definitely and uncompromisingly pluralistic just as mediæval Scholasticism was. I can see no way of bringing such thinkers to an appreciation of the strength of Scholastic philosophy until we have fought out the differences which divide the monist from the pluralist, that is, until the dualist position has become so fortified against attack that every species of Monism will willingly capitulate to the convincing force of its logic. Until recently it was the conventional thing to regard Monism as the only sound approach to the problems of the universe. Professor Ladd expressed that attitude when he wrote "that Dualism arises—at least in modern times—almost altogether as a protest against some form of Monism which is deemed extreme or dangerous."

The confidence of present-day philosophers in monistic thought is scarcely that of Professor Ladd. This confidence has been shattered in the last two decades. Many thinkers, it is true, are not as yet prepared to throw Monism overboard and to proceed in their quest, guided by an out-and-out Pluralism. On the other hand, despite lingering attachments to Monism, a fairer and juster estimate is quite universally made of the claim of Dualism that it represents a legitimate explanation of the nature of reality, and that only in a pluralistic universe can thought and experience ever come into harmonious and satisfying relations.

There is a general feeling that Scholastic thought is so bound up with mediæval ideas of science that anything like a *rap-prochement* between it and modern philosophy is unthinkable. The philosophy of Saint Thomas was developed in a period and in a *milieu* which were wholly unscientific. The physics, chemistry, and biology of the thirteenth century strike us as only a bit less childish than the animism of certain Australian semi-savage tribes of the present day. Not only did the Middle

Ages lack scientific knowledge; its atmosphere was positively anti-scientific because of over-emphasis on the deductive process which it regarded as the sole means of acquiring truth. It is for some such reasons as these that many feel that a philosophy developed under such unfavorable circumstances has little or nothing substantial to offer modern thinking.

The objection involves a theory of the fundamental relations of science to philosophy, which must be analyzed before we can accept it; it exhibits, too, a picture of the scientific condition of Europe in the thirteenth century which does not harmonize with recent historical investigations. To take the latter point first. That the condition of the sciences in the Middle Ages was not at all like the portrait traditionally drawn, any one can discover for himself who will take the trouble to read the writings of Haskins, Thorndike, and Duhem on the history of mediæval Science. The genuine scientific spirit never died, even in the darkest days. The story of its accomplishments in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries is as moving and dramatic as anything which modern science presents for our admiration. Particularly at Oxford was the pure spirit of investigation held in great honor. Such an attitude resulted in a series of achievements which are not only noteworthy but clearly opened the way to the more brilliant and better known discoveries of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

The student of the history of mediæval philosophy, too, is well aware of the analysis of the inductive method made by Occam and the disciples of his school. Without such preparatory studies the advance of science would certainly have been delayed for a long period. Moreover, the great Scholastics were well acquainted with the methods and progress of the sciences of their day. That this progress in no way approaches what has been done in the nineteenth century, that the methods of science then in vogue were crude as compared with our own, do not seem to justify us in sweeping away at one stroke the solid and lasting accomplishments of those stirring days of the re-awakening of the human mind. To praise our own times, it is not necessary to condemn the past.

The New Scholasticism, as far as science goes, is not mediæval but modern. As a matter of fact, that is one of the reasons why it is a *new* Scholasticism. We are quite conscious of the scientific handicaps under which Bonaventure, Albert and Thomas labored. We would consider it nothing short of suicidal to

fail to make use of every item of information laboriously achieved by modern research and investigation. The New Scholasticism cannot accept the physics, the chemistry, or the biology of the Middle Ages, nor does it make any pretense to justify the scientific views of that period. In this attitude we but follow along the lines pointed out by Pope Leo when he wrote: "We hold that every word of wisdom, every useful thing by whomsoever discovered or planned, ought to be received with a willing and grateful mind. . . . If anything is taken up with too great subtlety by the Scholastic doctors, or too carelessly stated—if there be anything that ill agrees with the discoveries of a later age, or, in a word, improbable in whatever way, it does not enter Our mind to propose that for imitation to Our age." Certainly, no one can quarrel with such sound and prudent advice. This being so, it becomes a laborious task to explain the view of those who assert that the advance of science has rendered useless the Scholastic synthesis but has left unscathed other philosophies, practically all of which antedate the great scientific accomplishments of our own day.

Perhaps the best indication of the willingness of the New Scholasticism to accept the proved results of modern science is the scientific work which believers in this philosophy have done. In every field of investigation we have made substantial and important contributions to present-day knowledge. We have accepted, too, the results of other investigators and have attempted to interpret them in terms of our general philosophy of nature. Where these results have contradicted theory, we have not wavered in sacrificing theory to facts. That we have not bowed before the "idol of scientific method" nor gone over unreservedly to a mechanistic view of the universe will hardly be laid to our discredit. Present-day philosophy is not at all convinced of the wisdom of the wholehearted surrender which nineteenth century philosophy made to mechanistic science. In fact, it has again and again repudiated this surrender and is working its way in a direction almost the very contrary to that pointed out by the science of the last century as the safe road to pursue. Again, it is only a reactionary view of science which condemns a philosophy because it refuses to succumb to the mechanical view of nature.

The New Scholasticism is not mechanist, neither is it materialist. If to be scientific it is necessary to become one or both, then Scholasticism will never become "scientific." But

what philosopher will accept the pretensions to intellectual autocracy made so often by materialistic science? To do so, would be to confess our impotency before the problems of our own special field of knowledge. Philosophy cannot be expected to sign its death warrant even at the demand of modern science.

Few things are more necessary to-day than a clear delimitation of the respective fields of science and philosophy. Science has been slowly but surely encroaching on the realm of philosophy until it has actually usurped command of all the approaches to knowledge, and claims for itself nothing less than the divine right to rule as dictator over all the provinces of human thought. It was certain that a reaction would come against such unjustifiable and absurd claims. The only surprising thing is that it was so long in coming. We are now in the full tide of that reaction. The scientists have finally awakened to the fact that modern philosophy is prepared to throw off the old yoke of servitude.

A new note, that of intellectual self-sufficiency, has been struck by philosophy, a veritable declaration of independence from the rule of science has been announced to the whole world. Philosophy is ready now to write its own charter of rights and in terms which it can understand, accept, and live under. The opinion of thinkers like Dewey and Russell, who favor the experimental method as the sole adequate philosophical method, is fast yielding to the viewpoint which refuses to submerge philosophy in the all-encompassing sea of laboratory science. As Hoernlé has so well remarked, "a philosophical theory is rarely such that it can be proved or disproved by some action devised *ad hoc*." If philosophy could be proved in the laboratory, it would cease to be philosophy, and would become science. Reality is so wide and so deep that no experiment can ever hope to fathom all its intricacies or all its profundities. The relationships of things, too, are so manifold that it is hopeless to attempt to bring them all under the head of a single carefully prepared test. One may play with the idea that, say, Utilitarianism or Absolutism may some day yield up their secrets to an experimental search. But the absurdity of the whole thing will strike us when it is realized that there are philosophers who actually work on the assumption that a particular experiment can be devised to test out the truth or falsehood of an inclusive view of the universe, a view which of its very nature involves both intangibles and imponderables.

The New Scholasticism cannot accept either the extreme of Experimentalism or the extreme of Deductionism. Taken as an exclusive method of approach to the problems of philosophy, both views are inadequate and false. Each, however, has a great deal to contribute to an ultimately achievable synoptic view of the universe. Thus, philosophy must be "scientific" in the sense that it cannot but accept the proved results of science. These results are both a starting-point and the crucial test of the validity of its speculations. But philosophy, because of the innate limitations of pure science, must ever soar above the formulations which are presented to it by science. It must also return to these same formulations in order to check up the truth of its own thought constructions. In both ways, therefore, science aids and even controls philosophy, for first of all, it starts philosophy on the right road to truth, and then it calls her back to this road whenever, because of the hardihood of her speculations, she strays into the by-paths of error or falsehood, or, what is worse, into blind alleys which lead nowhere.

Deductionism, too, has a part to play in the building up of a sound attitude towards reality. The manifest exaggerations which have resulted from an exclusive use of deduction in philosophy should not close our eyes to the validity of the process itself. The human mind, given axioms and postulates, is quite capable of arriving at the truths contained in them. That philosophers have abused the deductive method and brought it into disrepute is an unfortunate fact, but not a deciding argument against the method. Deduction, which does not involve *à priori* assumptions and is willing to be controlled by direct observation and scientific experiment, can be of untold value to philosophical progress. It is some such combination of the experimental and deductive methods that the New Scholasticism champions. The thought must strike every one that this *via media* presents itself as both rational and useful. To combine analysis and synthesis into a working method is a sure way of conserving the best that science has to offer, while discarding the worst that uncontrolled speculation is likely to afflict us with.

The widespread acceptance of the Darwinian theory is regarded in many quarters as having given the death-blow to every philosophy which admits the existence of God and of the spiritual, or which takes a teleological view of nature. Evolution is supposed to have made untenable any theory about nature which is not rigorously deterministic on the one

hand, and essentially materialistic on the other. Evolutionism has been particularly devastating as far as Scholasticism is concerned, since it displaces man from his position as the central figure in the universe, regarding him merely as the end result of a progressive natural development which has taken millions of years to achieve. Copernicus, Kepler, and Galileo in physics and mathematics, and Darwin in biology, are supposed to have thrust all purposiveness out of the universe, including human purposiveness, and in its place to have erected "forces, motions, and laws, changes of mass in space and time, and the like" into guiding principles for modern mathematics and modern philosophy. In such a universe man plays a very minor rôle. Mind, conscience, and values are admittedly non-existent.

It is very much of a question, even granting the truth of the Darwinian theory of evolution (which, of course, we do not, as no one to-day does) whether such awful consequences for philosophy flow from an acceptance either of the evolutionary hypothesis or of the Copernican revolution. I am not at all concerned here with the evolutionary movement in its biological aspects. Whether it be true or false biologically is a question which only biologists can determine. Even if it is true, there are few aspects of it which cannot be harmonized with the Scholastic view both of life and of man. But evolutionism as philosophy is quite a different thing, and it is to evolutionism as philosophy that we object. This translation of a working theory from the realms of biology to the wider reaches of philosophy has been accompanied by assumptions which startle us because of their naïveté as well as by leaps in logic whose perilous, even disastrous, consequences ought to be and would be recognized by any thinker not prepossessed in favor of his own pet ideas. Now the truth of biological evolution gives one the right to postulate that *ab initio* everything was a primordial undifferentiated mass of atoms, or that thought and matter are at bottom one and the same, or that noumenal and phenomenal are but aspects of a common reality, or that human ethics is either a matter of conventions or the result of economic determinations, or that God is but the construction of our own fear impulses—all of this has as much to do with the results of biology as the fantastic elephant which supported the fantastic tortoise which supported the world of Indian mytho-philosophy has to do with modern physical science. And while we are on the question of

mythology, what a grandiose myth the evolutionary philosophy constructs to explain the origin of this world of ours! Is it any wonder that philosophers have begun to rebel against the irrational pretensions of a theoretical biology of this type? Philosophy has no serious quarrel with scientific biology. As a matter of fact, it is greatly indebted to biological investigations. It welcomes, too, into its camp speculations founded on sound biological data. But philosophy can scarcely remain true to its own better nature should it longer permit the biologists to run wild in the field of philosophy. To do so would be to allow the tail to wag the dog.

Philosophers to-day are in revolt against biology; perhaps it would be more exact to say, against biologists. They are in revolt, too, against many of the other tyrannies of the nineteenth century. So oppressive in fact was the over-lordship which science for a hundred years had been exercising, that it is a matter of constant wonder that philosophy did not rebel sooner. In particular it has rebelled, or rather it is rebelling, against many of the unacceptable assumptions of the biological philosophers. Professor Urban, in his presidential address to the American Philosophical Association in December, 1925, pointed this fact out as one of the most significant accomplishments of philosophy in the past twenty-five years. "The last twenty-five years," he said, "have marked the gradual drawing of the limits of the concept of universal evolution. I should say that we are at the end of the biological philosophies of the last quarter-century. The brute fact is that the panorama of evolution, that comprehensive plan of the sequence of natural events as it seems to unroll itself before our intellectual eyes, is far from being the obvious, intelligible thing that many simple minds take it to be. It seems to make our life and the cosmos in which that life is lived intelligible to ourselves, but it itself is far from intelligible.

"In his poem, 'The Passing Strange,' John Masefield expressed in unforgettable words how passing strange the whole thing is:

Out of the earth to rest and range
Perpetual in perpetual change,
The unknown passing through the strange.

"That is what a merely naturalistic evolution inevitably is—the unknown passing through the strange. Strange—eternally and radically strange—all the varied phenomena of change, un-

less they possess that intrinsic meaning which attaches itself solely to a will oriented toward purpose and value."

The New Scholasticism will never become acceptable if it comes to us merely as a defensive position designed to protect its adherents from the exaggerations of naturalistic philosophy. Modern thought asks of the diverse philosophies which are called before its judgment seat more than that they be strong defensive positions. It asks them, first of all, to present their credentials in the name of philosophy itself, and this Scholasticism is prepared to do. The New Scholasticism is not a protest. It is a positive doctrine and, as such, exhibits a set of principles which must be evaluated on their own merits as on their general availability for the purposes of modern science and life. We feel, too, that this philosophy has a peculiar contribution to make towards the advance of human knowledge. It is on the basis of such contributions also that both its timeliness and truth are to be judged.

The body-mind problem and the problem of knowledge are the chief questions which divide philosophers to-day. A moment's thought will cause us to realize why these questions have assumed such large proportions in present-day philosophical speculation, so as almost to exclude the consideration of all other problems. The solution, for example, given to the epistemological question colors one's psychology inasfar as it is explanatory and not merely descriptive, one's metaphysics, and one's ethics. On the other hand, to profess parallelism or behaviorism or some sort of materialistic monism involves the acceptance of a group of psychological and metaphysical assumptions which cannot be squared with the postulates of the Interaction theory. In both cases the solutions offered are of immense significance for philosophy by reason of the consequences involved, as by reason of the attitude towards reality and experience which each theory necessarily implies. That the Neo-Scholastic theory of knowledge and of the psycho-physical relation is daily gaining ground and becoming more and more the accepted viewpoint of both science and philosophy, is an indication of the constructive possibilities for thought contained in that position.

Let us first look at the Neo-Scholastic solution of the problem of knowledge. The New Scholasticism, as far as knowledge goes, is realistic. It accepts the reality of thought; it also accepts the reality of the object known by thought. Such a position in-

volves a dualistic reading of nature. It is by a process of mental correspondence that the real object is brought within the knowing range of the mind. Given such a correspondence, truth results from the relationship; in the absence of correspondence, we have doubt or error.

Dualistic Realism is fully aware of the immense difficulties which flow from an acceptance of its philosophy of the knowledge relation. There are many points in the theory, particularly in the field of sense perception, which require a fresh and minute examination. While its analysis of error is the most profound and consistent that has ever been presented, there remains a great deal to be done in clearing up the obscurities of conception and judgment, to say nothing of that as yet unexplored field of knowledge, intuition. The foundations of the theory, however, are sound. Every advance in epistemological science abundantly proves this contention. Moreover, the consequences of Realism for all branches of science and knowledge are so important and decisive that one cannot think of giving it up unless he is prepared at the same time to overthrow practically all the certainties upon which life and knowledge depend for their meaning and value.

As a knowledge theory the New Scholasticism is profoundly intellectualist. It therefore approaches more closely idealistic theories than the voluntarism of Pragmatism. Yet, it sympathizes deeply with pragmatic strictures on the "inhumanity" of the cold, narrow intellectualism which has always characterized idealists, both subjective and objective. What is more, the utility theory of truth can be accepted by us, but not in the sense in which Pragmatism propounds it. If a thing is useful, undoubtedly it is true; it is not utility however which makes truth, for utility presupposes truth already made. We acknowledge, too, the value of the coherence theory, but cannot come to regard it as the final test of truth. Over and above the simple fact that the Real Whole, with which individual truths must cohere in order to gain truth, is for human knowledge a pure metaphysical abstraction, or, if not, then it is an unattainable acquisition, coherence presupposes a more ultimate criterion by which we are to judge the truth or falsehood of a particular proposition presented to the mind before it is capable of being brought into relation with the whole of truth. If we are not mistaken, Realism can be presented as a higher synthesis of both Idealism and Pragmatism, for by a series of distinctions the

differences between Scholasticism and these theories can be resolved into a higher and more acceptable philosophy.

Again, the New Scholasticism endeavors to steer a safe course through the exaggerations of radical empiricism, mysticism, and intuitionism. Whatever place must be accorded experience, pure, mystical, or intuitive in life and knowledge, we are convinced that these experiences in no sense exhaust the possibilities of knowledge. They do not even touch the heart of real human knowledge, which is the product of intellect alone. Nor can we accept the substitution of the will-to-believe for the intellect-which-knows. The philosophy of the place of the will in knowledge must be presented in sound and defensible terms if we are not to enmesh ourselves in a host of difficulties which will obscure rather than clarify the question at issue. The distinction between intellect and will must be maintained at any cost. It is a distinction which we present to modern philosophy, and which we consider one of the greatest contributions that the New Scholasticism has to offer to the solution of the epistemological problem.

The realistic trend of modern epistemology is something more than a reaction against Idealism. Some historians have seen it only as a protest against the ineptitudes of Idealism. This appears a superficial view of a movement which arose out of convictions and not out of animosities. Both in its new and in its critical forms, Realism has gone on the offensive and has presented a constructive programme of metaphysical thinking which is not to be despised. However much we may deplore the monistic, and in some cases the materialistic tendencies of the New Realism, we are forced to acknowledge that philosophy, after three centuries of hopeless wandering in the bogs of speculative thought, has at last put its feet firmly on the ground. And if one's feet are on the ground, the chances of an advance movement are not to be despised.

The New Scholasticism feels itself in friendly company when it associates with modern Realism. So many of our fundamental positions are the same, as our starting-points are identical. We feel, too, that we possess a something in the shape of clarity and precision of thought which is of incalculable value to the realist cause. Moreover, the arguments upon which Dualistic Realism is founded are of such a character that they are easily adaptable to the New Realism, and could serve the useful purpose of convincing thinkers, in whom there still linger strong attach-

ments to Idealism, that there exists a convincing basis for the realist solution.

Towards a solution of the psycho-physical problem, the New Scholasticism offers a series of ideas of vast importance, not only for this particular question, but for psychology as well. Its specific contribution to the problem at hand is the Interaction Theory. Parallelism is admittedly inadequate, and involves difficulties which are well nigh insurmountable. There has followed upon the breakdown of philosophical mechanism a decided reaction against every phase of Psychical Monism. Professor McDougall, who has done so much to make Parallelism untenable, contends that the body-mind problem can only be solved in one way, that is, by some form or other of animism. Crude animism is, of course, out of the question. However, it is animism, but a philosophical and scientific one,—what we call the Mind-Substance Theory,—that the New Scholasticism presents to the consideration of philosophy. We are quite conscious of the fact that of all the ideas which we defend, the idea of substance, and in particular mind-substance will probably be the very last that modern thought will accept. Since the days of Hume, the functional viewpoint has held undisputed sway and has acquired the prestige of being regarded almost everywhere as axiomatic. The functional idea, however, must be blasted out of the modern treatment of mind problems. In its place we must substitute a dualistic and dynamic philosophy of act and potency, substance and accident. These categories are of as vital importance for metaphysical thinking to-day as they were in the days of Saint Thomas and Aristotle. That the conceptions current of these categories are scarcely better than cartoons is due perhaps as much to our lethargy as to the inadequate presentations which we have made of such necessary and far-reaching principles of thought.

The New Scholasticism also has its own contributions to make to the philosophy of nature. Space does not permit a detailed discussion of these offerings, attractive as the question undoubtedly is. To give only one example, we may say that it possesses a theory of the fundamental principles which all science, descriptive and explanatory, assumes to be true, but makes no effort to justify. In the explanatory field, especially, metaphysic is of supreme importance, since upon a sound analysis of the categories of causality, actuality, and potency, the truth or falsehood of the laws of science rest.

No aspect of philosophy has been so manhandled by modern writers as the ethical. The introduction of the historical method into the treatment of ethics by Herbert Spencer has very often served to obscure its real problems. By this I do not mean that the history of ethical ideas has nothing of value to say to ethics *qua* ethics. It has a great deal to say, but it should say it in an illustrative and confirmatory, and not in an argumentative manner. The historical method has carried along the false and harmful assumption that all ethics is in constant flux, that no sound principles of thought underlie its construction; in a word, that morals are mere conventions. The result of such confusion has been that philosophers continue to discuss the idea of Hobbes, Bentham, and Mill as if these systems had any present-day import. The fact is that Hedonism, either in its ancient form or in its modern dress—Utilitarianism, is an exploded theory. We have given up completely the sensationalism of Locke. How can we continue to hold on to Hedonism, which is nothing less than the Lockian materialism translated into ethical terms?

I do not think it too strong an assertion to contend that the New Scholasticism has more to offer philosophy in the field of ethics than in any other field. The theoretical basis of its formulations is essentially sound. The practical application of these principles to present-day conditions of industry, politics, social life, education, and religious belief is easy to make. A large and respected wing of Neo-Scholastic thought is hard at work in Europe and America making such applications, following the lead of Pope Leo XIII, who, probably more than any other man, succeeded in calling universal attention to the significance of these principles and their applicability especially to modern industrial conditions. All of which suggests the thought that it is through the gate of ethics that the New Scholasticism should enter in its onward movement towards a better understanding and appreciation on the part of modern philosophy.

JAMES H. RYAN in *Present Day Thinkers and the New Scholasticism*, pp. 342-368. Edited by John S. Zybura. Published by B. Herder Book Co. (St. Louis). Reprinted by permission.

SUGGESTIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. List each objection to the New Scholasticism, with which Ryan deals, and indicate briefly his answer to each.

2. State clearly the attitude of the New Scholasticism towards (i) the relation of science and philosophy and (ii) evolutionism. Criticize Ryan's arguments.
3. What is the attitude of the scholastics towards the problem of knowledge? Compare it with that of the critical realists, the pragmatists, and the idealists.
4. How does the New Scholasticism solve the body-mind problem? With what modern theory of the mind is their view most in conflict? Do you think they are right in rejecting this modern view?
5. After reading Ryan's exposition do you think that it is consistent with his statement at the beginning that the New Scholasticism is a new philosophy and not an old philosophy in a new dress? Justify your answer.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

BIOGRAPHICAL AND BIBLIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES

These sketches have been prepared, with the assistance of one of my students, Mrs. R. L. Duncan, from such material as was available in the Miami University Library. They contain only a few bare facts about the philosophers from whose writings selections have been drawn, together with a list of their chief publications.

Adams, George Plimpton, was born in 1882. Both his under-graduate and graduate study was done at Harvard, where he was granted the Ph.D. degree in 1912. All of his teaching has been at the University of California, where he is now professor of philosophy and chairman of the department. He has published one book: *Idealism and the Modern Age*, 1919, and a number of technical articles in various philosophical journals.

Alexander, Hartley Burr, was born in 1873 at Lincoln, Nebraska. He received the A.B. degree from the University of Nebraska in 1897. He was a fellow at the University of Pennsylvania for two years. He was granted a Ph.D. degree by Columbia University in 1901. Since 1908 he has been professor of philosophy at the University of Nebraska. He was a lecturer at the Sorbonne, Paris, in 1925. During 1927-28 he has been teaching in the new Scripps College for Women at Pomona, California. His rather long list of writings are varied and include, besides his philosophical works, studies of the American Indian, several volumes of poetry, studies of Latin America, two masques and several pageants, including three on Lincoln. His philosophical writings include: *The Problem of Metaphysics*, 1902; *The Mystery of Life*, 1913; *Nature and Human Nature*, 1923; *L'Art et la Philosophie des Indiens de l'Amerique du Nord*, 1926 (his Sorbonne lectures).

Alexander, Samuel, was born in 1859 at Sydney, New South Wales. He received his education at the University of Melbourne and at Oxford. From 1882-1893 he was a fellow at Lincoln College. In 1893 he began teaching philosophy in Owens College, Victoria University, but for many years he has been at the University of Manchester, England. From 1908 to 1911 he was president of the Aristotelian Society. His writings include: *Moral Order and Progress*, 1889; *Locke*, 1908; *Space, Time and Deity*, 2 Vols. (Gifford Lectures for 1916-1918), 2nd ed., 1928.

Ames, Edward Scribner, was born at Eau Claire, Wisconsin, in 1870. He received the A.B. degree from Drake University in 1889 and the A.M. in 1891. The Yale Divinity School granted him a B.D. degree in 1892. The next two years were spent in graduate study in philosophy at Yale. He was given a fellowship at the University of Chicago, and was granted a Ph.D. degree there in 1895.

Mr. Ames was professor of philosophy and pedagogy at Butler College from 1897 to 1900. Since that time he has been at the University of Chicago, rising to the rank of associate professor in 1918 and full professor in 1928. He is also pastor of the University Church of the Disciples of Christ. During 1912-14 he was university preacher at Harvard University. He is the author of the following books: *Psychology of Religious Experience*, 1910; *The Higher Individualism*, 1915; *The New Orthodoxy*, 1918 (revised edition with new material, 1925).

Bakewell, Charles Montague, was born in 1867 at Pittsburgh. In 1889 he received the A.B. degree from the University of California, in 1892 the A.M. degree from Harvard and the Ph.D. in 1894, also from Harvard. From 1894 to 1896 he studied in the Universities of Berlin, Strassburg and Paris. In 1905 Yale conferred an honorary A.M. degree upon him. From 1896 to 1897 Mr. Bakewell was instructor in philosophy at Harvard and the next year he held the same position at the University of California. The following year he was called to an associate professorship at Bryn Mawr. From 1900 to 1903 he was associate professor of philosophy at the University of California and professor there from 1903 to 1905. Since 1905 he has been a full professor at Yale. He was decorated by the Italian Government for his war services with the American Red Cross. During 1920-24 he was a member of the Connecticut Senate. His writings include: *Source Book in Ancient Philosophy*, *Story of the American Red Cross in Italy*, *The Education of the Wage Earners*, and *The Philosophy of Goethe's Faust*. He is also editor of the Everyman edition of *William James' Selected Papers on Philosophy*, and *Emerson's Poems*.

Bergson, Henri, was born in Paris in 1859. He was educated in the public schools. In 1881 he graduated from the Ecole Normale. After teaching biology for some years, he was appointed to the chair of philosophy in the College de France in 1900. In 1901 he was elected to the Institute and in 1904 to the Academy. He was Gifford lecturer at Edinburgh in 1912 and in 1913 he was a lecturer at Columbia, where the Litt.D. degree was conferred upon him. His writings are: *Quid Aristotles de Loco Senserit*, 1889; *Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience*, 1889 (English translation under title, *Time and Free Will*, 1910); *Matière and Mémoire, essai sur la relation du corps avec l'esprit* (English translation in 1911); *Le Rire*, 1900 (English translation, 1911); *L'Évolution créatrice*, 1907 (English translation, 1911); *La Perception du changement*, 1911 (Oxford); *Introduction to Metaphysics*, 1912, and *L'énergie spirituelle*, 1919. Cf. J. Chevalier: *Henri Bergson*, 1928.

Bode, Boyd Henry, was born in 1873 at Ridott, Illinois. In 1897 he received the A.B. degree from the University of Michigan and in 1900 the Ph.D. from Cornell. He taught at the University of Wisconsin during 1900-09, rising from the position of assistant in philosophy to an assistant professorship. In 1909 he went to the University of Illinois where he was a full professor of philosophy until 1921. Since 1921 Mr. Bode has been a professor of education at Ohio State University. He has written *An Outline of Logic*, 1910; *Fundamentals of Education*, 1921; and he was a

joint author of *Creative Intelligence*, 1917; and *Modern Educational Theories*, 1927.

Bosanquet, Bernard, was born at Rock Hall, Alnwich, England, in 1848. He was educated at Oxford. From 1871 to 1881 he lectured at University College, Oxford. From 1903 to 1908 he was the professor of moral philosophy at St. Andrews University. He was the recipient of many honors. For many years he directed the work of the Charity Organization Society in London. He died in 1923. The following is a complete list of his works: *Schomann: Athenian Constitutional History*, Translated, 1878; *Translation of Lotze* (edited and part translated), 1884; *Knowledge and Reality*, 1885; *Hegel's Philosophy of Fine Art*, 1886; *Logic*, 1888; *Essays and Addresses*, 1889; *History of Æsthetic*, 1892; *Civilization of Christendom*, 1893; *Companion to Plato's Republic*, 1895; *Aspects of the Social Problem*, 1895; *Essentials of Logic*, 1895; *Psychology of the Moral Self*, 1897; *Philosophical Theory of the State*, 1899; *Education of the Young in Plato*, 1900; *Principle of Individuality and Value*, 1912; *Value and Destiny of the Individual*, 1913; *Distinction between Mind and its Objects*, 1913; *Three Lectures on Æsthetic*, 1915; *Social and International Ideals*, 1917; *Some Suggestions in Ethics*, 1918; *Zoar*, 1919; *Implication and Linear Inference*, 1920; *What Religion Is*, 1920; *Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy*, 1920; *Three Chapters on the Nature of Mind*, 1923. A memoir on Dr. Bosanquet has recently appeared, written by Mrs. Bosanquet.

Bradley, Francis Herbert, was born in 1846 in Glasbury, England. He was educated at Oxford where he was elected a Fellow of Merton College. He lived at Merton College the rest of his life. He died in 1926. His chief publications are: *The Principles of Critical History*, 1874; *Ethical Studies*, 1876, reissued with new material, 1928; *The Principles of Logic*, 1883 (new edition with supplementary essays in 1925); *Appearance and Reality*, 1893; and *Essays on Truth and Reality*, 1914.

Brightman, Edgar Sheffield, was born at Holbrook, Mass., in 1884. He received the A.B. degree from Brown University in 1906 and the A.M. in 1908. He continued his studies at Boston University where he received the S.T.B. degree in 1910 and the Ph.D. in 1912. He studied at Marburg and Berlin, Germany, in 1910-11. He taught philosophy for three years at Nebraska Wesleyan University (1912-1915), and for four years at Wesleyan University, Conn. (1915-1917). Since 1919 he has been professor of philosophy at Boston University. He has published the following books: *Religious Values and Recent Philosophy*, 1921; *An Introduction to Philosophy*, 1925; *Immortality in Post-Kantian Idealism*, 1925 (Ingersoll lecture at Harvard); *Religious Values*, 1925; *A Philosophy of Ideals*, 1928. Professor Brightman was the editor of the *Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy*, 1927.

Broad, Charlie Dunbar, was born in London in 1887. He was educated at Dulwich and Trinity Colleges, Cambridge, receiving there the M.A. degree and later the Litt.D. He is a Fellow of the British Academy. Mr. Broad was a Major Scholar in Natural Science, the

Burney Prizeman, and a Fellow at Trinity. He was assistant to the professor of logic at the University of Saint Andrews. After this he became lecturer on logic at University College, Dundee. From here he went to the University of Bristol as professor of philosophy. In 1923-24 he was the Turner lecturer in the Philosophy of Science at this institution. At present he is a lecturer in Moral Science, Trinity College, Cambridge. His works include: *Perception, Physics and Reality*, 1914; *Scientific Thought*, 1923; *Mind and its Place in Nature*, 1925; *The Philosophy of Francis Bacon*, 1926.

Brown, Harold Chapman, was educated at Williams College and at Harvard University. He received an A.B. degree from Williams in 1901, an A.M. from Harvard in 1903 and a Ph.D. from Harvard in 1905. He studied at the University of Berlin in 1903-4. He taught for two years at Harvard. He was at Columbia from 1906 to 1914, and he has been at Stanford University since 1914, now having the rank of associate professor of philosophy. He has contributed important essays to Dewey's: *Studies in Logical Theory*; to *Essays in Honor of William James*; and to *Creative Intelligence*.

Calkins, Mary Whiton, was born at Hartford, Connecticut, in 1863. Smith College granted her an A.B. degree in 1885 and an A.M. in 1887. During 1890-91 she studied at Clark University and from 1893 to 1895 at Harvard (Radeliffe). Columbia conferred the Litt.D. upon her in 1909 and Smith the LL.D. in 1910. She has been at Wellesley since 1891, first as an instructor, but now as professor of philosophy and psychology. Her books include: *Introduction to Psychology*, 1901, 1905; *Der Doppelte Standpunkt in der Psychologie*, 1905; *The Persistent Problems of Philosophy*, 1907, '08, '17, '25; *A First Book in Psychology*, 1910, '14; *The Good Man and the Good*, 1918. She is also the author of monographs and papers on psychological and philosophical subjects.

Carr, Herbert Wildon, was born in 1857. He was educated privately and later at King's College, London. In 1878 he became an Associate of King's College. The University of Durham conferred an honorary Litt.D. upon him in 1912. In 1914 he was made an honorary Fellow at King's College, the University of London. In 1924 he became a Fellow of the Royal Society of Literature. The University of Southern California granted him an honorary LL.D. in 1926. In 1925 he was a visiting professor at Southern California. Since 1918 he has been a professor of philosophy at the University of London, King's College. He is also editor of the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*. His works include: *The Scientific Approach to Philosophy*, 1924; *A Theory of Monads*, 1922; *Gentile's Theory of Mind as Pure Act* (translation), 1921; *The Principles of Relativity*, 1920; *Bergson's Mind-Energy* (translation), 1920; *The Philosophy of Benedetto Croce*, 1918; *The Philosophy of Change*, 1914; *Henri Bergson* (The People's Books), 1911; *The Problem of Truth* (The People's Books), 1912. In 1927 he published *Changing Backgrounds in Religion and Ethics, a Metaphysical Meditation*, and in 1928 *The Unique Status of Man*.

Cohen, Morris Raphael, was born in Minsk, Russia, in 1880, and emigrated to this country with his parents in 1892. He received a B.S. degree from the College of the City of New York in 1900 and a Ph.D. from Harvard University in 1906. He is now professor of philosophy in his alma mater, where he has taught since 1906. He is especially interested in legal and social philosophy, having organized the Conference on Legal and Social Philosophy in 1913, and being editor of the *Modern Legal Philosophy* series. He has contributed numerous articles to various philosophical journals, and he is a frequent contributor to the *New Republic*. He edited C. S. Peirce's *Chance, Love and Logic*.

Creighton, James Edwin, was born at Pictou, Nova Scotia, in 1861. He received his A.B. from Dalhousie College, Halifax. After this he studied at the Universities of Leipzig and Berlin. Cornell conferred the Ph.D. upon him in 1892. Queen's University in 1903 and Dalhousie in 1914 honored him with the LL.D. degree. In 1889 he went to Cornell as an instructor. In 1892 he became associate professor, and in 1895 professor of logic and metaphysics. From 1914 to 1925 he was Dean of the Graduate School at Cornell. For many years he was the American editor of *Kant Studien*, and the editor of the *Philosophical Review*. He was one of the founders of the American Philosophical Association. He died in 1925. He wrote a widely used text: *An Introductory Logic*, 1898, 1909. He translated Wundt's *Human and Animal Psychology* (with E. B. Titchener), 1894 and Paulsen's *Kant—His Life and Philosophy* (with Albert Lefevre), 1902. His *Studies in Speculative Philosophy*, edited by Harold Smart, appeared after his death.

Croce, Benedetto, was born at Pescasseroli, Italy, in 1866. He soon made Naples his residence. In 1909 an honorary senatorship of the kingdom was conferred upon him. The University of Freiburg bestowed an honorary doctorate upon him. As a philosopher and critic Croce stimulated a great revival of philosophical studies in Italy. He has written much and on several subjects. He collaborated with G. Gentile on the Bari series of *Classici della filosofia moderna* (24 volumes). His other works include: *Filosofia della spirito* (3 volumes); *Estetica* (new edition in 1918) *Logica* and *Etica* in 1909. There are English translations of *Æsthetik*, 1909; and *Ethics*, 1913. His autobiography was published in Italian in 1918 and in an English edition in 1927.

Dewey, John, was born in 1859 at Burlington, Vermont. He received the A.B. degree from the University of Vermont in 1879 and the Ph.D. from Johns Hopkins in 1884. The LL.D. was conferred upon him by the University of Wisconsin in 1914, by the University of Vermont in 1910, and by the Peking National University in 1920. He was an instructor and assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Michigan from 1884 to 1888, and became full professor there in 1888. From this institution he went to the University of Chicago where he was a full professor and head of the department of philosophy from 1894 to 1904 and director of the School of Education from 1902 to 1904. Since 1904 he has been a professor of philosophy at Columbia University. His rather long list of writings include: *Psychology*, 1886; *Leibnitz*,

1888; *Critical Theory of Ethics*, 1894; *Study of Ethics*, 1894; *Psychology of Number*, 1894; *School and Society*, 1899; *Studies in Logical Theory*, 1903; *Ethics* (with James H. Tufts), 1908; *How We Think*, 1909; *Influence of Darwin on Philosophy, and Other Essays*, 1910; *German Philosophy and Politics*, 1915; *Democracy and Education*, 1916; *Essays in Experimental Logic*, 1917; *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, 1920; *Human Nature and Conduct*, 1922; *Experience and Nature*, 1925; and *The Public and its Problems*, 1927. See also J. Ratner: *The Philosophy of John Dewey*, 1928.

Driesch, Hans, was born at Kreuznaek, Rhenish Prussia, in 1867. He was educated at the Universities of Freiburg, Munich and Jena. In 1889 and also in 1893 he traveled in Ceylon, Burma, India and Java. From 1891 to 1900 he was at Naples at the Stazione Zoologica. In 1900 he went to Heidelberg as a privat docent. He remained there until 1909 and returned again in 1911 as a professor extraordinary of philosophy. In 1907-08 he was the Gifford lecturer at Aberdeen. In 1910 this institution conferred the LL.D. degree upon him. He has written much in German on biology. He has also devoted himself to natural philosophy and logic. He was visiting professor of philosophy at the University of Wisconsin from 1926 to 1927. His late books include: *The Science and Philosophy of the Organism*, 1908-09 (Gifford Lectures); *Ordnungslehre*, 1912; *Logik als Aufgabe*, 1913; *The Problem of Individuality*, 1914. During 1927 he published *Mind and Body* (in English).

Durant, William James, was born at North Adams, Massachusetts, in 1885. He studied at St. Peter's College, New Jersey, and at Columbia. He holds the A.B., A.M., and Ph.D. degrees. He is a popular speaker and writer. His books are: *Philosophy and the Social Problem*, 1917; *The Story of Philosophy*, 1926; and *Transition, a Sentimental Story of One Mind and One Era*, 1927. He contributes to *Harper's*, *American Magazine*, *Cosmopolitan*, *Pictorial Review*, *Century*, and *Forum*. His office is in the Labor Temple in New York City.

Hart, Joseph Kinmont, was born at Columbia City, Indiana, in 1876. He received the A.B. degree from Franklin College in 1900 and the Ph.D. from the University of Chicago in 1909. He has taught philosophy, and education at Baker University, University of Washington, Reed College, and at present he is professor of education at the University of Wisconsin. He served in the Spanish American War as a private and corporal. He was one of the editors of the *Survey* for a time. His publications include: *A Critical Study of Current Theories of Moral Education*, 1910; *Democracy in Education*, 1918; *Community Organization*, 1920; *The Discovery of Intelligence*, 1924; *Social Life and Institutions*, 1924; *Adult Education*, 1927; and *Inside Experience*, 1927.

Hicks, George Dawes, was born at Shrewsbury (England) in 1862. He attended the Grammar School, Guildford. The B.A. degree was granted him by Owens College, Manchester, in 1888, with first-class honors in philosophy. The M.A. was granted in 1891

and the Litt.D. was conferred upon him in 1904. In 1896 he received his Ph.D. from the University of Leipzig. From 1891 to 1896 he was a Hibbert Scholar. By research he received his B.A. from Cambridge in 1909 and his M.A. in 1912. From 1897 to 1903 he was the minister of the Unity Church, Islington. During 1897-98 he was a lecturer for the London School of Ethics and Sociology. At present he is a professor of philosophy at University College, London, which position he has held since 1904. He has written: *Die Begriffe Phanomenon und Noumenon in ihrem Verhältniss zu einander bei Kant*, 1897; *English Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century* in Ueberweg-Heinze's *Geschichte der Philosophie*, 1897; *Memoir of James Drummond in J. D.'s Pauline Meditations*, 1919; *Ways Towards the Spiritual Life*, 1928.

Hocking, William Ernest, was born in 1873 at Cleveland, Ohio. Harvard granted him an A.B. degree in 1901, an A.M. in 1902 and a Ph.D. in 1904. Williams College conferred the L.H.D. on him in 1923. In 1902-03 he was the Harvard Fellow at the Universities of Göttingen, Berlin and Heidelberg. He was instructor in the history and philosophy of religion at Andover Theological Seminary from 1904 to 1906. The next year he was instructor in philosophy at the University of California, where the following year he became an assistant professor. In 1908 he went to Yale as assistant professor of philosophy, and became professor there in 1913. Since 1914 he has been professor of philosophy at Harvard, becoming Alford Professor in 1920. In 1918 he was Mills Professor at the University of California and in 1913 he was lecturer in philosophy at Princeton. He has written: *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*, 1912; *Human Nature and Its Remaking*, 1918, 2nd. ed., 1923; *Morale and Its Enemies*, 1918; *Man and the State*, 1927; *The Self, Its Body and Its Freedom*, 1928.

Hoernlé, Reinhold Frederick Alfred, received his education at the Gymnasium Ernestinum, Gotha, and at Balliol College, Oxford. In 1903 he was the John Locke Scholar. He was the Senior Demy of Magdalen College in 1904. From 1905 to 1907 he was an assistant to the professor of Moral Philosophy at St. Andrews, New Brunswick. He was also a lecturer there. From 1908 to 1911 he was the professor of philosophy at the South African College, Cape Town, Cape Province, Union of South Africa. The next two years were spent as professor of philosophy at Armstrong College (Newcastle-on-Tyne), in the University of Durham (1912-1914). He then became assistant professor of philosophy at Harvard. In 1920 he returned to Armstrong College. At present he is professor of philosophy at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa. He has written *Studies in Contemporary Metaphysics*, 1920; *Matter, Life, Mind, and God*, 1923; and *Idealism*, 1927.

Holt, Edwin Bissell, was born in 1873 at Winchester, Massachusetts. Harvard conferred the A.B. degree on him in 1896 and the Ph.D. in 1901. He received his A.M. from Columbia in 1900. During 1901-05 he was instructor in psychology at Harvard and during 1905-18 an assistant professor there. He has written: *The*

Concept of Consciousness, 1914; and *The Freudian Wish*, 1915. He was a contributor to the volume: *The New Realism*. He is now living at Glenmore, Knox County, Maine.

James, William, was born in New York City in 1842 and died in 1910. He was educated in private schools and by tutors in New York City and Europe. He studied at the Lawrence Scientific School and graduated from the Harvard Medical School in 1870. The LL.D. degree was conferred upon him by Princeton, Edinburgh, and Harvard. Padua conferred the Ph.D. and Litt.D. degrees upon him. In 1872 he started to teach at Harvard, where he became a professor in 1881. First he taught anatomy and physiology and later philosophy and psychology and then later only philosophy. In 1898 he was the Ingersoll lecturer on the Immortality of Man at Harvard. The next two years were spent at the University of Edinburgh as the Gifford lecturer on natural religion. In 1906 he was a lecturer at Lowell Institute. In 1909 he was the Hibbert lecturer on the Present Situation in Philosophy at the Manchester College, Oxford. In 1908 his colleagues at Columbia University published in his honor *Essays Philosophical and Psychological*. James wrote: *Principles of Psychology*, 1890; *Psychology, Briefer Course*, 1892; *The Will to Believe, and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy*, 1897; *Human Immortality: Two Supposed Objections to the Doctrine*, 1898; *Talks to Teachers on Psychology*, 1899; *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, 1902 (Gifford Lectures); *Pragmatism*, 1907; *A Pluralistic Universe*, 1909; *The Meaning of Truth*, 1909; *Memories and Studies*, 1911; *Some Problems of Philosophy*, 1911; *Essays in Radical Empiricism*, 1912. He also edited the literary remains of Henry James. The last-named volume was edited by Ralph Barton Perry, who has also published an *Annotated Bibliography of the Writings of William James*. See also the two volumes of the *Letters of William James*. Selections from James are in Everyman's Library.

Laird, John, was born in 1887 at Kincardineshire. He attended the Aberdeen Grammar School. Edinburgh University conferred the M.A. degree (with first class honors in philosophy) upon him in 1908. Here he was the Shaw Fellow. Later he studied at Heidelberg and at Trinity College, Cambridge University where he was a scholar. Trinity granted him a B.A. degree in 1911 and an M.A. in 1920. In 1911 he assisted at St. Andrews. The next year he became professor of philosophy in Dalhousie University, Halifax. From 1915 to 1924 he was professor of logic and metaphysics at Queen's University, Belfast. Since 1924 he has been the Regius Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Aberdeen. During 1923-24 he was the Mills Lecturer at the University of California. He has written: *Problems of the Self*, 1917; *A Study in Realism*, 1920; *The Ideal of the Soul*, 1924; *Our Minds and Their Bodies*, 1925; *A Study in Moral Theory*, 1926.

Leighton, Joseph Alexander, was born in Orangeville, Ontario, Canada, in 1870. He received the A.B. degree from Trinity College, Toronto, in 1891, and the Ph.D. from Cornell in 1894. In 1896 he received the S.T.B. degree from the Episcopal Theological Seminary, Cambridge, Massachusetts. During the year of

1896-97 he was at the universities of Tübingen, Berlin and Erlangen. Hobart College conferred a LL.D. degree upon him in 1913. From 1910 he has been professor of philosophy at Ohio State University. Before that, from 1897 to 1910, he was professor of philosophy and chaplain at Hobart College. During the years of 1900, 1902, 1905, 1907 he was University Preacher at Cornell. He was at Stanford University in 1925 as acting professor of philosophy. He is the author of the following books: *Typical Modern Conceptions of God*, 1902; *What Is Personality?*, 1903; *Jesus Christ and the Civilization of Today*; *The Field of Philosophy*, 1918 (third edition, 1923); *Educational Problems in Colleges and Universities* (in collaboration), 1921; *Man and the Cosmos*, 1922; *Religion and the Mind of Today*, 1924; *The Individual and the Community*, 1926.

Lovejoy, Arthur Onsken, was born at Berlin in 1873. He received the A.B. degree from the University of California in 1895 and the A.M. from Harvard in 1897. During the year 1898-1899 he studied at the University of Paris. In 1924 the University of California granted him the LL.D. degree. From 1899 to 1901 Mr. Lovejoy was assistant and associate professor of philosophy at Leland Stanford Jr., University. From 1901 to 1908 he was on the faculty at Washington University, going from there to the position of professor of philosophy at the University of Missouri for the years 1908-1910. Since 1910 he has been at Johns Hopkins as professor of philosophy. During 1907-08 he was a lecturer at Columbia. He was one of the authors of *Critical Realism*, 1920. He was Paul Carus lecturer in 1927 and the lectures delivered on this foundation are in press.

MacKenzie, John Stuart, was born in 1860 near Glasgow. He was educated at Glasgow, Cambridge, and Berlin. From 1884-89 he was a Fellow at Edinburgh. From 1890 to 1896 he was again a Fellow, this time at Trinity College, Canada. During the period from 1890 to 1893 he lectured on political economy at Owens College, Manchester. In 1895 he became the professor of logic and philosophy at University College, Cardiff, and he is now professor emeritus. His written works include: *An Introduction to Social Philosophy: The Shaw Fellowship Lecturers at Glasgow* (1890; 2nd edition in 1895); *A Manual of Ethics*, 1893 (7th edition); *Outlines of Metaphysics*, 1902; *Lectures on Humanism*, 1907; *Elements of Constructive Philosophy*, 1917; *Outlines of Social Philosophy*, 1918; *Arrows of Desire*, 1920; *Ultimate Values*, 1924; and *Fundamental Problems of Life*, 1928.

McGilvary, Evander Bradley, was born in Bangkok, Siam, in 1864. In 1884 he received his A.B. degree from Davidson College, North Carolina. Princeton granted him an A.M. degree in 1888. During 1889-1890 he was a Fellow at Princeton Theological Seminary. The University of California granted him a Ph.D. degree in 1897. From 1891-94 he was in Siam having been sent by the Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions. From 1894-99 he was a graduate instructor and assistant professor at the University of California. From 1899 to 1905 Mr. McGilvary was the Sage Professor of Ethics at Cornell. Since 1905 he has been professor and chairman of the department of philosophy at the University of Wisconsin.

He translated Matthew, Luke, John, and Acts of the Apostles into Lao dialect, Siamese, in 1892-94.

Mead, George Herbert, was born at South Hadley, Massachusetts, in 1863. In 1883 he received his A.B. from Oberlin. After studying under tutors from 1883-87 he received the A.B. degree from Harvard in 1888. From 1888-1891 he studied at the Universities of Leipzig and Berlin. From 1891-94 he was instructor and assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Michigan. From there he went to the University of Chicago as assistant professor. He became an associate professor in 1902 and a full professor in 1907. He has contributed important papers on philosophy to various periodicals, and he wrote one of the essays in *Creative Intelligence*.

Montague, William Pepperell, was born in 1873 at Chelsea, Massachusetts. Harvard conferred the A.B. degree upon him in 1896, the A.M. in 1897 and the Ph.D. in 1898. Mr. Montague has taught philosophy at Radcliffe College 1899, at the University of California from 1899 to 1903, and at Columbia since 1903, where he was made a full professor in 1920. During 1922 he was the visiting professor of philosophy at Johns Hopkins University. He has written *The New Realism* (with others), 1912; *The Ways of Knowing or the Methods of Philosophy*, 1925.

Moore, Addison Webster, was born in 1866 at Plainfield, Indiana. In 1890 he received the A.B. degree from De Pauw University, and in 1893 the A.M. In 1893-94 he studied at Cornell. The University of Chicago granted him a Ph.D. degree in 1898. He remained there becoming a professor of philosophy in 1909. His books are: *Functional versus Representational Theories of Knowledge in Locke's Essay*, 1902; *Existence, Meaning, and Reality in Locke's Essay and in Present Epistemology*, 1903; *Pragmatism and Its Critics*, 1910.

Moore, George Edward, was born in 1873. He was a fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, from 1898-1904. Cambridge conferred the Litt.D. upon him and St. Andrews the Honorary LL.D. He is a Fellow of the British Academy. His undergraduate work was done at Dulwich College and at Trinity. From 1911 to 1925 he was the University lecturer in moral science at Cambridge. At present he is the professor of mental philosophy and logic at Cambridge and the editor of *Mind*. His books are *Principia Ethica*, 1903; *Ethics* (Home University Library), 1912; *Philosophical Studies*, 1922.

Morgan, C. Lloyd, was born in 1852 and educated in an English Grammar School and at the Royal School of Mines. He taught for five years in the Diocesan College, near Cape Town, South Africa. He then became a lecturer and later a professor at the University of Bristol in England. He is now professor emeritus. His chief works are: *Animal Life and Intelligence*, 1890; *Introduction to Comparative Psychology*, 1894; *Habit and Instinct*, 1896; *Interpretation of Nature*, 1905; *Animal Behavior*, 1908; *Instinct and Experience*, 1912; *Emergent Evolution*, 1923 (Gifford Lectures).

Muirhead, John Henry, was born near Glasgow in 1855. He studied

at Glasgow Academy and University and also at Balliol College, Oxford. He assisted the professor of Latin at Glasgow University. Later he lectured on philosophy at Bedford College, London. In 1900 he became a professor of philosophy at the University of Birmingham and he is now emeritus professor. He has recently been Mills Professor at the University of California. He has written the following books: *The Elements of Ethics*, 1892 (3rd edition in 1910); *Philosophy and Life*, 1902; *The Service of the State*, 1908; *Four Essays on T. H. Green's Political Teaching*; *The Starting Point of Poor Law Reform*, 1910; *German Philosophy in Relation to the War*, 1915; *Social Purpose* (with Hetherington) 1918; *Life and Philosophy of Edward Caird* (with Sir Henry Jones), 1921. He translated into English, Zeller's *Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics*, 1897. He has contributed to *Mind* and other journals. He is the editor of a series called *The Library of Philosophy*; and of the first and second series of *Contemporary British Philosophy*.

Murray, D. L., studied at Oxford under Dr. Schiller. His *Pragmatism* appeared in 1912, with a preface by Dr. Schiller.

Otto, Max Carl, was born in Saxony, Germany, in 1876. He was brought to the United States at the age of five. The University of Wisconsin granted him an A.B. degree in 1906, an M.A. in 1908, and a Ph.D. in 1911. After this he studied at the Universities of Chicago and Heidelberg, Germany. Since 1910 he has been a member of the faculty at the University of Wisconsin, where he has been professor of philosophy since 1921. He was on the editorial board of the *American Review*. He has written: *Things and Ideals*, 1924; *Natural Laws and Human Hopes*, 1926. He contributes to philosophical and other journals.

Overstreet, Harry Allen, was born in 1875 at San Francisco. In 1899 he received the A.B. degree from the University of California. In 1901 Oxford University (Balliol College), England, conferred the B.Sc. upon him. From 1901 to 1911 he was instructor, assistant professor and associate professor of philosophy at the University of California. Since 1911 he has been a full professor and head of the department of philosophy at the College of the City of New York. He has written: *Influencing Human Behavior*; *About Ourselves*, 1927; and a number of monographs and technical papers. Since 1924 he has been a lecturer at the New School for Social Research.

Perry, Ralph Barton, was born in 1876 at Poultney, Vermont. In 1896 he received the A.B. degree from Princeton, in 1897 the A.M. from Harvard and in 1899 the Ph.D. from the same institution. He has been instructor in philosophy at Williams College, Smith College, and Harvard University. Since 1913 he has been professor of philosophy at Harvard. Mr. Perry was a Major in the army during the World War. In 1922 he was the Hyde Lecturer in the French Universities. He is the author of several books including: *The Approach to Philosophy*, 1905; *The Moral Economy*, 1909; *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, 1912; one essay in *The New Realism*, 1912; *The Present Conflict of Ideals*, 1918; *Annotated Bibliography of the Writings of William James*, 1920; *The Plattsburg*

Movement, 1921. He is the editor of *William James's Radical Empiricism*, 1912; *William James's Collected Essays and Reviews*, 1920; and *Revision of Weber's History of Philosophy*, 1925; *The Philosophy of the Recent Past*, 1927; *General Theory of Value*, 1927. He was one of the editors of the Collier edition of *The Harvard Classics*.

Pratt, James Bissett, was born in 1875 at Elmira, N. Y. He received the A.B. degree from Williams College in 1898, and the A.M. degree from Harvard University in 1899. He then taught Latin in preparatory schools and studied abroad, chiefly in Germany. Returning to Harvard University for further study, he received the Ph.D. degree in 1905. Since 1905 he has taught philosophy at Williams College, becoming professor in 1913. In 1913-14 he studied the native religions of the far east. He has written *The Psychology of Religious Belief*, 1907; *What Is Pragmatism?*, 1909; *India and Its Faiths*, 1915; *Democracy and Peace*, 1916; *The Religious Consciousness*, 1920; *Matter and Spirit* (Taylor Lectures), 1922; and *The Pilgrimage of Buddhism*, 1928. He contributed an important essay to *Essays in Critical Realism*, 1920.

Radhakrishnan, S., was born in 1888. He was educated at Madras Christian College. He holds the M.A. degree. From 1911-16 he was an assistant professor of philosophy at Presidency College, Madras. The next year he became a full professor at this college. From 1918-21 he was University professor of philosophy at Mysore. During 1927 he was the Upton lecturer at Manchester College, Oxford, and the Haskell lecturer in Comparative Religion at the University of Chicago. Since 1921 he has been the George V professor of philosophy at Calcutta University. His books are: *The Philosophy of Rabindranath Tagore*, 1918; *The Reign of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy*, 1920; *Indian Philosophy of the Upanishads*, 1924; *The Hindu View of Life*, 1927; *Indian Philosophy in the Library of Philosophy*, volume I in 1923, and volume II in 1927.

Rogers, Arthur Kenyon, was born in 1868 at Dunellen, New Jersey. He received the A.B. degree from Colby in 1891 and in 1916 the Litt.D. from the same institution. He studied at Johns Hopkins, and at the Hartford School of Sociology. In 1898 he received the Ph.D. degree from Chicago. In 1893-94 he was an instructor in the Chicago Academy. The following year he was assistant superintendent of the Charity Organization Society at Hartford, Connecticut. During 1899-1900 he was instructor in philosophy and pedagogy at Alfred University. From 1900 to 1910 he held the position of professor of philosophy and education at Butler College. During the following four years he was professor of philosophy at the University of Missouri. From 1914 to 1920 he was professor of philosophy at Yale. His writings include: *Life and Teachings of Jesus*, 1894; *A Brief Introduction to Modern Philosophy*, 1899; *A Students History of Philosophy*, 1901; *The Religious Conception of the World*, 1909; *Essay in Critical Realism* (in collaboration), 1920; *English and American Philosophy Since 1800*, 1922; *Theory of Ethics*, 1922; *What Is Truth?*, 1923; *Morals in Review*, 1927. He lives in New Haven, Connecticut.

Royce, Josiah, was born in 1855 in Grass Valley, Nevada Co., California. In 1875 he received an A.B. degree from the University of California. Later he studied at Leipzig, Göttingen and Johns Hopkins, where he received the Ph.D. degree in 1878. In 1878 he was instructor in English at the University of California. From there he went to Harvard where he rose from an instructor in philosophy in 1882 to a full professor in 1892. He was given honorary degrees by Johns Hopkins, Yale, Harvard, Aberdeen, St. Andrews, and Oxford. He died in 1917. His writings include: *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, 1885; *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, 1892; *The Conception of God*, 1897; *Studies of Good and Evil* (jointly), 1898; *The Conception of Immortality*, 1900; *The World and the Individual* (2 volumes), 1900-01; (Gifford lectures at Aberdeen). *Psychology*, 1903; *Herbert Spencer*, 1904; *Philosophy of Loyalty*, 1908; *Race Question, Provincialism, and Other American Problems*, 1908; *William James and Other Essays on the Philosophy of Life*, 1911; *Sources of Religious Insight*, 1912; *Problem of Christianity*, 1913 (2 volumes); *War and Insurance*, 1914. *Fugitive Essays and Lectures on Modern Idealism* have appeared since Royce died, edited by J. Lowenberg. His articles in the *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics* and in Ruge's *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, Vol. I, are especially valuable.

Russell, Bertrand, was born at Trelleck, Monmouth, England, in 1872. He was educated at Trinity College, Cambridge. Here he later became a fellow and lecturer. In 1915 he visited the United States and lectured in behalf of Peace. He has made other visits to the United States for lectures. He was in China for two years after the World War. He received in 1915 the Butler gold medal of Columbia University, awarded once in five years for distinguished contributions to philosophy or education. He has written the following: *German Social Democracy*, 1896; *Essay on the Foundations of Geometry*, 1897; *Philosophy of Leibniz*, 1900; *Principles of Mathematics*, 1903; *Philosophical Essays*, 1910; *Principia Mathematica*, 1910 (with A. N. Whitehead); *Problems of Philosophy*, 1911; *The Philosophy of Bergson*, 1914 (with H. W. Carr); *Scientific Method in Philosophy*, 1915 (Lowell Institute lectures at Boston); *Political Ideals*, 1917; *Bolshevism*, 1920; *Mathematical Philosophy*, 1920; *Analysis of Mind*, 1921; *Free Thought and Official Propaganda*, 1922; *The A B C of Atoms*, 1923; *Icarus*, 1924; *What I Believe*, 1925; *The A B C of Relativity*, 1925; *Education and the Good Life*, 1926; *Why I Am Not a Christian*, 1927; *Analysis of Matter*, 1927; *Philosophy*, 1928; *Essays*, 1928; *Mysticism and Logic* is a collection of his essays containing the famous essay entitled "A Free Man's Worship."

Ryan, John Augustine, was born in 1869 in Minnesota. He was educated at St. Paul's Seminary, St. Paul, Minnesota, and at the Catholic University, Washington, D.C. He holds the degrees of D.D. and LL.D. Since 1915 he has been professor of moral theology and industrial ethics at Catholic University. He is director of this department at Catholic University. He wrote an *Introduction to Philosophy* and is one of the leaders of the New

- Scholasticism. He recently became rector of Catholic University. *Santayana*, George, was born in 1863 in Madrid. In 1886 he was graduated from Harvard. In 1889 he became an instructor there. By 1912 he had become a full professor. After this he lived at Paris. In 1905 he was the Hyde lecturer in France. There he was elected to the National Institute of Arts and Letters. He has written: *The Sense of Beauty*, 1896; *Lucifer, a Theological Tragedy*, 1899; *Interpretations of Poetry and Religion*, 1900; *The Life of Reason; or The Phases of Human Progress*, 1905-06 (5 volumes); *Three Philosophical Poets, Lucretius, Dante, and Goethe*, 1910; *Winds of Doctrine*, 1913; *Scepticism and Animal Faith*, 1926; *Platonism and the Spiritual Life*, 1927, and *Realms of Essence*, 1928. He is a poet and literary critic. His *Dialogues in Limbo* are especially interesting from a literary as well as from a philosophical point of view.
- Schiller*, Ferdinand Canning Scott, was born in 1844. He was educated at Rugby and Balliol. Later he studied at Cornell, where he was refused a Ph.D. degree. At Corpus Christi College at Oxford he was an assistant tutor. In 1903 he became a tutor and fellow. He spent 1926-27 in the United States, being at the University of Southern California. His books are: *Riddles of the Sphinx*, 1891 (2nd edition in 1910); "Axioms as Postulates" in *Personal Idealism*, 1902; *Humanism*, 1903 (2nd edition in 1912); *Plato or Protagoras*, 1908; *Formal Logic, as Scientific and Social Problem*, 1912; *Problems of Belief*, 1924; *Cassandra; or the Future of the British Empire*, 1926; *Eugenics and Politics*, 1926.
- Sellars*, Roy Wood, was born in Egmondville, Ontario, Canada, in 1880. In 1903 he received an A.B. degree from the University of Michigan. A Ph.D. degree was granted him in 1908 by the same institution. He has studied at the Hartford Theological Seminary, at the Universities of Wisconsin and Chicago, and in France and Germany. In 1905 he joined the faculty of the University of Michigan, ranking as assistant professor in philosophy in 1913, associate in 1918, and professor in 1923. His works include: *Critical Realism*, 1916; *The Next Step in Democracy*, 1916; *The Essentials of Logic*, 1917; *The Essentials of Philosophy*, 1917; *The Next Step in Religion*, 1918; *Essays in Critical Realism*, 1921; *Evolutionary Naturalism*, 1921; *Religion Coming of Age*, 1928.
- Sheldon*, Wilmon Henry, was born at Newton, Massachusetts, in 1875. Harvard granted him an A.B. degree in 1895, an A.M. in 1896, and a Ph.D. in 1899. From 1909 to 1920 he was professor of philosophy at Dartmouth College. Since 1920 he has been professor of philosophy at Yale University. He published *The Principle of Productive Duality*, 1921.
- Smith*, J. A., was born in England in 1863. He was educated at the University of Edinburgh and Balliol College, Oxford. He is now Waynflete Professor of Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy in the University of Oxford. Professor Smith is the permanent chairman of the Seventh International Congress of Philosophy which will convene in Oxford, England, some time during the year 1930. His Inaugural Lecture was entitled *Knowing and Acting*, 1910. He has also published *The Nature of Art*, 1924, and he has con-

tributed to the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* (1914, 1918, 1920).

Smith, Norman Kemp, was born at Dundee, Scotland, in 1872. He received the M.A. degree from the University of St. Andrews, Scotland, in 1893 and the D. Phil. in 1901. He later studied at the Universities of Jena, Berlin, and Paris. He was a lecturer in philosophy at the University of Glasgow, 1895-1906. In 1906 he went to Princeton, where he was the Sturant professor of psychology until 1913, when he became the McCosh professor of philosophy. At present he is at the University of Glasgow. He has written: *Studies in the Cartesian Philosophy*, 1902; *A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* (2nd Revised Ed., 1923); and *A Prolegomena to an Idealist Theory of Knowledge*, 1924.

Spengler, Oswald, was born in 1880 in Germany. He was educated in a German gymnasium and at the Universities of Halle, Munich and Berlin, where he studied mathematics and philosophy. He was first a teacher in the gymnasium but since 1911 he has been a private tutor in Munich. The first volume of his *Untergang des Abendlandes* appeared in 1918 and the second volume in 1922. This book was at once heralded as an epoch-making work, over 100,000 copies being sold in Germany alone. The English translation is by Herbert O. Atkinson and is entitled *The Decline of the West*. In 1920 Spengler published *Prussentum und Sozialismus*.

Spaulding, Edward Gleason, was born at Burlington, Vermont, in 1873. The University of Vermont granted him the B.S. degree in 1894 and later the degree of LL.D. In 1896 he received an A.M. degree from Columbia. A Ph.D. degree was conferred upon him by the University of Bonn in 1900. He was instructor in philosophy at the College of the City of New York from 1900 to 1905, and from 1905 to 1914 he was an assistant professor. Since 1914 he has been professor of philosophy at Princeton. Since 1907 he has also been a lecturer in philosophy at the Marine Biological Laboratory, Woods Hole, Massachusetts. He contributed to *The New Realism*, 1912. He published *The New Rationalism* in 1918, and *What Am I?*, 1928. During the war he was a 1st Lieutenant in the Engineering Corps in Chemical Warfare Service. He was a lecturer at the Brooklyn Institute of Arts and Sciences from 1918 to 1925.

Strong, Charles Augustus, was born at Haverhill, Massachusetts, in 1862. He received the A.B. degree from the University of Rochester in 1884. The same institution conferred the LL.D. upon him in 1919. In 1885 he received the A.B. degree from Harvard. The next year was spent in study at the Rochester Theological Seminary, and the two following years in Germany and France. From 1887 to 1889 he was instructor in philosophy at Cornell. The year 1890 was spent as docent at Clark University. From 1892 to 1895 he was associate professor of philosophy at the University of Chicago. From 1895 to 1903 he was a lecturer in philosophy at Columbia, and from 1903 to 1910 he was professor of philosophy. His writings include: *Why the Mind Has a Body*, 1903; *The Origin of Consciousness*, 1918; *The Wisdom of the*

Beasts, 1921; *A Theory of Knowledge*, 1923. He contributed to *Essays in Critical Realism*, 1920. At present his home is at Villa Le Balze at Fiesole, Italy.

Tufts, James Hayden, was born at Monson, Massachusetts, in 1862. In 1884 he received the A.B. degree, and in 1890 the A.M. from Amherst. He was granted the B.D. degree by Yale in 1890. He studied at Freiburg and Berlin. In 1904 Amherst conferred the LL.D. degree upon him. From 1885 to 1889 he was instructor in mathematics at Amherst. From 1889 to 1891 he was instructor in philosophy at the University of Michigan. In 1892 he went to the University of Chicago, becoming an assistant professor in 1892; an associate in 1894 and a full professor in 1900. Since 1905 he has been head of the department of philosophy. From 1899 to 1904 he was Dean of the Senior College, from 1923 to 1926 he was Dean of Faculties, and from 1924 to 1926 he was Vice-president of the University of Chicago. His rather long list of writings include: *Ethics* (with John Dewey), 1908; *Our Democracy*, 1917; *The Real Business of Living*, 1918; *Ethics of Co-operation*, 1918; *Education and Training for Social Work*, 1923. He translated and edited *Windelband's History of Philosophy*, 1893 and 1901, and he contributed to *Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*. He is the co-editor of *Studies in Philosophy and Psychology*, 1906; and *Letters, Lectures and Addresses of Charles Edward German*, 1909. From 1906 to 1909 he was editor of the *School Review*. Since 1914 he has edited the *International Journal of Ethics*.

Urban, Wilbur Marshall, was born at Mt. Joy, Pa., in 1873. In 1895 Princeton granted him the A.B. degree. He was the Chancellor Green fellow in the Universities of Jena and Leipzig from 1895-97. He was a reader in philosophy at Princeton for one year. From 1898 to 1902 he was professor of philosophy and psychology at Ursinus College. From there he went to Trinity College as professor of philosophy. He remained at this post until 1920, when he became the Stone professor of philosophy at Dartmouth. He was an assistant editor of the *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*. He is also on the editorial staff of the *Psychological Bulletin*. He is the author of numerous articles on philosophy and psychology. *Valuation, Its Nature and Its Laws* is his chief work.

Vaihinger, Hans, was born in 1852, in Germany. He was educated at Tübingen, Leipzig, and Berlin. In 1877 he was a docent at Strassburg. In 1883 he became professor of philosophy and pedagogy. He has edited several German books, most of them concerning Kant. His books are *Goethe als Ideal Universeller Bildung*, 1875; *Hartmann, Dühring und Lange*, 1876; *Nietzsche als Philosoph* (2nd edition, 1902); *Die Philosophie in der Staatsprüfung*, 1906; *Die Philosophie des Als Ob—System der theoretischen, Praktischen, und religiösen Fiktionen der Menschheit*, 1911 (2nd edition in 1913), English edition under the title *The Philosophy of "As if"* (translated by C. K. Ogden), 1924.

Ward, James, was born in 1843. He was educated at the Universities of Berlin and Göttingen and at Trinity College, Cambridge. He was Professor of Mental Philosophy in the University of Cam-

bridge for many years. He died in 1926. His principal publications are *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, 1899 (4th ed., 1915, Gifford Lectures); *The Realm of Ends*, 1918 (2nd ed., 1920); *Psychological Principles* (2nd ed., 1920); *A Study of Kant*, 1922. He also wrote for the *Encyclopedia Britannica*.

Warren, Howard Crosby, was born at Montclair, New Jersey, in 1867. He received an A.B. degree from Princeton in 1889 and an A.M. degree in 1891. He completed his graduate studies at Johns Hopkins University, receiving the Ph.D. degree in 1917. But in the meantime he had studied for two years in the Universities of Germany (Leipzig, Berlin, and Munich). All of his teaching has been done at Princeton University, where he is now Stuart Professor of Psychology. Professor Warren is editor of the *Psychological Review* and of the *Psychological Review Publications*. He translated *Tarde's Social Laws*, 1900. He is the author of *Human Psychology*, 1919; *History of the Associative Psychology*, 1920; *Elements of Human Psychology*, 1920.

Whitehead, Alfred North, was born in 1861 on the Isle of Thanet (England). He was educated at Trinity College, Cambridge, and became a Fellow of the College. He taught mathematics in his early life and wrote important technical treatises in this field of knowledge, but he has devoted himself to philosophy in recent years. In 1924 he became Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University. He has received a number of honorary degrees, as well as other honors. He was Turner lecturer at Cambridge and he is Gifford lecturer elect. His chief works are: *A Treatise on Universal Algebra*, 1898; *Principia Mathematica* (with Bertrand Russell); *Introduction to Mathematics*; *Organization of Thought*, *Principles of Natural Knowledge*; *Concept of Nature*; *Principle of Relativity*; *Science and the Modern World*, 1926; *Religion in the Making*, 1927; *Symbolism*, 1928. His Gifford lectures will soon appear.

Wobbermin, Georg, was born at Stettin, Germany, in 1869. He was educated at Halle and Berlin, receiving the Ph.D. degree from the University of Berlin in 1894. He studied and traveled in Greece for one year. He was Nathaniel William Taylor lecturer in the Yale Divinity School in 1910. He has taught at Marburg, Breslau, and Heidelberg, and he is now at Göttingen. His chief works are *Theologie und Metaphysik*, 1900; *Der Christliche Gottesglaube*, 1902 (English translation, *Christian Belief in God*, 1918); *Monismus und Monotheismus*, 1911; *Systematische Theologie*, I, 1913, II, 1922, III, 1925. He translated Wm. James's *Varieties of Religious Experience* into German.

Woodbridge, Frederick James Eugene, was born in 1867 at Windsor, Ontario, Canada. In 1889 he graduated from Amherst. In 1892 he studied at the Union Theological Seminary. The two following years were spent in study at the University of Berlin. In 1895 he became professor of philosophy at the University of Minnesota. In 1902 he went to Columbia University, where he became the Johnsonian professor in 1904. In 1912 he became Dean of the Faculties of political science, philosophy, pure science, and fine arts. He has written: *Philosophy of Hobbes* in 1903; and *The*

Realm of Mind, 1927. He is an editor of the *Journal of Philosophy* and *Archives of Philosophy*.

Note on Reference Works

Dependable critical reviews of most of the books listed above, as well as valuable special articles by many of the authors, will be found in the bound volumes (available in any first-class library) of *Mind*, *The Hibbert Journal*, *The International Journal of Ethics*, *The Journal of Philosophy*, *The Journal of Philosophical Studies*, *The Journal of Religion*, *The Monist*, *The Personalist*, *The Philosophical Review*, *The Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* and *The Psychological Review*.

Important special articles by several of the authors will be found in Baldwin's *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*, in Hastings's *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, in *The Encyclopedia Britannica*, and in *The New International Encyclopedia*.

Students are advised not to depend upon small dictionaries for definitions of philosophical terms. Consult Murray's *New English Dictionary* or *The Century Dictionary and Encyclopedia*. Readers of French will find very useful the *Vocabulaire Technique et Critique de la Philosophie*, 2 vols., edited by Lalande, 1926, 2nd enlarged edition, 1928. This work has been crowned by the French Academy.

GLOSSARIAL INDEX

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
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